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Abstract 
Various environmental, economic and social practices in democratic capitalist 
countries like Germany and the UK cannot be sustained long-term without 
undermining their own foundations. Understanding what may facilitate more 
sustainable ways of living together is therefore paramount. The case study at hand 
makes an original contribution to this aim by comparing urban governance in 
Nottingham (UK) and Stuttgart (Germany) as two exemplars of capitalist variation – 
with different consequences for how capitalism’s unsustainabilities play out.  
While both cities are situated in similar capitalist systems, their configurations 
and relating values, conventions and power relations diverge markedly. I explore how 
these aspects of social order interact – i.e., are co-produced (Jasanoff, 2004a) – with 
local policies and their knowledge claims. This is done by interpretively examining how 
policy approaches, their negotiation and political and economic interdependencies in 
the two cities relate to sustainability – defined as social and intergenerational justice 
–, in terms of meanings and in terms of being unsustainable. Weberian ideal types of 
urban governance regimes outline initial expectations: those of a traditional Weberian 
bureaucracy in Stuttgart and those of New Public Management in Nottingham, where 
neoliberalisation has further progressed. The cases are further conceptualised as 
embedded in conservative-corporatist or liberal welfare state types (Esping-Andersen, 
1990) and in coordinated or liberal market economies (Hall & Soskice, 2001). To 
understand local policies and their relation with social order, the research draws on 
78 interviews with key informants in Nottingham and Stuttgart, on 83 policy 
documents and on desktop research. 
Policies, their negotiation, the roles of civil society and of the local economy 
differ significantly between the two governance regimes. Divergence can partly be 
explained by distinct ways of co-producing policies and social order. Policy approaches 
in Nottingham are more behavioural, individual-focused and measurable, while they 
are more developmental and collective in Stuttgart. These differences co-emerge with 
higher inequalities in Nottingham than Stuttgart; and with distinct policy-relevant 
  4 
knowledges, i.e. a more ‘collectivist’ civic epistemology in Stuttgart vs. a more 
‘individualising’ civic epistemology in Nottingham.  
Considering how policies aiming for social and intergenerational justice are 
devised, local power dynamics diverge. Whereas such policies in Nottingham often 
originate from its city council, dominated since 1991 by the progressive and electorally 
successful Labour Party, Stuttgart’s diverse municipal council with 11 groups has in 
some significant instances been driven by civil society. The varying power positions of 
civil society interact with differently pronounced inequalities between the public and 
policy developers in both cities: in terms of realising basic social and economic rights, 
access to economic and educational resources, experiential worlds, hierarchies and 
understandings of citizenship. Besides, higher interregional inequalities and a stronger 
ideological polarisation between central and local government in Nottingham 
contribute to – less sustainable – friction losses between governance levels and to the 
city’s structural disadvantage. Conversely, less spatial inequality, more local autonomy 
and more cooperative relations between governance levels in Stuttgart – relating to 
proportional representation instead of majority voting systems – appear more 
conducive to socio-economic sustainability.  
Finally, Stuttgart’s economy seems more locally embedded than Nottingham’s. 
This concerns communication and cooperation with the public sector, mutual 
obligations and levels of trust. Thereby, the high economic weight of Stuttgart’s car 
industry cluster and corporatist links with policy-makers appear to counter more 
environmentally progressive policies. On the contrary in Nottingham, some significant 
measures are implemented despite business opposition. Also, the city is a pioneer in 
environmentally sustainable policies – though its high deprivation may be an enabling 
factor herein.  
Altogether, the comparative case study points out different routes, their 
implications, struggles and turnarounds in relation to neoliberalisation and rising 
inequalities in two governance regimes approximating ‘centre’ (Stuttgart) and 
‘periphery’ (Nottingham) as poles of contemporary capitalism. It thereby provides 
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insights into how varying factors play out in relation to power, inequalitity and 
sustainability and offers according routes for future research. 
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1 Introduction 
This thesis begins with an illustration of its practical, personal and research 
rationales: in terms of inequalities and related knowledges (Section 1.1.1), urban 
sustainability challenges (Section 1.1.2) and the neoliberalisation thesis (Section 
1.1.3). Based on these angles, I outline the study, its research aim and questions 
(Section 1.2). Section 1.3 presents its structure. 
1.1 Rationales for the study 
1.1.1 Knowing inequalities 
Debates around Philip Alston’s – UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty 
and human rights – UK report illustrate themes and the relevance of this thesis. Alston 
summarises (United Nations, 2019, p. 1):  
“Although the United Kingdom is the world’s fifth largest economy, one fifth of its 
population (14 million people) live in poverty, and 1.5 million of them experienced 
destitution in 2017. Policies of austerity introduced in 2010 continue largely 
unabated, despite the tragic social consequences. Close to 40 per cent of children 
are predicted to be living in poverty by 2021. Food banks have proliferated; 
homelessness and rough sleeping have increased greatly; […] life expectancy is 
falling for certain groups; and the legal aid system has been decimated.  
The social safety net has been badly damaged by drastic cuts to local authorities’ 
budgets, which have eliminated many social services, reduced policing services, 
closed libraries in record numbers, shrunk community and youth centres and sold 
off public spaces and buildings. The bottom line is that much of the glue that has 
held British society together since the Second World War has been deliberately 
removed and replaced with a harsh and uncaring ethos. A booming economy, high 
employment and a budget surplus have not reversed austerity, a policy pursued 
more as an ideological than an economic agenda.” 
Alston argues for a change of direction: “All that is needed is a vision to make all 
Britons, not just the wealthy, better off, and to commit to minimum levels of social 
justice for all” (Alston, 2019). 
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Reactions on this report by some government members were dismissive. Then 
Prime Minister Theresa May’s spokesman said: “We strongly disagree with the 
analysis” (P. Walker, 2018). Then Chancellor Philip Hammond said that he did not  
“accept the UN rapporteur's report at all. I think that's a nonsense. Look around 
you, that's not what we see in this country.”  
"I reject the idea that there are vast numbers of people facing dire poverty in this 
country.”  
"Of course there are people struggling with the cost of living. […] But the point 
being is that we are addressing these things through getting to the root causes." 
Hammond further said that the government should be ensuring the market was 
"delivering in the way that the textbooks tell us it will work. […] To the extent that it's 
not working, we have got to evolve the system" (BBC News, 2019). 
Contrarily, Alston stated: “What is most puzzling to me is why the government 
is so defensive. Starting in 2010, it pursued a radical re-engineering of the welfare 
state, making poverty and its related outcomes foreseeable” (Alston, 2019). He viewed 
the government’s response as three strategies: denial, distraction and attacking the 
messenger. Alston describes the way to his findings in the UK as “meeting with people 
in poverty, prominent researchers, and frontline staff at foodbanks and advice centres, 
many of whom said they wished the government would do the same” (Alston, 2019). 
This juxtaposition exemplifies three interconnected aspects of this study, as 
explained subsequently: the substantive problem of rising inequalities and social 
injustice; societal disconnects; and epistemological divisions. 
First, Alston’s report makes inequality and related social injustices tangible. 
Economic inequality has been rising in most OECD-countries (Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development) during the last three decades (OECD, 2011; 
Piketty & Goldhammer, 2014). For instance, by 2010 income inequality in the UK 
reached levels it had last seen in the 1940s (Cassidy, 2014; Piketty & Goldhammer, 
2014). This thesis echoes Alston’s findings, with its Nottingham case being one of the 
UK’s most deprived places (Nottingham City Council, 2017d). In comparison, there has 
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not been a Country visit of the UN Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human 
rights to Germany (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2020). Being 
accustomed to comparatively stronger societal solidarities from continental Europe 
(lastly Stuttgart), I never ceased to be appalled and morally outraged by the high 
inequalities and injustices I encountered there in particular. I came to regard the 
devaluation of ‘the poor’ as increasingly regressive, but also partly unnoticed – which 
I wanted to understand. This all matters to the thesis, as I cannot take myself out of it. 
Coming to the research with an interest in inequalities, a major relating research 
puzzle and point of departure was:   
Why is there not more resistance against widening inequalities, particularly in 
places where they are more pronounced, despite their negative consequences for 
many? 
Although majorities in many industrialised countries – including Germany and 
the UK – consider social or economic inequality as too large (Mau & Heuer, 2016; 
Orton & Rowlingson, 2007, p. 10), there is no clear link between income inequality and 
public discontent (e.g. Larsen, 2016, p. 94). This equally applies to variation in 
inequality over time (McCall & Kenworthy, 2009). Also, although the majority of 
citizens would profit economically from redistributive measures (Meltzer & Richard, 
1981), significantly more people consider income inequality as too large than would 
support more redistribution (e.g. Orton & Rowlingson, 2007, p. ix). This thesis’ focus 
subsequently widens, but inequalities as a major societal concern (cf. also the 
following Section) remain central to it.  
Second, the disagreements between Alston and some government members 
about poverty in the UK exemplifies disconnects between some policy-makers and 
citizens, between national and local politicians and more widely between citizens and 
places in relation to inequalities. A further illustration of these disjunctions is the partly 
unexpected ‘Brexit’ referendum result (with Nottingham voting to leave the European 
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Union (EU) by 50.8%; Nottingham City Council, 2016c).1 An argument I encountered in 
Nottingham for Brexit was the sole wish to counteract the government’s expectations. 
I explore and compare these significant discrepancies throughout the thesis. 
Third, when Hammond does not “accept” Alston’s report, calls it a “nonsense” 
and “rejects” the “idea” of many in dire poverty, this illustrates an increasing 
contestation of what does or does not constitute authoritative knowledge. Since this 
is policy-relevant knowledge, understanding the context, workings, legitimisation and 
implications of civic epistemologies (cf. Section 2.3.1 b)) is of high societal relevance – 
and a purpose of this study. While this example is drawn from the Nottingham case, it 
is through the comparison with Stuttgart that I could further interpret both cases. 
All three aspects also arise in the current crisis around Covid-19 – which 
reinforces this study’s relevance as a governance and welfare regime comparison. 
Varying inequalities and systems in Germany and the UK cope differently with the 
pandemic; disconnects between populations and politicians deciding on courses of 
action occur to varying degrees; and civic epistemologies are paramount in relation to 
acting upon the outbreak. I reflect on implications of Covid-19 in the light of this study 
in Section 8.9.    
These rising inequalities and disjunctions are situated amongst other 
sustainability challenges in the following and connected to the urban level.  
1.1.2 Sustainability and the urban 
Subsequently, I argue that sustainability challenges are particularly pressing in 
cities – rendering the urban a highly relevant context to study them. Sustainability in 
this thesis is defined in terms of social and intergenerational justice (cf. Section 2.2.3): 
Aiming at not restricting the leeway of future generations to pursue their 
conceptions of the good beyond today’s restrictions. As a necessary condition, this 
                                                     
1 References relating to the European Union predate the withdrawal of the UK from it on 31 January 
2020. 
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implies aiming at preserving the natural environment and enhancing human well-
being equitably in the present. 
Increasing population shares living in cities worldwide exacerbate existing 
problems of sustainability (66% projected by 2050; United Nations, 2014). In Europe – 
the study’s context – urbanisation has already resulted in more than two-thirds of the 
EU’s population living in urban areas (European Commission, n.d.-b). Moreover, cities 
attract socio-economically more diverse populations than surrounding towns and 
rural areas (Glaeser et al., 2009) and therefore more likely exhibit societal polarisation 
which poses social justice challenges. 
Considering the main problems which cities face in the future as viewed by 
researchers and international organisations demonstrates the wider relevance of 
issues arising in this study. Adopting a global perspective, Sevilla-Buitrago (2013) 
surveyed key scholars and professionals in fields relating to urban processes and 
planning about what they saw as most pressing conflicts for contemporary cities. In 
the responses, social inequality is mentioned the most often. Further important 
conflicts, named by at least two respondents, are global warming and the exhaustion 
of natural resources; the impact of new economic forms on the city and the 
maladjustments that they cause; forms of social revolts and antagonisms; the 
dynamics of commodification of public space, gentrification and other attacks on 
socio-spatial justice; lacking affordable housing, inefficiency and limitations in our 
models of urban development and deregulation of the urbanisation process (Sevilla-
Buitrago, 2013, p. 467). 
The EU regards cities as key to a sustainable development of the Union. 
However, it considers the European model of sustainable urban development under 
threat through demographic change, a non-continuous economic growth and the 
weakening link between economic growth, employment and social progress; through 
growing income disparities and poor people getting poorer; growing social 
polarisation, segregation and ‘society dropouts’; through urban sprawl and the urban 
ecosystem being under pressure (European Union, 2011). 
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Overall, cities are particularly affected by current sustainability challenges. 
Many of them occur in Nottingham and Stuttgart – partly in uneven ways –, which 
makes them significant cases to study. 
1.1.3 Neoliberalisation and the urban 
Many of the outlined sustainability problems occur in democratic capitalist 
systems – the context of both Nottingham and Stuttgart. Single issues often relate to 
wider unsustainable tendencies in capitalism across the differing versions in which it 
exists. These tendencies include environmental degradation and climate change, a 
relatively low consideration of future generations’ interests in democratic processes, 
rising economic inequality, a declining rate of economic growth and rising public and 
private debt (cf. Section 2.2.2). These trends are often reinforced under 
neoliberalisation (cf. Section 2.2.2 b)). I therefore relate my study to this pervasive, yet 
contested (cf. below) interpretive path. Neoliberalism is understood in this thesis in 
the sense used by Pinson & Journel (2016, p. 137): 
“the set of intellectual streams, policy orientations and regulatory arrangements 
that strive to extend market mechanisms, relations, discipline and ethos to an ever-
expanding spectrum of spheres of social activities, and all this through relying on 
strong State intervention”.  
Pinson & Journel (2016, p. 139) summarise the thesis of urban 
neoliberalisation, as discussed in social sciences and urban studies, in terms of four 
key ideas. First, material and regulatory changes since the 1970s not only result from 
economic processes, but are part of a wider shift of – inter alia – regulatory 
arrangements. The changes are therefore also and primarily a process of “political 
nature implying the destruction of previous institutions and the creation of new ones” 
(Pinson & Journel, 2016, p. 139). Second, neoliberalisation involves the reengineering 
of the state “as an agent imposing the diffusion of market ethos and discipline in an 
increasing number of social spheres” and did not imply the hollowing out of the state 
(Pinson & Journel, 2016, p. 139). Third, the “neoliberalisation of urbanism” is central 
in the process of neoliberalisation, i.e. in tendency the reorganisation of local 
institutional arrangements according to market rule in contrast to earlier orientations, 
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e.g. bureaucratic, distributionist or managerial ones. Fourth, the “urbanisation of 
neoliberalism” through the financialisation of the economy and assets, such as 
infrastructures and the built environment, becomes increasingly important in current 
capitalism (Pinson & Journel, 2016, p. 139). They (2016, p. 139) conclude that “[…] 
cities are basically crucial cradles of neoliberalization, provide fundamental material 
bases for this process, but also for its contestation”.  
Cities can therefore help us to understand neoliberalisation, its pressures, 
processes, negotiations and contradictions, more widely. Nottingham and Stuttgart 
suit this purpose particularly well in their capacities as successful commercialiser 
(Nottingham), early and essential privatiser (Stuttgart), and significant contesters 
(both) of neoliberal trends. This significance of cities for understanding neoliberalism 
through its varieties substantiates the study’s urban focus. Herein, I “engage with both 
‘global discourses’ [around neoliberalisation] and contextually specific experiences” 
(Blanco et al., 2014, p. 3141).  
Behind this backdrop, an underlying puzzle of neoliberalisation in relation to 
sustainability is: 
Why is neoliberalisation often still advancing, despite its many unsustainable 
tendencies? 
Addressing few critiques of the neoliberalisation thesis, I do not rely on the 
loosely defined concept of neoliberalisation (Pinson & Journel, 2016, p. 141) as a key 
explanatory factor, but besides inductive theorising employ more concrete urban 
governance ideal types, concepts of welfare states and market economies (cf. below). 
Since these account for diverging institutional and cultural traditions, my proceeding 
obviates another difficulty of the neoliberalisation thesis: its “many traces of academic 
Anglo ethnocentrism”, being visible in “a propensity to infer the generality of 
processes – the reduction of local autonomy, fiscal stress, the downgrading of social 
expenditures etc. […] that are likely to be very specific to the US and UK” (Pinson & 
Journel, 2016, p. 144). I thereby refrain from reifying neoliberalisation as “the sole 
hegemonic project able to change the world” (Pinson & Journel, 2016, p. 148) – a 
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further criticism – but aim to understand conditions of amelioration in terms of social 
and intergenerational justice beyond this reference point. The study’s further 
theoretical and conceptual reach substantiates its according relevance.  
1.2 Overview of the study, research aim and questions 
This research emanates from the mentioned tendencies in Western societies 
which counter social and intergenerational justice. Despite similar trends across 
polities, their configurations differ – as does their relation with sustainability. 
Literatures on urban governance types and ‘varieties of capitalism’ conceptualise such 
differences. With this comparative case study of urban governance in Nottingham (UK) 
and Stuttgart (Germany), I aim to understand how constellations of factors in two 
diverging democratic capitalist systems relate to sustainability; evincing lessons which 
can be of interest for understanding further cases. For this, I examine and compare 
policy approaches, negotiation processes and interdependencies between public and 
economic sectors. These themes came up as relevant during the empirical comparison 
and in previous governance research. Accordingly, the research aim and questions are: 
Research aim: 
To compare and explain how governance in Nottingham and Stuttgart relates 
to sustainability. 
Research questions (RQs): 
1. How do policy approaches relate to sustainability?  
2. How does the negotiation of policies relate to sustainability? 
3. How do political and economic interdependencies relate to sustainability?  
4. How far can a co-production of policies and social order explain divergence? 
The case study cities are conceptualised through Weberian ideal types, 
justifying their selection and guiding the empirical examination. Broadly, the urban 
governance literature suggests a shift from a hierarchic (Weberian), old public 
administration to the business- and market-oriented New Public Management (NPM) 
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and to a more networked governance. While the old public administration steers and 
controls public services with clear demarcations between politics and administration, 
state and society, these lines become blurred in the latter forms (Kjær, 2009, p. 137). 
Based on initial explorations and literature, Stuttgart is assumed as a traditional 
Weberian bureaucracy, embedded in a conservative-corporatist welfare state and a 
coordinated market economy. Nottingham is supposed to represent NPM, embedded 
in a liberal welfare state and a liberal market economy (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Hall & 
Soskice, 2001). Nottingham and Stuttgart therefore represent high variation cases 
with regards to assumed regime types. The same applies to average socio-economic 
living conditions, public budgets, local autonomy, levels of inequality and states of 
industrialisation – and qualifies the cases as significant exemplars to better understand 
these factors. Linking governance to sustainability, NPM relates to the spread of 
neoliberalism which is associated with shorter-term policies (Rowden, 2013). While 
the ideal types serve as starting points to the comparison, this study empirically 
expands on the regimes’ understanding – also by drawing on further research to help 
interpreting findings.  
The employed interpretive lens of a co-production of policies and social order 
as developed in science and technology studies (STS) expresses the view that making 
knowledge about the world, e.g. through science or policies, means at the same time 
and reciprocally making social order (Jasanoff, 2004a). By ‘policies’, I refer to content-
related aspects of policy-making and associated reason. I define ‘social order’ as the 
“ways in which societies remain sufficiently stable to enable co-ordinated productive 
and cultural activity” (Harvey, 2012). This includes facets of power, politics, culture, 
values, morality and subjectivity. Particularly questions of power become central in 
the cases’ comparison. The thesis examines how social order influences policies and 
their knowledge claims; and how the latter alter, reinforce and override social order. 
Both thereby influence each other in an ongoing process, they are ‘produced together’ 
(co-produced). With the above conceptualisations, Nottingham’s and Stuttgart’s 
governance regimes are theorised as different ways of co-producing policies and social 
order. These ways often help explaining divergence. The study contributes to research 
gaps through its integrated approach to examining sustainability dimensions; by 
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exploring the co-production of policies and social order with respect to sustainability 
in two governance regimes – and not only regarding single issues; by connecting 
comparative regime literatures with the co-productionist STS strand; and by 
strengthening the relatively rare comparative perspective within the latter. 
To address the research aim and questions, the study draws on interviews with 
key informants in Nottingham and Stuttgart (2018; n = 78), on policy documents (2004 
– 2018; n = 83) and on further research. The data provide manifold insights into local 
meanings, problems and the dealing with sustainability issues in urban policy-making. 
Specifically, I explore how Nottingham’s seemingly difficult external conditions of 
governance and an advanced marketisation play out locally; and how Stuttgart’s more 
bureaucratic and purportedly favourable setting of high prosperity backed by, but 
partly dependent on a strong industrial base, relates to sustainability. Often 
triangulating between sources and actors, I compare and interpret how various factors 
in the regimes are viewed and play out in relation to sustainability. With this focus, the 
comparison enables normativity and learning from examples. By examining two 
configurations of capitalism, this study originally contributes to our understanding of 
how we might live together more sustainably in such polities. 
1.3 Thesis structure 
This Introduction is followed by the study’s conceptual foundations. Chapter 2 
discusses approaches to researching sustainability, its challenges in democratic 
capitalism and the sustainability conceptualisation I employ. It then introduces the 
idiom of co-production, relates previous co-productionist research to this thesis and 
outlines my use of the conceptual frame. In the light of identified research gaps, I 
delineate main contributions of the study.  
In Chapter 3, I discuss conceptualisations of and developments in capitalist 
welfare states, market economies and urban governance. Nottingham and Stuttgart 
are situated in terms of national contexts and hypothesised urban governance ideal 
types. The case study cities are then characterised with respect to their population, 
local government and finance, economy, social situation and inequalities.  
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The methodology – Chapter 4 – transposes the conceptual framework into 
research design. It depicts and justifies the study’s qualitative/case-based comparative 
approach, the case selection and ideal type conceptualisation. Furthermore, it outlines 
research methods, data collection and analysis.  
Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8 constitute the thesis’ empirical part and address RQs 1-
4, respectively. This is done for RQ 1-3 by examining policy approaches, negotiations 
and political and economic interdependencies; and by exploring and interpreting their 
relation to sustainability. Herein, I follow the cases for tendencies and exemplars 
appearing significant to me in these regards. In Chapters 5-7, I first consider 
Nottingham, then Stuttgart in thematically analogous sections; and compare findings 
in the light of previous theorisation. Accordingly, Chapter 5 explores urban policy 
approaches; and how policies relate to social justice and to future generations. 
Chapter 6 considers the negotiation of policies in the urban realm and with 
other levels of governance, i.e. central/federal government, regional/state levels and 
the European Union. I then focus on the role of the public as fundamental to 
understand the cities’ social order, its role in policy-making – and interrelations of 
both. 
Chapter 7 examines relations between local economies and the cities. It 
explores companies’ connections to place, communication and cooperation with local 
administration and politics – as well as according power dynamics and conflicts. 
Subsequently, I consider local economies’ relation with the public; and views about 
economic growth and intergenerational justice.  
Chapter 8 compares the co-production of policies and social order in both 
places. For this, it interprets the empirical urban governance regimes, welfare states 
and market economies in relation to the hypothesised ideal types and concepts. The 
chapter then compares, theorises and explains selected aspects of policy approaches, 
negotiations, political and economic interdependencies in both cities (RQ 4). It closes 
by discussing limitations as well as research and practical implications of this study. 
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Throughout this thesis, I have translated German interview and documentary 
data into English. I report translations in quotation marks.  
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2 Sustainability and a co-production framework 
2.1 Introduction 
While the preceding opens up the thesis thematically, this conceptual chapter 
lays its foundations to comparatively interpret policies and their developing in relation 
to sustainability. Section 2.2 conceptualises sustainability as intergenerational justice. 
It establishes how this study moved from a focus on social sustainability to considering 
sustainability in an integrated way (Section 2.2.1). It then sets out how tendencies in 
current systems of democratic capitalism – in which the cases are situated – restrict 
future generations’ leeway, i.e. are unsustainable (Section 2.2.2). On these grounds, I 
specify ‘sustainability’ for the study at hand (Section 2.2.3).  
Section 2.3 explains the interpretive stance of a co-production of policies and 
social order. I introduce the approach (Section 2.3.1) and review its previous 
applications in relation to governance (Section 2.3.2). Section 2.3.3 outlines how I 
employ the co-production lens and the study’s main contributions. Section 2.3.4 
clarifies ontological and epistemological foundations. Finally, Section 2.4 summarises 
conceptual and contentual arguments made in this chapter. 
2.2 Researching sustainability as intergenerational justice 
2.2.1 Conceptualising sustainability: an integrated approach 
This PhD is funded through a wider research project on urban sustainability (cf. 
Acknowledgements). It was initially conceived as part of a ‘social’ theme – alongside 
‘economic’, ‘environmental’, ‘policy’, ‘data’ and ‘modelling’ themes. However, after 
reviewing (social) sustainability literature, I concluded that restricting this sociological 
study to ‘social sustainability’ would constrain its potential and by design reproduce 
the structures which it seeks to understand. I subsequently explain this by sketching 
the ‘pillar’ approach to sustainability, integrated approaches and argue for the latter. 
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a) The ‘pillar’ approach to sustainability 
Customarily, sustainability is approached via a ‘three pillar’ structure of 
environmental, economic and social sustainability. This however lacks a solid 
theoretical foundation (Purvis et al., 2019) and often aligns with disciplinary 
boundaries (Boström, 2012, p. 3). Hereby, the environmental dimension receives most 
attention and is best defined in the literature (McKenzie, 2004). It includes the 
maintenance of the ecosystem and climate integrity, the conservation of species, the 
maintenance of abiotic natural resources, and a genetic stock that would guarantee 
resilience in case of external impacts. Ecological sustainability thus conforms to the 
conservation of nature which is external to humans (Foladori, 2005, pp. 502–503). 
There is less consensus in defining economic sustainability, often used synonymously 
for economic growth and productive efficiency.  
Finally, social sustainability is a contested concept. Its numerous definitions 
include: the fulfilment of basic needs, inter- and intragenerational justice, equal rights, 
employment, social capital and cohesion, security, health, sense of place, well-being 
and participation (Boström, 2012). The ‘social pillar’ has been neglected for a long 
time, compared to the research and policy attention which the economic and 
environmental dimensions received (Vallance et al., 2011). Since around 30 years, 
social aspects of sustainability are increasingly recognised as important and research 
and policy activity have accelerated (Boström, 2012).  
b) Researching sustainability in an integrated way 
Besides these ‘pillar’ approaches, researchers have widely argued for more 
integrated conceptions of sustainability to prevent compartmentalisation. For 
instance, Boyer et al. (2016, pp. 12–13) conclude that sustainability is “ultimately a 
holistic and systemic concern”, while “’one-pillar’ approaches to sustainability fail to 
acknowledge complexity and multifaceted problems represented by the convergence 
of a large number of competing needs”. Departing from an interest in social 
sustainability, Boyer et al. (2016) highlight the advantages of studying sustainability in 
a fully integrated, locally-rooted, and process-oriented way, so as to integrate values 
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and entities that have historically been separated into disciplines, like economics, 
physics or sociology. It “understands economic, environmental and social imperatives 
as overlapping in local experience” (Boyer et al., 2016, p. 10). “This idea undermines 
the dominance of one-size-fits-all perspectives in sustainability pursuits and highlights 
the need to recognize diverse visions for and perspectives about local environments” 
(Boyer et al., 2016, p. 11; emphases in original).  
Correspondingly, Saha and Paterson (2008, p. 26) claim in their study of local 
governments’ sustainability efforts: “[…] [s]ustainable development implies the 
recognition of the inter-dependence and inter-connection of environmental, 
economic, and equity concerns”. Regarding disciplines, Partridge (2005, p. 13) 
expresses a view shared by several authors: 
“[…] sustainability requires the integration of different and traditionally separate 
fields of knowledge. I suggest that this represents the central challenge but also 
the great potential of sustainability. Its usefulness as a concept lies in its 
integrating capability” (Partridge, 2005, p. 13).  
Moreover, aligning research with ‘three pillars’ is “[…] an inherently political 
act” (Boyer et al., 2016, p. 3): “[…] the three-pillar model serves to reinforce 
disciplinary divisions, leading to a similar set of judgments about their relative worth” 
(Boyer et al., 2016, p. 11). By contrast, a simultaneous and empirically-grounded 
consideration of various sustainability dimensions does not similarly reinforce certain 
– value laden – compartmentalising norms over practices.  
Countering the previous neglect of social aspects of sustainability, I argue that 
these are indeed – along with environmental aspects – central to sustainability: 
“sustainability […] refers to the viability of socially shaped relationships between 
society and nature over long periods of time” (E. Becker, 1999, p. 4; as cited in 
Partridge, 2005, p. 7). I regard an ‘economic’ dimension as embedded in society (cf. 
Section 2.2.3). Partridge (2005, p. 12) coincidingly concludes:  
“It is perhaps an indication of how pervasive the economic-centred paradigm has 
become that sustainability was ever able to be conceived as a relationship between 
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‘environment and economy’ in the first place, as if ‘economy’ is not absolutely a 
social creation.” 
c) Establishing an integrated approach 
An advantage of an integrated approach to sustainability is its openness to how 
sustainability is prioritised locally and to how structures and practices relate to it. This 
includes how far sustainability dimensions may interact, coincide or conflict. Focusing 
on one sustainability dimension would foreclose on such cognitions (Saha & Paterson, 
2008, p. 23). I therefore employ an integrated approach pragmatically in terms of 
recognising different sustainability dimensions – perhaps more than some cited above 
–, but studying them simultaneously. The environmental and the socio-economic 
dimensions which I then distinguish (cf. Section 2.2.3) are not derived from ‘pillars’ nor 
disciplines, but turned out useful during the empirical exploration and correspond to 
my substantive reflections. However, all of these interrelate and the integration of 
sustainability dimensions empirically has its limits.  
2.2.2 Sustainability and democratic capitalism 
Emanating from an integrated understanding of sustainability, dynamics in 
Western democratic capitalist societies tend to restrict the leeway of future 
generations beyond current conditions in specific ways. Those dynamics are climate 
change and environmental degradation, a limited consideration of future generations’ 
interests in democratic processes, rising economic inequality, declining rates of 
economic growth and rising public and private debt since the last decades (Streeck, 
2016, pp. 47–72). These issues are briefly sketched subsequently to contextualise the 
study.  
Firstly, there is substantial agreement that current practices of resource use, 
pollution and emissions cannot be sustained without compromising life chances on 
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the planet. This is inter alia due to resource depletion2 and human-caused global 
warming (Cook et al., 2016). Expansionist practices mostly intensified in the history of 
capitalism and relate to the requirement of economic growth (cf. Section 2.2.2 a)). 
However, while richer countries often contribute more to these developments, they 
also often suffer less from environmental problems and are better able to mitigate 
their consequences than poorer countries – making it a problem of global injustice.   
Secondly, following generations’ interests tend to be relatively marginalised in 
democratic processes since they often cannot participate in them and due to a 
declining electoral impact of younger generations in ageing populations.  
Thirdly, economic inequalities in most OECD-countries have grown during the 
last three decades (OECD, 2011; Piketty & Goldhammer, 2014), in which market 
intervention often decreased. This and related adverse effects, e.g. in terms of health 
inequalities, crime or political engagement, receive increasing attention (e.g. 
Wilkinson & Pickett, 2010). Growing inequalities deteriorate life chances for more and 
more people – and often their descendants – in less favourable positions. 
Connecting increasing inequality with – fourthly – stagnating economic growth 
and – fifthly – rising public and private debt, Streeck (2016, pp. 47–72) relates these 
tendencies to a growing mismatch between disposable public resources generated 
through taxes and a higher public demand for welfare and social justice in 
contemporary democratic capitalism. Both trends likely decrease future generations’ 
scope of action. While the ‘trente glorieuses’, i.e. the circa 30 years of expanding 
prosperity after World War II, may be its highly exceptional condition (Streeck, 2016, 
p. 73), economic growth rates have – with in-between ups and downs – decreased 
persistently since the 1970s (‘secular stagnation’). Simultaneously, overall 
indebtedness in many capitalist countries has risen. This applies to states, private 
households and non-financial corporations alike (Streeck, 2016, pp. 117–118). Streeck 
                                                     
2 For instance, the ‘Earth Overshoot Day’ expresses this. It marks the “date when humanity’s demand 
for ecological resources and services in a given year exceeds what Earth can regenerate in that year” 
(Global Footprint Network, 2020). In 2018, this happened on 1 August (Watts, 2018). 
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(2016, pp. 54; 115–116) however attributes the crisis of state finances more to a 
decreasing taxability, especially of middle classes and businesses, than to increasing 
welfare entitlements. In this climate, the growing use of credit within a financialising 
economy enabled states’ spending on welfare and infrastructure, as demanded by 
citizens and companies. Attempts to contain their growing debt from the 1990s, also 
to maintain their creditworthiness, led to spending cuts and fiscal reform in many 
OECD-countries. In parallel, possibilities for and the utilisation of private credit 
increased, thus compensating for cuts in public provision. In this way, previously public 
goods and services increasingly shifted to the private sector (Streeck, 2016, pp. 116–
119). With some of these developments culminating in the financial crisis of 
2007/2008, fiscal consolidation partly continued through austerity and not higher 
taxes for the wealthier (Streeck, 2016, p. 69) in the ‘European consolidation state’ 
(Streeck, 2016, pp. 113–142).  
a) The role of economic growth 
In the outlined context, economic growth is sometimes seen as necessary to 
ensure intergenerational justice.3 This is despite simultaneously rising inequality and 
poverty. For instance, though employment levels in Nottingham (full-time equivalents) 
in 2012 again reach their 2004 levels after Britain’s severe economic recession since 
2008 (Townsend & Champion, 2014, p. 44), Lee and Sissons (2016) find little evidence 
that economic growth in British cities between 2000 and 2008 has reduced poverty. 
This is because growth was associated with wage increases at the top of the income 
distribution, but not below the median, and it was not related to the low skilled 
employment rate.  
Moreover, while the need for economic growth is at the heart of capitalism, 
steady and limitless growth logically contradicts the finite nature of the planet and its 
resources. Relating to this problem, a correction of productive processes without 
                                                     
3 For example, growth is argued to “unleash[] enterprise that will bring benefits for generations to 
come” in Nottingham’s Growth Plan (Nottingham City Council, 2012, p. 5).  
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fundamentally questioning the growth paradigm is sometimes promoted as an 
alternative. This might involve ‘green’ technologies and conservation measures, 
replacing non-renewable resources with renewable ones and diminishing the negative 
imprint caused by economic growth, such as pollution (Foladori, 2005, p. 503). 
Specifically in relation to climate change and ecological breakdown, ‘green growth’ 
became the dominant policy approach. Green growth theory asserts that steady 
economic expansion in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) is or can become 
compatible with the earth’s ecology (Hickel & Kallis, 2019, p. 1).  
Beyond that, the continuous pursuit of economic growth is challenged more 
fundamentally. For instance, Jackson (2011) argues for a ‘post-growth’ economy, 
implying a transformation of current modes of exchange, inter alia of the nature of 
enterprise, work or money supply to achieve ecological and financial stability and to 
secure employment and reduce inequality. These debates manifest in governments 
examining (e.g. Deutscher Bundestag, 17. Wahlperiode, 2013) and using (e.g. 
Shrikanth, 2019) alternative measures for a nation’s prosperity than GDP.  
What is more, notions of ‘inclusive growth’ evolve. For example, the OECD 
launched an “Inclusive Growth in Cities Campaign” to increase the awareness of rising 
inequalities and its problematic effects. The aim is to establish growth and equity as 
mutually reinforcing goals, instead of the conventional focus on economic growth only 
(OECD, 2016b).  
Empirically, green growth has not been achieved so far. Examining relevant 
research on historical trends and model-based projections on resource use and carbon 
emissions, Hickel & Kallis (2019) find no empirical evidence that an absolute 
decoupling of economic growth from resource use can be achieved at a global level. 
Moreover, they found absolute decoupling of economic growth from carbon 
emissions highly unlikely to be achieved rapidly enough to prevent over 1.5°C or 2°C 
of global warming. Similarly, economic growth as a remedy against social and 
intergenerational inequalities became partly empirically refuted, as in relation to 
trickle-down economics (Dabla-Norris et al., 2015, p. 4). Furthermore, Kuznets coined 
the idea that income inequality would rise in the early stages of economic 
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development due to industrialisation and decline in later stages. This has been 
questioned to the point that the reverse causation, i.e. that economic inequality can 
hinder economic growth (OECD, 2014), seems to have become a consensus (Guidetti 
& Rehbein, 2014, p. 2). 
The outlined conflict between the need for economic growth in capitalist 
systems and the ways in which growth partly not only ceases to improve future 
generations’ living conditions, but also undermines their natural bases of life, sets the 
scene for how claims around economic growth are made in Nottingham and Stuttgart 
as two variations of this system. How actors negotiate inherent tensions gives insights 
into the local weight of an economic growth logic, of (political) sustainability 
considerations and the nature of political and economic interdependencies (RQ 3).  
b) Neoliberalism and sustainability 
The following relates the general tendencies in which democratic capitalism 
develops unsustainably (cf. Section 2.2.2) to neoliberalism (cf. also Section 1.1.3). With 
neoliberalism being widely discussed (e.g. Pinson & Journel, 2016), its concept and 
definition contested, it is here understood as  
“the set of intellectual streams, policy orientations and regulatory arrangements 
that strive to extend market mechanisms, relations, discipline and ethos to an ever-
expanding spectrum of spheres of social activities, and all this through relying on 
strong State intervention” (Pinson & Journel, 2016, p. 137).  
In the last third of the twentieth century, in which laissez-faire capitalism again 
became the leading Western model, neo-liberal economics had a significant impact 
and challenged mixed economy and welfare states (Berend, 2015, pp. 94; 97); which 
welfare state types incorporate differently, cf. Section 3.2. Fiscal consolidation in 
industrialised countries since the 1980s has primarily been strived for by reducing 
public expenditures. Therefore, infrastructures, public services and benefits have not 
been maintained at previously achieved levels. This happened in the spirit of a 
neoliberal transformation to increase competition and efficiency (Streeck, 2016, p. 
68). It importantly involves ever shorter planning horizons for public expenditures. 
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Shorter-term policies, fixes and accounting mechanisms then tend to prevail and 
additionally obstruct the maintenance of services and infrastructures. However, their 
insufficient maintenance implies a transfer of current costs of welfare into the future 
– unless a degradation in welfare is intended –, and thereby restricts future 
generations’ leeway.  
The appeal of these moves partly lies in directly available revenues in times of 
strained budgets. Examples are the (partial) privatisation, sale or leasing of public 
infrastructures and services such as gas, water, electricity or public transport. The 
same applies to private debt which younger generations are partly increasingly 
expected to take on, as is the case with tuition fees in the UK.  
Altogether, neoliberalisation likely relates to less sustainable governance 
arrangements. I specify this initial theoretical expectation for the cases Nottingham 
and Stuttgart forth following. 
2.2.3 Concept specification: sustainability 
The previous section sketches problems of intergenerational justice in current 
democratic capitalism. They are the reason why intergenerational justice is at the 
centre of this study’s sustainability conception. This ‘future focus’ of sustainability 
distinguishes it from mere social justice (Partridge, 2005, p. 8), i.e. it includes not only 
intragenerational justice, but also intergenerational justice. I define sustainability as: 
Aiming at not restricting the leeway of future generations to pursue their 
conceptions of the good beyond today’s restrictions. As necessary conditions, this 
implies aiming at preserving the natural environment and enhancing human well-
being equitably in the present. 
Future generations’ leeway can e.g. be restricted through climate change and 
environmental degradation, through debts or infrastructures and social systems which 
are run down, lacking or not publicly accessible. To specify, enhancing human well-
being “equitably” is understood in terms of the principle of fair equality of 
opportunities – one of two principles of Rawls’ theory of justice. It states that 
inequalities in wealth and social positions ought to maximally benefit the least 
  34 
advantaged citizens (Freeman, 1998). Intergenerational justice requires 
intragenerational justice, because current injustices restrict the future leeway of 
disadvantaged groups. 
 This definition can be positioned among many others. First, it understands 
sustainability as a societal question and is therefore anthropocentric. Second, its 
integral dimensions are a natural and a societal one. I do not consider a separate 
‘economic’ dimension, as it could be a means for sustainability, not its end 
(Henderson, 2011) (cf. Section 2.2.1 b)). Instead, socio-economic sustainability 
expresses the mutual embeddedness of social and economic issues – in fact being two 
perspectives on the same matter. I therefore integrate sustainability dimensions by 
jointly examining socio-economic and environmental sustainability. These dimensions 
serve as heuristic devices, i.e. for analytical clarity.  
The definition’s purpose is to enable the empirical exploration. It is normative 
in its focus on justice and involves interpretational leeway – corresponding to the 
study’s interpretational approach. With “aiming at not restricting”, expressed 
intentions and policies’ directions are in the foreground, since policies’ outcomes are 
not easily discernible. 
This study’s interest in knowledge is how urban governance in Nottingham and 
Stuttgart – and the ways in which it is co-produced with social order – relates to 
sustainability. I explore this inductively in terms of how local political priorities and 
problems are defined and which meanings are attached to them on the one hand. On 
the other hand, I examine and interpret ways in which both systems appear 
unsustainable (cf. Section 2.2.2), and what (comparative) lessons may be learned from 
this. One underlying expectation is that in Nottingham, policy approaches, 
negotiations and political and economic interdependencies appear less sustainable 
with a more progressed neoliberalisation than in Stuttgart (RQ 1-3) (cf. Section 3.3.5). 
Finally, I reflect about how far a co-production of policies and social order explains 
divergence (RQ 4). 
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2.3 Conceptual framework: the co-production of policies and social order 
2.3.1 The conceptual approach of co-production 
a) Meanings of co-production 
Co-production serves as an interpretive frame to this study. However, there 
exist two meanings of co-production which partly intermingle (Nerlich, 2015): a 
‘science and technology studies’ (STS) meaning and a ‘public policy’ meaning, as 
explained subsequently. This thesis employs the STS meaning and by ‘co-production’ 
only refers to it. While the public policy meaning has contact points with this research, 
I refer to it differently. 
Co-production, importantly coined by Jasanoff, describes the view that making 
knowledge about the world, e.g. through science or regulation, means at the same 
time and reciprocally making social order. Knowledge and social order are in that sense 
co-produced in a single process (Jasanoff, 2004a). This implies that scientific 
innovation and all kinds of knowledge claims always relate in some way to societal 
power relations, politics and values. Simultaneously, these latter build on and emerge 
in response to the development of knowledge. In Jasanoff’s words, co-production is  
“the proposition that the ways in which we know and represent the world (both 
nature and society) are inseparable from the ways in which we choose to live in it. 
[…] [S]ociety cannot function without knowledge any more than knowledge can 
exist without appropriate social supports” (Jasanoff, 2004b, pp. 2–3).  
Therefore, “solutions to the problem of knowledge are also solutions to the problem 
of social order” (Shapin & Schaffer, 1985, p. 332). The perspective of co-production 
enhances explanatory possibilities about how knowledge is made legitimate and 
meaningful (Jasanoff, 2004b). It thereby implies a social-constructivist perspective (cf. 
Section 2.3.4). I expound the concept’s use not only in relation to knowledge, but also 
to governance in Section 2.3.2.    
The public policy meaning of co-production describes processes in which public 
services, policies or knowledge are established together by the public sector and by 
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publics in the sense of ‘making something together’. Nerlich (2015) interrelates both 
meanings: “While the public policy meaning of co-production focuses on participatory 
governance or co-governance, the STS concept of co-production is used to subject 
such processes to critical scrutiny”. Coined by Ostrom (1996), this co-governance 
assumes that state-society synergies are enabled by the local state, e.g. in that it 
guarantees basic rights, provides a framework for participation and encourages it 
(Kjær, 2009).  
b) Theoretical outlooks and civic epistemologies 
Jasanoff (2004a) distinguishes two theoretical outlooks in studies of co-
production: constitutive and interactional co-production. Constitutive co-production 
examines the emergence of new socio-technical formations and their key ontological 
distinctions, e.g. the boundaries between the human and the non-human (Hilgartner 
et al., 2015, p. 5). Interactional co-production is more interested in epistemology, i.e. 
in conflicts that arise as new knowledge interacts with existing institutions and 
practices as well as cultural, economic and political formations. The approach 
therefore focuses on “histories of change through deliberation, competition and 
conflict, investigating the social processes through which knowledge and order change 
in specific societies” (Hilgartner et al., 2015, p. 5). This study examines some of these 
processes – though not only with regards to knowledge – in Nottingham and Stuttgart, 
which locates it in the interactional co-production strand.  
Civic epistemologies form an important idea within this interactional approach: 
“the concept refers to regularities in the styles of reasoning, modes of argumentation, 
standards of evidence and norms of expertise used in public deliberation and by 
political institutions” (Hilgartner et al., 2015, p. 7; for further discussion cf. Miller, 
2008, p. 1898). Civic epistemologies are useful to conceptualise according divergence 
in Nottingham and Stuttgart (cf. Section 8.3.2). This research thereby contributes to 
exploring an almost ‘blind spot’, given its practical consequences:   
“[…] surprisingly, sociologists and political scientists know relatively little about 
how knowledge gets made in political communities, nor how the making of 
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knowledge is tied to other key aspects of political life, such as identity, authority, 
legitimacy, and accountability” (Miller, 2008, p. 1896). 
2.3.2 Co-production and governance 
While the co-production idiom is predominantly being applied to science and 
technology, its interpretive potential extends to all areas of society and knowledge. 
Recently, a growing number of contributions employs co-productionist perspectives 
to study public sense-making, legitimation and democratic engagement. Authors 
examine how these latter are shaped by and shape technoscientific, political and social 
orders (Chilvers & Kearnes, 2015, p. 15). Likewise, this study explores how “societies 
legitimate claims to both political and epistemic authority” (Chilvers & Kearnes, 2015, 
p. 24) in their urban governance practices.  
In order to locate my research, I have – non-exhaustively – reviewed co-
productionist literature of governance regimes, public policy and participation as well 
as foundational literature. Based on this, I discuss some insights of the co-production 
perspective subsequently. I then identify research gaps and substantiate them with 
examples relating to this study.  
a) Perspectives 
A key concern of the co-production perspective is to question a view where 
current situations are interpreted as determinisms (cf. also Section 2.3.3 a)). To give 
an example, Jasanoff (2016) studies imaginaries of global governance: world trade, 
climate change, and generic drugs. She shows how all three “employed economic 
logics to redefine political subjectivity in terms that diminished agency. Each case also 
demonstrates how creative legal and political action can force a rethinking of 
seemingly intractable ontologies and classifications, opening up spaces for a more 
expansive politics” (Jasanoff, 2016, p. 361). 
Besides, by studying public participation processes, co-productionist research 
led to criticising their often implicit normative and realist assumptions (Chilvers & 
Kearnes, 2015, pp. 29–33). This includes accounts of a democratisation of science, 
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often deriving from normative theories of deliberative democracy (Habermas, 1996); 
or contributions comparing public participation practices against theoretically pre-
defined procedural standards (Chilvers & Kearnes, 2015, p. 29). They exhibit “a 
commitment to pre-given normative models of democratic politics. ‘The democratic’ 
is […] ready-made and external to the situated, material performances of democracy 
and participation (Marres, 2012)” (Chilvers & Kearnes, 2015, p. 30). However, these 
realist assumptions do not account for empirical findings showing that supposedly 
democratic politics and consensual deliberative practices “might be reconceived as the 
outcome of political struggle and power” (Chilvers & Kearnes, 2015, p. 30). For 
instance, Flyvbjerg (1998) demonstrates how power – in local politics and 
administration – dominates over and leads to its own rationality in a local planning 
project. This challenges contrary beliefs in modernity about the workings of local 
democracy and faith in rationality. STS more generally questions – and debunks – the 
“modernist paradigm of scientific rationalization and control” (Jasanoff, 2005, p. 41). 
In response to the shortcomings of normative and realist perspectives, Chilvers 
& Kearnes (2015, pp. 33–38) argue for an understanding of policy-making and public 
participation as co-produced, relational and emergent. This implies no pre-given 
categories external to the practices studied, but their continual construction, revision 
and re-construction in open-ended processes. These practices then shape and are 
being shaped by social and political orders. A ‘public opinion’ could therefore not be a 
set external reality, nor could the structure of local power be normatively 
presupposed. Concurring with the governance concept (cf. Section 3.3.1), this study 
adopts these perspectives – while in a second step, though explicitly, interpreting 
findings normatively in relation to sustainability. 
b) Research gaps 
Behind this foundational background, the following carves out three gaps in 
the co-productionist governance research and substantiates them with examples. 
First, research has not focused on the co-production of governance regimes 
with social order. Units of analysis in the co-production literature are typically specific 
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issues, measures or projects, rather than regimes as a whole – neither at urban nor at 
national levels. Examples are Mahony’s (2013) study about the Copenhagen 
international climate change negotiations 2009; or Chilvers and Longhurst (2016) 
comparatively examining public engagement in four cases of UK low carbon energy 
transitions. However, some co-productionist research tends towards a regime 
perspective. Being relevant to this study, I subsequently consider national and urban 
governance levels.  
Regarding national levels, Miller (2015a, p. 283) identifies a literature strand 
considering how the concept of the welfare state, “its particular knowledge engines – 
statistically represented populations and their problems” and its imaginations of policy 
areas emerged together. For instance, Skocpol & Rueschemeyer’s (1996) edited 
volume comparatively examines the reciprocal influences of social policies and 
academic research. Herein, Wittrock and Wagner (1996) in effect take a co-production 
perspective to the emergence of social knowledge and the origins of social policies – 
comparing the building of early Anglo-American and European welfare states and the 
emergence of the research-oriented university, as a ‘double transformation’. They 
state that “[e]ach of these two transformations, that is, in the relations between state 
institutions and society and in the academically legitimated discourses on society, had 
a major impact on the other” (Wittrock & Wagner, 1996, p. 90). The authors find 
divergence between an Anglo-American and a European path of development in terms 
of “deep-seated institutional and intellectual differences which tend to set the stage 
for substantially different outcomes in terms of policy and social structure” (Wittrock 
& Wagner, 1996, p. 107). This concurs with my findings (cf. Section 8.2). Furthermore, 
Scott (1999), in trying to understand why well-intentioned, large-scale authoritarian 
plans to improve living conditions failed in many cases, contributes to a co-
productionist understanding of state activity and the role of civil society. He identifies 
four conditions common to these failures: administrative ordering of nature and 
society by the state; a prostate civil society unable to effectively resist such plans (cf. 
Section 6.6); a ‘high-modernist ideology’ placing confidence in science to improve 
human life in every aspect; and a willingness to use authoritarian state power for large-
scale interventions, often inflicting violence on complex interdependencies that 
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cannot be fully understood (Scott, 1999). However, STS research on state activity is 
relatively limited. I agree with Goldstein & Tyfield (2018, p. 75), who call for greater 
according attention – and contribute to it: 
“Science and technology studies (STS)-informed analysis allows, and compels, 
asking how socio-technological innovation and their constitutive power relations 
are crucially interrelated, making the reshaping of the state – still the primary 
institution and system of social relations of collective governance – a core but 
neglected political, technological and ecological project of our time, with a key role 
for STS”.  
Co-productionist research about urban governance and sustainability partially 
adopts normative stances and develops according analytical frameworks. For instance, 
Muñoz-Erickson et al. (2017) propose a knowledge systems analysis framework to 
examine practices in relation to knowledge and their interplay “with the visions, 
values, social relations, and power dynamics embedded in the governance of building 
sustainable cities” (Muñoz-Erickson et al., 2017, p. 203). The focus is on how cities “can 
co-produce new knowledge with meaningful sustainability and resilience actions and 
transformations” (ibid.). Wyborn (2015) develops a framework for adaptive 
governance in employing co-production as an analytical lens as well as a normative 
goal to achieve. She operationalises co-production in terms of the context, knowledge, 
process and vision of governance. Contrary to these approaches, I do not commit to 
pre-defined categories or analytical frameworks. Neither do I employ co-production 
as a normative goal, meaning that I do not strive for certain ways in which policies and 
social order should interact – but only as an interpretational lens. As such, I aim to 
understand the normative implications for sustainability of varying co-production 
modes. Where Muñoz-Erickson (2014, p. 190) states that “[t]he co-production 
literature, however, lacks empirical studies in urban contexts”, this study contributes 
to this. 
As a second research gap, there has been relatively limited co-productionist 
engagement with policy areas other than science, technology and environment. This 
corresponds to STS’ ‘traditional’ foci on scientific innovation, emerging technologies 
and the natural sciences. Examples are stem cell patenting (Hoeyer et al., 2009), 
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climate change (Mahony, 2013) or the governance of pharmacogenomics in Europe 
and the United States (Hogarth, 2012). Where co-productionist research examines 
sustainability issues, they are primarily understood in environmental terms, rather 
than in integrated ways (e.g. Baya-Laffite, 2016).  
Other areas such as economic and social policy or welfare state activity more 
broadly receive less attention. However, an example is St Clair’s (2006) study of the 
World Bank as a site of co-production of knowledge and social order. Through this lens, 
the author exemplifies how power plays out in relation to global poverty eradication. 
She concludes that institutional mechanisms should be established that can 
“deconstruct hegemonic visions and methods, choices and policy decisions and then 
reconstruct and renegotiate in a participatory, equitable and fair way with all parties” 
– the alternative being “the recognition that global problems may have to be left to 
sheer power relations” (St Clair, 2006, p. 73). This relates to my findings in Section 
8.3.1.  
Besides, Straßheim & Korinek (2016) examine ‘nudging’, i.e. behavioural 
governance, in the UK – where it became most influential. They define behavioural 
governance as “every mode of governing informed, designed or implemented by 
focusing on psychological as well as cognitive mechanisms of behaviour in both 
individuals and collectives” (Straßheim & Korinek, 2015, p. 154, as cited in 2016, p. 
109). Understanding its rise as an empirical puzzle, the authors see behavioural 
governance “as unfolded and stabilised not by the simple diffusion of ideas or the 
provision of new insights about human rationality”, but as “the result of a complex 
interlinkage between expert authority and sociotechnical imaginaries about future 
state-citizen relationships” (Straßheim & Korinek, 2016, p. 121). Where they call for 
future research “to show how behavioural expertise is justified, legitimized, and 
culturally embedded across countries” (Straßheim & Korinek, 2016, p. 122), 
Nottingham and Stuttgart constitute according exemplars (cf. Sections 5.2.2 a) and 
8.3.2). 
The third research gap is a relative scarcity of comparative co-productionist 
governance studies. Though the number of comparisons is growing, single case studies 
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are still prevailing. While being valuable, through a single case it may be harder to see 
how policies and social order could or should be co-produced differently than by 
comparing existing variants. This is because all research is culturally, politically and 
temporally embedded. Conversely, comparisons can demonstrate these contingencies 
by discerning differences in their ‘natural environments’. While they may open up 
alternatives, transfers may not easily be possible (cf. Section 2.3.3). Altogether, the 
rare use of comparisons limits the scope of co-productionist governance research. 
Having outlined its gaps, Section 2.3.3 discusses this study’s relating contributions.  
2.3.3 Employing co-production as an interpretive lens 
The following explains how this research draws on the concept of co-
production and contributes to it.  
Co-production in this study describes how policies and related reason, i.e. 
knowledge, cannot be separated from values, morality, subjectivity, culture, politics 
and power (adapted from Filipe et al., 2017). I subsume the latter under ‘social order’, 
and the former under ‘policies’. Social order therefore influences and forms policies; 
and policies in turn alter, reinforce and override social order. Both thereby influence 
each other in an ongoing process, they are ‘produced together’ (co-produced). 
Governance as an umbrella concept (cf. Section 3.3.1) enables examining these 
interactions between policies and social order.  
The value of co-production to this study lies in its “way of thinking about 
power” (Jasanoff, 2004b, p. 4). This means seeing governance elements, e.g. policies, 
not as neutral or deterministic, but as enacted for specific reasons, involving unequal 
influence of actors and views, compromise and relating conventions (Jasanoff, 2005, 
p. 13); examining these elements and their epistemic claims; and thereby opening 
them up for debate. In Jasanoff’s words (2004a, p. 36), co-production 
“[…] provides […] the possibility of seeing certain ‘hegemonic’ forces not as given 
but as the (co-)products of contingent interactions and practices. These insights 
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may, in turn, open up new opportunities for explanation, critique and social 
action.”  
Co-production thereby “performs a neglected critical function […] [and] enables 
normative analysis by following power into places where current social theory seldom 
thinks to look for it […]” (Jasanoff, 2004a, p. 42) – such as in processes intended and 
partly taken-for-granted in certain ways (e.g. democratically or participatory). Other 
approaches equally assume such a “neglected critical function”, though from different 
angles. For instance, post-structuralist discourse theory focuses on ‘repressions’ by 
aiming to  
“reactivate those options that were excluded and foreclosed during the emergence 
and institution of a practice, that is, the forces and elements which are repressed 
or defeated in the constitution of an identity […]”, thereby “revealing the non-
necessary character of existing social formations and enabling us to explore the 
consequences and political effects of such ‘repressions’” (Howarth et al., 2016, p. 
103). 
a) A sensitising concept 
Co-production as an interpretive frame can open up ways to examine 
phenomena, but its “[…] aim is not to provide deterministic causal explanations […] 
(Jasanoff, 2004a, p. 38). Co-production is not a  
“fully fledged theory, claiming lawlike consistency and predictive power. It is far 
more an idiom – a way of interpreting and accounting for complex phenomena so 
as to avoid the strategic deletions and omissions of most other approaches in social 
sciences” (Jasanoff, 2004b, p. 3).  
Employing co-production in this way is an anti-foundational approach – I accordingly 
do not restrict the research to pre-defined theoretical categories. Co-production 
thereby serves as a ‘sensitising concept’ which Blumer (1954) distinguishes from 
definitive theoretical concepts: 
“[a] sensitizing concept lacks such specification of attributes or benchmarks [of 
definitive theoretical concepts] and consequently, it does not enable the user to 
move directly to the instance and its relevant content. Instead, it gives the user a 
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general sense of reference and guidance in approaching empirical instances. 
Whereas definitive concepts provide prescriptions of that to see, sensitizing 
concepts merely suggest directions along which to look” (Blumer, 1954, p. 7). 
b) Exploring with co-production 
In this study, I examine and compare how local policy approaches, their 
negotiation and political and economic interdependencies in Nottingham and 
Stuttgart relate to sustainability (RQ 1-3). I attempt to explain divergence by 
understanding how policies and social order are co-produced in both governance 
regimes (RQ 4). This should be comprehended through the viewpoints of actors 
involved or concerned via interviews. Besides, policy-making involves materiality in 
the form of documents codifying objectives and views. Finally, participation processes 
and surveys construct and give voice to groups, e.g. citizens or businesses, in specific 
ways. These are the essential data sources on which I draw to answer the research 
questions (further described in Section 4.4).  
To open up this research, guiding questions illustrate how I employ the co-
productionist lens. However, they are exemplary, non-exhaustive and not all followed 
through in the study. This flexibility, especially in a comparative context, is a strength 
of the approach. The aim is to comparatively explore some tendencies in relation to 
them:  
 Who holds formal and informal power in the cities? 
 Which political priorities are being pursued locally – which are not? Why? 
 Which knowledge is called on to formulate policies? 
 How long/short are planning horizons? 
 How are policies negotiated? 
 Who has or is given a voice – who is not? 
 How are actors being viewed?  
 How do actors and sectors interrelate? 
 Who benefits in what way from local policies?  
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 What are critical or paradigmatic cases in these regards and what do they 
show? 
 Which values, moralities and conventions underpin these practices? 
 How did policies and social order emerge out of earlier situations?  
Based on the hypothesised ideal types and the cases’ high variation (cf. Chapter 
3), I expect that they diverge in many respects, also in relation to sustainability. 
Accordingly, I theorise the two governance regimes as differently co-producing 
policies and social order.  
c) Main contributions 
This study makes some main contributions in relation to previous research and 
its gaps.  
First, it argues for and contributes to an integrated approach to researching 
sustainability in terms of intergenerational justice. Thereby it aims to avoid the 
established ‘silo’-thinking with regards to the future, but also as a wider conception in 
modernity. The integrated approach facilitates making connections between political, 
social, economic and environmental (sustainability) issues. 
Second, it examines and compares how policies and social order are co-
produced in two empirical instances of welfare states and urban regimes (cf. Chapter 
3) and how these modes relate to sustainability. This angle is relatively novel, but more 
so relevant in the face of sustainability problems in current democratic capitalism. 
Also, the co-production perspective expands beyond more conventional analyses of 
urban and welfare state governance by explicitly focusing on the co-construction of 
policies and social order. Therein, urban governance regimes as units of analysis widen 
the research scope beyond the established co-productionist focus on single policy 
problems or instruments for an inductive exploration of varying and overarching 
questions. Relatedly, Chilvers & Kearnes (2015, p. 15) emphasise the relevance of 
analytically surpassing single participation instances (e.g. consultations or 
instruments) towards 
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“the level of political culture and constitutional relations between citizens, science 
and the state, within which certain participatory collective practices and 
knowledge-ways become seen as authoritative and are endowed with legitimacy 
and meaning (Jasanoff, 2005, 2011; emphasis in original).”  
Regarding the case study cities, urban governance research often focuses on large 
cities (e.g.: Blanco, 2015; Lachmund, 2013) and less so on mid-sized ones – making the 
study contribute to this void.  
Third, this research brings together comparative literatures on urban and 
welfare state regimes with the co-productionist STS perspective. This means using the 
latter’s insights to more closely examine how these regimes and their epistemic 
foundations are co-constituted with power, values and normativity – which is a 
substantively underexposed angle. Otherwise, the dynamically expanding field of STS 
can profit from developing a stake in the lasting discussions around welfare state 
regimes and urban governance. This might help to re-integrate relating literatures of 
STS, sociology, political science and political economy.  
Fourth, the comparative perspective establishes a contentual and 
methodological contribution to the co-production literature which predominantly 
relies on single-case studies. It enables a normative discussion about how both 
regimes as configurations of capitalism account for the future. This question is of 
fundamental public interest and a major substantive contribution. Jasanoff (2005, p. 
14) accordingly states: “[c]omparison may even help us decide which courses of action 
we wish to follow, as individuals or as political communities.” Notwithstanding, given 
the cultural embeddedness of governance, “there are reasons to be sceptical of 
unproblematic learning from others’ experiences” and of “prescribing 
decontextualized best practices” (Jasanoff, 2005, p. 15) – cf. also Section 8.9. 
2.3.4 Ontological and epistemological foundations 
Regarding assumptions about the nature of social existence, becoming and 
reality, this study broadly comes from a social constructivist stance which coheres with 
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its co-productionist conceptual framework (Chilvers & Kearnes, 2015). Constructivism 
assumes  
“that social phenomena and their meanings are continually being accomplished by 
social actors. It implies that social phenomena and categories are not only 
produced through social interaction but that they are in a constant state of 
revision” (Bryman, 2004, p. 17).  
It suits the empirically emergent character of urban governance, where policies and 
their meanings are established, revised and renewed; and where power is relational. 
Meanings may materialise in statements, documents, objectives, employed evidence 
or surveys ordering the social world; and these representations in turn give reference 
to emerging perceptions. Stuttgart’s introduction of the ‘New Steering Model’ and its 
partial reversal illustrates these shifting meanings and their real consequences (cf. 
Section 6.4.1). 
Corresponding to the social constructivist view, this study employs an 
interpretive epistemological approach. Interpretivism emphasises the need to grasp 
subjective meanings of the social world and behaviours, assuming that people and 
natural sciences’ objects differ in this regard (Bryman, 2004, pp. 11–13). The 
interpretive view implies multiple realities and situated knowledges. Governance is 
therefore understood as culturally, politically, historically and socially bound within 
the urban and national regimes. The cases therefore need to be comprehended in 
their contexts (cf. Section 4.2.2).  
2.4 Summary 
The following table provides an overview of key conceptual elements and 
arguments of this study in relation to sustainability and co-production, as justified 
within this chapter.  
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Table 1: Conceptual framework in relation to sustainability and co-production 
Sustainability 
Conceptualisation  
From ‘pillars’ (environmental, social, economic) to an 
integrated approach: socio-economic and environmental 
dimensions 
Problems of sustainability in 
democratic capitalism – 
accelerating in neoliberalism 
Environmental degradation and climate change 
Neglect of future generations’ interests in democratic 
processes 
Rising economic inequality 
Declining rates of economic growth 
Rising public and private debt 
Definition of sustainability 
Aiming at not restricting the leeway of future generations 
to pursue their conceptions of the good beyond today’s 
restrictions. As necessary conditions, this implies aiming at 
preserving the natural environment and enhancing human 
well-being equitably in the present. 
Co-production of policies and social order 
Understanding of co-
production  
Intermingling and simultaneity of making policies and 
making social order (Jasanoff, 2004a)  
Use of co-production 
Sensitising concept (Blumer, 1954) 
Guiding questions – expecting convergence 
Main contributions 
Promoting an integrated approach to sustainability 
Whole governance regime-perspective in relation to 
sustainability 
Connecting co-productionist approach with research on 
urban governance and welfare states 
Adding a comparison to co-production research  
Ontology and epistemology Constructivism – interpretivism 
Source: own research.  
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3 Welfare states, urban governance and case 
introductions 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews welfare state and urban governance concepts in relation 
to the case study cities Nottingham and Stuttgart – and introduces the concepts as 
heuristic devices. While it is a shortcoming of the community power debate (cf. Section 
3.3.2) to assume “that cities could be treated as self-contained and independent 
entities” (Harding, 2009, p. 32), I include national and international, state and regional 
contexts. I also consider broader structural conditions in which places and actors are 
embedded, encompassing institutional, socio-economic and historical factors.  
The chapter starts from the general and proceeds to the specific. It first draws 
on conceptualisations of welfare states and market economies and in these respects 
situates Germany and the UK (Section 3.2). Second, I locate the research in the urban 
governance literature, describe the cases’ ideal-typical conceptualisation and relate 
according developments to the cases (Section 3.3). Third, I describe Nottingham and 
Stuttgart (Section 3.4). Concludingly, Section 3.5 summarises and juxtaposes the cases 
in their conceptual and empirical capacities. 
3.2 Conceptualising the capitalist welfare state 
3.2.1 ‘Varieties’ or ‘stages’ of capitalism? 
Versions of democratic capitalism, which Nottingham and Stuttgart represent, 
shape conditions of governance and social order. They are compared in terms of 
‘varieties’ and ‘stages’. The former approach synchronically distinguishes varieties of 
capitalism along selected variables or combinations of factors. Hereto, Esping-
Andersen (1990) and Hall & Soskice (2001) contributed significantly and are drawn on 
subsequently. ‘Stages’ of capitalism, a Marxian concept, takes a diachronic perspective 
on the changing character of capitalism based on its inherent dynamics and therefore 
focuses on convergence (Bresser-Pereira, 2012; McDonough, 2015).  
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In his study “The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism”, Esping-Andersen (1990) 
carves out three configurations of capitalist welfare states: a liberal, a conservative-
corporatist and a social-democratic welfare state type. Countries are classified along 
six variables mainly based on their forms of de-commodification, which „occurs when 
a service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a livelihood 
without reliance on the market” (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 21). Essential criteria 
distinguishing welfare states then involve the quality of social rights, social 
stratification and “qualitatively different arrangements between state, market, and 
the family” (Esping-Andersen, 1990, pp. 26; 29). In the liberal welfare state type, 
means-tested assistance, mainly catering low-income, working-class citizens, modest 
universal transfers or modest social-insurance plans predominate. Liberal work-ethic 
norms imprint the welfare state with strict rules that are often associated with stigma 
and an encouragement of market-solutions to welfare. The liberal welfare state cluster 
is therefore the least de-commodifying of the three, effectively containing the scope 
of social rights and exhibiting a class-political dualism between relatively equally poor 
state-welfare recipients and majorities disposing of a market-differentiated welfare. 
The cluster encompasses inter alia the United States, Canada, Australia and the UK 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990, pp. 26–27). Welfare states of the conservative-corporatist 
type have not embraced market efficiency and commodification to the extent of the 
liberal type and “the granting of social rights was hardly ever a seriously contested 
issue” with the state often displacing the market as a welfare provider and private 
provision playing a marginal role (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 27). However, rights are 
attached to class and status, thus preserving status differentials with relatively little 
redistribution. Besides, the Church shaped corporatist regimes which preserve 
traditional familyhood through tax, benefit and social insurance arrangements – with 
the family also being the first instance of care for its members. Examples for the type 
are Austria, France, Germany and Italy (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 27). Finally, 
countries of the social-democratic regime-cluster embrace universalism and de-
commodification of social rights with social democracy being the driving force for 
social reform. This involves promoting “equality of the highest standards”, not 
tolerating a dualism between state and market as well as between working and middle 
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classes and “guaranteeing workers full participation in the quality of rights enjoyed by 
the better-off” (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 27).  
Criticisms have been raised in relation to Esping-Andersen’s (1990) typology, 
including a neglect of the gender dimension in social policy or a misspecification of the 
Mediterranean welfare states as immature Continental ones (Arts & Gelissen, 2002). 
Other welfare state typologies were therefore developed (cf. Arts & Gelissen, 2002, 
pp. 143–144), for a discussion regarding Germany and the UK cf. Section 3.2.2.  
However, Emmenegger, Kvist, Marx & Petersen (2015) show that the ‘Three Worlds’ 
continues to be the point of reference for comparative welfare state research. In this 
study, Esping-Andersen’s (1990) typology helps understanding the two configurations 
of welfare capitalism in which the urban governance regimes are situated.  
Besides, market economy conceptualisations capture political and economic 
interdependencies (RQ 3). Hereby, ‘varieties of capitalism’ (Hall & Soskice, 2001) are 
particularly relevant, as they regard Germany and the UK as typical for a ‘coordinated 
market economy’ (CME) and a ‘liberal market economy’ (LME), respectively (cf. 
Section 3.2.2). The approach  
“starts from the premise that countries exhibit distinct, historically determined, 
national institutional equilibria that tie together a number of building blocks (such 
as the industrial relations, financial, corporate governance, and vocational training 
systems) in a coherent fashion that defines particular and differentiated market 
economies” (Fioretos, 2001, p. 219).  
These ‘building blocks’ have combined effects, making their sum greater than 
just an addition of their parts (Fioretos, 2001, p. 219). In this way, countries can “derive 
comparative advantages from their institutional structure” (Hall & Soskice, 2001, p. v). 
The approach contradicts the ‘phases’ models in that it suggests that “economic actors 
have strong stakes in protecting existing structures”, since transforming one market 
economy type to another is very costly, long and uncertain, “due to the difficulties of 
achieving a new and stable institutional equilibrium” (Fioretos, 2001, p. 220). 
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While the ‘varieties of capitalism’ literature emphasises “the survival of 
capitalist variation over space in the context of global competition” (Hall & Soskice, 
2001), the ‘stages’ theoretic tradition locates spatial variations of capitalism “in 
national responses to capitalist crises which demand for their resolution the 
reorganization of the institutional conditions of the capitalist accumulation process” 
(McDonough, 2015). The author summarises three main criticisms of ‘varieties’ 
approaches, partly based on Deeg & Jackson (2007, pp. 150; 157) and Bohle & 
Greskovits (2009, p. 382): that the framework is biased in assuming stability rather 
than change; that widespread change in institutional structures challenges the 
coherence of the limited number of typologies; and that the preoccupation with 
capitalism’s different varieties overlaps recognising its essence, e.g. its expansionary 
nature, vulnerabilities, destructive tendencies and recurrent crises. In line with this 
critique, Wolfson & Kotz (2009) propose an alternative conceptualisation to that of 
Hall and Soskice. It consists of ‘liberal’ and ‘regulated social structures of 
accumulation’ that temporally follow one another due to crises that each of their very 
nature leads to.  
While ‘varieties’ and ‘stages’ of capitalism are both useful for its 
understanding, their partial emphasis on variables omits much of cases’ contexts. I 
employ the insights of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) and Hall & Soskice’s (2001) typologies 
and relate my cases to them. However, I combine them with an alternative, case-based 
approach where context matters in ways that are not pre-defined and which is open 
to case transformation (cf. Section 4.2). This approach is novel in that it connects the 
constructivist view on how policies and knowledge are co-created with power, values 
and morality with the comparative welfare state literature – and thereby adds to both 
strands. 
3.2.2 British and German welfare states and market economies 
Nearly 30 years on from Esping-Andersen’s (1990) typology, it still provides 
relevant insights into the German and British welfare states. However, they also 
evolved significantly. Some according aspects are considered subsequently; as are 
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characteristics of their market economies, both to ground the case study cities’ 
embeddings. 
Germany’s ‘social market economy’ emanates from a social insurance 
contribution-based ‘Bismarck’ system which in a pure form does not redistribute 
between income groups (Bismarck versus Beveridge: A Comparison of Social Insurance 
Systems in Europe, 2008; Cremer & Pestieau, 2003; Kolmar, 2007). While Esping-
Andersen (1990, p. 29) remarks that European conservative regimes have become less 
corporatist and less authoritarian by incorporating both liberal and social-democratic 
impulses, Seeleib-Kaiser (2016) empirically confirms those impulses for social policy 
areas in Germany. He concludes that the comprehensive transformation that social 
policy underwent since the early 1980s, relating to altered interpretive patterns, no 
longer affords conceiving of Germany as a conservative welfare state. For pension 
policies, Seeleib-Kaiser argues that the dualised pension system for future pensioners 
resembles that of liberal welfare states with pensioners largely depending on 
complementary occupational or private provision to avoid poverty. Similarly 
approximating a liberal model, unemployment insurance “no longer guarantees 
occupational status protection and the achieved standard of living” (Seeleib‐Kaiser, 
2016, p. 235). This resonates with the radical and controversial labour market reforms 
– partly seen as a neoliberal incision – which were implemented in Germany between 
2002 and 2005, overhauling the social security and labour market activation system in 
line with a ‘work first’ strategy (Knuth, 2014, p. 5). By contrast, family policy displays 
“very similar elements to those found in Scandinavia” (Seeleib‐Kaiser, 2016, p. 235).   
Despite some common tendencies, the UK as part of the ‘leanest’ welfare state 
group developed in a more neoliberal way than Germany (Prasad, 2006). However, 
the UK’s former status of an exemplary welfare state (Wincott, 2006), emanating from 
its post-war tax-based ‘Beveridge’ system, redistributing between income groups 
(Bismarck versus Beveridge: A Comparison of Social Insurance Systems in Europe, 
2008; Cremer & Pestieau, 2003; Kolmar, 2007), resonates with a “fourth world of 
radical welfare capitalism” (Castles & Mitchell, 1992, p. 20). As part of Esping-
Andersen’s (1990) liberal cluster, the radical type corresponds  
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“to a particular configuration of political preconditions, consisting of a labor 
movement unable to obtain a degree of partisan control commensurate with its 
political support base in the community and also, perhaps, of a historical legacy of 
radical egalitarianism” (Castles & Mitchell, 1992, p. 20).  
In seeming contrast to its progressive past, later literature observes an 
‘Americanisation’ of the British welfare state. As “[t]he ‘Thatcher revolution’ and its 
continuation by New Labour make Britain a kind of master model for the neo-
liberalization or Americanization of European welfare states”, Schierup (2006) finds 
that the development of state managed race relations and multiculturalism went 
parallel with growing inequality and labour force restructuring according to race, 
gender, human capital and legal status. Regarding social policy, Holmwood (2000) 
explains an ‘Americanisation’ with the transformation and demise of the post-
Imperial/Commonwealth system in which the British economy was embedded (cf. 
Section 3.4.1 c)). During today’s “period of historically prolonged austerity and 
substantial working age welfare reform”, with ‘Brexit’ there is “yet another 
renegotiation of the social contract” looming (Gingrich & King, 2019, p. 89). Relatedly, 
Alston (2018, p. 2) states shat “[k]ey elements of the post-war Beveridge social 
contract are being overturned”, accusing government ministers of a “systematic 
immiseration of a significant part of the British population” (Booth, 2019). He warns 
that unless austerity was ended, the UK’s poorest people faced lives that are “solitary, 
poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Booth, 2019).  
Based on the ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach, Hoffmann (2003, p. 125) 
characterises Germany’s and the UK’s institutional economic structures, drawing on 
Hall & Soskice (2001), Fioretos (2001), Wood (2001), Vitols (2001) and Graham (1997). 
Accordingly, ownership is central to economic activity in the British ‘liberal market 
economy’. Companies are merely able to provide quasi ‘public goods’, such as 
vocational training, research and development, technological diffusion and long-term 
financing. They therefore mainly refinance themselves at the stock market and thus 
depend on short-term profit expectations. Membership in business associations is 
below 50% and unions are organised pluralistically, with collective labour agreements 
mostly at a company’s level. Altogether, this entails low qualification and wage levels 
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as well as partly extreme income spreads – alongside a high-tech production sector 
with highly qualified employees. Larger companies can invest relatively quickly into 
innovations with risk capital, while qualified labour can be bought externally or 
developed in protected “intragroup labour markets”.  
In contrast, Hoffmann (2003, p. 125) condenses the following properties of 
Germany’s ‘coordinated market economy’ (based on Fioretos, 2001; Streeck, 1997; 
Vitols, 2001; Wood, 2001; Hall & Soskice, 2001): an extensive coordination of 
economic activities between firms via business organisations in which over 95% of 
them are members. If financed externally, companies mostly depend on long-term 
bank loans or when they have shareholders, these mostly also see themselves as 
stakeholders. Businesses can therefore solve problems of collective action through 
cooperation and supply quasi ‘public goods’. This again leads companies to develop 
innovation processes incrementally towards a quality-based competition strategy – 
causing Germany to lag behind in high-tech production, but focusing on ‘medium-tech’ 
manufacturing. Simultaneously, qualifications and wages are relatively high and, also 
via unions’ wage policy and welfare state redistribution, income spread is low 
compared with the UK or US. The resilience of Germany’s labour market through the 
2008/2009 economic crisis has been attributed to factors reflecting a return to the 
traditional ‘coordinated market economy’ “rather than the neoliberal spirit of the 
labour market reforms [cf. above]” (Knuth, 2014, p. 5). 
Concludingly, diverging welfare state regimes and market economies set the 
scene of varying power relations, social orders and policy environments in Nottingham 
and Stuttgart.  
3.3 Conceptualising urban governance  
This section turns to the city level and specifies urban governance and power for 
this research (Section 3.3.1). I then relate it to community power studies (Section 
3.3.2), urban regime and governance theory (Section 3.3.3) and to the shift ‘from 
government to governance’ (Section 3.3.4). The latter section outlines initially 
assumed urban governance ideal types, i.e. the Weberian bureaucracy for Stuttgart 
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and NPM for Nottingham. In this regard, I finally review local governance trajectories 
in Germany and the UK (Section 3.3.5).  
3.3.1 Specifying urban governance and power 
In this study, “urban governance refers to the process through which a city is 
governed without making any prejudgements about the locus of power or the relative 
significance of political and societal actors in that process […]” (Pierre, 2011, p. 4). This 
“offers […] a more accurate way of discussing power in city politics beyond simply the 
power to control” (M. Brown, 1999). By surpassing the formal, ‘governance’ stresses 
the relevance of arrangements between public and private spheres for how urban 
matters are structured and dealt with (Horan, 1997). The governance process 
manifests inter alia in policy approaches, in ways in which issues are negotiated and in 
relative power positions of civil society, political and economic sectors (RQ 1-3).  
Power is therefore central to this research. I understand it in relation to the 
conceptual and theoretical framework. The two distinct settings of urban governance 
within varieties of welfare capitalism evince high variation in inequalities, average 
living conditions and (de-)industrialisation. These characteristics are relevant to local 
power relations between citizens, local politicians, city administration, national 
government, possibly state government, other authorities, associations, institutions 
and companies in both cities – and how they might link with (policies’) sustainability. I 
consider actors’ interests as embedded in and shaped by these structures. Assuming 
the co-production of policies and social order (cf. Section 2.3.3), the aim is to 
empirically comprehend where and how power is then situated in both governance 
regimes (according assumptions cf. Sections 3.3.4 a) and b)); and how this interacts 
with policy-making.  
However, power not only manifests in decision-making, but also in agenda 
setting and preference shaping – which Lukes (1974) identifies as “three faces of 
power”. Agenda setting includes preventing issues from becoming subject to formal 
political decisions. Preference shaping prevents people from having grievances in the 
first place “by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that 
  57 
they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or 
imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and unchangeable […]” 
(Lukes, 1974, p. 24).  
3.3.2 Community power studies 
The community power debate around the 1970s focuses on the nature of local 
power and first set central according themes of continuing relevance (Dowding, 2011). 
It centres on formal and informal urban decision-making processes (Harding, 2009, p. 
29). The debate sparked off between ‘elitists’ and ‘pluralists’, where the former 
essentially ask ‘Who constitutes the power elite?’, seeking to identify a ‘community 
power structure’ and its interrelations. Conversely, ‘pluralists’ studied specific 
decisions and found that leading actors differed across issues (T. N. Clark, 1975, p. 
271). On these bases, many case studies were conducted (summarised in Saunders, 
1979). 
Not committing to either of the positions, two propositions flow from the 
community power debate on which this research builds. First,  
”the way place-shaping decisions are made does not conform to standard textbook 
descriptions of the policy-making process within liberal democracies, whereby 
elected politicians ostensibly translate the desires of the majority of citizens into 
policies and programmes that are then implemented by apolitical executives” 
(Harding, 2009, p. 32).  
Second, “[…] the textbooks are wrong because they underestimate the capacity of 
business groups and business ‘needs’ to shape policy agenda and decisions” (Harding, 
2009, p. 32). Relatedly, neo-pluralist Lindblom (1977) argues that in market-based 
democratic societies, businesses’ interests are privileged in influencing public policy 
choices – far more than any civil society groups – because of their ‘structural’ and 
‘instrumental’ power. Structural power reflects the critical importance of business 
decisions for providing public welfare – via jobs, tax income and thus standards of 
living. Instrumental power refers to businesses’ ability to mobilise their case effectively 
and receive attentive hearing, due to their critical influence over public welfare and 
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their financial and organisational advantages (Harding, 2009, pp. 33–34). This study 
comparatively examines how far this applies to Nottingham and Stuttgart and 
discusses resonances with the community power debate in Section 8.5.1.   
3.3.3 Urban regime theory and urban governance 
Urban regime theory evolved from pluralist antecedents (Elkin, 1987; Harding, 
2009). Its appeal is the “ability to explain urban politics by incorporating both political 
and economic influences, resolving prior debates over elitism, pluralism and economic 
determinism in urban politics” (Mossberger, 2009, p. 40). The urban regime concept 
describes formal and informal modes of collaboration between public and private 
sectors: 
“Regimes, or city governments, negotiate between the demands of social 
movements and electoral politics on the one hand, and the forces of capital on the 
other. […] [P]olitics is bounded by the economic relations of the capitalist system, 
but political concessions may be made to social movements and popular causes” 
(Mossberger, 2009, p. 42). 
Urban regime theory focuses on why and under which conditions local 
governments pursue developmental (economic) as opposed to redistributive goals 
(Mossberger, 2009). In a relating public choice-influenced approach based on the 
American federal structure, Peterson (1981) argues 
“that cities effectively ‘die’ if they are deserted by people and firms in big enough 
numbers. ‘They’ therefore have no choice but to try to capture and retain 
potentially mobile businesses and residents, and the income they can provide, if 
they are to survive” (as cited in Harding, 2009, p. 34). 
City administrations would therefore compete in devising strategies to improve 
business and employment location factors, explicitly or implicitly expressed by 
economic actors (Harding, 2009, p. 34). Meanwhile, “[g]enerous social policies would 
attract poor people and strain local resources, and repel businesses and affluent 
residents fleeing high taxes” (Mossberger, 2009, p. 41). 
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Urban regime theory’s claims of local politics being ‘economically bounded’ in 
capitalism – with the concept’s international transferability being challenged (e.g. 
Davies, 2003) – is interrogated through both cases in Chapter 7, concluding in Section 
8.5.1. With urban regimes being a subconcept of urban governance (Pierre, 2011), I 
however employ the latter as it is more open and flexible and thereby especially useful 
for cross-national comparisons (Mossberger, 2009, pp. 47–48). Nonetheless, I do not 
follow governance theory in its normative claims analytically, as discussed 
subsequently. 
3.3.4 From government to governance 
With the term ‘governance’ emerging during the 1980s (Ives, 2015, p. 3), the 
urban literature suggests a shift from hierarchic ‘government’ to a more networked, 
heterarchic governance (Blanco, 2015; Jessop, 1998). Stoker (1998) defines this move 
through five propositions. They describe governance as “a set of institutions and actors 
that are drawn from but also beyond government”; identifying “the blurring of 
boundaries and responsibilities for tackling social and economic issues” and “the 
power dependence involved in the relationships between institutions involved in 
collective action”; governance being “about autonomous self-governing networks of 
actors” and recognising “the capacity to get things done which does not rest on the 
power of government to command or use its authority”. Finally, Stoker (1998, p. 18) 
sees government as able to use “new tools and techniques to steer and guide”. 
Governance theory importantly assumes civil societies’ active participation in public 
issues which I examine empirically from Section 6.1 onwards. 
New Public Management (NPM) reforms are described “as a forerunner for the 
emergence of the concept of governance” (Kjær, 2009, p. 138). This administrative 
reform model shares properties with neoliberalism (defined in Section 1.1.3) as an 
ideology and policy model (Bleiklie, 2018, p. 1). Equally, the shift to governance and 
this “governance narrative” (Griggs et al., 2012, p. 1) itself are closely associated with 
neoliberalism (Geddes, 2005, p. 360), with no clear-cut differentiation of both (Bessant 
et al., 2015).  
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With NPM being a local level manifestation of neoliberalism and the traditional 
Weberian bureaucracy as the model it should replace, these two are employed as ideal 
types for Nottingham and Stuttgart, respectively (thus escalated and not existing in 
reality, cf. Section 4.3.1). I outline the types subsequently and thereafter explain their 
assignments through local governance trajectories in Germany and the UK. Where 
useful, this study draws on further models of urban governance. 
a) The Weberian bureaucracy 
Understandings of ‘old public administration’ stem from Max Weber’s theories 
of the modern bureaucracy (Kjær, 2009, pp. 134; 139). Weber conceives of the ideal 
type of a classic bureaucratic organisation as legal authority, being one of “three pure 
types of legitimate domination”, besides traditional and charismatic authority (Weber, 
1978, pp. 217–226). It is based on rationality, “resting on a belief in the legality of 
enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue 
commands” (Weber, 1978, p. 215). This ‘Weberian bureaucracy’, as I refer to it, is 
characterised by a clear separation between private and public spheres. Urban 
bureaucrats then neutrally implement decisions taken by an elected representative 
body and are controlled by it. They are recruited based on merit and work within steep 
internal hierarchies and highly specialised institutional structures with marginal scope 
of action. Budgeting and resource management are input-oriented and thus costs of 
local services and ‘products’ not recorded (Kjær, 2009, pp. 138–139; Kuhlmann, 2010, 
p. 1118; Weber, 1978, pp. 217–226). Table 2 contrasts assumptions of this old public 
administration type, NPM and governance theory. Power in the Weberian bureaucracy 
is understood as A being able to get B to do something B would not otherwise have 
done (Lukes, 1974). “Power is thus identifiable, visible and located in the centre of 
government, and this renders democratic control possible” (Kjær, 2009, p. 139). 
Elected bodies identify collective interests which are cast into policies – by which the 
state provides the overall development direction (Kjær, 2009, p. 139).  
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Table 2: Assumptions in old public administration, New Public Management and governance theory
 
Source: Kjær (2009, p. 140). 
b) New Public Management 
Theories of NPM stem from public choice theorists and are based on 
economics, i.e. anthropologically a ‘homo economicus’. They are characterised by a 
minimal state vision; and the application of market and business principles to the 
public sector; as well as associated ideas such as competition and individual behaviour 
as utility-maximisation (Kjær, 2009, p. 140; Kuhlmann, 2010, p. 1116). There is no 
agreed-upon definition of NPM (Kjær, 2009, p. 138). It represents a “loose set of 
techniques and ideas” (Dalingwater, 2014, p. 3). 
NPM (cf. also Table 2) can be understood through overlapping external and 
internal dimensions. The external dimension includes the redistribution of tasks 
between the state and the market, thereby often favouring market-mechanisms which 
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the state should only enable. This often leads to ‘quasi-markets’ in the public sector, 
separating the purchaser from the provider, competition, outsourcing, privatisation, 
an institutional ‘autonomisation’ or agencification of public services and should 
empower citizens. Internally, NPM suggests a transfer of private sector management 
principles to the public sector, e.g. hands-off, professional management. It proposes 
administrative decentralisation, the creation of profit-centres or executive agencies, 
management by results and value for money (e.g. with output- instead of input-
oriented budgeting); controlling systems (with explicit standards, measures of 
performance and new accounting systems), incentivisation through performance-
measurement and related rewarding, human resource management and 
disaggregation, i.e. a clear separation between politics and administration (D. Clark, 
1996; Kjær, 2009, p. 138; Kuhlmann, 2010, p. 1116). The public bureaucrat is driven by 
performance-related pay and pursues neutral efficiency in serving his/her ‘clients’, 
often aiming to reduce costs. Power mainly means state intervention in NPM theory. 
However, power is not in its focus and seen as unproblematic, as long as it is dispersed 
through the market (Kjær, 2009, pp. 140–141). 
3.3.5 Local government trajectories in Germany and the UK 
The following grounds shifts from ‘government’ to ‘governance’, as described 
in Section 3.3.4, for Germany and the UK (for encompassing accounts cf. Barkowsky, 
2014; Wollmann, 2008).  
Across Europe, these shifts vary considerably and neither simply reflect 
distinctions between federal and unitary systems nor between Northern, Southern 
and Anglo local government systems (Denters, 2005, p. 261). However, NPM is 
differently adopted by Anglo-Saxon countries as “marketizers” and European 
countries as “modernizers” (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004). In the former, NPM “has a 
closer affinity to neoliberalism and focuses on introducing market mechanisms in the 
public sector and/or privatizing public sector services”, while in many continental 
European countries, “the reforms can best be described as attempts to strengthening 
the public sector by making institutions more efficient [(Paradeise et al., 2009)]” 
(Bleiklie, 2018, p. 2).  
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a) British local government and New Public Management 
British local government is highly centralised. Only specific competences are 
decentralised and thus constitute “a subordinate mechanism” (Wilson & Game, 1998, 
p. 22; as cited in Gill-McLure, 2014, p. 369) of a government acting by “constitutional 
convention” with no written constitution (Widdicombe & Britain, 1986, p. 235; as cited 
in Gill-McLure, 2014, p. 368). Relatedly, civil service in an Anglo-American government 
cluster is described as “more open to management doctrines” as opposed to e.g. the 
Germanic civil service (Ferlie et al., 2019, p. 44). Indeed, as part of the “neoliberal 
heartland” (Geddes, 2005, p. 369), the UK is “one of the earliest and most enthusiastic 
adopters of NPM-style reforms since the 1980s” (López-Murcia & Hood, 2015). In a 
Western European comparison, the country was located “at the end of a continuum 
of governance” (John, 2001, p. 174). Privatisation and marketisation are more 
extensive in the UK than in other European countries (Whitfield, 2006, p. 3). The 
tendency may relate to it “having the most liberal market-oriented welfare system in 
the European Union and the most majoritarian governmental system, capable of rapid 
and decisive action” (Taylor-Gooby et al., 2004) and being a prime example of a 
competitive democracy (Vorländer, n.d.). 
In light of post-war public administration principles, fiscal crisis and economic 
stagnation at the end of the 1960s, NPM developed out of the view that a self-inflating, 
unproductive public sector (Niskanen, 1994) led to over-production; and expanded at 
the expense of a productive private sector (Bacon & Eltis, 1976; Dalingwater, 2014, p. 
2). From 1979 on, the Conservative government under Margaret Thatcher imposed 
radical NPM reforms in order to improve efficiency and effectiveness in the public 
sector (Dalingwater, 2014, p. 2; Kuhlmann & Bogumil, 2019, p. 5) and to “reduce the 
traditional strength of local politicians, local government […] staff to challenge central 
government policies” (Gill-McLure, 2014, p. 373). The reforms aimed to reduce local 
government to its ‘core’ functions, including stronger financial control by central 
government, the break-up of traditional bureaucratic departmental structures, a 
“purchaser/provider split” and service delivery through competition and outsourcing 
(Gill-McLure, 2014, p. 373; Kersting et al., 2009, p. 56). 
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Centralised NPM implementation has specifically in Anglo-Saxon countries 
been related to a loss of control and coordination; organisational and sectoral 
fragmentation; and accompanying losses of institutional transparency and political 
accountability through the establishment of agencies, quangos (quasi non-
governmental organisations) etc. besides local government (Kuhlmann & Bogumil, 
2019, p. 7). Thereby in the UK, “autonomy and steering capacity of local authorities 
has been weakened in a way unparalleled in Europe” (Kuhlmann & Bogumil, 2019, p. 
8). With an “audit explosion” and “proliferation of performance indicators”, NPM 
reforms have also been described as distorting professional behaviour through 
unmanageable tensions between efficiency and equity (Hood, 1995; Rouban, 2013; as 
cited in Gill-McLure, 2014, p. 374), to erode trust and demoralise staff (Gill-McLure, 
2014, p. 374).  
Also to address coordination problems, New Labour pursued post-NPM 
reforms as of 1997. They comprised devolution, the set-up of regional assemblies, 
elected mayors for towns and cities and joined-up government, i.e. bringing together 
governmental entities with private and voluntary organisations to work on common 
goals (Bogdanor, 2005; as cited in Kjær, 2009, pp. 143–144). These multi-agency 
partnerships should share responsibilities, resources, risks and contribute to 
democratic renewal at the local level (Lowndes & Sullivan, 2004; as cited in Kjær, 2009, 
p. 144). However, NPM principles continued to dominate this ‘post-NPM’ phase with 
private sector techniques, a drive for efficiency, responsiveness to and choice for 
users, performance measurement and outsourcing being prioritised in public service 
organisation (Dalingwater, 2014, p. 11). 
Moreover, in 2010 the coalition government resuscitated NPM ideas with its 
austerity measures forcing local governments to drastically cut local public services 
and improve efficiency (Dalingwater, 2014, p. 12). Geddes (2005, pp. 369–370) 
relatedly concludes that neoliberalism has come to dominate public policy in the 
Anglo-Saxon cluster in a way that “alternatives are largely seen to be within 
neoliberalism”. Also, Kuhlmann & Bogumil (2019, p. 9) see the model of an agency-
administration in the UK – despite a reduction of their number – still in place. 
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Considering the history of managerial reform in UK local government, Gill-McLure 
(2014, p. 381) infers a dialectical movement between local actors aiming to resist 
central control and central government constantly reasserting it with NPM attacking 
council autonomy and employees’ conditions. With its continuing pervasiveness in UK 
local government, NPM functions as the hypothesised ideal type for the Nottingham 
case – as the more neoliberal model being associated with less sustainable governance 
characteristics than a more traditional Weberian bureaucracy (cf. Section 2.2.2 b)). 
b) German local government and the New Steering Model 
The ‘classical’ Continental European administrative model is shaped by the 
tradition of Roman law, with a written constitution and the ‘Rule of Law’ principle 
underlying (Kuhlmann, 2010, p. 1118). Contrasting with the Anglo-Saxon world and 
others, the international reform agenda towards NPM was adopted relatively late in 
Germany via the ‘New Steering Model’ (NSM) during the 1990s (Kuhlmann et al., 
2008).  
Importantly, “public management reforms in Germany must be understood in 
terms of a bottom-up movement that has been driven primarily by local 
‘entrepreneurs’” (Kuhlmann et al., 2008, p. 851) (for Stuttgart cf. Section 6.4.1). 
Despite a spread of NSM, Kuhlmann et al. (2008) find in their survey of 1,565 German 
local authorities that ‘Weberian’ administrative structures and processes still 
characterise them. While there was an “unquestionable conceptual and discursive 
predominance of NSM” in German communes (Kuhlmann, 2010, p. 1120), its “rise and 
fall” (Kuhlmann, 2010, p. 1119) is marked by an implementation gap. Mostly, only 
selected NSM elements were introduced (Kuhlmann, 2010, p. 1120). However, NSM is 
“conceptually misleading” in its separation of politics and administration (Kuhlmann 
et al., 2008, p. 859) which contradicts political decision-making in German local 
government. Herein, administration and the municipal council’s majority groups are 
closely interwoven and an often competitive urban political arena precludes political 
actors from setting measurable objectives. Therefore, NSM instruments such as 
political contracts and benchmarking barely functioned and were mostly abolished. 
Staff members reported to have become tired of reforms and perceived the 
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modernisation mainly as downsizing and cutback management (Kuhlmann et al., 2008, 
pp. 859–860) in times of often strained communal finances. However, another 
examination of NSM finds that it did not contribute sustainably to budget 
consolidation (Mauch, 2008). Otherwise, some positive effects have been ascribed to 
the NSM reforms in Germany. This is in terms of positive mayoral self-assessments, 
improved citizens’ consultancy, ‘customers’’ services and performance (Kuhlmann, 
2010, p. 1120). 
Altogether, there was no paradigm shift to a managerial NSM in German local 
government. NSM’s emphasis on transparency and bindingness was at odds with its 
legalist culture, political steering and arising logics of action (Kuhlmann et al., 2008, p. 
860). However, NSM clearly imprinted German local government (Kuhlmann et al., 
2008, p. 860), i.e. through elements of performance management, benchmarking and 
cost-benefit-accounting (Kuhlmann & Bogumil, 2019, p. 4). To conceptualise these 
developments in combination with the Weberian tradition, Kuhlmann & Bogumil 
(2019) propose the ‘Neo-Weberian State’ for the emerging hybrid governance form. A 
partial reversal of NPM principles also occurred in terms of a re-communalisation, re-
regulation, the repurchase and insourcing of local public services and assets, de-
agencification, de-quangoisation, and a re-hierarchisation and re-centralisation in the 
Weberian sense (Kuhlmann & Bogumil, 2019). These ‘NPM reversals’ can be 
interpreted as a learning curve and administrative resilience (Kuhlmann & Bogumil, 
2019, p. 6). With the ongoing significance of the Weberian bureaucracy in German 
local government, it functions as an assumed ideal type for the Stuttgart case – and as 
the less neoliberal model is associated with more sustainable governance 
characteristics than NPM (cf. Section 2.2.2 b)).  
Overall, Section 3.3 outlines how this study builds on existing urban 
governance research and concepts. It adds to these by its constructivist focus on how 
policies and social order are co-produced in two governance regimes – and how these 
modes relate to sustainability. Combining the two approaches, the varying urban 
governance practices may express different civic epistemologies: in the UK one 
carrying central domination, an embrace of market-logics, measurement and 
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quantification; and in Germany one functioning in decentralised ways with a statist 
and relatively preservationist tradition. This may have made NPM more alien to the 
German context – just as Weberian approaches would possibly be in the UK, were they 
any ‘modern’. I expound on the two civic epistemologies based on my empirical 
findings in Section 8.3.2.  
3.4 Case introductions: Nottingham and Stuttgart 
The following grounds the comparative case study at the cities’ level. I illuminate 
characteristics of their population, local government and finance, economy, social 
situation and inequalities. Table 3 comparatively complements and summarises this. 
Case descriptions are selective, simplifying and oriented towards aspects relevant to 
the cases and their comparison. I augment them throughout the thesis.   
Data can often only approximate conditions in both cities restrictedly, as 
comparative statistics are not always available at city levels. Regional and national 
figures are sometimes used instead. I attempt to employ relatively recent data, though 
partially aiming for 2018, when I conducted the research interviews. However, the aim 




The city of Nottingham is located in the East Midlands region of the United 
Kingdom and within the county of Nottinghamshire. Population size of Nottingham 
(unitary authority) in 2018 is 329,200 and in Nottinghamshire 823,100 (Nottingham 
City Council, 2019a). Nottingham is ethnically relatively diverse, with 34.6% of the 
population (2011 Census) belonging to Black and Minority Ethnic groups, being 
defined as everyone who is not White British (Kirk, 2019, p. 9). There is a high 
population turnover, illustrated by 21% of it changing address in the year before the 
2011 Census. Nottingham’s population grows since 2001 with its main drivers being 
international migration (recently from Eastern Europe) and an increase in student 
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numbers, together with an excess of births over deaths (Nottingham City Council, 
2019d). The population is relatively young with 50% aged under 30 (Nottingham City 
Council, n.d.-c) and full-time students making up one in eight of the population 
(Nottingham City Council, 2019d). 
b) Local government and finance 
Government levels in England are central government and locally mostly either 
a two-tier system (consisting of county councils and district councils) or a one-tier 
system (unitary authorities) (Sandford, 2018, p. 4). Having seen an “erosion of the 
autonomy, powers, roles, functions and responsibilities of English local government” 
(Copus et al., 2017; John, 1990), one of today’s diagnoses is that of a “super-
centralisation of the English state” (Hambleton, 2017, p. 3). This is despite initiatives 
to devolve powers, budgets and responsibilities from central government to new 
combined authority mayors within regions since mid-2010 (UK Government, 2017). In 
context, many European countries seek to strengthen local autonomy as “a highly 
valued feature of good governance” (Ladner et al., 2016, p. 321).  
Whole council elections in Nottingham are held every four years via the First-
past-the-post voting system (UK Government, n.d.-a, p. 10). Local councillors 
represent wards, into which English local authorities are divided (Sandford, 2018, p. 
7). Nottingham is a Labour Party stronghold and controlled by the party since 1991. 
Previously, the non-metropolitan district of Nottingham (foundation of the unitary 
authority in 1997) was controlled by the Conservative Party in 1976-1979 and in 1987-
1991. Otherwise, the Labour Party continuously dominated since the first council 
elections in 1973 (The Elections Centre, n.d.). At the end of the electoral term of 2015-
2019, 52 of the city’s 55 councillors belong to the Labour Group and three to the 
Conservative Group (Nottingham City Council, 2018g). Turnout at the 2019 local 
elections is 29% (Sandeman, 2019).  
Unitary authorities like Nottingham are responsible for all local government 
functions in a place, among them social care, schools, housing and planning, waste 
collection and recycling, licensing, Council Tax collections, business support, registrar 
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services and pest control (Local Government Association, 2019b; UK Government, 
n.d.-b).  
UK local government finance is “extremely complex” (Sandford, 2018, p. 14) 
and only sketched subsequently. The largest sources of income for local authorities 
are Council Tax on domestic properties (fully retained by municipalities) and business 
rates (one half redistributed between local authorities to support those with lower 
revenues; the other half used by government for grants to local authorities which are 
distributed based on varying criteria) (Local Government Association, 2019a; 
Sandford, 2018, p. 14). Central government has significant control over both operating 
structures (Local Government Association, 2019a). However, central government has 
planned that local governments retain 100% of business rates in the future – which 
could exacerbate spatial inequality (Muldoon-Smith & Greenhalgh, 2015) (cf. Section 
5.4.3 b)). Besides, it is expected that the government’s Revenue Support Grant which 
supports local council’s general revenue expenditure will disappear by 2020/21 
(Nottingham City Council, 2018l, pp. 4–5). Further sources of income for local 
authorities are a range of possible local fees, charges and commercial income they 
generate (Sandford, 2018, pp. 14–15).  
Nottingham City Council’s net expenditure in 2017/18 is £243,759m 
(Nottingham City Council, n.d.-e, p. 36), i.e. circa £756 per inhabitant with 2017 
population data (Population UK, 2019). The city’s budget declined significantly since 
government’s austerity policies, as Figure 1 illustrates. Nottingham is among the 
places worst hit through austerity (cf. Section 6.2.2 a)). Government’s Revenue 
Support Grant plummeted from £127m in 2013 to £25m in 2019 (Nottingham City 
Council, 2018k). This led to an increasing relative significance of the Retained Business 
Rates – which also rose –, and recently became the major funding source after Council 
Tax with £116,101m assumed for 2019/20 (Nottingham City Council, 2018l, p. 5). 
Councils whose business rates income undercuts their initial baseline funding level, as 
in Nottingham, receive the balance as a ‘Top-up Grant’ (Nottingham City Council, 
2018l, p. 6). Besides, Council Tax in Nottingham is the second highest after Rutland in 
a comparison of an average Band D household in 2019 (County Councils Network, 
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2019). In 2019/20, a basic Council Tax increase of 2.99% is assumed in Nottingham. It 
is part of the tendency to increasingly fund local services through local tax payers and 
decreasingly by government. Moreover, Council Tax is regressive (Corlett & Gardiner, 
2018). Though the council aims “to minimise the impact of service reductions on 
vulnerable citizens” and “to maximise commercial opportunities that generate 
income” (Nottingham City Council, 2018l, p. 3), funding cuts and increasing costs for 
Adult Social Care and children in care “will have a significant impact on the Council’s 
ability to fund other local services” (Nottingham City Council, 2018l, p. 5). 
Figure 1: Nottingham City Council's funding excluding Council Tax and Assumed Collection Fund surplus, 2010/11-
2019/20
 
Source: Nottingham City Council (2018l, p. 5) 
c) Economy 
With the Industrial Revolution emanating from Britain in the 18th century, 
Nottingham was one of the places where water and steam power were first used in a 
factory system, newly employing hundreds of people and imprinting industrial 
capitalism (Encyclopedia Britannica, n.d.; White, 2009). During the 19th and 20th 
century, heavy industry (inter alia gypsum, brick, clay and iron working), coal mining, 
manufacturing (especially cotton, hosiery and lace) and engineering (inter alia frame 
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and cycle making) were important and flourishing industries in Nottingham and 
created considerable wealth. Notwithstanding, through rapid growth and no chance 
for the city to expand before 1865, living conditions in the city were appalling, marked 
by overcrowding and a lack of sanitation – being considered the worst of English towns 
in 1844 (BBC, 2003). In the course of deindustrialisation, many of the firms have 
closed, removing a large number of the former often relatively well-paid, but low-
skilled manufacturing jobs (Mckenzie, 2015, pp. 19–43; Spence & Bishop, n.d.). In 1938 
denoted as “the Stately Queen of the Midlands” by Writer Arthur Mee or “the neatest 
town I have ever seen” by Celia Fiennes (Jenkins, 2006), parts of Nottingham were 
more recently described as having developed “into a depressed post industrial 
landscape with all the attendant social problems” (Spence & Bishop, n.d., p. 2). 
Graham, Hardill & Kofman (2013, p. 228) detail that  
“[t]he decline in manufacturing […] [in the UK] has resulted in levels of high, long-
term unemployment in many of these ‘rust pockets’, particularly former coalfields 
and areas of heavy engineering. This has had its greatest impact on men, but the 
cycle of decline impacts on the whole community as average incomes and 
investment decline and poor health, crime, drug abuse, suicide and family 
breakdown increase – the pathologies of despair”. 
Comparative research shows that Britain’s employment structure became 
polarised. Analysing stratification outcomes in Britain, Germany and Denmark over the 
1990s and 2000s, Oesch (2015) finds that while occupational upgrading took place in 
Denmark and Germany, in Britain high-end and low-end service jobs expanded in a 
polarised version of upgrading. Relatedly, in Nottingham there is “a strong demand for 
lower skilled jobs (e.g. Level 2), in retail and health for example” (Rossiter et al., 2011, 
p. 4); and simultaneously a higher concentration of knowledge intensive jobs in 
Nottingham than in the surrounding core city area, the East Midlands and England in 
2017 (Nottingham City Council, n.d.-d). These increasing labour market inequalities 
resonate with British government policy and its colonial embedding, pursuing “an 
apparent competitive advantage provided by lower wage levels” (Holmwood, 2000, p. 
470; emphasised in original) after the UK’s entry into the European Economic 
Community in 1973. It then  
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“confronted a very different kind of economic order than that of the 
Commonwealth bloc to which it had traditionally been tied, one characterized by 
high basic prices and high wages with highly productive and competitive 
industries” (Holmwood, 2000, pp. 469–470).  
Considering some economic structures, there are 9,035 active VAT and/or 
PAYE registered enterprises in Nottingham in 2018. The city’s economy in 2017 
comprises 226,000 employee jobs. Most of them fall into administrative and support 
service activities (23%), wholesale, retail, trade and repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles (14.6%), human health and social work activities (14.6%) as well as 
education (9.7%) (Nomis, n.d.). The ten largest employers in Nottinghamshire in 2018 
are (followed by number of employees; Rossiter, 2018): 
1. Nottingham University Hospitals Trust – 13,600 
2. Nottingham City Council – 8,928 
3. Nottinghamshire County Council – 8,155 
4. Nottinghamshire Health Care Trust – 7,500 
5. Boots UK Limited – 6,000 
6. University of Nottingham – 5,000 
7. E.On – 5,000 
8. Sherwood Forest Hospitals Trust – 4,558 
9. Nottingham Trent University – 3,309 
10. Nottinghamshire Police – 3,200 
In the UK, there is a productivity gap between London and the South East on 
the one hand and most other regions on the other. While labour productivity as gross 
value added per hour worked in 2017 is 100 across the UK, it is 84.8 in the East 
Midlands (NUTS-1 region, unsmoothed, current prices) and 74.9 in Nottingham (NUTS-
3 subregion, smoothed, current prices) (Office for National Statistics, n.d.). McCann 
(2019, p. 15) sees these “[m]ajor differences in local productivity” as “a challenge to 
the country’s institutional and governance structures”.  
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d) Social situation and inequalities 
Disposable income per equivalised household is 25,218 US $ in Nottingham 
metropolitan area in 2016 (constant prices, constant purchasing power parity, base 
year 2010; OECD, n.d.). In a national comparison, Nottingham has the lowest 
household disposable income per head in the UK in 2016 with £12,232 (Collinson, 
2018). Nottingham’s unemployment rate according to the ILO-concept (International 
Labour Organization; model-based) is 7.9% between April 2015 and March 2016 (4.4% 
in the East Midlands and 5.1% in England) (Nomis, n.d.). In 2014, the share of workless 
households in Nottingham is the highest in the UK with 30.1% (Monaghan, 2014).   
With no comparable city level data on economic inequality, the UK ranks as the 
8th most unequal of 39 (mostly) OECD-countries in terms of incomes with a Gini-
coefficient of 0.36 in 2017 (OECD, 2018a). The UK is also one of the most 
interregionally unequal out of 30 OECD-countries, with only Slovakia and Ireland being 
more unequal, drawing on 28 indicators (McCann, 2019).4 In comparison, McCann 
(2019, pp. 14–15) concludes that  
“[i]n the UK it is the combination both of the magnitude and the proximity of the 
interregional inequalities which is so marked.”  
“As such, in many ways the economic geography of the UK is more reminiscent of 
a much poorer country at an earlier stage of economic development (McCann, 
2016).” 
Social mobility in the UK is below an OECD-24 average: it would hypothetically take 
five generations for those born in low-income families (bottom 10%) to approach a 
mean income (OECD-24: 4.5 generations) (OECD, 2018b).  
                                                     
4 Germany was more interregionally unequal than the UK at four measures – which McCann describes 
“entirely [as] a legacy of the absorption of the former East Germany”, while the UK was more unequal 
than Germany according to 17 measures (McCann, 2019, pp. 14–15).  
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Figure 2: Indices of Deprivation for Nottingham (centre) and parts of Nottinghamshire, 2015
 
Source: Nottingham City Council (2019c) 
Nottingham is the 8th most deprived district in the UK. According to the 2015 
Indices of Deprivation5, 61 of Nottingham’s 182 LSOAs (Lower Layer Super Output 
Areas) are amongst the 10% most deprived in the UK (Nottingham City Council, 
2017d). By contrast, Nottinghamshire County (excluding Nottingham City) ranks only 
103rd of the 152 upper tier local authorities in England regarding deprivation, with 1 
being the most deprived (McCormick et al., 2017, p. 53). Figure 2 illustrates this strong 
residential segregation of deprivation. Moreover, child poverty is high in Nottingham 
                                                     
5 The English Indices of Deprivation 2015 are based on 37 indicators, organised across seven domains 
of deprivation which are combined and weighted. The domains (and weights) are: 
 Income Deprivation (22.5%) 
 Employment Deprivation (22.5%) 
 Health Deprivation and Disability (13.5%) 
 Education, Skills and Training Deprivation (13.5%) 
 Crime (9.3%) 
 Barriers to Housing and Services (9.3%) 
 Living Environment Deprivation (9.3%) (McCormick et al., 2017, p. 52). 
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with 64.8% (2015) of children living in families who receive government financial 
support because nobody in the household works or due to low family incomes (43% in 
England) (Nottingham City Council, 2015a). Otherwise, the 40 wealthiest people and 
their families who have connections to Nottinghamshire together own almost £20 
billion in 2018 (Bunn, 2019). 
As a general tendency, economic inequality correlates with inequalities in 
health, education, work, housing, leisure, culture and others (Bundesministerium für 
Arbeit und Soziales, 2013). This resonates with health in Nottingham where life 
expectancy in 2018 (77 years for men and 81.1 for women) is lower than in England 
(79.5 years for men and 83.1 for women) (Nottingham City Council, 2019b). Life 
expectancy within Nottingham differs significantly, e.g. by 11 years between 
Arboretum and Wollaton West Care Delivery Group areas (Famodile & Keenan, 2018, 
p. 3f). Despite its young age-structure, Nottingham has a higher share of people with 
a limiting long-term illness or disability than the national average (Nottingham City 
Council, 2016b). In terms of education, “the East Midlands are the worst performing 
region in the country on a range of key indicators”, leading to an according warning by 
Ofsted (2016). Nottingham also ranks 150th out of 150 local areas on the Youth 
Opportunity Index (Nottinghamshire: 73rd). It comprises seven variables in relation to 
attainment of GCSE-level qualifications, Level 3 qualifications, higher education, 
apprenticeships, employment opportunities, net underemployment and young people 
not in employment, education or training (Evans & Egglestone, 2018). Professional 
qualifications are also lower in Nottingham than the UK average (January to December 
2018). 31.2% in Nottingham have a level four of National Vocational Qualification 
(NVQ) and above (UK: 39.3%), 55.7% of NVQ3 and above (UK: 57.8%), 69.9% of NVQ2 
and above (UK: 74.9%) and 10.2% have no such qualification (UK: 7.8%) (Nomis, n.d.). 
As Cauvain (2018, p. 254) discusses, the concentration of low incomes and 
worklessness in Nottingham partly relates to public housing provision within its 
boundaries, going back to the city’s legacy as “an exemplar public housing builder”. 
The described inequalities coincide with social class which still plays a 
predominant role in British society and sociology (e.g. Savage, 2015) – more so than in 
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Germany. Class inequality and injustice hereby intersect with other social divisions and 
shape perceptions (Warren & Pattison, 2018, p. 243).  
3.4.2 Stuttgart 
a) Population 
Stuttgart, located in the south-west of Germany, is the state capital of Baden-
Württemberg. Stuttgart’s population (urban district) is 611,213 in January 2018 
(Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, n.d.-c) and 2.78 million in Stuttgart Region in 2017 
(Verband Region Stuttgart, n.d.). 24.6% of Stuttgart’s population in 2015 are foreigners 
and 43.3% have a migrant background (Statistisches Amt Stuttgart, n.d.-a, n.d.-b; own 
calculations). Until 2019, the city’s population grew constantly since 2010 
(Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, 2019, p. 1). This growth is also attributable to an inner-
German migration with Stuttgart attracting 25- to 34-year-olds, especially young 
professionals. According to Simons & Weiden (2015), members of this numerically 
underrepresented age cohort in Germany increasingly move to 30 ‘swarm cities’ – 
Stuttgart being one of them – to find their peers and an attractive residential location. 
Median age in the city is 39.8 years in 2016 (Bertelsmann Stiftung, n.d., p. 4). The 
number of students at Stuttgart’s 13 universities in 2014/2015 equals circa 10% of the 
city’s population (M. Walker, 2016). Foreign students partly make up considerable 
shares of their student bodies, e.g. 21.2% at the University of Stuttgart (Jacobs, 2016). 
b) Local government and finance 
The German federal system consists of two tiers, the federal and the state level 
(Länder). Local government belongs to the state level, including local electoral and tax 
laws, varying across the country’s 16 states. However, fundamental are the guarantee 
of the general principle of local autonomy or subsidiarity as part of the German Basic 
Law (Article 28) (Vetter, n.d., p. 1) and the guideline of local self-government. 
Decentralisation historically has been significant in the territories making up Germany 
today (Renzsch, 1989) and local autonomy is high in a European comparison (Ladner 
et al., 2016). Besides, there is a strong cooperation between the federal, state and 
local levels in Germany with various intertwinings (Vetter, n.d., p. 1).  
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Stuttgart’s local councillors are elected every five years according to the 
principles of proportional representation (Korte, 2009; Tetzlaff & Cantow, 2013). 
Votes can be given city-wide to candidates of different parties (Stuttgarter Zeitung, 
2019). A mayor presides the local council, has a vote and is controlled by it 
(Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, n.d.-k; Stuttgarter Zeitung, 2019). He is directly elected 
by citizens for eight years (Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Baden-Württemberg, 
n.d.-b). Since 1946, majorities in Stuttgart city council have evolved in three phases. 
First, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) consistently held majorities of votes from 1946 
until 1971. Second, it was superseded by the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) from 
1975 until 2004. Third, in 2009 and 2019, Alliance 90/The Greens gained most votes in 
the city council – being replaced in between by the CDU in 2014 and thus representing 
a period of faster change. There are a number of politically diverse other groups 
(Durchdenwald, 2019; Statistisches Amt Stuttgart, n.d.-c). Stuttgart’s mayor Fritz Kuhn 
belongs to Alliance 90/The Greens and took office in 2013 (Landeshauptstadt 
Stuttgart, n.d.-m). At the end of the electoral term of 2014-2019, 17 of Stuttgart’s 60 
councillors belong to the CDU, 14 to Alliance 90/The Greens and nine to the SPD; three 
to SÖS (‘Stuttgart Ecological Social’), three to The Left (party), one to The Pirates, one 
to Student’s List, with these four latter groups forming the parliamentary group SÖS-
LINKE-PluS. Four council members are part of the Free Voters, three of the Free 
Democratic Party (FDP); and two of BZS23 (‘Alliance Future Stuttgart 23’), the legal 
successor of the former Alternative for Germany group. There is one representative 
respectively of SchUB (‘Schertlen’s Independent Citizens’), of the Alternative for 
Germany and of LKR (‘Liberal-Conservative Reformers’). Turnout is 57.5% at the 2019 
local elections (Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 2019).  
Baden-Württemberg’s municipalities fulfil voluntary tasks, compulsory tasks 
and directives. They decide how far they engage in voluntary tasks such as cultural 
matters, sports facilities or green areas. Federal or state governments prescribe 
compulsory tasks which are mainly local elections, sewage disposal, utility facilities, 
transport facilities, social affairs, fire service, general schooling and urban land-use 
planning. Finally, the legislator obliges municipalities increasingly to fulfil directives, 
inter alia parliamentary elections, local police issues, registry, commercial law, partly 
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construction law or social assistance (Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Baden-
Württemberg, n.d.-a).  
Around 40% of municipal tasks are tax-financed – and thus cyclical. For the rest, 
communes generate revenue via charges, allocations, rents, leases, fines, interest 
rates and others (Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, n.d.-h, 2018a, p. 73). Of local 
authorities’ tax income, business tax is most important with 43.5% in 2012, followed 
by their shares of income tax6 (36.2%), property tax (14.4%) and sales tax (4.8%). Of 
these, municipalities can only set collection rates of the property tax and the business 
tax. (Vesper, 2015, pp. 8–10). The complex and contested German revenue-sharing 
schemes are not further discussed here. They inter alia aim at reducing communes’ 
dependence upon the cyclically sensitive business tax (Vesper, 2015, pp. 8–9) and at 
accounting for municipalities’ varying financial and spending requirements (mainly in 
relation to number of inhabitants) (Vesper, 2015, pp. 11–15). 
Stuttgart’s ordinary and extraordinary expenses (‘Ergebnishaushalt’) in 2017 
are altogether 3,107,646,367.93 € (Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, 2018a, p. 71), i.e. circa 
5,097 € per inhabitant with population data for June 2017 (Landeshauptstadt 
Stuttgart, n.d.-b). In 2018, Stuttgart becomes debt-free for the first time since the 
Second World War, following high budget surpluses due to a good economic situation 
and related tax income (Nauke, 2018; K. Schwarz, 2018b). Figure 3 depicts local 
authorities’ tax income in Stuttgart Region since 2002 per inhabitant. Overall, it shows 
a considerable upward trend. This opens up possibilities for an expanding and 
complementary local state, as this thesis illustrates. Budget surpluses also led the 
municipal council to lower the property tax collection rate for 2019 (Nauke, 2018; K. 
Schwarz, 2018b). Stuttgart’s according rate for a family in 2018 is ranked 46th of 
Germany’s 100 largest cities, with 1 being the lowest (IW Consult, 2018). Stuttgart’s 
                                                     
6 The communes’ share of income tax (15%) is distributed relative to a state’s entire income tax revenue 
and to a degree levels communal revenue differences within a state (Bundesministerium der Finanzen, 
2014; Vesper, 2015, pp. 8–10). 
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business tax collection rate is among the higher values in Baden-Württemberg in 2018 
(Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammertag, n.d.; own calculation). 
Figure 3: Tax revenue of municipalities in Stuttgart Region, 2002-2017
 
Source: IHK Region Stuttgart (n.d.) 
c) Economy 
For long into the 19th century, Stuttgart remained a tranquil residence city.  
Stronger industrial development started relatively late under the unfavourable 
conditions of lacking raw materials such as coal and ores (Diercke, n.d., p. 48),  
suboptimal transport links and no access to sufficient water power (Stadtmuseum 
Stuttgart, n.d., pp. 25; 29). However, the city developed into an industrial centre with 
railway expansion playing a key role (Maier, 2010, p. 50). During the 19th and 20th 
centuries, engineering and manufacturing, especially of cars which were developed in 
Stuttgart, electrical engineering and textiles became important industries. They were 
often export-oriented and evolved under the given constraints (Diercke, n.d., p. 48). 
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Stuttgart’s population grew rapidly at the time, from 107,273 in 1875 to 286,218 in 
1910. Life in the cities was then partly marked by overcrowding, lacking hygiene, 
spreading diseases and pauperisation (Bergmann, 2018). In the second half of the 20th 
century, deindustrialisation decimated Stuttgart’s textile, leather and clothing 
industries. Other sectors remained significant with an according demand for industrial 
goods, also within the European Economic Community (Grotz, & Seibel, n.d.).  
Today, Stuttgart forms the centre of one of the main industrial regions in 
Europe and especially has – and economically depends upon – a successful car industry 
cluster (Lüken-Klaßen, 2010; The Economist, 2016). Export orientation remained 
characteristic to the regional industry (Wirtschaftsförderung Region Stuttgart, 2016a). 
A specificity of Baden-Württemberg’s economy is a comparatively high density of 
medium-sized world market leading companies (‘hidden champions’). They 
significantly contribute to regional prosperity, are important innovators and 
employers. Their competitiveness has been explained historically in terms of German 
particularism until the foundation of the German Empire in 1871, requiring cross-
border activity of medium-sized enterprises and efficient production to compensate 
for tariffs (Lochner, 2016). 
Considering economic structures, there are 32,143 enterprises in Stuttgart in 
2015 according to the company register (preliminary). In 2016, there are 396,516 
employees subject to social security deductions in Stuttgart, of which 239,014 are 
incoming commuters (T. Schwarz & Haarer, 2017, p. 11). Main economic sections in 
terms of employment in Stuttgart Region are in 2016 engineering (share of employees: 
8.8%), car (parts) manufacturing (8.6%), retail (6.3%), healthcare (5.8%) and wholesale 
(without motor vehicles: 5.7%) (IHK Region Stuttgart, 2018, p. 2). The ten largest 
employers in Stuttgart in 2016 are (followed by number of employees; T. Schwarz & 
Haarer, 2017, p. 12): 
1. Daimler AG – 39,000 (in Stuttgart Region) 
2. State administration Baden-Württemberg – 37,500  
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3. City administration Stuttgart – 20,100 (including in-house operations, e.g. 
hospitals) 
4. Bosch Group – 12,500 
5. Dr. Ing. h.c. F. Porsche AG – 9,700 
6. Universities (Stuttgart and Hohenheim) – 9,200 
7. State bank Baden-Württemberg – 7,500 
8. MAHLE Group – 4,600 
9. Allianz Germany AG – 4,500 (without ca. 600 employees of smaller 
subsidiaries) 
10. EnBW Energy Baden-Württemberg AG – 3,900 
Comparing all large German cities in 2015, productivity in terms of GDP per worker is 
highest in Stuttgart (Bury, 2017).   
d) Social situation and inequalities 
Disposable income per equivalised household is 32,623 US $ in Stuttgart 
metropolitan area in 2013 (constant prices, constant purchasing power parity, base 
year 2010; OECD, n.d.). For a national comparison, disposable household income per 
head in 2016 is 25,012 € in Stuttgart, being the second highest of Germany’s 15 largest 
cities (Baden-Württemberg: 23,947 €; Germany: 21,952 €) (Seils & Baumann, 2019). In 
2019, local purchasing power in Stuttgart is estimated as 25.8% higher than in 
Nottingham (Numbeo, 2019). Unemployment in the NUTS-2 region of Stuttgart is 3.3% 
in 2015 according to the ILO-definition (Eurostat, 2016).  
Income inequality in Germany is 25th highest among 39 (mostly) OECD-
countries, i.e. in the lower third, with a Gini-coefficient of 0.29 in 2016 (OECD, 2018a). 
Regional inequality of disposable incomes in Germany is low in a European 
comparison. Specifically, it is lower than in all large EU countries, i.e. France, Italy, 
Spain or Great Britain (Braml & Felbermayr, 2018, p. 48). Social mobility in Germany is 
low in an OECD-24 comparison and lower than in the UK: it would hypothetically take 
six generations for those born in low-income families (bottom 10%) to approach a 
mean income (OECD-24: 4.5 generations) (OECD, 2018b).  
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Figure 4: Net income per taxable person in Stuttgart, 2009
 
Source: Stein (2012) 
Relative poverty in Stuttgart is 16.1% in 2014 according to the federal income 
median (15.4% in Germany), i.e. the fourth-lowest rate among 15 German big cities 
(Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder, 2015). 7.9% of Stuttgart’s inhabitants 
receive unemployment benefits II or benefits according to social security statute book 
XII in 2013 (Hanke & Pott, 2013, p. 175). Stuttgart’s relative child poverty in terms of 
the state income median (Baden-Württemberg) is 17.9% in 2012 (18.7% in Germany) 
(Saleth et al., 2015; Statistische Ämter des Bundes und der Länder, 2015). 13.4% of the 
under 15-year-olds depend on unemployment benefits II in 2014 (15.3% in Germany) 
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 2016; Statistisches Bundesamt, 2016). At the opposite, 
Stuttgart ranks fourth of German cities as home to ultra high net worth, i.e. persons 
owning more than 30 million US $ in 2013. These are 1,220 persons in Stuttgart and 
19,095 in Germany (Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 2014). Figure 4 visualises net incomes 
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per taxable person in Stuttgart 2009 to approximate spatial income inequalities.7 The 
map shows how higher incomes especially gather around the city centre (desired 
locations ‘half up the hill’) and lower incomes more towards north-eastern districts. 
Regarding health, average life expectancy at birth in 2015/17 in Stuttgart is 
79.7 years for boys and 84.3 years for girls (78.4/83.2 years in Germany) 
(Brachat‑Schwarz, 2018). Education levels in Stuttgart are above the German average 
according to the 2011 Census. With 45% of the over 15-year-olds possessing a general 
or subject-related higher education entrance qualification and almost a quarter of 
them a secondary school certificate or equivalent, Stuttgart herein ranks third of 
German large cities after Munich and Frankfurt. Stuttgart is also within the upper third 
of larger cities for professional qualifications with 15% of the population having a 
university degree. However, Stuttgart in the same comparison has an above-average 
proportion of persons without school-leaving qualification (7.2%) and of people 
without professional qualification (29.1%) (Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, 2015).  
3.5 Comparison and summary   
This chapter has conceptually located the case study cities Nottingham and 
Stuttgart as varieties of capitalism and as initial urban governance ideal types. It has 
introduced relating debates and specified concepts which the study employs. I have 
described Nottingham and Stuttgart to ground the comparative case study, focusing 
on aspects which become narratively important.  
Altogether, the chapter has shown how both cases are relatively extreme urban 
exemplars of contemporary democratic capitalism: with high variation in local power 
structures, governance embeddings and local autonomy; public budgets, states of 
industrialisation and prosperity; socio-economic living conditions and inequalities. The 
case selection builds on this, as I discuss in Section 4.3. The following table summarises 
                                                     
7 This excludes persons receiving benefits. Also, incomes above 200,000 € and below -200,000 € are 
capped at these levels (Stein, 2012). 
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and complements aspects in comparison. Hereby, exact comparability is often limited 
due to data availability and different institutional set-ups.  









Country Liberal Conservative-corporatist 
Market economy type 
(Hall & Soskice, 2001)  






City New Public Management Weberian bureaucracy 
Adoption of NPM Country Government-imposed Locally-driven 
Population 
Inhabitants (2018) City 329,200 611,213 
Local government and finance 
Local Autonomy Index 
2014 (Ladner et al., 
2016) 
Country 
Relatively low (UK: 9th 
lowest among 39 
European countries) 
High (Germany: 5th 
highest herein) 
Voting system City First-past-the-post 
Proportional 
representation 
Electoral majority  City Labour Party (since 1991) 
CDU (1975-2008; 2014-
2019) 
Green Party (2009-2013; 
2019-) 
Voter turnout (2019) City 29% 57.5% 
Local budget per 
inhabitant8 






decreasing since 2010 
Tax revenue in tendency 
rising since 2002 in 
Stuttgart Region 
                                                     
8 Due to diverging responsibilities, both values are not comparable. While Stuttgart’s city council 
altogether provides more comprehensive services than Nottingham’s, e.g. including additional welfare 
benefits or childcare, Nottingham City Council’s provision however includes Adult Social Care – which 
in Germany is financed or subsidised by federal states.  
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Economy 









expansion of high- and 
low-end service jobs (UK) 
Occupational upgrading 
(Germany) 
10 largest employers City 8 rather public, 2 private 6 private, 4 rather public 




30,550 US $ 
 
60,022 US $ 
 
Labour productivity 





64,394 US $ 101,789 US $ 
Social situation and inequalities 
















0.36 (UK, 8th highest; 
2017) 
0.29 (Germany, 25th 
highest; 2016) 
Interregional inequality Country 
UK: 3rd most 
interregionally unequal of 
30 OECD-countries 
Germany: low regional 
inequality of disposable 
incomes in European 
comparison 
Poverty/deprivation City 
High (8th most deprived 
district in UK) 
Child poverty: 64.8% 
(2015) 
Low in German big cities’ 
comparison: relative 
poverty of 16.1% (2014; 
federal median) 
Child poverty: 17.9% 
(2012; state median) 
Life expectancy City 
77 years for men/81.1 
years for women (2018) 
79.7 years for men/84.3 
years for women 
(2015/17) 
Education City 
Lowest in Youth 
Opportunity Index 
Mostly above German 
average 
                                                     
9 Constant prices and purchasing power parity, base year 2010 (OECD, n.d.). 
10 Data not available for same years. 
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Professional 
qualifications 
City Below British average Above German average 
Sources: own research and as given in Chapter 3.  
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4 Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
Preceding chapters locate this research with regards to sustainability, urban 
governance and comparative welfare regimes, set out the conceptual co-production 
framework and describe the cases. This chapter takes the approach into methodology, 
aiming for a comparative case study at a high level (Yin, 2015). That presupposes 
choosing, explaining and justifying the research practice which I do successively 
regarding the comparative case study method (Section 4.2), the case selection (Section 
4.3), research methods (Section 4.4) and data analysis (Section 4.5). Section 4.6 
summarises the research design’s main elements. 
Altogether, my methodological choice of a comparative case study is not only 
backed by, but also extends beyond previous research in the fields I address. On the 
one hand, single and multiple-case studies are an established method to examine 
urban governance and welfare state regimes. Co-productionist research on the other 
hand predominantly relies on single case studies (cf. Section 2.3.2 b)). This scarcity of 
comparisons limits its interpretational scope. It is this gap where my study makes a 
relevant contribution through its comparative cases’ setup. 
4.2 Comparative case study method 
4.2.1 The comparative method 
To set out the foundations and logic of the qualitative/case-based design of this 
comparison, I discuss approaches to the comparative method subsequently. 
Comparison is an integral part of thinking and “[v]irtually all empirical social 
research involves comparison of some sort” (Ragin, 1989, p. 1). Comparisons facilitate 
the interpretation and categorisation of empirical instances, the evaluation of their 
regularity and significance by drawing on context, other instances and derived 
theoretical criteria (Ragin, 1989, p. 1). Comparative methods to facilitate explanation 
in the social sciences have long been split into qualitative and quantitative approaches 
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(Ragin, 1989, p. 2). This is reinforced by qualitative research tending to be case-based 
and associated with Weberian studies, whereas quantitative research is mostly 
variable-based and associated with the Durkheimian tradition (Ragin & Zaret, 1983, p. 
732). Case-based and variable-based approaches are two fundamentally different 
strategies in social science research that draw on distinct epistemologies, conceptions 
of causality, units and methods of analysis (Ragin & Zaret, 1983). 
a) Qualitative/case-based comparisons 
Qualitative/case-based approaches focus on cases as wholes and their 
comparison. In this logic, cases are viewed as evolving configurations, i.e. causes are 
combinations of temporally discrete factors and cases are being compared with 
respect to these combinations. Max Weber accordingly conceives of sociology as a 
science of historical reality, employing qualitative-historical methods concerning 
concrete cases (Ragin & Zaret, 1983, pp. 743–744). His strategy “uses ideal types to 
enable limited generalization about historical divergence“ (Ragin & Zaret, 1983, p. 731, 
emphasis in original), aiming to understand its causes and consequences (cf. Section 
4.3.1 for the use of ideal types). This approach by no means renounces explanation 
and generalisation, but “it leads to a different type of explanation and different 
degrees of generalization” (Ragin & Zaret, 1983, p. 741). Qualitative/case-based 
comparisons often employ “genetic explanations” which, according to Ernest Nagel, 
demonstrate “why it is that a given subject of study has certain characteristics, by 
describing how the subject has evolved out of some earlier one”. Genetic explanations 
include “singular statements about past events” and “those events which are 
mentioned are selected on the basis of assumptions (frequently tacit ones) as to what 
sorts of events are causally relevant” (Nagel, 1961, p. 25). Criteria for assumptions 
about explanatory relevance are objective possibility (“relationships which our 
imagination accepts as plausibly motivated”) and logical consistence (Weber, 1949, p. 
92). Variation across cases then does not need to be associated with different 
underlying factors, but might also relate to similar factors playing out differently within 
cases (Abbott, 1988). 
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b) Quantitative/variable-based comparisons 
By contrast, in variable-based or analytic approaches cases are being treated 
as carriers of specific variables only (Ragin, 1989, p. 3), thus blanking out large parts of 
their context. Durkheim’s associated comparative strategy consists of emulating 
laboratory experiments in the natural sciences (Ragin & Zaret, 1983, p. 732). In this, 
he advocates “social species”, i.e. discrete types of societies, as intermediaries 
“between the confused multitude of historical societies and the unique, although 
ideal, concept of humanity” (Durkheim, 1982, p. 109). Importantly, Durkheim sees 
social species’ attributes as permanent over time which corresponds to regarding a 
variety of social species as given rather than “historical phases” (Ragin & Zaret, 1983, 
p. 734). Evidence of a permanent cause then is concomitant variation of effects or 
variables. Quantitative-statistical studies of cross-societal data predominantly stem 
from Durkheim’s comparative strategy, though using different units of analysis (Ragin 
& Zaret, 1983, pp. 736–737). 
c) Contrasting case-based and variable-based approaches to comparison 
Andrew Abbott (1992) trenchantly concludes how both comparative 
strategies, which he describes as case/narrative and population/analytic, differ – 
thereby carving out the formers’ benefits. First, the population/analytic approach 
requires clearly delimitable cases and assigns them properties with trans-case 
meanings while the case/narrative approach “assumes cases will have fuzzy 
boundaries, takes all properties to have case-specific meanings, analyses by 
simplifying presumably complex cases, and allows, even focuses on, case 
transformation” (Abbott, 1992, p. 64). Second, where the case/narrative approach 
ignores variables where they are not narratively important, population/analytic 
approaches must consider all included variables. In this way, the case/narrative 
explanation is led by what should be explained, instead of taking universal or constant 
relevance of factors as a basis. Third, “[t]his selective attention goes along with an 
emphasis on contingency. Things happen because of constellations of factors, not 
because of a few fundamental effects acting independently” (Abbott, 1992, p. 68). 
Fourth, there is no need in the case/narrative approach to assume that all causes lie 
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on a same analytical level as is the case in standard sociological models, but small 
factors (e.g. an assassination) can potentially have crucial effects (Abbott, 1992, p. 68; 
this relates to path dependency: Mahoney, 2000). Having set out the logic of the 
qualitative/case-based comparison, the following takes it into practice. 
4.2.2 A comparative case study design 
a) Establishing the comparative case study method 
This study makes use of the virtues of the comparative method in a qualitative 
case study design, as justified and illustrated in the following. The comparative case 
study method suits the aim of this research as it facilitates a normative discussion 
about how both regimes account for sustainability – potentially having policy 
implications. A single case study on the one hand would not open up comparative 
possibilities. A quantitative, variable-based comparison on the other would impede to 
“focus[] on understanding the dynamics present within single settings” (Eisenhardt, 
1989, p. 534) as an objective of this study. This is because variable-based approaches 
ignore much of cases’ contexts, so that “comparativists […] are often unfamiliar with 
the populations constituting their data bases” (Ragin & Zaret, 1983, p. 740). By 
contrast, Abbott (1992, p. 65) describes the case-based method as a way “to seeing 
cases as engaged in a perpetual dialogue with their environment, a dialogue of action 
and constraint that we call plot”. Equally stressing the relevance of context, Yin defines 
a case study as “[a]n empirical inquiry that closely examines a contemporary 
phenomenon (the case) within its real-world context” (Yin, 2015, p. 194; emphasis in 
original). Context essentially matters to this research in terms of institutional 
frameworks and multi-level governance, social, economic and historical embeddings 
as well as interacting conventional understandings and moralities. These are 
understood as reflected in different combinations of factors in the two settings. Also, 
an a priori separation into variables would not resonate with the interpretive co-
production frame which requires openness and induction to unfold, as well as the 
possibility to take evolution over time into account (Abbott, 1992, p. 53). In sum, the 
qualitative, case-oriented approach fits this study with its sensitivity to complexity and 
suitability to examine empirical historical outcomes in their contexts, often forming 
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the basis to develop new conceptual schemes (Ragin, 1989, p. ix). Having justified the 
comparative case study method, I discuss its application, credibility and 
generalisability subsequently. 
b) Applying the comparative case study method 
As main aims of comparative research, Charles Ragin (1994, pp. 108–112) 
distills: to explore diversity, to interpret cultural or historical significance and to 
advance theory. As an explanatory undertaking, this study attempts to contribute in 
relation to all these three objectives. The first two are embedded through the case 
selection (cf. Section 4.3) and pursued in relation to the conceptual framework, the 
approach to the latter is discussed forth following. 
This study primarily employs analytic induction, i.e. “the systematic 
examination of similarities within and across cases to develop concepts, ideas, or 
theories” (Pascale, 2011, p. 53). This inductive approach means that preconceptions 
about the subject matter are limited and that the researcher “will rather let the 
empirical world decide which questions are worth seeking an answer to” (S. 
Brinkmann & Kvale, 2014, p. 224). According to a conventional view in the social 
sciences, case studies are methodologically inferior to large-n studies and cannot be 
of value unless they are linked to hypotheses and follow the hypothetico-deductive 
model of explanation (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 220). However, this emphasis on 
generalisation should be put into perspective as only one way of creating knowledge 
since “[p]redictive theories and universals cannot be found in the study of human 
affairs” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 224). The purpose of this case study lies in providing 
concrete and context-dependent knowledge and in interpreting it comparatively. 
Restricting it only to a priori defined hypotheses would limit its scope, as the 
understanding evolves in the course of research.  
In practice, the ideal-typical inductive, deductive and abductive modes of 
analysis are not neatly separated. Their flexible combination better suits “the 
unpredictable conversational world of human beings” (S. Brinkmann & Kvale, 2014, p. 
225). This study therefore also pragmatically makes deductive and abductive moves 
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by drawing on previous concepts and theorisation, inter alia in relation to urban and 
welfare state regimes. The research process then is iterative and flexible, moving back 
and forth between analysis and interpretation of the collected data and consideration 
of previous research and theory.  
Corresponding to the social constructivist underpinnings of this study (cf. 
Section 2.3.4), understanding the co-production of urban policies and social order in 
two regimes involves interpreting case-specific meanings. It implies multiple realities, 
meanings and situated knowledge of the interviewees and the researcher. These 
multiple meanings must be reflected by the knowledge claims that the research 
makes. Accordingly, I do not assume any ‘true’ meaning, but an “interrelational 
conception in which meanings are constructed and reconstructed through 
conversational interactions” (S. Brinkmann & Kvale, 2014, p. 246).  
Finally, this study flexibly and creatively uses research methods in order to 
answer the research questions (cf. Section 1.2). The underlying belief is that “good 
social science is problem driven and not methodology driven” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, pp. 
242–243). It corresponds to the pragmatist understanding of sociological theory that 
“[w]here problems lie and how they are to be solved do not derive from a single 
correct strategy” (Holmwood, 2011, p. 25). Techniques of analysis are non-formal and 
not pre-determined, but are chosen in the light of how the study unfolds and guided 
by what should be explained (cf. Section 4.5.3). 
c) Credibility 
With methods of qualitative/case-based research being less codified than of 
quantitative/variable-based research, there are little methodological guarantees. This 
opens up possibilities for problem-focused and creative social inquiry (Holmwood, 
2014, p. 14). However, disposing of little quantifiable and comparable standards also 
challenges case study research, deriving from caveats about its credibility and 
reliability. This may have contributed to a strong scepticism about case studies and 
their findings in general (Yin, 2015, p. 196). These challenges are being addressed by 
strengthening credibility through “show[ing] explicitly how [the case study] has 
  93 
collected and presented its evidence, both completely and fairly”, which involves 
applying certain methodological procedures (Yin, 2015, p. 197). As three ways to do 
so, I address “creating an aura of trustworthiness, dealing with concerns over validity, 
and striving for reliability” (Yin, 2015, p. 197; emphasis in original), in the remainder 
of this section.     
Trustworthiness. The interpretivist approach of this research renders 
trustworthiness an important requirement (Yin, 2015, p. 197). While acknowledging 
the constructed nature of this representation (Eisenhart, 2006, p. 573), a case study 
should demonstrate that the data and interpretations are accurate from some point 
of view, which also involves reporting about the reflexivity or two-way interplay 
between the researcher and the research participants (Eisenhart, 2006, pp. 575–579; 
Yin, 2015, p. 197); attending to complexity and ambiguity. Different procedures should 
build the trustworthiness of this research. First, I logged deliberations, decisions and 
my proceeding throughout the study. Second, I kept a research diary to reflect on the 
research process, including my perceptions, expectations and what may have 
contradicted or changed them (for reflexivity cf. Section 4.4.4). Aspects of the first 
entered the thesis and both practices imprinted on it. Third, I included how this 
research developed and shifted in the process. 
Validity. The validity concept largely stems from a realist epistemology. 
However, validity is a particular strength of the interpretivist approach which this 
study adopts. For instance, where quantitative/variable-based research often assumes 
content validity through a seemingly apparent face validity without any further 
validation (Bortz & Döring, 2006, p. 200) – which ultimately remains uncertain –, I 
examine via interviews whether issues of interest have been understood in similar 
ways by researcher and interviewees. Validity also matters to this study in terms of its 
explanatory aspiration: “[i]n setting forth its main explanation, a case study needs to 
amass credible data in support of these claimed relationships” (Yin, 2015, p. 197). 
Accordingly, I substantiated interpretive claims by evidence derived from the analyses 
and linked them to relevant research, aiming for consistency and coherence. 
Reliability: transparency and triangulation. In terms of reliability,  
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“[t]he case study needs to convince readers that data have been collected and 
analysed consistently and fairly and that the case study descriptions represent the 
claimed reality or the perspective of field informants – but not the analyst’s 
imagination” (Yin, 2015, p. 198).  
Putting this into practice, I aim for a transparent approach throughout, including  
robust data collection techniques and documenting the research procedure (Bowen, 
2009, p. 29). Notwithstanding, exact replicability is not an objective that can or should 
be achieved in all steps, also because it depends upon previous knowledge and 
theorisation by the researcher (cf. also Section 4.4.4).  
Triangulation, which “occurs when the evidence from several different sources 
converges on the same finding” (Yin, 2015, p. 198), helps increasing a study’s 
reliability. Since case studies provide the according conditions, “the fieldwork should 
deliberately seek to corroborate key findings by searching for multiple sources of 
evidence” (Yin, 2015, p. 199). I therefore draw on various documentary sources, i.e. 
strategies, plans, websites and instruments of consultation and engagement, 
interviews and numerous secondary sources. This enables triangulation by source and 
by method which can reduce systematic biases.  
d) Generalisability 
Yin (2015, p. 199) describes the ‘how’ of generalisation in case studies as 
follows:  
“The generalizing procedure involves extracting a more abstract level of ideas from 
a case study’s findings and asserting, mainly through careful argument than any 
numeric or statistical calculation, how these ideas might pertain to newer 
situations other than those in the original study”.  
The claimed impossibility to generalise from one or a few cases is a major objection 
against the case study method. Flyvbjerg (2006, p. 228; italicised in original) effectively 
challenges this widespread belief by concluding that  
“[o]ne can often generalize on the basis of a single case, and the case study may 
be central to scientific development via generalisation as supplement or 
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alternative to other methods. But formal generalisation is overvalued as a source 
of scientific development, whereas ‘the force of example’ is underestimated.”  
He puts formal generalisation – the increasingly significant paradigm in many social 
sciences – into perspective by identifying it as “only one of many ways by which people 
gain and accumulate knowledge” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, pp. 226–227).  
Being familiar with both sides of the argument, I support Flyvbjerg’s view since 
it allows drawing normative cognitions from social research and employing it in ways 
which matter to societies. After all, significant policy instances have been adopted by 
learning from others. I realise this perspective through practical implications which 
generalise based on the comparative case study (cf. Section 8.9). Subsequently, I 
consider the scope of this study in conjunction with its case selection. 
4.3 Case selection 
Choosing cases for comparison in a theoretically useful way requires 
establishing according selection criteria. Though their relevance might change during 
a study, transparency about initial considerations is important in terms of 
trustworthiness; as is openness and flexibility to how cases might move differently 
while conducting the case study. Since this PhD research has been developed as part 
of the Leverhulme Programme Grant “Sustaining Urban Habitats: An Interdisciplinary 
Approach”, its empirical cases have broadly been determined from the outset with 
Nottingham and Stuttgart. Consequently, this multiple-case study needs to be 
designed in a way that the empirical instances can function as useful exemplars 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006) in relation to the broad topic of sustainability, British and German 
urban contexts. Weberian ideal types as preliminary constructs and high variation in 
conditions relevant to co-production justify the case selection subsequently.  
4.3.1 Governance regimes as ideal types 
a) Uses of ideal types 
The concept of ideal types has been introduced by Max Weber who describes 
them as follows: 
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“An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of 
view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present 
and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged 
according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical 
construct. In its conceptual purity, this mental construct cannot be found 
empirically anywhere in reality” (Weber, 1949, p. 90). 
Ideal types serve several related functions: as an aid to conceptualise research 
subjects – the approach I take –, to help identifying and assessing adequate causes, 
and to provide a basis for explanations of historical diversity (Ragin & Zaret, 1983, p. 
741). In the latter two senses, ideal types are employed in deductive-analytical ways 
(Clarke, 2015, p. 519). As analytical categories, they are claimed to enable the 
identification and separation of underlying causal factors which are concealed by a 
complex interplay of causes. Simplification via abstraction and the identification of 
useful ideal types are in this way aimed to serve explanatory generalisations (Clarke, 
2015, p. 518):  
“For whatever content the ideal type is given … its only value … for empirical 
investigations lies in its purpose: to ‘compare’ empirical reality with it, so as to 
ascertain … the distance or degree of approximation between [reality and the 
type], and thus to be able to describe and causally to explain [reality] in terms of 
clearly understandable concepts” (Weber, 1922, pp. 534–536; as cited in Ringer, 
2002, p. 174). 
However, as ideal types do not exist in reality, generalisations based on them 
are actually not suitable for explanation or prediction, “since the things they would 
allow us to explain or predict never happen”, thus making them unfalsifiable 
(Papineau, 1976, pp. 137; 139). 
A different interpretation of ideal types from that conceived by Weber is to 
employ them inductively as preliminary concepts open to empirical exploration, as 
suggested by David Papineau (1976). I employ this approach. As auxiliary structures, 
ideal types in this sense serve to select and justify starting points for an analysis which 
subsequently provides in-depth insight into one or several cases from the angle 
provided by the previously described ideal types. An aim can then be to develop 
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frameworks of generalisations based on the empirical investigation, rather than only 
filling such existing frameworks empirically. Frameworks of generalisations might be 
developed by means of “partially articulated suggestions” of the following kind: 
“suggestions about the limits within which situations approximating to the ideal 
type situation will approximately satisfy the consequent term of the ideal type 
generalisation; suggestions about the dimensions along which such 
approximations can fruitfully be differentiated; suggestions about the kinds of 
generalisations that might relate specific approximations thus differentiated; etc.” 
(Papineau, 1976, p. 145; emphasis in original). 
In this way, ideal types can be essential in the production of systematic 
frameworks of comparison (Papineau, 1976, p. 146). The according case selection can 
be grounded in how cases or their broader categories have been conceived by 
previous research. Corresponding justifications are then not based on showing that a 
case fits into a certain – “otiose” – position in a framework of generalisations, “but, if 
at all, by the possibility that it might lead to the elaboration of such a framework” 
(Papineau, 1976, p. 146). The following section takes this ideal type approach into 
practice.   
b) Employing ideal types as preliminary constructs 
Corresponding to the predominantly inductive design of this study, ideal types 
derived from previous research serve as preliminary constructs to justify the case 
selection and to guide the empirical analysis. As outlined in Section 3.3.4, the urban 
governance literature suggests a shift from more hierarchical types of an older, 
‘Weberian’ bureaucracy towards ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) and a more 
networked governance. Considering the two current city strategies (cf. Section 4.4.2), 
Stuttgart resembles the Weberian bureaucracy in many respects. In contrast, 
Nottingham significantly approximates NPM principles. Accordingly, I adopt these two 
ideal types, as described in Sections 3.3.4 a) and b), preliminarily for the empirical 
exploration of their governance regimes. Being bound into two different 
configurations of capitalism, the regimes are at the same time exemplars for the liberal 
(UK) and the conservative-corporatist (Germany) welfare state types (Esping-
  98 
Andersen, 1990) as well as for liberal (UK) and coordinated market economies (Hall & 
Soskice, 2001) (cf. Section 3.2). Units of analysis are therefore the urban governance 
regimes in context. 
Relating to the conceptual framework, I am theorising the regime types as two 
different ways of co-producing policies and social order. With the ideal types as 
starting and guiding points of the comparison, the objective is to enrich them 
empirically and to better understand the regimes’ nature and phenomena they evince. 
This implies that the initial ideal types as heuristic devices are open for investigation 
and that the empirical regimes are likely hybrids of different governance concepts – as 
interpreted in Section 8.2. Findings throughout the thesis can help understanding 
governance beyond the two cases. 
4.3.2 Areas of homogeneity and diversity 
Besides governance regimes as ideal types, areas of homogeneity and diversity 
render Nottingham and Stuttgart interesting cases for comparison following an 
information-oriented case selection (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 230). For this, cases first need 
to parallel each other sufficiently – thus defining boundaries for the case selection – 
and then be comparable along certain specified dimensions (Berg-Schlosser, 2015, p. 
441). According areas of homogeneity are systems of democratic capitalism in mid-
size11 European cities in the early 21st century.  
“A second consideration concerns the extent of diversity within the selected 
universe. In this regard, a maximum of heterogeneity for a minimum number of cases 
should be achieved” (Berg-Schlosser, 2015, p. 441). Indeed, Nottingham and Stuttgart 
diverge significantly regarding average socio-economic living conditions, public 
budgets and levels of local autonomy, inequalities and states of (de-)industrialisation 
(cf. Section 3.4) – conditions of relevance for social order and how it is co-produced 
                                                     
11 Although the cities’ administrative boundaries are not directly comparable (cf. Section 4.3.3), a 
limitation is that Nottingham (unitary authority) with 329,200 inhabitants in 2018 (Nottingham City 
Council, 2019a) is smaller than Stuttgart (urban district) with 611,213 inhabitants in January 2018 
(Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, n.d.-c). 
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with local policies. Consequently, Nottingham and Stuttgart fit the criterion of 
‘maximum variation cases’, having the purpose “[t]o obtain information about the 
significance of various circumstances for case process and outcome” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, 
p. 230). In these properties, the cases form two relatively extreme settings which help 
understanding more general connections relevant to other cases. 
4.3.3 Situating the cases temporally and spatially 
Delimiting cases temporally and spatially can be challenging given the 
messiness of the social world (Yin, 2015, p. 195). Indeed, this study’s case/narrative 
approach assumes fuzzy boundaries. Corresponding to limited time resources, this 
case study’s design is primarily cross-sectional, comparing two contemporary 
governance regimes. Due to the creation dates of some documents (cf. Section 4.4.2) 
and interview data collection (cf. Section 4.4.3), the time frame of selected data items 
for the comparative case study is September 2004 until June 2018 with an emphasis 
on more recent items since ca. 2010. Notwithstanding, case introductions and the 
explanatory undertaking require further sources beyond the – therefore fuzzy – cases’ 
delimitations.  
For practical reasons, spatial boundaries comply with the local authorities’ 
territories, i.e. Nottingham unitary authority and the urban district of Stuttgart. It 
could be argued that these demarcations lack comparability in terms of social and 
economic structures with Nottingham’s boundaries being drawn around an urban core 
which excludes directly adjacent areas such as Rushcliffe, Gedling or Broxtowe12, but 
Stuttgart’s seemingly stretching out further. Though comparability of the employed 
city boundaries would be desirable (and hard to establish), fit with local policy 
                                                     
12 There is the argument that Nottingham’s boundaries lead to a socio-economically unbalanced 
picture, as deprived areas concentrate within the unitary authority and considerably more affluent ones 
lie beyond its territory (Nottingham City Council, 2012, p. 10), as visualised with Figure 2. However, 
strong segregation and concentrated deprivation are characteristics both of the Nottingham case and 
the UK’s high inequalities, as condensed in major conurbations (Nottingham City Council, 2012, p. 10). 
Indeed, equally tight boundaries around Stuttgart would provide a very different, partly even opposed 
picture, since over-average incomes concentrate in inner-city districts (cf. Figure 4) and national income 
inequality is lower (OECD, 2018a).  
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approaches and processes is more important. The spatial boundaries of the case study 
cities are fuzzy since their embedding matters, so that I take regional, state and 
national contexts into account. Having justified the case selection, I subsequently 
describe the study’s research methods. 
4.4 Research methods and data collection 
This research combines policy documents and semi-structured interviews in a 
multistage approach to compare and explain how governance in Nottingham and 
Stuttgart relates to sustainability. Results of each phase inform foci and 
methodological choices of the following stage. The successive phases and related data 
sets are:  
1. Analysis of the two current city strategies 
2. Extended document analysis of selected sectoral strategies and 
consultation instruments 
3. Semi-structured interviews with informants, including key 
stakeholders 
The aim of this study poses the challenge of how to select and analyse relevant 
data, since these are abundant (e.g. consultation minutes, position papers, news 
reports, web and social media contents). I aim at an effective, rigorous and 
comprehensible approach. Given the time constraints of the project, I attempt to 
select particularly purposive and informative data sources in relation to the research 
questions. Besides, I follow the cases and research issues relevant to them through 
various sources – in this way processing within-cases and triangulating by sources. 
Therefore, I draw on newspaper reports and websites since they often provide local 
information which academic sources or official figures do not. I also make connections 
to structural conditions in both places which partly requires approximation via 
regional or national level data due to a lack of cross-nationally comparable urban level 
data. In relation to this strategy, I argue that social science is more meaningful when 
it not only resorts to questions where completely robust (mostly quantitative) data are 
available, as this leads to a sort of confinement in a ‘cage of data availability’, which is 
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itself characterised by the very conditions social sciences seek to understand and 
question. Instead, creatively approaching questions by also drawing on indications 
that appear relevant (and are of course up for discussion), making connections based 
on objective possibility and logical consistence, allows a more holistic and critical 
engagement with the social world – as in this study. The following sections explain the 
selection of within-case data, the familiarisation with the cases, data collection and 
address reflexivity and research ethics.   
4.4.1 Familiarisation with the cases 
Before and during this PhD research, I familiarised myself with the two case 
study cities. I got to know both of them as a resident and followed public life – in 
Stuttgart for two and a half years and in Nottingham for over three years. I attended 
diverse public events and discussions, e.g. about social housing in Nottingham or 
refugee issues in Stuttgart and co-organised talks about financial citizenship and fuel 
poverty in Nottingham. In Stuttgart, I was a member of the District Advisory Council 
(‘Bezirksbeirat’, a formal instrument of citizen participation) of Stuttgart-Bad 
Cannstatt for the party Alliance 90/The Greens for more than a year. Besides, desktop 
research inter alia encompasses legal and institutional frameworks, levels of 
governance, political life and debate, socio-economic data and previous research 
about both cities.  
4.4.2 Policy documents 
Selected policy documents13 have been analysed to (a) answer the research 
questions as far as possible, i.e. to compile and interpret policies across both cities, (b) 
to provide sufficient insight into both co-production regimes in order to specify whom 
and how to interview and (c) to further develop my knowledge and understanding of 
the two cases. The document analysis thus supports triangulation and theory building 
(Bowen, 2009, p. 35). 
                                                     
13 ‘Policy documents’ and ‘documents’ are used interchangeably for this data source.  
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I conducted a first exploratory document analysis using the two city strategies 
‘City of Nottingham Sustainable Community Strategy 2020. Family, Neighbourhood, 
City: Raising Aspirations’ (One Nottingham, 2009) and ‘Stadtentwicklungskonzept 
Strategie 2006’ (Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, 2006).14 The rationale for this data set as 
a starting point was that these documents were still the current overall city strategies 
at the time of analysis (January 2017), thus setting the envisaged directions of 
development for both cities and spanning many policy fields. This initial analysis 
provides insights about governance, imagined futures, prevailing issues and policies in 
both regimes for justifying the case selection in terms of ideal types (cf. Section 4.3.1). 
Coinciding with the theoretical expectation, they diverge significantly in many 
respects. 
Based on this, an extended and refined analysis of documents, mostly sectoral 
strategies and plans, was a useful next step. Reasons to construct this data set were 
(a) to include more current policies and debates and (b) thereby to broaden the scope 
of policy areas for the comparison. The aim here was not to collect detailed knowledge 
about one policy field or issue, but a broad brush overview. This critical engagement 
with policy documents (c) elicited significant information in relation to the research 
questions and the co-production regimes in terms of related reason, conventions and 
morality. Finally, (d) modes of developing policies, e.g. with stakeholders, become 
apparent in some documents. After all, the policy documents are rich sources of data 
for the case studies, as they are often products of various meetings and consultations.  
The rationale for selecting further documents was to include publicly and 
online available strategies, plans and websites which detail policies and objectives in 
many policy areas. I attempted to only include the most actual available strategy or 
plan, respectively. Due to time restrictions, not all policy areas could be covered. I limit 
the selection to areas which appear relatively fundamental (e.g. economic policy), 
significant to the regimes or in their comparison (e.g. public health) and/or relevant to 
                                                     
14 I refer to these two as ‘current city strategies’. 
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research questions and theorisation. Furthermore, I aimed to include the main 
instruments of consultation and engagement as evidence of according involvement 
and citizens’ views. Hereby, a selection criterion was that websites and documents 
repeatedly referred to these instruments. Although I researched carefully and 
repeatedly, I might have missed certain relevant strategies or their most actual 
version; and not all relevant strategies might be available online. 
The time frame of the case studies (cf. Section 4.3.3) also depends on the 
creation dates of the selected documents. These lie between September 2004 and 
August 2017, until when I chose documents to analyse. The starting date equals the 
publication date of the first document of Stuttgart’s current city strategy, 
‘Stadtentwicklungskonzept Entwurf 2004’ (Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, 2004). 
Considered documents in both cities therefore date back maximum until September 
2004 to set comparable time frames, also in relation to external developments such 
as the financial crisis of 2007/2008.  
A scoping exercise of the webpages and available documents of both cities 
preceded their selection. For Nottingham, I selected 38 data items for analysis (cf. 
Appendix B) Analysed policy documents). Hereto, the 15 of 1615 strategies and plans 
which the database ‘Nottingham Insight’ listed as “Nottingham key strategies” 
(Nottingham City Council, 2017f) have been included.16 I then searched “strategy plan” 
on Nottingham Insight (Nottingham City Council, 2017g), considered the 100 
“Document results” and selected further 18 strategies and plans according to the 
above rationale. Some of these are summaries of strategies. Finally, I included five 
instruments of consultation and engagement by the city council from the website 
‘Engage Nottingham Hub’ (Nottingham City Council, 2017c) and from the Nottingham 
Insight Document Library ‘Local Engagement and Consultation’ (Nottingham City 
Council, 2017b). For Stuttgart, I selected 45 documents and websites for analysis (cf. 
                                                     
15 Excepted here is the ‘Nottingham Growth plan - annual review 2014’. 
16 One Nottingham's ‘20 year Vision for 2030’ is mentioned in a number of documents and might be 
considered a key strategy. However, I could not obtain it online nor through enquiries at One 
Nottingham and Nottingham City Council. 
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Appendix B) Analysed policy documents). The three documents which form part of and 
lead up to the current city strategy have been included as key strategies along with a 
document about the development of a new strategy ‘Stuttgart 2030’. As there was no 
encompassing online document database for Stuttgart, I comprehensively researched 
the city administration’s webpages for further strategies and plans. Since deliberate 
strategies have not been formulated in many policy areas, I partly included websites 
and documents summarising policy approaches, programmes and directives, 
amounting to 36 further strategies, plans and outlines. Finally, I selected five 
instruments of consultation and engagement based on the online research. 
Across Nottingham and Stuttgart, 83 documents form part of the analysis, 
mostly published by the local administrations and partnerships. The documents’ 
length lays between one and 290 pages. Their formats are text documents, websites 
and illustrated brochures. As an effective approach, I only analysed a fraction of most 
documents (cf. Section 4.5.1). All of them have been downloaded from the websites 
and transferred into PDF format if they had another format. Webpages have been 
saved in PDF format. I then uploaded all files into the qualitative data analysis software 
NVivo 11. 
4.4.3 Interviews 
Building on the findings of the document analyses, I have conducted qualitative 
semi-structured interviews with informants17, aiming to include key stakeholders in 
both cities.18 Where the former provided broad overviews in relation to the research 
questions, the latter enhanced my understanding of debates, knowledge and power 
constellations in the two regimes through various actors’ perceptions. Relating to the 
research aim and questions, the interviews (cf. Appendix D) Interview guideline) 
addressed inter alia views about (formal and informal) urban policy negotiations; 
about which actors are considered important in them and informants’ potential 
                                                     
17 ‘Informant’ and ‘interviewee’ are used interchangeably.  
18 I understand stakeholders as persons who can considerably affect local policies or issues or have a 
particular interest in them. 
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involvement; about how urban policies and objectives relate to social justice and 
account for future generations; about interviewees’ priorities for the cities; about the 
cities’ future and the role of economic growth in it; and about the interdependence of 
political and economic spheres. Through the interviews, I attempted to comprehend 
interests and meaning from participants’ viewpoints. In relation to the constructionist 
approach, they are understood as “locally produced in and through the social practice 
of interviewing” (S. Brinkmann & Kvale, 2014, p. 172). I strived for rich descriptions to 
facilitate later interpretation and theoretical reading (S. Brinkmann & Kvale, 2014, pp. 
269; 274) – and to understand the co-creation of policy-making with values, power 
and rationalisations in both governance regimes. Thereby, subjective views matter 
because they influence actions, as expressed by the ’Thomas theorem’: “if men define 
situations as real, they are real in their consequences” (W. I. Thomas & Thomas, 1928, 
p. 572; as cited in Merton, 1995, p. 380). 
I aimed to interview informants from the sectors local politics and 
administration, business and civil society in each city, particularly those who appeared 
formally or informally most relevant to shaping the cities’ policies and development.19 
Besides, I endeavoured to include a diversity of views in order to provide good 
potential for comparison (Barbour, 2014, p. 68). My sampling strategy was therefore 
not randomised, but purposive. The aim was not a representative sample, but to 
include key informants. Participants have been identified through the familiarisation 
with the cases, the document analyses, focused searches and ‘snowball sampling’ 
during the interviews. I incrementally contacted 199 potential interviewees or their 
institutions, possibly through their professional affiliations. 109 of them referred to 
Nottingham: 45 were politicians or public sector employees, 35 business 
representatives and 29 civil society representatives. 90 pertained to Stuttgart: 30 were 
                                                     
19 In tendency, I therefore focus on more powerful people – thereby contributing to understanding an 
under-researched group in sociology compared to the less powerful (Neal & Mclaughlin, 2009, pp. 689–
690). 
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politicians or public sector employees, 37 business representatives and 23 civil society 
representatives. 
The realised sample consists of 78 interviews with 81 informants – sometimes 
two interviewees took part in a conversation. 45 of the interviews (with 47 
interviewees) relate to Nottingham, whereby 11 informants were politicians, 18 were 
public sector employees, eight were business representatives and 10 were civil society 
representatives. 33 interviews (with 34 informants) relate to Stuttgart. Nine of those 
interviewees were politicians, five were public sector employees, nine were business 
representatives and 11 were civil society representatives. Where this does not disclose 
interviewees’ identity, informants were inter alia elected politicians, representatives 
of the city administrations and other public institutions, of business associations, small 
to large companies, of civil society groups, pressure groups, faith groups, unions, 
charities, foundations, social services associations and other institutions focusing on 
civil society issues. The sample comprises of a number of key informants in both 
places. I aimed to include comparable functions across both regimes, but depended 
on actors’ willingness to participate. This latter, interviewees’ openness and the 
insights I gained through the interviews frequently exceeded my expectations, so that 
I conducted more interviews than initially intended up to a point where I felt a certain 
saturation in terms of issues and interpretations that came up. This happened later in 
Nottingham – the context with which I was still less familiar – than in Stuttgart, partly 
explaining diverging interview numbers. I further describe interviewees’ 
characteristics in Sections 5.3 and 5.6. 
In practice, the interview guideline functioned as an orientation only. Aiming 
for a conversational interview style, I left out some questions and added others, e.g. 
critical interpretive questions (S. Brinkmann & Kvale, 2014, p. 245). I partly expanded 
on issues that the interviewees brought up or which appeared critical to a case; and 
adapted questions in relation to sectors and informants. To refine my interview 
questions prior to fieldwork, I carried out a pilot interview with a native English 
speaker and academic stakeholder in Nottingham.  
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I only conducted interviews after participants took note of the participant 
information sheet and gave their consent by signing the according form (cf. Appendix 
C) Consent form), both of which I sent them in advance. Interviews took place between 
December 2017 and June 2018 and have all been audio-recorded, often lasting for ca. 
1 to 1,5 hours. Besides, I took notes. All of the Stuttgart interviews and 37 of the 45 
Nottingham interviews have been transcribed (few only partially), using funds of the 
Leverhulme Programme Grant “Sustaining Urban Habitats: An Interdisciplinary 
Approach”. Weighing up effort and costs, I refrained from transcriptions for some 
interviews where informants did not really open up and/or which I would unlikely cite. 
4.4.4 Reflexivity 
Since preconceptions with which I have conducted this research are significant, 
I aimed to check and question these in a (self-)critical and adaptive approach – partly 
through a research diary (cf. Section 4.2.2 c)). Besides, I tried to avoid an account that 
presents itself as superior to the views of actors in the field (S. Brinkmann & Kvale, 
2014, p. 246; Holmwood, 2014). Hereto, the interviews allowed me to enquire about 
actors’ interpretations and to compare and challenge my own interpretations on these 
grounds. This relates to many interviewees’ in-depth local knowledge and 
understanding. I aim to include and compare these views in order to improve the 
coherence of explanations. At the same time, my research possibly interacts with 
actors’ interpretations, e.g. through the exchange during the interview, and could 
thereby equally influence its object of study (Chilvers & Kearnes, 2015, p. 24). 
Furthermore, Kaufmann (2013, p. 13) rightly emphasises 
“national idiosyncrasies in […] comparative welfare state research, and [how] the 
conceptualizations as well as the normative criteria of the comparison take their 
cues from the peculiarities of welfare state arrangements in the scientist’s own 
society. […] With this, however, every international comparison becomes 
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prejudiced, and a perspective that looks at the differences of national peculiarities 
without bias is rendered impossible.” 
Correspondingly and particularly with the intensifying ‘Brexit’ crisis, I felt 
increasingly estranged by political, societal and economic developments in the UK. I 
also became more conscious of my cultural rooting, inter alia within a more 
continental welfare state conception. My views and values necessarily underlie and 
shape this work to some extent, carrying (more) prejudice in relation to the 
Nottingham case. I addressed this by attempting to interact with and interview diverse 
persons, draw on many and diverse sources of information and re-check my 
interpretations with data and interviewees. This also caused the higher number of 
Nottingham interviews. 
In both cities, I perceived my access to interviewees as relatively privileged, 
which might to some extent relate to partly similar backgrounds and experiences. 
These are relatively often being white, from affluent Global North countries, middle-
class, university-educated, civically or politically involved and working or having 
worked in the public sector. These are privileged traits in many respects – and likely 
impact on our views and prejudices. Having moved away from Stuttgart, my active 
Green Party engagement rested during my time in Nottingham. In relation to it, I 
aimed to encounter informants and data in open and unbiased ways from the point of 
view of a researcher. I conducted one interview with a civil society representative 
whom I knew personally through my political engagement. Otherwise, party affiliation 
did not seem to impact markedly on my realised sample – e.g. did Stuttgart’s Green 
Party mayor refuse an interview.  
4.4.5 Research ethics 
Considering ethical issues in relation to social research is an integral part of it. 
Prior to the collection of any data which were not freely accessible in the public 
domain, this research received ethical approval from the School of Sociology and 
Social Policy at the University of Nottingham. I ensured informed consent by clearly 
informing interviewees about all aspects of the study which may be relevant for their 
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decision to take part through a participant information sheet and by offering further 
discussion beforehand (The University of Nottingham, 2016, p. 20). This has been 
documented by signing a consent form (cf. Appendix C) Consent form).   
Confidentiality and anonymity are particular challenges for this study. 
Conventions of both are not static and their application can be complex (Lancaster, 
2017, p. 100):  
“As such researchers […] must resolve a dilemma: (a) they can disclose accurately 
and faithfully their findings, potentially exposing respondents’ identities and 
placing them at risk of harm; or (b) they can withhold certain information (or alter 
it in some way), thus raising some questions about the accuracy of their studies” 
(Baez, 2002, pp. 35–36). 
Relating hereto, Lancaster (2017, p. 101) points out that “[r]especting 
participants’ concerns about the use of particular data, or choosing not to report 
sensitive issues, can maintain and perpetuate the very power relationships 
participants may fear or seek to uphold”. Since participants for this study have been 
selected because of their (professional) roles, specific statements could in principle 
disclose their identity (similarly: Lancaster, 2017, p. 100). I therefore ensure 
participant confidentiality and anonymity as far as possible, but cannot guarantee 
them entirely. I have excluded identifiable personal data from the stage of data 
storage onwards insofar as they appeared irrelevant from the perspective of theory 
and research questions. Interviewees have not been named, unless they agreed to be 
non-anonymously quoted and I found this added to the study. Where I was aware that 
participants could be readily identified, such identifying information was discarded to 
preserve their anonymity (Lancaster, 2017, p. 101). I offered participants to send them 
a copy of their interview transcript in order to review in terms of accuracy and 
providing clarifications – which some did. Moreover, participants had the opportunity 
to approve any anonymous and (if agreed to) direct quotes in draft copies of 
publications.  
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4.5 Data analysis 
Useful ways to answer the research questions were the familiarisation with the 
data, coding, meaning condensation and interpretation, qualitative thematic analysis, 
bricolage practices and theoretical reading. I applied these procedures of 
predominantly qualitative data analysis flexibly across data sets in relation to the stage 
of research and my understanding, as discussed subsequently.  
4.5.1 Familiarisation with the data and identification of parts for analysis  
To start the analysis, I read both current city strategies and familiarised myself 
with the other policy documents. On these bases, I decided which sections to analyse 
since time constraints demanded a selective and pragmatic proceeding.20 The 
rationale was that I considered them of particular interest in relation to research 
questions and conceptualisation. Having conducted the interviews, I was more familiar 
with their data and used my extensive notes and the transcripts to select sections for 
analysis. 
4.5.2 Coding 
Coding served to collate findings of the policy documents and to enable further 
analyses. It “involves attaching one or more keywords to a text segment in order to 
                                                     
20 Contrarily, Yin argues that  
“[i]n pursuing […] transparency, a particular ethical challenge arises in assuring 
readers that your case study has reported and fairly analysed all the collected data. 
Such a challenge also exists with other research methods, as in doing experiments, 
where a constant temptation is to find some procedural excuse to exclude data 
that might in fact have been contrary to initial expectations” (Yin, 2015, p. 197; 
emphasis in original).  
I argue against Yin’s generic rule that all collected data need to be analysed. In relation to this study, it 
would equal a straightjacket precluding the broad overview that the extended document analysis 
provides and the encompassing insights arising from interviewing a multitude of actors – and would 
thus unnecessarily curtail the possibilities of social research. Unlike Yin suspects, I was not tempted to 
exclude data that may contradict my expectations, but conversely sought these instances also beyond 
my data because I tried to represent the cases as fairly and accurately as I could. Since the described 
manipulations are possible at many stages of qualitative and quantitative research, fixed procedures 
cannot fully obviate them – and all research rests on a degree of trust and trustworthiness. 
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permit later identification of a statement” (S. Brinkmann & Kvale, 2014, p. 226). To 
provide an overview and to facilitate comparisons, I employed concept-driven and 
data-driven coding (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 89; S. Brinkmann & Kvale, 2014, pp. 227–
229). Aspects of the former were derived from research questions, assumed ideal 
types, urban governance and welfare state concepts and the co-production lens. 
Besides, I inductively coded for further regime instances appearing relevant. Using the 
software NVivo 11, codes have been developed, revised, grouped into categories and 
re-grouped in the process without a fixed scheme.  
4.5.3 Methods of analysis 
This research aims to flexibly and creatively use methods of analysis to answer 
the research questions. In practice, this implies moving beyond the common 
convention in the social sciences of choosing and applying a specific method. 
Brinkmann and Kvale (2014, p. 267) outline relatedly: 
“Many analyses of interviews are conducted without following any specific analytic 
technique. Some go beyond reliance on a single mode of analysis to include a free 
mixture of methods and techniques. Other interview analysts do not apply specific 
analytical procedures but rest on a general reading of the interview texts with 
theoretically informed interpretations, following from different philosophical 
paradigms.” 
Accordingly, I do not identify with a specific methodological paradigm 
prescribing theoretical requirements or practical proceedings. Instead, the study 
builds on a general reading of selected parts of the data and employs adaptable 
methods. These are not tied to certain theoretical underpinnings, are primarily 
concerned with content and meaning and only secondarily with language (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006, p. 81; S. Brinkmann & Kvale, 2014). They therefore suit the research 
questions, the constructionist epistemological stance and the co-productionist 
conceptualisation. The following sections discuss their use and the proceeding.   
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a) Qualitative thematic analysis 
“Thematic analysis is a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns 
(themes) within data. It minimally organizes and describes [a] data set in (rich) 
detail” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 79).  
The data-driven form of thematic analysis aims to elicit predominant themes 
of an entire data set (Braun & Clarke, 2006, pp. 83–84). As expounded by Braun & 
Clarke (2006, pp. 86–94 for a detailed explanation), I used it initially with the two 
current city strategies in order to identify relevant themes and policy areas in both 
cities, especially in relation to sustainability and economic inequality, i.e. the early 
research focus. This resulted in two thematic maps (cf. Appendix A) Thematic maps of 
the two current city strategies).  
b) Bricolage 
Bricolage is an eclectic form of meaning generation “through a multiplicity of 
ad hoc methods and conceptual approaches” (S. Brinkmann & Kvale, 2014, p. 267). 
“The bricolage interpreter adapts mixed technical discourses, moving freely between 
analytic techniques and concepts” (S. Brinkmann & Kvale, 2014, p. 267). I inter alia 
used the following bricolage techniques (cf. Miles & Huberman, 1994, pp. 245–246 for 
further explanation):  
 Noting patterns and themes 
 Seeing plausibility 
 Counting 
 Making contrasts and comparisons 
 Subsuming particulars under the general 
 Building a logical chain of evidence  
 Establishing conceptual/theoretical coherence 
c) Theoretical reading 
Theoretical reading refers to a theoretically informed reading of data items (S. 
Brinkmann & Kvale, 2014, p. 269). “This may […] suggest that recourse to specific 
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analytic tools becomes less important with a theoretical knowledge of the subject 
matter of an investigation and with a theoretically informed interview questioning” (S. 
Brinkmann & Kvale, 2014, p. 270). Employing theoretical reading, this was exactly the 
case in relation to my growing knowledge of both regimes. 
d) Meaning interpretation 
Meanings in the data have been interpreted in order to illuminate actors’ views 
and to enhance my understanding in relation to the study’s conceptualisation and 
research questions (S. Brinkmann & Kvale, 2014, p. 236). Brinkmann and Kvale (2014, 
p. 235) describe this process as follows: 
“The interpretation of meaning of interview texts goes beyond a structuring of the 
manifest meanings of what is said to deeper and more critical interpretations of 
the text […] [in order] to work out structures and relations of meanings not 
immediately apparent […]. [I]nterpretation recontextualizes the statements within 
broader frames of reference.” 
Collating data accompanied their interpretation in terms of two comparative 
tables. The first was based on the policy documents and their coding. It comprised the 
addressed policy areas and subordinate policy issues to understand priorities. The 
second table was organised around policies and policy objectives which came up 
during the case study (e.g. air pollution, infrastructure provision, teenager 
pregnancies, fuel poverty). I then researched respective policies, objectives or states 
of an issue for the other city and comparatively interpreted on these grounds how 
policies or objectives relate to sustainability (RQ 1). This often involved ambiguity and 
trade-offs which I attempted to understand. Cognitions and parts of both tables 
entered the thesis’ arguments and helped addressing the other research questions. 
Finally, I considered factors of the governance regimes and interpreted them in their 
combinations (RQ 4). Attempts at explanation originated from seeking tendencies and 
patterns, e.g. convergence or divergence, within the two cases (e.g. across policy 
issues) and between them. This process involved reflection based on the gained 
knowledge about both regimes, previous literature and theorisation as well as further 
inquiry and refinement based on these in an iterative process.  
  114 
Practically, my understanding of governance in both regimes grew with each 
interview and I developed, tested, noted and revised interpretations while doing the 
research (as described in H. S. Becker, 1998). Based on these interpretations and the 
– equally evolving – research questions, I drafted the comparative thesis structure and 
then the chapters in a back and forth between data analysis and developing my 
arguments (H. S. Becker & Richards, 2007). Hereby, I mostly analysed data in a more 
focused way than initially, e.g. a specific question across transcripts – thus moving to 
a more concept-driven approach. While much more can be drawn from my data, I 
attempt to represent diverse tendencies and to select conceptually and comparatively 
significant instances for this thesis. Given my leeway in the process, I try to do justice 
to the cases by weighing and questioning my interpretations via exploring counter-
arguments and adjusting mine if appropriate. 
4.6 Summary 
This chapter has explained and justified the comparative case study method, 
the case selection, the research methods and the practice of data analysis. Table 4 
summarises key elements of the research design. 
Table 4: Key elements of the research design  
Research design 
Qualitative/case-based comparison 
Interpretive approach:  
aiming at understanding 
predominantly inductive  
non-formal 
emerging, techniques of analysis not pre-determined 
multiple realities and meanings, situated knowledge 
Strengthening credibility 
Building trustworthiness, inter alia via reflexivity 
Validity: interpretive claims substantiated by evidence 
Aiming for reliability through transparency and 
triangulation  
Case selection 
Weberian ideal types as preliminary constructs:  
Nottingham – New Public Management  
Stuttgart – Weberian bureaucracy 
High variation cases:  
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socio-economic living conditions 
public budgets 
local autonomy 
levels of inequality 
states of (de-)industrialisation 
Case boundaries 
September 2004 – June 2018 for my data sets 
Nottingham unitary authority; Stuttgart urban district – 
fuzzy 
Data sources  
Document analysis of the two current city strategies 
Extended document analysis of selected strategies and 
consultation instruments 
Semi-structured interviews with informants 
Data analysis  
Coding 
Meaning condensation 




Source: own research.  
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5 Policy approaches 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter takes the preceding methodology into practice. It examines RQ 1: 
How do policy approaches relate to sustainability? 
With cities having become central sites in an “uneven, crisis-laden advance of 
neoliberal restructuring projects”, which are interconnected translocally, they 
“provide an important reference point for understanding some of the limits, 
contradictions and mutations of the neoliberal project since the 1990s” (Peck et al., 
2009, p. 49) (cf. Sections 1.1.3 and 2.2.2 b)). This chapter explores Nottingham’s and 
Stuttgart’s positions and experiences in this neoliberal advance. Both are significant 
exemplars to understand these developments in their capacities of high variation 
cases in relevant respects (cf. Sections 3.5 and 4.3). 
In a parallel structure for both cases starting with Nottingham, the chapter 
explores policy approaches (Sections 5.2 and 5.5), reports and interprets views on 
their relation to social justice (Sections 5.3 and 5.6) and future generations (Sections 
5.4 and 5.7). I draw conclusions in Section 5.8.  
5.2 Nottingham: exploring policy approaches 
5.2.1 Describing policy approaches  
This section examines which issues are tackled politically in Nottingham. This 
is to enable exploring diversity across the cases as one aim of comparative research 
(cf. Section 4.2.2 b)). Therefore, I created an overview of all 38 Nottingham policy 
documents (cf. Appendix B) Analysed policy documents) by collating them into a table 
according to what I understood to be their main – or one main – policy issue and policy 
area. Examples are given in Table 5, including main policy objectives. To reduce 
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complexity, I subsumed policy issues under broader policy areas.21 Categories have 
thus been derived from the data. Emerging policy areas are (number of documents in 
brackets):  
 Health (7)  
 Crime and drugs (4) 
 Overarching (4) 
 Children/young people (2) 
 City administration (2) 
 Economic/location development (2) 
 Environment (2) 
 Homelessness (2) 
 Neighbourhoods (2) 
 Transport (2) 
 Education (1)  
 Energy (1) 
 Family support (1) 
 Housing (1) 
 Planning (1) 
While it could have been arranged differently, this coarse overview gives 
insights into where efforts and funds are being invested – at the very least in drafting 
a document.22 Policy issues within the three most frequent policy areas illustrate this. 
First, health matters appear highly relevant with documents regarding autism, 
breastfeeding, health and wellbeing, healthcare, mental health and wellbeing, healthy 
weight and suicide prevention. Second, the four documents in the area of crime and 
drugs concern these two in general as well as smoking and alcohol. Third, the category 
                                                     
21 I assigned documents to one policy area and to one policy issue only. Summary documents have not 
been listed if the relating comprehensive document was part of the document analysis. 
22 Policy documents were to some extent produced because of statutory duties set by central 
government. However, a good number of them go back to local initiatives and are therefore significant 
to the Nottingham case. 
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“Overarching” comprises the Sustainable Community Strategy, the Council Plan, 
citizens’ survey and citizens’ panel.  
In conclusion, amongst policy areas taken up there is a high relevance of health 
issues and social problems. Due to the frequency of these themes in policy documents, 
I interpret instances of them subsequently. 
Table 5: Examples of policy objectives in Nottingham 
Nottingham 








To increase the number and 
proportion of children and adults who 
are a healthy weight in Nottingham” 
“NOTTINGHAM PLAN TARGETS  
Halt the rise and then reduce the 
prevalence of child obesity in 
Nottingham to 18% in children by 
2020. Baseline 2006/07: 20% 
Reduce the proportion of overweight 
and obese adults in Nottingham to 
60% by 2020. Baseline 2006/07: 69%” 
(NHS Nottingham City et al., n.d., p. 2; 











“WHAT WE WILL DO IN 2014-16 
Our plan to reduce and sustain the 
number of unplanned teenage 
conceptions and support teenage 
parents is based on national evidence, 
local knowledge and consultation with 
the wider Teenage Pregnancy 
Network.” 
(Nottingham Children’s Partnership, 
n.d., p. 10; emphases in original) 
Sources: own research and as indicated. 
5.2.2 Interpreting policy approaches 
As an aim of comparative research, this section interprets cultural or historical 
significance for the Nottingham case. Given the amount of data, I can only carve out 
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few tendencies – which is around the themes changing individual behaviours and the 
use of data as knowledge. These are significant and repeatedly present in documents 
of the more frequent policy areas identified in the above overview. They therefore 
serve as examples for how the domains of policy and reason are intertwined and 
simultaneously produced – co-produced – with those of culture, values, subjectivity 
and politics (Filipe et al., 2017).  
a) Changing individual behaviours 
Policy documents for Nottingham partly converge in aiming at changing 
individual behaviours.23 They then typically analyse according data for Nottingham and 
contrast them with national, regional or core cities’24 figures. With Nottingham often 
coming off unfavourably in these comparisons, objectives for improvement are 
formulated. These in many cases also require citizens to change their behaviours (cf. 
also Section 7.4.2). Objectives then partly take the form of measurable target values 
with defined time horizons and responsibilities. 
Example: teenage pregnancies. I illustrate this pattern through the 
“Nottingham City Teenage Pregnancy Plan 2014-16” (Nottingham Children’s 
Partnership, n.d.). Data on teenage pregnancies evidence how Nottingham’s rate still 
lies above the England average: 
Extract 1 
“[…] [T]he number of pregnant teenagers, in the 15-17 year old age group, 
continued to fall with 62 fewer young women conceiving in 2012 (181) as 
compared to 2011 (243). Continued investment and dedication over the last 15 
                                                     
23 This relates to the wider rise of behavioural governance (‘nudge’) in the UK as analysed by Straßheim 
& Korinek (2016) (cf. Section 2.3.2 b)) and which materialises liberal paternalism. The authors conclude 
that “behavioural experts have cultivated politico-epistemic authority by claiming the role of ‘choice 
architects’” and that “the political vision of Big Society was put forward that constitutes a powerful 
diagnosis of the UK’s social and economic problems as well as a frame of an alternative, progressive 
future” (Straßheim & Korinek, 2016, p. 121). This latter imagines “a much smaller, but smarter state 
that empowers citizens in terms of making better choices for their individual and collective good”, thus 
turning “societies into highly individualized states of mind” (Straßheim & Korinek, 2016, pp. 121–122).  
24 The core cities group in the UK comprises of Birmingham, Bristol, Cardiff, Glasgow, Leeds, Liverpool, 
Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham and Sheffield (Core Cities Group, n.d.). 
  120 
years has reduced the teenage pregnancy rate significantly but […] our rate in 
Nottingham is still above the England average, although the gap is narrowing” 
(Nottingham Children’s Partnership, n.d., p. 2).   
The plan then aims “to reduce and sustain the number of unplanned teenage 
conceptions and support teenage parents”. This mainly requires teenagers to change 
their behaviour and avoid unplanned pregnancies. The time horizon to deliver the plan 
is defined as 2014-2016. Five “overall success measures” are in place, inter alia: 
“[c]ontinue to reduce the rate of conceptions under 18 years of age” and “[i]ncrease 
the attendance, and attainment, of teenage parents in education, training and 
employment”. Finally, responsibilities are allocated as the plan “will be delivered 
through the Teenage Pregnancy Network and performance managed by the Teenage 
Pregnancy Taskforce” (Nottingham Children’s Partnership, n.d., p. 10). Substantiating 
the interpretation, this described pattern also applies to the documents 
“Breastfeeding: A Framework for Action. Nottinghamshire County and Nottingham 
City 2015 – 2020”, “Healthy Weight Strategy for Nottingham City 2011-2020”, 
“Safe.Responsible.Healthy: Nottingham's approach to alcohol”, “Nottingham City 
Tobacco Control Strategy 2015-2020. Inspiring Nottingham's smokefree generation”, 
“Wellness in Mind. Nottingham City Mental Health and Wellbeing Strategy 2014-
2017” and “Nottingham Crime & Drugs Partnership. Partnership Plan 2015 to 2020”. 
Defining policy problems. Where reasons to tackle certain issues given in 
documents and interviews often involve high problem pressures in Nottingham, the 
comparison with Stuttgart shows that these only explain parts of the variance in 
addressed policy issues. This is the case where issues are being addressed in 
Nottingham but not in Stuttgart, although factual problem pressures (e.g. alcohol 
consumption) partly appear similar and local action would be possible (cf. Section 
8.3.1). Other factors accounting for the different outcomes may lie in power relations 
and values such as individual responsibility and progressiveness. Similar external 
impacts (measured problem pressures) therefore do not need to have same 
consequences in both cases (as suggested by Abbott, 1988) with different modes of 
co-producing policies and social order. It is therefore of interest who formulates policy 
problems in what way, as addressed subsequently. 
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Policies which focus on changing citizens’ behaviours exhibit power relations 
where such requests by those in the positions to do so appear broadly acceptable, i.e. 
an according power gap. An advice on Christmas spending makes this tangible:  
Extract 2 
“Avoid a debt hangover this Christmas: Fix your budget. List what you expect to 
spend on Christmas – from presents and decorations to food, socialising and 
transport. Be mindful that you’ll have to keep some cash to pay the mid-January 
bills, and keep a detailed list of your expenses so you don’t blow your budget” 
(Nottingham City Council, 2017a, p. 17). 
The power gap here seems to exist in terms of money, the chance to plan 
ahead and/or financial education – altogether indicating very different living 
conditions of the involved groups (cf. Section 6.3.3). It also occurs through higher 
expectations towards the disadvantaged group (H. S. Becker, 1998). Nottingham’s 
focus on changing individual behaviours was also referred to as a “nanny state” 
approach during an interview and was defended in another by politician 2: 
Extract 3 
“Yes, we have done that. I’m [...] not sorry about that because... It is [...] a bit nanny 
state, but the alternative is not having a nanny, right [...]. And I would much sooner 
have a nanny than not a nanny [...]. [...] And there is a bit of dependency as well 
and a bit of expectation and I know that is a slight downside of it. [...] We do try 
and make people stand up on their own feet a bit, but in the end we will provide 
the safety blanket. [...] and I think the alternative of leaving people to themselves 
[...] can often be quite dangerous. [...] I would also say to you [...] it’s politically 
quite successful [...]. So it must appeal to somebody.”    
Taking up the metaphor of the nanny is indicative of a state-society relationship where 
the citizen is compared to a child and “leaving people to themselves” seen as 
dangerous. This is also indicative of liberal paternalism. However, in Nottingham’s 
social order where living conditions are partly very difficult, e.g. many living below the 
breadline (cf. Section 6.3.1), and thus lacking basic social and economic rights, 
expecting an active and self-reliant civil society may be misplaced. Altogether, aiming 
for individual behaviour change tends to reduce attention to the structural conditions 
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in which social problems arise (‘deficit model’), as further illustrated subsequently and 
in Section 7.4.2.  
b) Data as knowledge  
The following demonstrates how the production of data as a form of 
knowledge is shaped by social order and data are in turn invoked as evidence to 
formulate specific policies (and not others), always purporting a certain 
representation of the world. First, Nottingham’s policy documents often call on 
geographically fine-grained data about their issues. This reflects how there is a view 
that these behaviours should be recorded and be geographically traceable to residents 
exhibiting them, e.g. regarding breastfeeding: 
Extract 4 
“Underlying the overall breastfeeding rate, there is considerable variability 
between different groups and geographic areas. The geographic distribution of 6-
8 week breastfeeding prevalence varies between 21.5% in Clifton North and 67.7% 
in Dunkirk and Lenton” (Nottinghamshire County Council & Nottingham City 
Council, 2015, p. 6). 
Second, this use of data is linked to focusing on the individual, as shown for 
teenage pregnancies: 
Extract 5 
“The empirical evidence tells us that the provision of high quality, comprehensive 
sex and relationships education along with easy access to contraception has the 
greatest impact on teenage pregnancy rates. The provision should be universal for 
all along with more intensive support for young people at risk. There is no solid 
evidence that alternative approaches eg promoting abstinence or benefit 
sanctions reduce teenage pregnancy rates” (Nottingham Children’s Partnership, 
n.d., p. 7). 
Here, causes are again mainly seen at an individual level, thus portraying teenage 
pregnancies as a relatively isolated and fixable problem, especially depending on 
knowledge about and access to contraception. The invoked alternative approaches 
maintain a focus on the individual. This therefore exemplifies how the choice of 
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evidence underlying the formulation of policies carries values stressing individual 
responsibility. Only considering data raised in relation to a specific issue may then 
impede seeing how connections could be different. For instance, McKenzie (2015, pp. 
91–94) shows in her ethnographic study of St. Ann’s neighbourhood in Nottingham 
how – also early – motherhood provides a way towards social recognition where other 
routes, such as the labour market, appear hopeless. However, these structural 
conditions are not represented in the above evidence. Any policy formulated on its 
basis therefore likely also tackles individual behaviours, given and not questioning 
their structural circumstances. 
5.3 Nottingham: policies and social justice 
In the following two sections, I discuss how policies in Nottingham are seen to 
account for social justice and for future generations, thus approaching RQ 1 (cf. 
Section 5.1). My interviewees were not often aware of policy objectives, therefore the 
research broadened to also include invoked policies. Some informants were in a 
position of notable power in that they often made or influenced public decisions in the 
city. They may thus have had an interest to see them represented as socially just which 
I considered in the interpretation. Furthermore, most interviewees were university-
educated, relatively high-earning25, middle-aged, and more than two thirds were 
male. Some of these aspects can make a difference in views on social justice and 
economic inequality (e.g. Sachweh, 2014).  
                                                     
25 As a rough orientation regarding public sector employees, an average gross salary for council jobs is 
estimated at £32,500 (Totaljobs Group, 2018). Regarding politicians, mean payments to councillors of 
Nottingham City Council in 2017-18 whom I interviewed are £30,737 (Nottingham City Council, 2018f; 
own calculation) – which could be complemented through other professional activities. As a 
comparison, the average household income per head in Nottingham in 2016 is £12,232 once taxes and 
benefits are taken into account (Collinson, 2018). Business representatives were often in more senior 
roles with higher earnings to be expected, whereas two of the ten civil society representatives held 
their roles as unpaid volunteers.  
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5.3.1 Policies accounting for social justice?  
When asked, more than half of the informants found that policy objectives or 
policies in Nottingham accounted for social justice, relating to their understanding of 
it (interview questions cf. Appendix D) Interview guideline). Five did not feel they could 
comment on the matter, e.g. due to a lack of knowledge. Views then included seeing 
policies strongly accounting for social justice, finding that the council tried very hard, 
that councillors understood social issues well and did what they could. No interviewee 
expressed that policies did not account for social justice. 
 Measures that were seen to account for social justice included (often 
mentioned several times): early intervention, jobs and skills support, Nottingham’s 
social housing stock, increasing council houses’ energy efficiency, building new 
affordable homes, the Selective Licensing Scheme26, homelessness support, a good 
public transport system, the Workplace Parking Levy (cf. Section 7.3), regeneration 
projects, a fuel poverty strategy and the foundation of Robin Hood Energy.27 Besides, 
                                                     
26 The Selective Licensing Scheme has been introduced on 1 August 2018 in order to raise standards in 
Nottingham’s private rented housing sector (Nottingham City Council, 2018c, p. 1), where it has been 
“estimated that 21% of […] properties are likely to have ‘Category 1 hazards.’ Examples of this type of 
hazard include exposed wiring, a dangerous boiler, cold bedrooms, a leaking roof, mould on walls or 
ceilings and vermin infestation” (Nottingham City Council, 2018d, p. 3). The Scheme was enforced 
against landlords’ resistance (Jarram, 2018b). 
27 In 2015, Robin Hood Energy was founded by Nottingham City Council as the first not for profit energy 
company owned by a local authority in the UK – later being followed by further local authorities (N. 
Thomas, 2017). “We were set up to tackle fuel poverty and to help give people a cheaper, more helpful 
alternative to the Big Six [largest electric and gas suppliers in the UK]” (Robin Hood Energy, n.d.). “Within 
months of [Robin Hood Energy’s] launch, the East Midlands became the cheapest region in the country 
for dual fuel tariffs and prompted competitors to realign tariffs [...] (Nottingham City Council, 2018d, p. 
9). However, in September 2020, Robin Hood Energy collapsed (BBC News, 2020). The company became 
financially unviable and was propped up with £9,5m of local public resources in 2019. Factors for the 
developments are seen in the environment of austerity policies since 2010 and the encouragement of 
entrepreneurial approaches in local authorities which implied big risks in industries where they did not 
have enough experience or skill to succeed in (Pete Murphy); as well as “complex and hard” (Ellen 
Fraser) conditions in the energy industry (Pittam, 2020). Besides, the Public Interest Report on the case 
inter alia finds that some aspects of Robin Hood Energy, “particularly its focus on low tariffs and poorer 
customers” further increased its risks within these competitive markets (Grant Thornton, 2020, p. 2).  
“There was an insufficient appreciation within the Council (as a corporate body) of the huge risks 
involved in ownership of, and investment in, RHE”, as well as of the companies’ financial position (Grant 
Thornton, 2020, p. 2). The report concludes that  
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tendencies seen to promote social justice in Nottingham were keeping services and 
infrastructures in public ownership, the city council paying a living wage and equalities 
assessment of policies. Finally, Nottingham’s policies were seen as progressive in 
strengthening disadvantaged groups, such as by classifying misogyny as a hate crime 
by Nottinghamshire police as the first police force in Britain (Finnigan, 2016).  
I now summarise some of the further qualifications made, aiming to represent 
diverse views. At least three times interviewees mentioned that the council was well-
meaning, but powerless due to a lack of resources through continuous budget cuts. 
For instance, it was felt that the economy has been left out of social justice 
considerations: 
Extract 6 
“[...] I think there’s a massive focus on social justice in everything until it comes to 
the economy. [...] I just think that underpinning – so thinking about inclusive 
growth, thinking about good jobs, thinking about anything that fundamentally 
tackles structure of the economy and work, [is] not there, at all” (public sector 
employee 14). 
Two to three saw the council acting in a patronising way, e.g. “very much 
dictating from the top rather than necessarily listening to the residents from the 
bottom” (politician 3). Finally, few policies were seen as stigmatising, inter alia 
referring to anti-begging posters which have been banned by the Advertising 
Standards Authority for "reinforcing negative stereotypes" (BBC News, 2016).  
                                                     
“[o]verall, the governance arrangements were overshadowed by the Council’s 
determination that the Company should be a success, and this led to institutional 
blindness within the Council as whole to the escalating risks involved, which were 
ultimately very significant risks to public money. Where concerns were raised by 
some individuals, these concerns were downplayed and the resulting actions 
insufficient” (Grant Thornton, 2020, p. 3).  
The failure of the company aggravated Nottingham City Council’s difficult financial situation, also being 
due to increased spending during the crisis around Covid-19. Beyond Nottingham, Catherine Waddams 
sees this also as the end, for the time being, of councils trying to get involved in the energy market 
(Pittam, 2020).  
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A pattern across policies in Nottingham is an effort to improve living conditions 
especially for less well-off residents (cf. most measures above) and beyond that to 
redistribute to them, e.g. through the Workplace Parking Levy. Politician 9 outlined 
that  
Extract 7 
“[...] a lot of those commuters come from outside the city, so it’s a way of them 
subsidising transport improvements for Nottingham citizens.”  
Relating to this, another interviewee described that Nottingham increasingly attracted 
less well-off citizens from southern parts of the UK due to its good public infrastructure 
and lower living costs. Thus perpetuating its low tax base, this in a way made it a victim 
of its own success. 
Regarding social justice, policies driven by the Nottingham Labour Party reflect 
views of the UK Labour Party. Its “[...] historic links with trade unions have led it to 
promote an active role for the state in the creation of economic prosperity and in the 
provision of social services” (Webb, 2018). The Labour Party’s manifesto dedicates a 
chapter on “A more equal society”, self-describing:  
“The Labour Party is the party of equality [...]. “Labour brought in the Equal Pay 
Act, the Sex Discrimination Act, the Equality Act, the Minimum Wage and 
introduced Sure Start. Every progressive piece of equality legislation has been 
delivered by Labour” (Labour Party, 2017, p. 108). 
Relatedly, Nottingham Labour Party’s manifesto associates the party with 
fairness: “we need a Labour government, as well as a Labour council, to bring funding, 
investment and fairness to our city” (Nottingham Labour Party, 2015, p. 3) – however, 
in its 19 pages not literally referring to “just*” in the sense of justice, “equal*” or 
“generation”. 
5.3.2 Rebalancing national policies 
Informants repeatedly described policies in Nottingham as rebalancing 
national policies in working towards social justice. Nottingham’s approach has partly 
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been characterised as more coordinated by creating and sustaining publicly owned 
local infrastructures and services (with examples in the preceding section). Central 
government policies by contrast were seen as marked by a decreasing role of the state 
and the adoption of free-market-approaches. This antagonism between urban and 
national governance regimes (cf. also Section 6.2.2 a)) – occurring all over the 
interviews – is exemplified in the following:  
Extract 8 
“[...] The whole point of it [Nottingham Labour Party’s manifesto] really from our 
perspective is to make life better for the poorer parts of society [...]. So yeah, we 
have a very strong commitment to social justice and to fight for the rights of our 
citizens [...]. [...] So there’s a strong presence of trying to rebalance what is 
happening nationally on behalf of our citizens. [...] Nationally, [...] always the 
elements of support are being reduced. Investment in health, education, housing, 
are all facing threats, [...]. [...] [P]rivatisation of everything has led soon all our 
institutions more or less being gradually privatized [...]” (politician 9). 
Informants found this opposition of national and local approaches 
dysfunctional, requiring local actors to work around central government frameworks 
in order to account for social justice, e.g.:  
Extract 9 
“[T]he enhanced partnership scheme in Nottingham for our bus network [...] i[]s 
basically a way of us partially regulating the deregulated bus market [...]. [...] 
Because obviously you get issues of congestion, increased air pollution, [...] you are 
basically not running a good bus network, the deregulated bus operators will just 
compete on routes that they see they can make the most money out of rather than 
taking a more holistic view of the network [...]. [...] we [the city council] are sort of 
plugging gaps in the commercial bus network [...]. [...] [Y]ou literally do need a PhD 
sometimes to work it out what ticket, what fare [...]. [...] [W]hen you go to 
European cities generally it’s a lot more straightforward than what you will find 
anywhere in the UK, which is absolutely ridiculous, everyone knows it as well [...]. 
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[...] The bus industry know it but they won’t really admit to it [...]. [...] [A]s I say 
that’s what deregulation brings, dysfunction really” (public sector employee 12). 
5.3.3 Inequality and social justice 
Asked whether they saw economic inequality as a justice issue in Nottingham, 
more than half of the interviewees affirmed this, partly strongly. Examples are: “[...] 
within Nottingham, there are [...] people who are living below [...] the breadline. That 
can’t be right in a civilized, twenty-first-century city” (business representative 3). 
Extract 10 
“[...] [I]t’s so grossly unequal that it distorts the political process to the extent that 
some people almost ignore the political process. But it impacts on health, it 
impacts on access to services, it impacts on everything across the board. [...] [W]e 
have a level of ignorance of how critical structures work. How this country works. 
A level of ignorance of the impacts of inequality. It's frightening, it's corrosive” (civil 
society representative 6). 
Four informants said that they did not have a view on this or e.g. that this was 
“more a philosophical point” (politician 3). Some understandings were that 
inequalities were widening, unjust and had gone too far. Interviewees lined out that 
there was a lot of inequality, deprivation and poverty in Nottingham. They referred to 
many related issues, inter alia fuel poverty, health inequalities, disparities in life 
expectancy, in-work poverty and student debts.  
A number of inequalities recurred during the interviews, of which the city’s 
tight boundaries are discussed as an exemplar. They have been connected to 
economic inequality with those having a choice often leaving Nottingham to find more 
attractive surroundings and better schools outside of it. Consequently, predominantly 
poorer citizens remain within it, seen as impeding social justice: 
    Extract 11 
“[...] [O]ur poverty is not good for us [...]. [...] [I]f you're building [...] an ideal city, 
you'd need a city that has a bit of a range in incomes so that you can be 
redistributive with your policies, the problem with Nottingham, but for a couple of 
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pockets which are relatively small [...] [t]o have extreme poverty and then just 
quite poor, and there's nothing more than that. So, trying to redistribute between 
the very poor and the quite poor is a [...] bit of a mug’s game. So [...] that economic 
injustice to the national average means that it's a very limiting factor on pursuing 
social justice” (politician 5). 
The city’s boundaries were thus viewed as reinforcing inequalities between 
Nottingham and surrounding areas (for relating politics cf. Section 6.2.2 c)). From a co-
production perspective, the city’s tight boundaries may be afforded by a societally 
shared habituation to and maintenance of high inequalities. Then again, moral 
disapproval with these large inequalities enabled policies attempting to counter it, as 
in the case of the Workplace Parking Levy or the foundation of Robin Hood Energy – 
which eventually collapsed (cf. Section 5.3.1).  
Further inequalities were seen in terms of work, its pay and conditions as well 
as the ability to plan ahead (and thus save, e.g. in public transport). Described was also 
a tendency of talent, understood as university graduates, leaving Nottingham. Political 
divides came up between the Labour Party and the Conservative Party as well as 
between Labour-led Nottingham City Council and Conservatives-led Nottinghamshire 
County Council and Conservatives-led central government. Also, a divide was seen 
between London and the rest of the UK, inter alia in terms of investment and 
attractiveness. Altogether, Nottingham’s and the UK’s society were found to be too 
unequal and divided in various respects. Growing economic inequalities along with a 
regulatory framework reinforcing these at different levels (cf. also Section 5.4.3) then 
brought forth a view of citizens being more or less desirable residents according to 
their socio-economic status.   
5.4 Nottingham: policies and future generations 
5.4.1 Policies accounting for future generations? 
Half of the informants found that policies in Nottingham accounted for future 
generations with views ranging from strong approval to seeing actors aiming for it. 
Most other interviewees did not voice a tendency and a few said local policies did not 
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account for future generations. Answers did not differ consistently between the 
sectors public, civic or economic. 
Several areas were seen as characterised by a long-term perspective in 
Nottingham. Over a quarter of informants here referred to Nottingham’s public 
transport system, the tram, benefits of the planned HS2 connection between 
Nottingham (Toton) and London, efforts towards low carbon/emissions or the local 
bus company Nottingham City Transport. Almost a quarter of informants saw a 
sustainable perspective in early intervention efforts, early years education, the Dolly 
Parton Imagination Library supporting free books for young children, the early 
intervention programme ‘Small Steps, Big Changes’ or children’s well-being generally. 
Eight informants mentioned the areas of schools, education, skills, apprenticeships, 
school leavers, or helping young people into work. Seven interviewees named housing 
as accounting for future generations, partly relating to Nottingham City Homes, an 
arms’ length management organisation (ALMO) of Nottingham City Council or its 
efforts towards home insulation. Three informants respectively mentioned the 
regeneration of the Broadmarsh area in Nottingham, the Workplace Parking Levy (cf. 
Section 7.3) and two (public) health. Measures named once included the Nottingham 
Castle regeneration, financial investment, land use, the Selective Licensing Scheme for 
private housing (cf. Footnote 26), homelessness, fuel poverty, energy and Robin Hood 
Energy (cf. Footnote 27), air quality, environmental sustainability and accounting for 
poorer communities. These favourable views of city policies reflect the interests of 
(the well-represented) informants involved in them. However, the spread of positive 
appraisals exceeds that circle.  
Conversely, informants described some issues in Nottingham as unsustainable, 
predominantly civil society representatives. Two interviewees respectively mentioned 
the education system or schools and the council’s constrained funding. Issues 
mentioned once were rising child-poverty, parts of the city being unsafe, tuition fees, 
little possibilities to care for children and elder persons through the need to work in 
several jobs, a lacking plan to keep the youth in Nottingham, local housing standards, 
homelessness, the Nottingham Incineration Plant and, more broadly, the economy: “I 
  131 
don’t think there’s a future focus on what the hell we’re doing with the economy, at 
all” (public sector employee 14). On the whole, there was a predominantly positive 
view of local efforts in Nottingham to act sustainably. 
However, a number of informants were concerned about justice between 
generations in the UK generally, with critical views on national policies. They described 
how following generations had worse life chances than they did, referring to high 
debts through tuition fees (when they themselves studied for free), worse prospects 
in terms of jobs, earnings, pensions and to buy a property, e.g.:  
Extract 12 
“I grew up in the ‘70s when the government used to give me money to go to the 
university. Now it’s the very opposite. It is mad, absolutely madness. [...] There is a 
very important psychological impact of this and a social and cultural impact, which 
is that it’s taking kindness away from us really. It’s making us transactional and 
brutal, hard-hearted, because we don’t care about people’s needs” (civil society 
representative 8). 
Extract 13 
“[...] [O]ur national government chooses to absolve itself of responsibility. For 
setting a vision for what we need to achieve to give future generations even a 
fighting chance of having a future as comfortable as currently ours is. [...] The 
biggest thing is will we actually have a society that hasn't basically broken down 
by the end of this century? Always on the point of collapse because of the 
pressures” (civil society representative 6).  
Building on this overview, the following sections discuss recurring factors seen 
as contributing or inhibiting a long-term orientation of policies in Nottingham and 
suggest interpretations.  
5.4.2 Long-term orientation through political stability 
Interviewees mentioned political stability in Nottingham as a main factor 
contributing to more sustainable policies – besides the inclusion of young people into 
policy processes. As advantages of the long-standing Labour Party-leadership of the 
city council (since 1991 the non-metropolitan district, since 1997 the unitary authority; 
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The Elections Centre, n.d.), informants stressed that infrastructures, skills and 
knowledge were kept in-house. Some also attributed sustainable policies to a strong, 
ambitious and little risk-averse council leadership, e.g.: 
   Extract 14 
“So, I think on the positive side, because there’s coherent political control and they 
don’t expect it to change, it can be a real future focus.  On the flip side, it just means 
there’s going to be more of the same” (public sector employee 14).   
Downsides of this political stability were seen in a lack of innovation, control 
and opposition – partly being attributed to the voting system (cf. Section 5.4.3 d)). 
5.4.3 Factors seen as impeding a long-term orientation 
a) Centralisation and competition between regions 
Some informants expressed that the local authority did not have enough 
power to decide locally but was too tied to central government regulation. This was 
partly found to restrict a long-term orientation. Besides, interviewees anticipated that 
Nottingham would in the future fall (further) behind other core cities and regions who 
reached a devolution deal (ten until June 2018; Local Government Association, 2018) 
– like Greater Manchester or the West Midlands – when Nottingham did not.28 Since 
the devolution deals mean passing down powers, budgets and responsibilities from 
central government to new combined authority mayors within regions (UK 
Government, 2017), Nottingham was seen as less able to compete with them. 
Relatedly, informants perceived an increasing competition between cities and 
regions for investment, businesses as well as highly-qualified and high-earning people. 
This points towards a growing significance of market principles, a greater 
                                                     
28 In 2016, some Conservatives-led districts have pulled out of a proposed North Midlands Combined 
Authority, justifying this with a lack of detail, thus hampering Derbyshire’s and Nottinghamshire’s 
devolution deal plans (Paine, 2016). In 2018, council leaders in the East Midlands agreed to explore a 
strategic alliance “to create a 'unified voice' for the region” in order to work towards a devolution deal. 
(J. Robinson, 2018). 
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differentiation and thus inequality between cities, regions (budget-wise substantiated 
for both by Gray & Barford, 2018) and its residents.  
b) Decreasing local funding 
Informants by and large saw Nottingham’s decreasing funding as a – mostly 
the – central limitation to account for future generations. Central government has cut 
Nottingham’s grant funding since 2013 by two-thirds (Nottingham City Council, 2018j), 
from £126 million in 2013-14 to £35 million in 2019 (Sandeman, 2018a) (cf. Section 
3.4.1 b)). Some council employees and local politicians stressed that they were trying 
to act long-term, but found that their according leeway was very restricted by the cuts; 
that with ongoing austerity, short-term action would become more prevalent in the 
future and the council limited to its statutory duties. The cuts were seen to lead to 
difficult decisions regarding social justice with the strongest voices not being the most 
vulnerable ones. Views on the budget cuts included relatively often opposing them 
and blaming central government for them; being frustrated with having to implement 
them; and seeing them as an externally given and not alterable condition.  
Beyond that, further cuts to local funding should follow: 
“In October 2015 the Government committed that local government should retain 
100% of taxes raised locally by the end of the Parliament. These reforms will help 
move local authorities away from dependency on central government grant and 
towards self-sufficiency” (Department for Communities and Local Government, 
2017).  
Local authorities could apply for piloting this in 2018 to 2019. Muldoon-Smith & 
Greenhalgh (2015, p. 609) conclude that it could “further polarise uneven 
development” in England where “areas most in need of investment, that exhibit some 
kind of market failure and geographical disadvantage, could be less able to generate 
new development in order to fund the Business Rate Retention Scheme” than a 
minority of ‘premium locations’ with beneficial property market characteristics. While 
potentially shifting power relations between businesses and the local authority and 
aggravating tendencies of short-termism, this repeats the theme of strengthening self-
  134 
reliance. Where a city should become financially independent from central 
government, citizens should take on more responsibility and e.g. not become reliant 
on food banks, but “need to stand on their own two feet a bit” (Civil society 
representative 5) – repeating the pattern of emphasising individual responsibility in 
unfavourable conditions (cf. Section 5.2.2 a)). 
Regarding future budgets, informants partly expressed concern and insecurity. 
This also applied to the UK leaving the EU and its effects on Nottingham. Related 
concerns were employers, i.e. Boots, leaving the city due to tariff barriers (cf. Section 
7.2), difficulties of companies to recruit qualified employees and insecurity over an 
actual replacement of EU funding (cf. Section 6.2.2 d)). The latter was viewed as 
benefitting Nottingham and alleviating inequalities on an individual and on a regional 
level, e.g. by politician 4:  
Extract 15 
“[M]uch of our employment and skills support services [...], almost all of that 
activity is European funded [...]. [...] [W]ithout that funding we will have much 
bigger inequality problems.” 
Here again, a parallel can be drawn from the city to the individual level. Where 
insecurity over the future is an important deprivation of people living in poverty (e.g. 
Tirado, 2014), Nottingham as a poor city is equally less and less able to plan ahead.  
c) Marketisation of local government 
With Government aiming for local authorities to become self-sufficient as 
discussed above, several informants raised how the city council had to commercialise 
for maintaining its infrastructures and services – making it more similar to a private 
actor. Strengthening market principles also applies to the increasing need to bid for 
funding. The created competition between local authorities was viewed as precluding 
more sustainable action and dysfunctional in terms of demanding the council’s scarce 
time resources: 
   Extract 16 
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“[...] [T]he problem is there’s less money coming to us in what we call block 
allocations which is money which is free for us to spend and now everything is 
coming through competitions [...], bids to government. [...] You can waste a lot of 
time putting together bids and then not being successful. [...] [A]nd it’s very 
difficult to plan for the long-term with competitions because [...] the competitions 
keep changing. [...] What we would prefer is more certainty [...] (public sector 
employee 5). 
However, Nottingham fared well in the competition with other local 
authorities, both in terms of bidding and commercialisation:  
“Well, we are probably the most entrepreneurial council in the country. So we are 
selling our services to other councils. We are putting up solar panels for East 
Midlands Airport and for local businesses. We are managing the business waste 
budget for two, three other councils in the area. We are selling plants. We couldn’t 
be doing much more to raise money. But that’s only raising 20 million a year” 
(Nottingham City Council, 2017e; Cllr Graham Chapman, Deputy Leader, 
Nottingham City Council). 
Reasons for successful commercialisation were found to be the council’s 
history of keeping expertise (e.g. regarding energy) and infrastructures in communal 
ownership.29 Altogether, the increased competition between local councils combined 
with scarcer resources was viewed as leading to greater disparities between places. 
Irrespective of a frequent disapproval, marketisation was successfully embraced in 
Nottingham. 
d) Election cycles and system  
Finally, a few interviewees criticised the First-past-the-post electoral system 
and short election cycles on local and national levels as leading to less sustainable 
                                                     
29 An opposite model represents Conservatives-run Northampton County Council, which in 2015 
reduced itself to a commissioning body of 150 staff from 4,000, buying in all its services from private 
providers (J. M. Brown, 2015) to be run like a business (P. Butler, 2018). Inter alia under austerity, 
increasing demand for local services and with expected efficiency savings not materialising (some 
services having been returned in-house), the council went effectively bankrupt in February 2018 as the 
first local authority in two decades (P. Butler, 2018). 
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policies. Here, the cyclical nature of central government with significant shifts in 
approaches to local government was described as problematic. Also, the local political 
system with four year terms and an assessment of how set goals have been attained 
was partly found to encourage short-term action. 
Having explored policies, views on social and intergenerational justice in 
Nottingham, the Stuttgart case follows with the same proceeding to enable 
comparisons.   
5.5 Stuttgart: exploring policy approaches 
5.5.1 Describing policy approaches 
In the following, I provide an overview of policy areas and issues of the 45 
documents and websites analysed for the Stuttgart case (cf. Appendix B) Analysed 
policy documents). Methodically, it parallels the one for Nottingham, as described in 
Section 5.2.1. In this way, emerging policy areas are (number of documents in 
brackets):  
 Environment (10) 
 Overarching (5) 
 Planning (5) 
 Social development (3) 
 Integration (3) 
 International development (3) 
 Transport (3) 
 Economic/location development (2) 
 Energy (2) 
 Health (2) 
 Housing (1) 
 Children/young people (1) 
 Citizen participation (1) 
 City administration (1) 
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 Employment (1) 
While this coarse overview could have been done differently, it provides 
impressions into which policy areas received some attention during the last years as 
illustrated by the three most frequent policy areas.30 First, ten documents treat 
environmental issues. They deal with air pollution control, environmental protection 
(climate protection, saving resources and energy), greening (of courtyards, rooftops 
and facades), urban gardening, soil protection, climate adaptation and noise 
protection. Second, the five overarching documents are the Urban Development 
Concept Outline 2004, the Urban Development Concept Dialogue 2005 and the 
resulting Urban Development Concept Strategy 2006, as well as a documentation of a 
city council debate on a new urban development concept, ‘Stuttgart 2030’, and the 
citizens’ survey. Third, the five documents around planning concern land use planning, 
sustainable management of building areas and inner development. Table 6 displays 
examples of the underlying overview with main policy objectives. Altogether, 
documents suggest a high relevance of the environment in which the city exists, both 
built and natural, followed by matters of social development and integration. Because 
of the frequency of these themes in policy documents, I interpret such examples 
subsequently. 
Table 6: Examples of policy objectives in Stuttgart 
Stuttgart  








„2. Goals set out by the action plan 
                                                     
30 Some of the policy documents have been produced as legal requirements from federal government. 
However, most documents go back to local initiatives and are thus significant to the Stuttgart case. 
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An important aspect in achieving these goals is to 
reduce the volume of conventionally powered 
vehicle traffic entering the city basin by 20 per 
cent.” 
(Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, 2016a, p. 2; 












„The aim of the strategy process is to identify 
fields of action which further develop the 
competitiveness of the economic region and 
position the location so well that employment 
and prosperity in Stuttgart Region can be secured 
long-term. The identified fields of action should 
help to bring Stuttgart Region closer to the vision 
already formulated in the Strategy Paper 2007: 
the region of Stuttgart will be the most 
competitive economic area in Europe – a creative 
region with a high social and educational level, 
where ideas are quickly implemented into 
innovative processes, products and services. The 
actors in Stuttgart Region see themselves as 
pioneers of technological and economic progress 
as well as of social and ecological responsibility 
[…].” 
(Verband Region Stuttgart, 2013, p. 5f) 
Sources: own research and as indicated. 
5.5.2 Interpreting policy approaches 
a) Tackling (infra-)structures 
Across documents for the Stuttgart case, tendencies are to address issues at 
the level of structures, infrastructures and in the form of public or collective action. To 
some extent shared imaginations – e.g. in the form of developmental objectives (cf. 
example of economic/location development in Table 6) and conventional practices 
appear important, while comparing Stuttgart’s performance in policy issues is less 
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significant. Policy objectives are relatively often non-measurable, have no defined 
time-frames nor pre-defined responsibilities attached. I discuss instances of these 
patterns in the co-production of policies and social order subsequently. 
b) Example: urban development 
Some of the tendencies find expression in Stuttgart’s Urban Development 
Concept Strategy 2006 (Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, 2006). It formulates “[t]en 
guiding principles for urban development”: 
   Extract 17 
“2.1 Sustainability as a leading principle [...] 
2.2 Strengthening urban qualities [...] 
2.3 Expanding cooperation in the region [...] 
2.4 Securing and developing green and open spaces [...] 
2.5 Promoting social togetherness and integration [...] 
2.6 Securing housing and developing forms of urban living [...] 
2.7 Expanding economic location factors [...] 
2.8 Promoting cultural diversity and high quality educational opportunities [...] 
2.9 Developing sports and leisure activities [...] 
2.10 Developing mobility in a city-friendly way [...]” (Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, 
2006, p. 5) 
These principles only line out the desired direction of development. The strategy then 
describes the situation in Stuttgart for each of them – mostly without national or inter-
city comparisons – and what should be done, e.g. regarding schools:  
   Extract 18 
“In the foreground of schools’ development is improving equality of opportunities 
for children from migrant and deprived backgrounds. The results of the PISA study 
make clear that mainly children of migrants – but also German children from 
underprivileged educational backgrounds – have linguistic deficits. Educational 
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work with non-German-speakers therefore becomes important in education 
policies.” (Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, 2006, pp. 31–34). 
This is one example for a rather developmental objective (i.e. where success is not 
defined in numbers) with open time horizons and without pre-defined responsibilities. 
This approach applies to a good number of documents for the Stuttgart case, while 
there are counterexamples.31 Further illustrating the structural and collective 
approach, measures regarding cultural diversity and education include expanding 
childcare or a project aiming to promote children’s social and emotional intelligence. 
Focusing on behaviours of disadvantaged groups is not central to the objectives. 
The emphasis on urban planning when imagining Stuttgart’s future is also 
exemplified by the Urban Development Concept Strategy 2006 encompassing four 
“leading projects” and eight “impulse project” (Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, 2006, pp. 
5; 57–65). The fact that all these projects focus on infrastructures and the built 
environment epitomises the social-structural approach often taken in Stuttgart.  
c) Societal-level approaches and social cohesion 
As described, policy documents in Stuttgart partly show a tendency to focus on 
structures, i.e. living conditions, public provision, procedures (e.g. policy processes or 
procurement), urban infrastructures or the handling of the natural environment. 
Though this sometimes includes encouraging individual behaviour change (e.g. in 
energy use or transport choices), approaches often rather refer to the societal level. 
The following examples make this vivid, beginning with a collection of ideas for the 
city council’s new strategy ‘Stuttgart 2030’. It lines out how secure living conditions 
are seen as a requirement to maintain well-being:    
Extract 19 
                                                     
31 One instance is the vision of Stuttgart becoming climate-neutral by 2050 under the coordination of a 
steering group – led by the mayor –, and a central contact in the office for environmental protection 
(Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, 2016b, pp. 20; 22). 
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„Stuttgart as a feel-good city 
 Stuttgart is a feel-good city and will remain it.  
 A feel-good city does not go without a feel-good region. For this we need secure 
life circumstances in the areas of family, housing, work, leisure and sports” 
(Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, 2017a, p. 1). 
The same document goes on to describe “Stuttgart as a social city”: 
Extract 20 
 “Guaranteeing participation in housing, work, education, politics, culture and 
health.  
 Arousing interest beyond the own social environment. 
 Creating meeting places and facilitating encounters – with the objective to have 
an integrative effect.  
 Enabling integration and cohesion – for the socially deprived as well as for the 
very affluent. 
 A city in which all societal groups and classes make an effort for societal 
cohesion. 
 […]” 
(Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, 2017a, p. 1f). 
This Extract shows how participation should be „guaranteed“ and not primarily be 
attained by citizens through certain behaviours. Another document more precisely 
specifies the responsibilities of the collective and of disadvantaged citizens, opting to 
combine public measures with enabling self-help: 
   Extract 21 
„[...] [T]he internationalisation and polarisation of the city progresses and 
recognising specific needs of migrants and deprived groups becomes a 
requirement. […] [T]here is the mission to protect deprived groups, for which 
accompanying measures and capacity building have to be developed“ 
(Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, n.d.-p). 
In Extract 20, there is also an emphasis on sustaining and increasing social 
integration beyond one’s own social setting, with societal cohesion being an issue of 
concern for all social groups and classes. Naming the “very affluent” here widens the 
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focus to include the upper end of the socio-economic spectrum. A project of the city 
administration relatedly aims to promote social cohesion to contribute to a “solidary 
city”: 
   Extract 22 
“The people contribute to the way how they want to treat and live with one 
another in this city. Thus for a vivid, open and solidary city we need a new 
conversational culture across existing societal and spatial boundaries. The aim of 
Salt & Soup is to promote this process and to bring the most different people in 
Stuttgart to a common table“ (Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, n.d.-o, p. 1). 
Altogether, this exploration of policy documents, debates and related values 
gives insights into important policy areas in Stuttgart. It shows how approaches are 
often structural, developmental and focused on urban planning and the environment. 
Values interacting with public measures are a societal-level orientation with an 
important role for the public sector and societal cohesion. 
5.6 Stuttgart: policies and social justice  
In the remainder of this chapter, I summarise and discuss how policies in 
Stuttgart were seen to account for social justice and for future generations, thus 
approaching RQ 1 (cf. Section 5.1). Interviewees could often not relate to policy 
objectives and therefore also referred to urban policies more broadly. The 
characterisation of interviewees’ relative positions in society and interest in a positive 
representation of policies in Nottingham (cf. Section 5.3) similarly applies to Stuttgart. 
The only differences are a higher share of male informants of almost three quarters 
and a lower average disparity of incomes between informants and Stuttgart’s 
population.32  
                                                     
32 As a coarse reference point, a monthly gross salary of 3,320 € is estimated for public sector 
employees, i.e. ca. 39,840 to 43,160 € per year (Gehalt.de, n.d.). Elected members of Stuttgart’s 
municipal council receive a blanket allowance of 1,500 € per month, i.e. 18,000 € p.a., inter alia 
complemented by attendance fees of at least 60 € per session (Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, 2018b, p. 
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5.6.1 Policies accounting for social justice? 
In relation to informants’ understandings of social justice, 16 of the 33 Stuttgart 
interviewees did not express a clear tendency in how they found that policies in 
Stuttgart accounted for social justice, while in few cases the question has not been 
asked. 15 of the informants approved that policies in Stuttgart rather, in some areas 
or up to strongly accounted for social justice and two civil society representatives 
disapproved this. Two thirds of economic informants did not express a clear tendency 
regarding the question – otherwise there were no systematic differences between the 
sectors public/politics, economic and civil society.  
Policies and measures which were found to account for social justice included 
(often mentioned several times): education, childcare and kindergartens, schools and 
all-day schools, mobility and transport, planning policies, access to green spaces; 
generally a good and sophisticated social system in Stuttgart and Germany despite 
problems, the city’s support for youth work, foodbanks, provision for homeless 
persons and a municipal poverty conference. Informants also invoked the Family 
Card33, the Bonus Card + Culture34, construction of social housing, the Stuttgart Inner 
Development Programme35 and the city being seen as a model in refugee-related 
                                                     
1f), compensation for supervisory board activities and often earnings from professional activities. An 
overview of payments to respective councillors is not available. To compare, disposable income per 
inhabitant in Stuttgart is 24,517 € in 2015 (Statistisches Landesamt Baden-Württemberg, 2018, p. 3). 
High average earnings can be expected for business informants, most of them being directors, division 
managers and spokespersons. Four of the civil society representatives exercised their roles as 
volunteers, mostly unpaid; the others were employed, some as directors and partly well-earning. It is 
notable that CEO pay in the UK is mostly markedly higher than in Germany, as is the gap between CEO 
pay and that of other employees (Conyon & Schwalbach, 2000). 
33 The Family Card has been introduced in 2011 as a voluntary social benefit “to enable all children and 
young people to participate in the many recreational and educational activities in Stuttgart” 
(Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, n.d.-e). It can be obtained if their parents claim major unemployment, low 
income or asylum seekers’ benefits (Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, n.d.-e). 
34 The Bonus Card + Culture is a voluntary social benefit that allows for discounts and subsidies for 
various cultural, sports and social offerings in Stuttgart as well as for discounted monthly public 
transport tickets. It can be claimed by those living and Stuttgart and receiving major unemployment, 
low income or asylum seekers’ benefits (Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, n.d.-a). 
35 Enacted in 2011, the Stuttgart Inner Development Programme (SIM) should promote a socially 
balanced urban development and qualified land use. With lacking housing space in Stuttgart for lower 
and middle income groups, SIM obliges builders to reserve 20% of a created floor space for subsidised 
housing (Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, n.d.-i). 
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policies. Tendencies perceived to promote social justice were being a wealthy city, 
many available funds for civic involvement, NGOs and refugee issues – also instated 
by companies (cf. Section 7.8.1) –, almost full employment, the Green Party state and 
city governments, strong political support for social justice across parties, pietism as 
well as very mixed and no poor-only neighbourhoods.  
Forth following, I illustrate views and discuss further tendencies, aiming to 
represent diversity. The city’s social standards were by some interviewees rated as 
relatively high, e.g.: “The welfare net in Stuttgart is as well-developed as in hardly any 
comparable large city. […] In Stuttgart, we actually have everything you could imagine 
at all” (public sector employee 1). Public sector employee 3 weighted that  
   Extract 23 
„compare[d] to […] other countries, we are in that sense on the positive side of all 
possible worlds. Whereas there are of course also strong differences here, very 
clearly. We certainly have strong social disparities, but they are not as massive as 
in other cities”. 
Also, public sector employee 4 highlighted that “in Stuttgart socially 
marginalised groups [were] well considered” with no social group except for refugees 
having no access to ‘regular’ social security. However, one informant found that the 
availability of financial means had the downside that the usefulness of usual 
approaches was not questioned – while at first thinking holistically about underlying 
concepts would be desirable. Broadly, local approaches appeared to fit with and 
expand on national policies.  
Social justice deficits were by at least seven informants perceived in relation to 
housing, four of them criticising that the city has done too little for social, affordable 
or normally priced housing instead of expensive segments (further discussed in the 
following section). Other measures or phenomena which were found to contradict 
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social justice include (mostly mentioned once): Stuttgart 2136, child poverty – with 
children being unaccountable for living in bad conditions –, a missing free provision of 
learning materials and free swimming pool access for poorer children and not enough 
available places in public childcare. Mentioned were furthermore particulate matter 
pollution with a priority of the car industry over citizens’ health (cf. Section 7.7), public 
transport being too expensive, refugees having been preferred in social housing 
provision compared to others waiting, exclusionary high prices at public festivities, a 
supposed elite keeping people down and state nannyism. Altogether, civil society 
representatives were more critical of city policies than other interviewees. 
5.6.2 Housing as a justice question 
 Many informants raised the issue of too expensive and not enough housing as 
a major problem in Stuttgart. Some interviewees initially expressed how they valued 
a relatively strong social mixing in Stuttgart’s neighbourhoods, without “ghettos” nor 
no-go-areas – this being politically promoted, e.g. through tolerating then formal 
misallocations in social housing: 
Extract 24 
„[...] [T]he neighbourhoods are very mixed. So there are no such problem 
neighbourhoods where poverty is rampant. Poverty and at least middle classes are 
very close here which also practically reduces the issue of social inequality“ (civil 
society representative 9). 
Many interviewees shared the view that this mixing was now declining as part 
of a housing crisis and gentrification in many German cities. It has been preceded by a 
reversal of the 1980s’ tendency of wealthier citizens moving out of the city and 
commuting to work. Relatedly, housing inequality became seen as a main justice issue: 
Extract 25 
                                                     
36 Stuttgart 21 is a contested major traffic and urban development project restructuring Stuttgart’s 
railway station (cf. Section 6.4.1). 
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„In Stuttgart, social inequality is especially large in the field of housing, I find. So 
the access to liveable housing space is not distributed very equitably in Stuttgart. 
Because simply the prices are such that in fact, two thirds of the people cannot 
afford life in Stuttgart. Per year, Stuttgart lacks 16,000 flats”  
– “since 2015, being estimated” [later specified by interviewee] (public sector 
employee 4). 
Civil society representative 11 described the requirements for purchasing a 
property: „And you can actually only buy a property when you inherited twice or so“, 
leading many to move out of the city. Then again, housing property was found to 
sometimes not be used purposefully: 
Extract 26 
„Many older houses in Stuttgart are simply left empty and the heirs, they mostly 
do not live in Stuttgart anymore and they just wait until any construction company 
comes and pays the millions for it, ok? So, that’s also such a thing where I have to 
say, that’s not exactly social [...]” (Civil society representative 3). 
Pointedly, civil society representative 7 asked:  
Extract 27 
„[W]ho can actually still afford to live in this city? Is Stuttgart only a city for the 
rich? And are the rents and housing costs the new walls of our cities?” 
Rising economic inequalities have been seen as a problem here, with assets 
and high incomes enabling expensive rents and properties. Those increasingly led to 
displacing persons on middle and lower incomes, which ultimately questioned the 
city’s functioning:  
Extract 28 
“But the dynamic is there, that […] we simply have many employees in the area of 
childcare centres or nursing, these are no highly paid professions and the question 
is, how do we get educators, how do we get nurses and geriatric nurses here into 
this city, who take care of people, if they, with the salary which they receive, cannot 
afford to live here. […] [W]e need this housing space here [...] for the many, many 
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professions, who are simply also important that such a city functions, especially in 
the social sector“ (civil society representative 7). 
Also, older persons on small pensions and families with children were seen to 
increasingly be displaced from the city. More people becoming homeless or living in 
temporary accommodations were outlined as further consequences.  
Some interviewees found that the city administration had done too little to 
prevent the housing crisis. They criticised the overall decline of the social housing 
stock, insufficient and – during some years no – social housing building activity, social 
housing having been sold off to “corporate raiders” and constantly passing out of the 
stock as well as lacking support for affordable private rented housing. A lack of space 
due to Stuttgart’s topography in a basin added to the lack of construction space. 
Overall, informants depicted a growing residential segregation due to economic 
resources with increasingly influential market dynamics driving out sections of the 
population – a development often seen as problematic or unjust.  
5.6.3 Inequality and social justice 
Responding to the question whether they saw economic inequality as a justice 
issue in Stuttgart, half of the informants to some degree approved this. Of the others, 
half disapproved it and half did not express a clear tendency or were not asked the 
question. Approval was most unequally spread between civil society and business 
representatives – of the former, nine out of 11 affirmed while of the latter, only two 
in nine did so. The following extracts provide some insight into this diversity of views.   
Extract 29 
„There certainly is economic inequality, but it is not a justice problem, I would say. 
It just simply results from the different life situations of the people, from their 
different life courses“ (politician 4). 
Extract 30 
“We have to strengthen the mid-sized sector again, that sounds so odd. But the 
spreading is a problem. If someone, and these are symbols, if someone earns 10 
million per year and you can break that down, then the normal worker asks himself 
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what he is actually doing all day. And these are excesses which are bad for the 
social fabric. As I said, at the moment that’s not an issue because everyone is 
relatively well. […] 
But of course we have neighbourhoods and corners which don’t know anything of 
the world. Also from which I actually don’t know anything, if I am completely 
honest. And there we have a task, because if they do not feel that they belong to 
us, at some point they are doing shit, they are doing it already (politician 1).” 
Not appraising economic inequality as a problem of justice, politician 4 
described it as a consequence of different life courses. This resonates with 
individualisation as an explanation of economic inequality (cf. Section 7.4.2) in that 
attention lies primarily on individual level symptoms rather than the nature of social 
structures in which they arise – thus reducing a critical consciousness towards them. 
By contrast, politician 1 emphasised structural aspects of economic inequality by 
interrelating diverging incomes and morally disagreeing with the ensuing low value of 
a “normal worker’s” activity. He judged this as detrimental for the social fabric and 
resulting in problematic behaviours of those not feeling to belong. While politician 1 
found that these issues were currently mitigated by “everyone being relatively well”, 
civil society representative 8’s experience contradicts this:  
Extract 31 
„[...] [A]s it is now with the long-term unemployed, that is indeed dreadful. One 
can be happy if one does not end up in this and one can get into it very quickly. So 
you can ask a couple of people here [in a food bank], they would not have thought 
with 40 years that they would be here with 45 years, […] and also not have thought 
that when it was shortly over with the working life, that one does not get back into 
it. So that is nothing that is owed to one’s own activity or so. That goes swiftly and 
one does not get out of that hole quickly again. […] 
Also the conditions on the first labour market are already made in a way that 
someone weaker can no longer enter it.”     
Describing the situation of long-term unemployed people as “dreadful” and hard to 
get out, the informant stressed how structural conditions were crucial for individual 
trajectories, i.e. a first labour market being inaccessible for “weaker” persons and 
again becoming harder and more selective (e.g. with bad employment chances from 
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about 50 years of age), as the interviewee outlined further on. Working closely with 
disadvantaged persons, civil society representative 8 came to see social descent as 
happening easily and quickly to people, not owing to one’s own behaviour. By 
contrast, politician 1 remarked himself that he did not know about disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods – a difference which can relate to diverging views, e.g. in terms of 
intergroup contact effectively reducing prejudice (Kteily et al., 2017).  
Summarising tendencies across informants, social standards in Stuttgart were 
repeatedly seen as comparably high (cf. Section 5.6.1), with some valuing how 
problems they saw relating to inequality not being major issues, i.e. with integration, 
xenophobia, high residential segregation and violence. This was often attributed to 
Stuttgart’s economic prosperity, growth and high tax incomes, especially in business 
tax. Sometimes, a related moral view was that such a rich society should ensure a 
degree of equality. However, informants named a number of inequalities being justice 
problems: high and rising economic and housing inequalities, income inequalities and 
pay not reflecting societal value added. Some expressed a view that there was enough 
work in Stuttgart (“de facto no unemployment”, politician 8), if one wanted to find it, 
but that low pay or social problems (e.g. drug addiction), were the prevailing problems. 
Further justice issues were child poverty and the withdrawal and invisibility of poverty 
as well as equal opportunities, educational justice and that effort needed to pay off in 
society; wrong spending priorities, lacking participation possibilities and prostitution. 
Altogether, while Stuttgart was sometimes seen as exemplary with regards to social 
justice and inequalities due to its economic prosperity, informants also expressed 
discontent in many areas and views were diverse. 
5.7 Stuttgart: policies and future generations 
5.7.1 Policies accounting for future generations?  
More than a third of the interviewees did not express a clear tendency when 
asked how far they found policies in Stuttgart accounted for future generations. 
Another third raised approval, from very strong to tentative or concerning specific 
areas. Most of the rest disapproved and few have not been asked. Approval was 
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strongest from public sector informants, disapproval most pronounced from civil 
society representatives, this being reflective of both groups’ interests and cleavages 
(cf. also Section 7.7).37  
A number of areas were found to account for future generations in Stuttgart. 
Almost a quarter of informants respectively mentioned Stuttgart’s Youth Council (cf. 
Section 5.7.2 b)) and investments for children and youth, be it into schools (and their 
digitalisation), youth social work (also mobile and in schools), local school trips, youth 
centres, sports clubs or planning. Four interviewees referenced early education and 
childcare and three supporting the economy and maintaining prosperity, inter alia 
through the Strategy Dialogue Automotive Industry (Ger.: Strategiedialog 
Automobilwirtschaft).38 Other measures mentioned once or twice included preparing 
young people for the labour market, also by cooperating with companies, 
environmental policies (preservation of nature, bio-diversity and resource use), 
investment into sustainable or electric mobility, pupils’ and citizens’ participation; 
Stuttgart’s Child Welfare Officer and the city exemplarily accounting for children, 
efforts for social mixture and support of less privileged groups, a new poverty 
conference, new building projects, Stuttgart 21, the city administration being 
cooperative and rooted within the region, the introduction of the double-entry 
accounting system (‘Doppik’)39 and not leaving municipal public debts for future 
generations.  
                                                     
37 However, interviewees partly understood “accounting for future generations” only in the sense of 
how far young people were involved in policy processes and not in relation to their results. 
38 The Strategy Dialogue Automotive Industry is an institutionalised cooperation aiming at developing 
projects, measures and concepts to successfully shape the transformation process of the automotive 
industry in Baden-Württemberg. It involves political and economic actors, researchers, employees’ 
associations, consumer organisations, environmental organisations and civil society (Staatsministerium 
Baden-Württemberg, n.d.).   
39 The double-entry accounting system (‘Doppik’), being introduced in German local authorities, applies 
principles of private sector commercial accounting. It gives an overview of all business transactions on 
two accounts, as debit and credit. In contrast to the previously employed cameralistics, which only 
include receipts of and outgoing payments, Doppik also includes liabilities, commodities and 
receivables. Its aim is to document all transactions promptly and comprehensively with an automatic 
overview of economic success, assets and liabilities (Ruhr-Universität Bochum, 2013). 
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Contrarily, other policies and practices in Stuttgart were seen as unsustainable 
– most of them by civil society representatives: the state of affairs being ecologically 
unsustainable, that we were living on the costs of next generations and the other half 
of the world – an inequity which would threaten us. Civil society representative 4 lined 
out how ecologically unsustainable we lived, but were indifferent about it: 
   Extract 32 
„[...] [W]e believe that the system that we are operating is a long-term system. But 
that will in all probability not be able to be long-term, because we are using up far 
too quickly the things which we […] have as a basis of life. We are contaminating 
our atmosphere, air pollutants and the like. We are messing up the water as our 
basis. We are consuming our soils. And we are very, very successful in removing 
other species […]. But that does not sound very successful […]. So as a fallacy, that 
is an expressedly stupid thing, viewed long-term. Yes. And in that stupid behaviour 
we feel comfortable. We have many present advantages from it. But it has no 
aspects of a long-term orientation, which we also don’t care about. I very often 
hear the saying: for me it will still suffice. […]” 
Further issues which informants found unsustainable included housing and 
social housing, Stuttgart 21, overfull schools, not enough places in old-age and 
childcare, little pay for educators, traffic not being human-friendly enough (too many 
cars, too few bikes), the car industry not taking responsibility for air pollution, too little 
public participation in planning and selling publicly-owned land. On a more 
fundamental level, interviewees remarked that taking a long-term perspective was 
limited to accumulating property for a next generation; that current action was 
polishing only without future-care and criticised a “business as usual” in terms of 
continued conventional construction activity despite its ecological problems. 
Altogether, views about the sustainability of local policies were diverse, though with 
more positive than negative instances being invoked.  
5.7.2 Factors seen as promoting a long-term orientation  
Besides referring to actual policies and practices, some interviewees described 
how policies should account for future generations. Most frequently mentioned 
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aspects are explored subsequently, while others were good education and the 
relevance of which political party was in power.  
a) Prosperity – today and in the future  
Informants emphasised Stuttgart’s prosperity as a factor enabling 
sustainability. Maintaining that prosperity was found to secure a long-term 
perspective, entailing strengthening the economic location, keeping the industries and 
related jobs. Preferences in this regard were cooperation, preservation and the 
importance of keeping up with international developments, mainly in the automotive 
sector which was indeed seen as crucial for the city’s future (as explored in Section 
7.9.2). For instance, business representative 5 saw jobs and economic prosperity 
besides environmental protection as crucial for intergenerational justice and implied 
a trade-off between both: 
Extract 33 
“So I think that everything that is so to speak being done to facilitate a good 
education. To enable good economic structures. And that as resource-saving as 
possible. That this has something to do with intergenerational justice […]. But also 
meaning for me that I provide that the economic location, as it is, is simply being 
strengthened. That one endeavours that the industry and economy remain on site. 
Because only then the successive generations will still have their workplaces. And 
I have also already mentioned that I sometimes have the feeling that there is a 
certain oversaturation. And that what is connected here with the economy is often 
perceived as a burden and disturbance […]. And I find that dangerous in tendency. 
Because such a […] company can by now very easily […] relocate. And then the 
future generation here has maybe no more access to work. But in return they have 
a nicer, clean air” (Business representative 5). 
b) Youth participation  
Citizen participation and especially of young people through Stuttgart’s Youth 
Council were mentioned repeatedly as contributing to sustainable policies. The Youth 
Council is a biennial directly elected interest representation of young people between 
14 and 18 years of age at the level of districts and the whole city towards the municipal 
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council, the mayor, the district advisory councils and the city administration 
(Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, n.d.-j). Conversely, children and youth not having their 
own voice in the democratic process and an overageing of politics were found to 
weaken long-term orientations, e.g.: 
Extract 34 
„I [...] certainly believe [...], if now more people under 30 years would be in the 
municipal committees, that the issue of climate protection would play a different 
role. And similarly this applies of course to the topic of pensions […]” (civil society 
representative 9). 
5.7.3 Factors seen as impeding a long-term orientation 
Besides the aspects discussed below, informants found that the following 
factors impeded a long-term perspective: social disintegration, also in 
neighbourhoods, a lack of space for the growing city, a perishing of medium-sized 
companies and associated loss of apprenticeships, generally a lack of employment and 
apprenticeships, rising inequality, declining public participation, a tiredness of politics 
and people being lied to with the examples of the ‘Brexit’-vote and Stuttgart 21. 
a) The future as unknown  
Some informants expressed that not knowing the future and future 
generations’ preferences made it difficult to account for them politically. Interviewees 
here referred to difficulties in demand planning for public childcare, changing opinion-
forming processes or shifting urban planning conventions. Besides, there were feelings 
of a general acceleration of progress, international economic and labour-market 
developments, while the security of employment biographies had ended. These 
tendencies were seen as a challenge for public authorities due to a different logic 
operating compared to the private sector.  
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b) Election cycles 
Few informants found election cycles of four or five years too short and 
impeding long-term action. Additionally to that, civil society representative 8 missed 
any long-term view on desired directions of development:  
Extract 35 
„I nowhere see any development into any direction. […] [I] simply miss that long-
term view of: where do we head towards and how do we act against this or how 
do we make it better than before?” 
5.7.4 Neoliberal shifts and returns 
In the course of the 1990s and 2000s, reforms towards more market-based 
approaches were also pursued in Stuttgart which have since been largely reversed. 
Those are an introduction of the ‘New Steering Model’, taking up the NPM agenda in 
Germany (cf. Section 3.3.5 b) and 6.4.1), a partial privatisation of public infrastructures 
and cross-border leasing transactions. Also coming up in interviews, I sketch the latter 
two subsequently. 
Stuttgart is the only city in Germany who has privatised its infrastructure for 
gas, electricity and drinking water with all its associated assets (Loewe, 2007, p. 76). 
Citizens party opposed this sale in 2002 and organised as the ‘Water Forum’ to reverse 
it, e.g. stressing that the management of water supply should be municipal, public and 
controllable, as this was about the bases of life and active participation (Stuttgarter 
Wasserforum, n.d.). In 2010, the city council joined a related petition, so that the city 
had to resume public water supply in 2014 (Stuttgarter Wasserforum, n.d.). Also, 
through lawsuits in 2016 and 2018, it was decided that the private company owning 
the electricity and gas networks as well as distribution plants in Stuttgart had to give 
back large parts of it to the municipal operator (K. Schwarz, 2016, 2018a).  
A related tendency are cross-border leasing transactions through which local 
authorities in Europe during the 1990s leased their then public infrastructures, e.g. 
sewerage networks or trams, in ca. 700 cases from American investors (Messner et al., 
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2015c). The transactions are fictitious purchases where US trusts or funds, i.e. offshore 
companies from tax havens, pretended foreign investments to obtain tax benefits in 
two countries: buying infrastructures and immediately leasing them out to the local 
authorities. The municipalities entering such a – confidential and complex – contract 
got initially paid out a small part of the “profit”, the present-value benefit (Loewe, 
2007, p. 84; Nauke, 2017). This happened at a time of often crumbling municipal 
budgets which could thus be supplemented (Messner et al., 2015a) and the need for 
a publicly operated water supply was partly viewed as outdated (Loewe, 2007, p. 78). 
At the end of 2004, cross-border leasing transactions have been forbidden in the US 
due to associated tax losses at the expense of US citizens (Loewe, 2007, p. 84).40 
Citizens in Stuttgart partly opposed the transactions with the Water Forum precluding 
a further cross-border leasing transaction of 27 schools and administrative centres in 
2003 through its activities. Municipal councillors then conceded at discussion events 
that they did not know the ca. 1000 pages long leasing contracts. The basis of the 
Green Party forced their councillors to rethink and the SPD changed its opinion, thus 
ending the political majority for cross-border leasing contracts. Civil society 
representative 1 accordingly described these transactions as unsustainable: 
Extract 36 
„[…] I think that that, something like that, is also not sustainable. […] Because, it is 
about public infrastructure. And the public infrastructure should remain in the 
public sector and not belong to any investors.” 
Sewage treatment plants went back into municipal ownership, leaving 
Stuttgart with a net profit of 11.8 million Euro (Schulz-Braunschmidt, 2010) – while 
other local authorities in Baden-Württemberg risked losses worth several times the 
                                                     
40 At their core, these transactions are described as a concealed credit default swap, i.e. an investment 
instrument betting against the creditworthiness of the bank and other contract partners over time. 
With the contract spanning decades, the banks were seen to be in a better position to win this bet 
(Messner et al., 2015b). 
  156 
initial present-value benefit (Messner et al., 2015b).41 In 2018, Stuttgart’s sewage 
system remained the last cross-border leasing transaction with the city aiming to 
prematurely dissolve the contract (Nauke, 2017). Civil society representative 1 
commented on the process: 
   Extract 37 
„[…] [T]he other thing we meanwhile have recognised, [is] that one should not sell 
the water network. And all these stories. That, with the cross-border leasing, that 
this was crap.” 
Altogether, while Stuttgart locally relatively strongly adopted moves towards 
infrastructure privatisation and cross-border leasing transactions in Europe, these 
were mostly turned back henceforth. These processes involved identifying and 
deliberating on the nature, implications and risks of the reforms – as the above quote 
illustrates – with a crucial role of civil society in the shifts of views. Main concerns 
raised were sustaining public ownership and control over infrastructures across 
generations – as one aspect of sustainability besides those discussed in the previous 
sections. 
5.8 Discussion – research question 1 
This section summarises and compares how policy approaches in Nottingham 
and Stuttgart are co-produced with social order and relate to sustainability (RQ 1). 
However, a more holistic comparison of the governance regimes follows in Chapter 8. 
Where entrenched and increasing deprivation and inequalities are 
Nottingham’s context, predominantly perceived as unjust by the informants, little and 
– relating to austerity – shrinking leeway was seen to tackle these socio-economic 
problems directly. However, local policies aim at more social and intergenerational 
justice in impressive and pioneering ways. This is through redistributive local 
                                                     
41 For its sewage system, Stuttgart received a present-value benefit of 22 million Euro. However, 
solicitors, bankers and consultants received 4% of the transaction volume, i.e. 18 million Euro – thus 
markedly exceeding the city’s net profit (Messner et al., 2015a). 
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infrastructures and services, thereby partly counteracting central government’s more 
market-based approaches – and exemplifying a capacity for resilience and local agency 
despite given centre-local relations (Griggs et al., 2017). Herein, Nottingham is a 
remarkable outlier across UK local authorities in terms of retaining expertise and 
infrastructures in the public sector – whereas others transferred these into the private 
sphere. Besides, measures aiming at individual behaviour change across political 
parties display a co-production regime entailing individual responsibility, social and 
environmental progressiveness and a very unequal power distribution between those 
in local political or administrative roles and most residents. Wedged in contradictions 
between local and central government, sustainability was seen as increasingly 
constrained by the latter through centralisation and competition between regions, 
decreasing local funding, the marketisation of local government, short election cycles 
and the electoral system – but promoted through local political stability. Some 
informants thus saw future generations left with worse living conditions than at 
present.  
Stuttgart’s policies by contrast often focus on structural and infrastructural 
issues and rarely on individual behaviours – with ‘nudge’ being less prevalent in 
Germany than in the UK. Views on social and intergenerational justice were more 
diverse and informants less ready to take an overall stance than in Nottingham. 
However, more often than not economic inequality was seen as unjust – most 
frequently crystallising in the increasingly exclusionary question of housing in 
Stuttgart. Seen to depend on its economic development, Stuttgart’s policies by and 
large complement national and state approaches42 to a relatively high level of (social) 
support in a German and European comparison. Sustaining economic prosperity was 
thus perceived necessary to further account for future generations – with the 
                                                     
42 For instance, a functional public transport provision in Nottingham was perceived by interviewees as 
impaired through nationally prescribed deregulation and competition of providers. By contrast, actors 
in Stuttgart did not take issue with national-level guidelines. Also, Stuttgart Region’s transport provision 
is more passenger-oriented in that a transport association unites providers into an integrated tariff 
structure without additional costs if these are combined (Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, n.d.-q) – which is 
not the case in Nottingham. 
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automotive sector seen as threatened. While youth participation was considered as 
contributing to sustainability, environmental degradation, the future being unknown 
and short election cycles were found to counteract it. The same applies to neoliberal 
shifts in infrastructure provision which have largely been reversed, crucially due to 
citizens’ opposition.    
Locating the cases in relation to neoliberalisation, this has been government-
led and in full swing in Nottingham: with shrinking budgets, local government 
marketisation and increasing interregional competition. Consequently, the council’s 
role further approaches its statutory duties only and the city’s structural disadvantages 
exacerbate, making long-term perspectives ever harder to maintain. This 
approximates what Streeck (2016, pp. 113–142) describes as a ‘consolidation regime’ 
(cf. also Section 8.4.4) in terms of postponing costs into the future (e.g. for 
infrastructure maintenance); but only partially in terms of privatisation due to local 
political counteraction. It confines social justice in that only wealthier citizens can pay 
for additional services and excluding all others, leading to significant deprivation and 
Nottingham’s polarised social order. Budget restrictions more often favour shorter-
term policies in Nottingham than in Stuttgart – as initially expected. Resisting this 
trend, significant long-term infrastructure measures were pursued and realised (e.g. a 
comparatively comprehensive public transport system, the tram or Robin Hood Energy 
– which however collapsed in 2020, cf. Footnote 27) nonetheless. Also, environmental 
measures are partly more ambitious and appear more effective than in Stuttgart (cf. 
Section 8.5.1). Contrary to Nottingham, neoliberal restructuring in Stuttgart since the 
1990s was early and comprehensively adopted by local initiative; and was later widely 
reversed due to local resistance, leaving traces differentiating it from the ideal type of 
a Weberian bureaucracy. Stable budgets in Stuttgart, being considerably higher than 
in Nottingham (cf. Section 3.5), enable expanding on the comparatively generous 
German welfare state.  
Social order is very differently co-produced in both cases. I argue that 
Nottingham’s more pronounced inequalities than Stuttgart’s find their expression in 
data and policies focusing more on individual behaviours rather than on the structural 
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conditions in which they arise. This again shapes social order by morally underpinning 
these individual-level approaches. Conversely, in Stuttgart with its more collective 
values, less responsibility is placed on those facing social problems and policies are 
behaviourally less prescriptive (cf. Sections 8.2.1 a) and 8.3.2). How the regimes relate 
to sustainability thus depends on policy areas and a trade-off between sustainability 
dimensions appears likely (cf. Section 7.5.3). Overall, the comparison of both cases’ 
policy approaches exemplifies how the uneven neoliberal advance and relatedly 
increasing national and European inequalities play out with realities of life, values and 
morals moving apart.  
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6 Policy negotiations and the public 
6.1 Introduction 
Having previously explored policy approaches, this chapter addresses RQ 2: 
How does the negotiation of policies relate to sustainability? For this, Chapter 3 lies 
theoretical and substantive foundations regarding welfare states, urban governance 
and the cases. Forth following, I explore findings through claims which governance 
theory sets out. Besides, Polanyi’s (1944) ‘double movement’ as conceptualised for 
urban responses to marketisation by Warner & Clifton (2014) helps analysing the roles 
of local authorities and civil societies. I outline both subsequently. 
Governance theory (cf. Section 3.3.3) assumes that democracy is secured 
through citizens’ participation in public tasks, since local communities’ contemporary 
challenges are too complex to be left to markets or to the local state alone. This builds 
on assumptions that participation and inclusion will overcome citizens’ varying 
abilities to promote their interests and that involvement creates consensus. 
Community participation can then lead to win-win situations where new ways to meet 
collective needs are developed and efficiency and effectiveness enhanced. Besides the 
public, other actors, agencies and institutions can participate in this networked 
governance which the local state facilitates, encourages and mediates. Underlying 
beliefs are that civil society can take on this active role and that shared interests, 
dialogue, trust and reciprocity enable a smooth cooperation. Power would be 
fragmented and shared across networks, but is not a major concern in governance 
theory (Kjær, 2009, pp. 140–145). With this optimism for participation and 
collaboration, networked governance appears promising for enhancing sustainability 
in local policy-making.  
Polanyi’s (1944) concept of ‘double movement’ implies a dialectic of 
marketisation moves and a following push for social protection, since the market 
economy is itself socially embedded and requires ongoing public intervention. Warner 
& Clifton (2014, p. 46) argue that Polanyi’s thesis can be used “to explain the 
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variegated urban response to austerity”. They operationalise these for European and 
American cities in terms of three main patterns: ‘hollowing out’, i.e. cities engaging in 
service cut backs, ‘riding the wave’ where cities try to harness the market and ‘push 
backs’, i.e. cities and citizen movements opposing marketisation in the sense of 
Polanyian countermovements. 
How far these approaches correspond to empirical instances in Nottingham 
and Stuttgart provides an angle to explore policy negotiations and the roles of the 
public in this chapter. Both are fundamental components of urban governance. In a 
parallel structure for both cities, I examine negotiations and relations between urban 
political actors (Sections 6.2.1 and 6.4.1) and with national, regional, other local, state 
and European Union levels (Sections 6.2.2 and 6.4.2) through my data. I then focus on 
the publics in terms of their views and conditions (Sections 6.3.1 and 6.5.1), their role 
in devising policies aiming for sustainability (Sections 6.3.2 and 6.5.2) and their relation 
to those developing local policies (Sections 6.3.3 and 6.5.3). Section 6.5.3 concludes 
on RQ 2 and the outlined conceptual perspectives – while Chapter 8 deepens 
comparative aspects. 
6.2 Nottingham: political power embedded 
This section focuses on what case study data evince about the development of 
policies in Nottingham (Section 6.2.1) and its relation to other levels of governance 
(Section 6.2.2) by discussing some significant themes. 
6.2.1 Urban negotiations 
Corresponding to the significant dominance of the Labour Party in 
Nottingham’s city council since 1991, interviewees partly saw urban policy processes 
as strongly imprinted by it and its politicians. This was in terms of relatively directed, 
top-down decision-making and implementation, a strong and ambitious leadership 
and limited coordination before plans were drafted and decisions made. With the 
First-past-the-post electoral system, local council majorities are relatively stable and 
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belonging to one of the two major political parties – Labour or Conservative Party – is 
more or less a precondition for becoming a local councillor. 
Informants’ views about the acting of the city council ranged from positive in 
terms of a determined and effective leadership to critique about lacking negotiation 
and contestation, e.g.:  
   Extract 38 
“[…] [T]here’s no effective opposition. So as long as there’s no one who’s going to 
take them [Nottingham’s local government] to court, they just do what they want. 
[…] [T]hey make it quite obvious that they’re really not interested what anyone 
outside their little group thinks or wants (business representative 7). 
Jon Collins, leader of the city council until May 2019, shared the view of a 
largely absent opposition and outlined how political consensus-building instead was a 
challenge within the Labour Group:  
Extract 39 
I: […] How do you see the kind of political opposition in the council? 
Collins: I do not see any. 
[…] 
I mean, the biggest issue is trying to make sure that we maintain and build 
consensus within the Labour Group […], making sure that you do the consensus 
over what is effectively quite a large number of people [52] can be difficult, and 
that is what we do. 
Process-wise, interviewees described the Council Plan as fundamental to 
formulating policies in Nottingham. It mostly sets specific and measurable political 
objectives for a legislative period, e.g. “[b]uild 2,500 new homes that Nottingham 
people can afford to rent or buy” (Nottingham City Council, 2016a, p. 3). The Council 
Plan is predominantly based on the Nottingham Labour Party’s manifesto with equally 
specific targets. Ideas for the latter are developed by local politicians, administrative 
officers and in their interchange, as politician 9 described:  
   Extract 40 
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“[…] I will talk with my officers about how I’ve got some ideas about what I might 
like to put in the manifesto. […] [A]bout what’s a realistic-“ 
[…] 
“So that’s where I get my ideas from really a range of sources I suppose, but also 
officers will come to me with ideas that they’ve had, that they think we could do 
[…] something which would be interesting or useful, or we could expand on what 
we do or we could take a different path.” 
This equally illustrates a relatively close communication and cooperation 
between politicians and administrative officers. The latter generally exhibited positive 
views of local councillors’ approaches.  
Policy processes in Nottingham are partly outlined in strategies or plans, 
directed by the city council and implemented accordingly, while lengthier disputes 
with urban opponents and long delays are rather unusual. Instances of this are the 
introduction of the Workplace Parking Levy (cf. Section 7.3), the creation of the tram 
and of Robin Hood Energy (cf. Footnote 27) or the development of Nottingham’s 
cycling infrastructure against resistance e.g. of car drivers. An exception are 
government’s funding cuts which necessitated changes to plans or sometimes made 
them obsolete.  
Besides the city council, a multitude of actors in Nottingham are involved in 
negotiating policies, depending on the issue at hand and often in partnerships. They 
are inter alia public authorities and institutions, such as the D2N2 Local Enterprise 
Partnership (LEP)43, parts of the National Health Service (NHS) or the two universities 
– the latter often being seen as fundamental to the city (cf. Section 7.3). Involved are 
furthermore various civil society actors, often charities, business associations and 
sometimes companies.  
                                                     
43 The D2N2 Local Enterprise Partnership for Derby, Derbyshire, Nottingham and Nottinghamshire “[…] 
play[s] a central role in deciding local economic priorities, and undertaking activities to drive economic 
growth and create local jobs” (D2N2 Local Enterprise Partnership, n.d.). 
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The relevance of partnerships in Nottingham, described in many policy 
documents, coincides with the shift from government to governance (cf. Section 3.3.4) 
in that responsibilities should become more shared between multiple local actors. 
With the government’s local spending cuts having “hit poor communities and big cities 
hardest”, Nottingham’s Labour Party (2015, p. 3) emphasises: 
   Extract 41 
“But in these difficult times we need to change the way we deliver our goals. Now 
more than ever, partnerships with others in the public, voluntary and private 
sectors will be key to our city’s success. And we will work even more closely with 
local people so that we can all take on more responsibility: look out for each other, 
respect the city’s environment and take the opportunities that are presented to 
us”.  
Taking on more responsibility – of which the withdrawing state could not be 
the main carrier – expresses rising expectations towards the population, a repeating 
theme in Nottingham.  
However, parts of the population were seen as missing from policy 
negotiations which is relevant in terms of local power relations. Interviewees referred 
to disadvantaged, disenfranchised and disintegrated people with whole 
neighbourhoods not engaging. Further mentioned ‘missing’ actors were inter alia the 
Conservative Party, headteachers and schools since their academisation and the black 
and minority ethnic group being underrepresented in the city councils’ workforce. 
Finally, small and middle-sized enterprises were found to struggle in making their 
views known, as opposed to big companies. 
Regarding RQ 2, political stability in Nottingham was seen as contributing to 
sustainable policies (cf. Section 5.4.2) – but as unjust when there was little (effective) 
challenge to political power. Deprivation curtails sustainability from the onset, while a 
shrinking state increasingly shares tasks through partnerships. 
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6.2.2 The urban relating to other governance levels 
a) Central government  
Some local informants described Nottingham’s relation with the Conservative 
Party-led government as difficult. Herein, the last “years of unprecedented funding 
reductions” (Porter in Eichler, 2018) to local authorities played an important role (cf. 
Section 3.4.1 b)). A number of politicians and public sector employees criticised them, 
inter alia as a main central government steering instrument, though with little interest 
in their local implementation and consequences. This partly implies a one-sided 
dependency of Nottingham’s local from central government. The city council’s leader 
voiced this:  
   Extract 42 
Collins: [With] […] [g]overnment […] that is more a take it or leave it relationship. 
I: How [is] that? 
Collins: So government, they tell you what they are going to do and they give you 
what they are going to give you and they are not terribly interested in what we 
may or may not say about things. So not much in the way of dialogue. It is this […] 
what you are having, thanks very much or not thanks very much. 
He saw government’s austerity policies as ideology-driven:  
   Extract 43 
“[…] [W]hen you have a government that knows the cost of everything and the 
value of nothing, where it is determined to drive down public spending because it 
has some weird and wonderful notions about what makes a thriving economy, 
what you end up with is […] public spending being cut regardless of its impact. So 
those areas where public spending is productive and can make a difference and 
could boost the economy, […] they go as well. […] [T]hey just cut public spending 
because it is an ideology” (Jon Collins). 
Collins relatedly expressed a preference for a more ‘European’ governance 
with greater local control: 
Extract 44 
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Collins: I think that it is with the government that believes in the market. If you 
believe in the market, then you believe in competition, you believe in 
fragmentation because you believe in people not cooperating but competing. That 
creates a certain type of culture and a certain type of society. It is not one I am [...] 
particularly attracted by. It is a bit like America [...] where anything goes as long 
as you got the money to pay for it. 
I: How would you like to see it differently? 
Collins: Well, I would like local authorities to have the power to act on a range of 
things. [...] So it would be better if we were better funded, if we ha[d] an 
independent tax base, if we could be genuinely influential, if we could have proper 
control of key aspects [...] but that would make us more like other European cities 
rather than an outpost of the United States. So that is probably not what we are 
going to have from this government [...]. 
Beyond this, views on government policies were sometimes marked by relatively 
strong dismissive reactions, such as moral outrage, sadness or frustration (cf. Extract 
12 and Extract 13). 
Collins also deprecated the distribution of the cuts: “[…] we [Nottingham] see 
our funding reduced far faster than more affluent councils representing conservative 
voting areas in the south and the southeast […]”. Indeed, examining the geography of 
local government austerity, Gray & Barford (2018) identify 
“[…] substantial variations between authorities in terms of funding, local tax-base, 
fiscal resources, assets, political control, service-need and demographics. We 
argue that austerity has actively reshaped the relationship between central and 
local government in Britain […]” (p. 541). 
“[…] [A]usterity pushed down to the level of local government in the UK has 
resulted in (i) a shrinking capacity of the local state to address inequality, (ii) 
increasing inequality between local governments themselves and (iii) intensifying 
issues of territorial injustice” (p. 543).  
Thereby, “cities still dealing with the legacy of industrial decline or sustained 
levels of poverty” and thus more people relying on local government services “were 
also among the local areas with higher proportions of their budgets reliant on the 
grant from central government” (Gray & Barford, 2018, p. 550). Aggravatingly, the 
largest spending cuts tended to affect cities (Gray & Barford, 2018, p. 553f). But also 
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national welfare cuts have disproportionally affected more deprived areas (Beatty & 
Fothergill, 2016). Local and national cuts combined “compound[] the impact of 
austerity in the worst hit places” (Gray & Barford, 2018, p. 553) – and all these 
characteristics apply to Nottingham. Also regionally, the East Midlands receive lower 
shares of public expenditure on services per head and in total than the eight other 
regions in the country in 2015-16 (EastMidlands Councils, n.d., p. 1). EastMidlands 
Councils (n.d., p. 4) conclude: “[…] [g]overnment does not invest on the basis of 
equity”. 
Taken together, policy-making in Nottingham is constrained by the centralised 
organisation of local government in the UK and exacerbated by very severe funding 
cuts. They play out as structural disadvantage by disproportionately affecting 
Nottingham and the East Midlands in combination with existing social and economic 
problems. These spatial injustices were locally perceived as hampering urban 
sustainability efforts (e.g. to fund infrastructures and support promoting social 
justice). 
b) Regional level and local authorities 
In relation to other local authorities, main issues coming up in the data were 
intensifying mutual cooperation and Nottingham’s contested boundaries (cf. next 
section). Regionally, the Midlands Engine was sometimes invoked. It self-describes: 
“Our core purpose is to create a Midlands Engine that powers the UK economy and 
competes on the world stage” (Midlands Engine, 2017, p. 6). With the productivity gap 
between the UK and the East Midlands and even more so Nottingham (cf. Section 3.4.1 
c)), the Midlands Engine’s “ambition is to close the GVA gap to match or exceed the 
national average and add £54 billion to the Midlands and UK economies by 2030” 
(Midlands Engine, 2017, p. 6). However, a critical view on it was: „[…] the Midlands 
Engine, I don’t even know what that is. It’s just a marketing strategy as far as I can see” 
(public sector employee 14). 
Stronger regional collaboration is set through the Derby-Nottingham Metro 
Strategy 2030 with “five big ambitions to drive us forward over the next 15 years”, in 
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terms of economic development, skills and training, connectivity, living spaces and 
service provision, stating: “[w]e have more to gain from cooperation than competition 
if we want to unlock the potential of our cities to develop and keep our local talent” 
(Derby City Council & Nottingham City Council, 2016, p. 2).  
c) Contested urban boundaries 
Locally, there are politics of Nottingham’s contentious boundaries. Nottingham 
city is markedly more deprived in various respects than its surrounding areas (cf. 
Section 3.4.2 d)). This is enhanced by Nottingham, but not Nottinghamshire, being 
among those hardest hit by the cuts to government spending, also with its higher 
reliance on it (Beatty & Fothergill, 2016, p. 19). These territorial injustices are co-
produced with morality, partially devaluing Nottingham. This is reflected in 
informants’ views and in debates around revisions to local authority boundaries in 
Nottinghamshire. For instance, 
“Conservative councillor Philip Owen […] said that it was 'project fear' to suggest 
that West Bridgford [note of the author: being among the 3% least deprived areas 
in the UK (McCormick et al., 2017, p. 53)] would join Nottingham City, which he 
called a 'basket case'. He said the city council has always had its eye on areas like 
West Bridgford, but it would never happen because people there didn't want it” 
(Sandeman, 2018b).  
By contrast, Nottingham City Council favoured an expansion of Nottingham’s 
borders to include the wealthier areas West Bridgford, Arnold, Gedling and Broxtowe 
(Sandeman, 2018c). This dissent parallels the ‘flight’ of many wealthier citizens to 
residing outside the city – while informants would partly explain themselves if they 
acted differently, e.g.: 
   Extract 45 
“[…] the boundary is so tight, the people who work in Nottingham don't actually 
live in Nottingham, surrounding Nottingham some fairly prosperous areas. And 
some of the people who are a bit eccentric like me who are affluent but believe in 
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living in the city, living in areas of disadvantage. Most people take flight and go 
outside and that's a sensible way forward” (politician 11). 
Central government’s funding regime reinforces the ensuing inequalities and 
thus facilitates Nottingham’s further devaluation. Therefore, I argue that 
Nottingham’s “small official boundaries”, denoted by Nottingham City Council to 
“skew[] the results” of household disposable income data (BBC News, 2018b) – with 
Nottingham exhibiting the lowest value per head in the UK in 2016 (Collinson, 2018) – 
are precisely a function and indicator of the local power distribution. Since Nottingham 
is in a financially weak position already and gets further pushed behind politically, this 
dynamic equals structural violence.  
d) European Union 
The EU’s structural and cohesion funds have reduced regional disparities 
within EU countries – as shown for 1995-2006 (Kyriacou & Roca-Sagalés, 2012). 
Correspondingly, the European Regional Development Fund “aims to strengthen 
economic and social cohesion in the European Union by correcting imbalances 
between its regions” (European Commission, n.d.-a).  
There “is no consistent picture of how much each region of the UK receives in 
funding from the EU”, since this depends on a varying number of funding applications 
per region (Full Fact, 2016). As a rough approximation, the East Midlands receives for 
the European Regional Development Fund and the European Social Fund together ca. 
598 million Euro during 2014-2020.44 This sum is the third-lowest out of nine regions 
in England with the East of England being lowest with 387 million Euro and the South 
West being highest with 1,495 million Euro (Soubry & Herbert, 2016). However, poorer 
areas – both at regional and Local Enterprise Partnership area levels – tend to “receive 
a larger proportion of these funds than richer areas in both per capita and absolute 
                                                     
44 This is based on Local Enterprise Partnership areas which partly cross the boundaries of regions. 
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terms” (Hunt et al., 2016, p. 9). They would therefore “be more vulnerable to any 
negative economic impacts arising from the loss of structural funding”, should the UK 
leave the EU without replacing these (Hunt et al., 2016, p. 10). Coincidingly, informants 
found that EU funding alleviated inequalities in the city and Nottingham City Council 
(n.d.-a) states that it “helped to regenerate Nottingham since 2000” and supported 
many projects in the city. 
Altogether in relation to other levels of governance, I argue that Nottingham 
suffers from structural disadvantage and violence in terms of the national funding 
regime, regional and local inequalities. This interacts with – therefore lower – social 
recognition towards Nottingham and many of its inhabitants, thus counteracting social 
and intergenerational justice. Recent developments such as continued austerity and 
‘Brexit’ likely exacerbate these inequalities, while alleviating factors such as EU 
funding, attempts at a devolution deal (unsuccessful until 2018) or the Midlands 
Engine are threatened or could not reverse the tendency.  
6.3 Nottingham: the public 
The following focuses on the public’s position and impact on policies in 
Nottingham. After approximating its situation (Section 6.3.1), I examine how urban 
policies aiming for sustainability are devised and what role the public has in it (Section 
6.3.2). Cognitions are then connected to the relationship between Nottingham’s public 
and those developing local policies. However, I can only approach both cities’ publics 
to an extent as they are diverse in many respects.   
6.3.1 Views and conditions of the public 
Extending beyond more standard socio-economic indicators (cf. Section 3.4), 
this section seeks to understand views and conditions of Nottingham’s public through 
its own perceptions as expressed in surveys, interview data and further research.  
Nottingham’s annual citizens’ survey gives according insights and displays 
understandings of the local state-citizen relationship. Respondents in 2017 (n=2,017, 
cluster-based quota sample; Nottingham City Council, 2018a, 2018b) were often 
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satisfied with their local area: 40.5% were very satisfied and 44.8% were fairly 
satisfied. Relatedly, 60.8% would recommend Nottingham a great deal as a place to 
live and 32.3% to some extent, 4.6% not very much and 2.3% not at all. 54.8% would 
recommend Nottingham a great deal as a place to work and 35.9% to some extent. 
76% of respondents would speak highly about Nottingham. Local area cohesion was 
rated relatively highly with 50.7% definitely agreeing that people from different 
backgrounds get on well and 40.2% tending to agree. Also, 57.5% definitely agreed 
that they could rely on local people (friends, family, neighbours) to provide help, 31.1% 
tended to agree, while 11.3% in tended to or definitely disagreed. 77% in tendency 
agreed that they could rely on local people (voluntary, faith groups etc.) to provide 
help (Nottingham City Council, 2018e).  
Concerning austerity and financial hardship, 30.2% of respondents have 
“noticed a deterioration in council services in the last five years as a result of cuts to 
the Council’s budget”, while 55.3% have not (Nottingham City Council, 2018e, p. 63). 
24% indicated that they struggled to or did not keep up with bills – a third of them in 
employment (Nottingham City Council, 2018e). 
Finally, Nottingham’s mental wellbeing score (52.4 out of 70) was slightly 
higher than the England average of 50.1 (NHS, 2016). 8.4% of respondents felt lonely 
all the time or often and 26.1% sometimes (Nottingham City Council, 2018e). 
The design of Nottingham’s citizens’ survey as an ordering instrument to some 
extent exhibits business and behavioural approaches in that there are foci on 
satisfaction, partly representing the citizen as a customer (e.g. about how the city 
council handles enquiries, value for money, local events or cleanliness), and individual 
conduct (smoking, drinking alcohol). The survey thereby also constitutes a tool to 
create numbers about ‘social problems’ operationalised as individual behaviours; and 
evidences an observational and rather distanced stance of those designing the survey 
towards those it aims at. Contrarily, more collective concerns such as main problems 
or the satisfaction with areas of life in the city do not figure in the survey (Nottingham 
City Council, 2018e).  
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While self-reported satisfaction with Nottingham appears relatively high in the 
citizens’ survey, the interviews and other data also evince adverse perspectives. 
Interviewees particularly lined out how poverty and deprivation significantly impacted 
on – deteriorating – living conditions in Nottingham, e.g.: 
   Extract 46 
“[D]efinitely, the gap has widened since this austerity [...]. There is definitely huge 
disparity between the poor and rich. […] And I think it is not Europe, am I 
somewhere in a part of Bangladesh? [...]”  
[…] 
“[…] I think the major issue for me is, […] the local deprivation and local poverty is 
not coming up anywhere in the statistics at all. So we will only see the headline, 
does that link with the crime? I'm sure it does. Does that […] link with the mental 
health? I'm sure it does. And also, I think it is important that there was a notion 
that the family was supporting each other, do the famil[ies have] that capacity to 
support each other? I don't think anymore. So […] the less well-off have […] become 
more kind of destitute” (civil society representative 7). 
Nottingham’s ‘Your City Your Services’ survey 2016 substantiates this view. 
Therein, 2,034 respondents (self-completion) “indicate[d] their level of concern about 
[…] issues during the current economic situation” (Hill, 2017 Annexe 6, p.8). Shares of 
those concerned or very concerned include 94% in relation to cuts to public services; 
74% regarding an impact on their health; 68% due to household money problems; 58% 
relating to changes in benefits; 48% of losing their home and 39% of losing their job 
(Hill, 2017 Annexe 6, p.8; Appendix A). These existential fears of many partly prove 
true in a falling healthy life expectancy at birth between 2009-2011 and 2015-2017 in 
77 of 150 UK local areas. Of these, women in Nottingham experienced the greatest 
and statistically significant fall of 6.1 years, to averagely 53.5 years lived in good health 
(Finch, 2018). Correspondingly, Watkins et al. (2017) estimate that the squeeze on 
public finances since 2010 is linked to almost 120,000 excess deaths in England. 
More specifically, some problems in Nottingham which shaped up during the 
research are illustrated exemplarily: fuel poverty, underemployment, access to food 
and crime. First, fuel poverty “affected the lives of 18,980 Nottingham households in 
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2016/17”, i.e. a share of 14.6% (Nottingham City Council, 2018h, p. 5). “Living in excess 
cold leads to a higher risk of poor health outcomes, as well as increased morbidity and 
mortality” (Nottingham City Council, 2018h, p. 7). It is estimated that half of excess 
winter deaths are caused by fuel poverty, equalling 500 in Nottingham during 2013-
2016 (Nottingham City Council, 2018h, p. 6).  
Second, while employment does not prevent from financial hardship in the UK 
(e.g. P. Butler, 2017), many also struggle to find it in Nottingham. For instance, 
McKenzie (2015, p. 93f) describes that residents of St. Ann’s neighbourhood often 
could not find work that would sustain a living for them and their families. The 
tendency also materialises in many applicants for few jobs, such as 1,701 applying for 
eight positions when a Costa Coffee branch opened in Nottingham (Mapperley) in 
2013 with hourly wages between £6.10 and £10 (Lansley & Mack, 2015, p. 90). The 
authors (2015, p. 92) state that “[h]unting for work in Britain, especially in areas of 
high unemployment, has become an increasingly demoralising and often demeaning 
process”. Unemployment figures “understate the scale of the modern jobs crisis”, also 
through a steady rise in underemployment (Lansley & Mack, 2015, p. 94).  
Third, low incomes interact with access to food. Increasing numbers of low-
paid workers in Nottingham – with 9% of its workforce earning the lowest legal wage 
of £4.20 to £7.38 per hour – turned to foodbanks (Bunn, 2018). Relatedly, a food bank 
employee described how underpaying employers would sometimes volunteer and 
questioned food bank’s existence: 
   Extract 47 
“[…] [T]he managing director is coming in smiling and having his photograph taken 
handing out some food, we’re feeding his employees. 
[…] 
So I think there has to be always a focus on how do we get rid of food banks. […] I 
don’t want to live in a society where food banks are just normal” (Nigel Webster, 
Bestwood & Bulwell Foodbank). 
Fourth, crime was mentioned as an issue in Nottingham with rates having risen 
by 29% during 2017 in Nottinghamshire (Jarram, 2018a). Numbers of knife crime were 
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highest in 2017 since their publishing started in 2011 (Pittam, 2018). Politician 11 
related crime to difficult living conditions in Nottingham:  
   Extract 48 
“[…] 25 percent of all crime in Nottinghamshire, […] comes from five wards in the 
city. And what are those five wards? Well the five most disadvantaged wards in 
the city. And if you're going to make a difference about crime in the long term, 
you've got to do stuff around early intervention, around early year’s education, 
around decent housing, around jobs and training or skills and about people getting 
a decent wage. 
[…] 
I think people who are more affluent […] are less likely to offend. […] [I]f we had a 
fairer, more equal society, life would be better for those who are disadvantaged”.   
To summarise, Nottingham’s citizens’ survey pictures a public relatively 
satisfied with the city and local cohesion, though around a quarter experienced 
financial hardship. However, attempting to understand further major problems in 
Nottingham, large groups of the population face existential threats and fears, often 
relating to deprivation. The UK’s median household total net wealth of £259,400 (July 
2014-June 2016; Office for National Statistics, 2018, p. 5) evinces this lack of social 
justice. Policies underpinning these conditions, such as continued austerity, are fuelled 
by and enable a highly unequal social order – playing out violently in Nottingham with 
disadvantaged citizens living shorter under harshening circumstances. United Nations 
envoy Philip Alston relatedly describes the government’s approach: “British 
compassion for those who are suffering has been replaced by a punitive, mean-spirited 
and callous approach […]” (P. Butler & Booth, 2018). 
6.3.2 Devising policies aiming for sustainability – and the public  
Behind the sketched background, I examine the public’s role in the negotiation 
of policies aiming for sustainability in Nottingham. To understand the public’s relative 
power position, I draw on policies in Nottingham and Stuttgart which were repeatedly 
mentioned in the data to aim for social and intergenerational justice. I grouped and 
summarised them in Table 7. Instances marked in italics in the table display a crucial 
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civil society impact in their development. For Nottingham, this is only the case for 
‘socially progressive policies’, as I expound subsequently. 
Table 7: Comparison of the public’s role in policy negotiations 
How are urban policies aiming for social and intergenerational justice devised? 
Nottingham Stuttgart 
Keeping infrastructures public and at a high 
level 
Privatisation and re-municipalisation of 
infrastructures 
Environmentally progressive policies Air pollution; traffic organisation 
Socially progressive policies Stuttgart 21 
Support of disadvantaged groups Strong support of disadvantaged groups 
Changing individual behaviours Changing (infra-)structures 
Source: own research; in italics = crucial civil society impact.       
Keeping infrastructures public and at a high level. Partly working against the 
governments’ market-oriented approaches, Nottingham’s left-wing local government 
aims to provide more encompassing public services, justifying it with social justice 
considerations (cf. Extract 8). This is the case for a high-level public transport, the 
foundation of a first local authority-owned energy company to tackle fuel poverty and 
provide cheaper energy (Robin Hood Energy, n.d.), the redistributive Workplace 
Parking Levy (cf. Section 7.3), a large social housing stock or the Selective Licensing 
Scheme for minimum housing standards (cf. Footnote 26). Despite noble intentions, 
some of these projects had contested side-effects (cf. for example Section 7.3). 
Importantly, Robin Hood Energy collapsed in 2020 as it was not financially viable in the 
longer term (cf. Footnote 27).  
Environmentally progressive policies. Section 7.5.3 discusses some ways in 
which Nottingham’s local policies stand out in the UK as emphasising environmental 
sustainability: inter alia in terms of carbon emissions, use of renewable energy, 
retrofitting social housing or public transport support and cycling promotion. Both the 
infrastructural and environmentally progressive tendencies are mainly driven by the 
city council and its deliberate long-term approaches, enabled by in-house expertise 
(cf. Section 5.4.2).  
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Socially progressive policies. Local policy approaches partly appear socially 
progressive with a tendency to more identity-based concepts. This is the case for the 
city council’s and partially public support for discriminated groups based on ethnic 
background, sexual orientation or gender. An insightful instance here is the 
recognition of misogyny as a hate crime. This recognition by Nottinghamshire police 
in 2016 as the first police force in Britain received significant attention (Finnigan, 
2016). It followed work since 2014, when Nottingham Citizens45 built a hate crime 
commission with its member organisations. Associated research found that 85% of 
young women across the UK have been sexually harassed in a public place (Citizens 
UK, 2018a). This created evidence base has been employed to ask the police to class 
misogyny as a hate crime – with success. This policy and data making its case have 
thereby been co-produced with partly intensifying identity-based anti-discrimination 
efforts and codified the latter. The policy is partially considered as pioneering and 
progressive, as e.g. shown by a call to extend it nationally (BBC News, 2018c). An aim 
of civil society actors in the process – whose impact appears crucial to the outcome – 
was to make the county safer for women (Finnigan, 2016), thus relating to social 
justice. 
Support of disadvantaged groups. Equally established in terms of social justice, 
some local policies especially aim to support disadvantaged groups such as the city 
council’s commitment to “No Second Night Out” in relation to homelessness 
(Nottingham City Council, 2018i, p. 2), unemployed persons in terms of jobs and skills 
support and generally poorer parts of the population (cf. Section 5.3.2). 
Changing individual behaviours. The document analysis shows how policy 
approaches seeking to improve life for those facing social problems relatively often 
                                                     
45 “Nottingham Citizens is a non-partisan alliance of 36 civil society institutions comprised of trade 
unions, faith groups, charities, schools and universities, all working together to make Nottingham a 
better place to live” (Citizens UK, 2018b). 
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also aim for change of individuals and not primarily of structures in which these 
problems arise (cf. Section 5.2.2 a)).  
To probe my interpretation and to better understand Nottingham’s civil 
society, I looked for policy instances where it had an important impact. One example 
was equally organised through Nottingham Citizens: the University of Nottingham 
agreeing to pay all staff the real Living Wage46 after an according protest at the 
university (Sandeman, 2017b). Participants recurred to moral ideas about distribution 
and justice, e.g.: “[T]hey [cleaning staff] deserve to be paid enough to live on.”; “A 
university that is so wealthy can afford to pay its staff the living wage” (Sandeman, 
2017a). Further instances are lifting wages of over 5,000 employees in the city through 
the real Living Wage campaign; an investment of £36,000 into the Women’s Aid 
Domestic Violence hotline or the creation of two hate crime officer positions in the 
city council and the police (Nottingham Citizens, 2018). These examples all originate 
from activities of Nottingham Citizens. As shown, they are often justified by social 
justice concerns. Nottingham Citizens similarly self-describes:  
“We organise communities to act together for social justice and the common good, 
developing the leadership capacity of our members so they can hold our cities' 
decision-makers to account on the issues that matter to them” (Citizens UK, 
2018b).  
Nottingham’s civil society organises in many varied groups and charities, such 
as Pedals47 or Sustrans48 for transport and protests take place on a wide range of 
issues.  
                                                     
46 The voluntary ‘real’ Living Wage aims to represent the cost of living. With £9 per hour in 2018/2019 
(£10.55 in London), it is higher than the National Minimum/National Living Wage of £7.83 (for those 
over 25 years; Living Wage Foundation, n.d.). 
47 “Pedals was founded in 1979 to encourage more people to use bikes and to campaign for safer and 
more attractive conditions for cyclists in the Nottingham area” (Pedals, 2018). 
48 “We are the charity that makes it easier for people to walk and cycle. […] We are grounded in 
communities and believe that grassroots support combined with political leadership drives real change, 
fast” (Sustrans, n.d.). 
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In summary, civil society influenced various policies in Nottingham, often 
striving for social justice. However, major policies aiming for sustainability have more 
often been devised by the city council and civil society therein relatively seldom played 
a crucial role. The next section refers this to the relation between the public and those 
developing policies. 
6.3.3 Relation of the public and policy developers  
To better understand this relation, I compare average conditions of the public 
and of policy developers49 in Nottingham, drawing on indications from my and other 
data. Table 8 approximates both groups. It illustrates considerable inequalities 
between them in terms of realising social and economic rights, the allocation of 
economic and educational resources, a relatively steep hierarchy towards political 
decision-making and significant distance in various areas of life, e.g. spatially. 
Table 8: Nottingham's public and policy developers 
 Public Policy developers 
Local government Centralised 
Austerity 
First-past-the-post voting system 
55 councillors (2015-2019): Labour majority 
(Nottingham City Council, 2018g) 
Social and economic rights/ 
resources 
Average household income 
per head in Nottingham 
(2016, taxes and benefits 
taken into account): 
£12,232 (Collinson, 2018) 
Existential problems and 
fears; basic needs partly 
unmet 
Average gross salary for 
council jobs: £32,500 
(Totaljobs Group, 2018) 
Mean payments to 
interviewed councillors 
(2017-18): £30,73750 
(Nottingham City Council, 
2018f; own calculation) 
National inequalities In incomes (Gini coefficient) – UK: 0.36  
                                                     
49 As ‘policy developers’, I denote those typically involved in developing local policies. They could not 
be clearly delimited, since these actors vary with a policy issue. However, usually I hereby mean and 
approximate local councillors, administrative officers and other public sector employees. Many 
interviewees are policy developers, thus giving according indications. 
50 This could be complemented through other professional activity. 
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(7th most unqual of 37 mostly OECD-countries; OECD, 
2017) 
UK one of the most interregionally unequal of 30 OECD-
countries (McCann, 2019) 
Education Low attainment; 
Nottingham worst in UK for 
children‘s prospects (Evans 





Significant between Nottingham and Greater Nottingham – 
social class; interacting with attributed value  
Sources: own research and as indicated. 
Nottingham’s 2017 citizens’ survey also addresses the city council’s work. 
52.9% of respondents agreed to some extent that the city council treats them fairly 
and 29.3% to a great deal. 21.2% definitely agreed that the council provides value for 
money, 41.5% tended to agree, 21.7% neither agreed nor disagreed, while 7.2% 
tended to disagree and 8.4% definitely disagreed. 19.8% were very satisfied and 51.8% 
were fairly satisfied with how the council runs things; 18.8% were neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied and the remaining 9.6% were fairly or very dissatisfied. Besides this relative 
satisfaction, respondents averagely appraised their own impact as limited with more 
than half in tendency disagreeing with the statement “You can influence decisions 
affecting your local area” (28% tended to disagree and 25% definitely disagreed; 13.3% 
definitely agreed and 33.6 % tended to agree; Nottingham City Council, 2018e). 
Interviewees also described the relation between policy developers and citizens. 
Hereby, Extract 3 displays politician 2’s view of a relatively caring, but also paternalistic 
asymmetry between policy-makers and citizens with “a bit of dependency” and “a bit 
of expectation” of citizens, while it could “often be quite dangerous” to leave “people 
to themselves”. Civil society representative 6 described how disadvantaged citizens 
were disengaged in public issues: “[…] [I]f you live in more deprived communities you 
don't have access. You don't know how those systems work. You don't know who to 
talk to.” Public sector employee 9 pictured these groups’ distance to some of the city 
council’s efforts in terms of existential problems prevailing:  
    Extract 49 
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“How are we going to be able to help them, if their immediate concerns are 
struggling to sort of get food on the table or get kids to school, or a whole range 
of other issues that they're facing, that seems a world away from […] what we're 
trying […] with bio-city […]” 
Lastly, two interviewees expressed that the tightening limits of what the local 
authority could do made it reluctant to consult with citizens, e.g.:  
   Extract 50 
“[…] [W]e don’t do enough consultation around that [citizen’s concerns: inter alia 
cuts in relation to schools, houses’ accessibility for elderly people], but the problem 
is if you do consultation you raise expectations and if we haven’t got the money it 
becomes a real problem” (politician 2). 
In this way, the local state might become less responsible for citizens’ main concerns 
– and know them less.  
 Though Nottingham’s public is very diverse, these sections show how parts of it 
cannot realise basic social and economic rights. This came up as a hindering factor for 
active political involvement – and I argue that it diminishes the position of 
Nottingham’s civil society, which in parts is very active, but in others politically 
apathetic. Correspondingly, a slight majority of citizens’ survey respondents saw their 
impact on local matters as limited. Also, large-n longitudinal research supports the 
connection, showing that poverty decreases political participation (Mood & Jonsson, 
2016). While the pronounced power asymmetries between citizens and policy 
developers contradict social justice, they also afford diverging experiences which 
potentially hamper understanding constraints and motives of those in different 
positions – as e.g. expressed by some prescriptive and individualising policy 
approaches.  
6.4 Stuttgart: political power embedded  
Moving to the Stuttgart case, I first focus on how informants described the 
development of policies and actors’ involvement. 
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6.4.1 Urban negotiations  
“Also hold together a bit.”  
(Manfred Rommel, mayor of Stuttgart 1974 – 1996; Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 
2013) 
Informants often described policy-making in Stuttgart as pluralist, marked by 
discussion and consensus-seeking – being exemplified by the above quote which an 
interviewee invoked. Pluralism is expressed through the 11 groups present in the city 
council and shifting majorities in the proportional representation system; through new 
groups emerging and others dropping out. An example for a new group are 
‘Stadtisten’, who entered the council in 2014 via 1.7% of the votes, justifying its 
foundation as follows: 
   Extract 51 
„I have nowhere really felt at home [politically] and not even in a way that I say, 
with some spirit of compromise I can think my way into this or that. So at […] most 
parties there are still topics, where I say, well that really is a no-go. [...] That […] is 
always such a block thinking. That then left against right […]. And the other side 
[…] just declares itself in favour of or against something. But not [that] a dialogue 
happens where one could meet in the middle. To find a solution which is maybe 
viable for both sides. [...] [T]hat was the core idea of Stadtisten, [...] pluralism. That 
means, not one or the other is right” (Dr. Ralph Schertlen, then Councillor of 
STAdTISTEN). 
This exemplifies a relatively differentiated representation of political stances in 
Stuttgart.  
With the various groups in the council, practices of exchange, negotiation and 
consensus-building were seen as necessarily prevailing. Interviewees described how 
groups would typically try to achieve majorities for motions before they put them to 
the local council in order to avoid rejections. Though majorities in Stuttgart often form 
along politically-habituated lines, e.g. agreements between SPD and Green Party or 
between CDU and FDP, groups also negotiate beyond traditional camps. Similarly, 
relations between councillors and the administration were mostly characterised as 
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communicative and coordinating. Political ideas would partly be discussed with 
administrative officers, adjusted for feasibility or amended by administrations’ 
proposals. Documents in single policy areas are often formulated by according 
administrative departments. Policy styles were partly viewed as pragmatic, partly as 
ideological (cf.    Extract 51). 
 Correspondingly, policy processes in Stuttgart sometimes stretch over longer 
periods. Negotiation then prevails over scheduled and top-down decisions and action, 
even if these were aimed at. According examples are firstly developing the cycling 
infrastructure with objectives not being realised until almost a decade after setting 
them (Baur, 2018) – and a public petition in response (cf. Section 6.5.1). Secondly, the 
traffic and urban development project Stuttgart 21 is a prime instance. It restructures 
the city’s railway junction and has been presented in 1994 with its architectural design 
decided upon in 1997. Subsequently, the project came to a halt due to the withdrawal 
of proponents from their offices and a new federal level coalition (Südwestrundfunk, 
2018). It also met increasing and significant public opposition, escalating in the ‘Black 
Thursday’ on 30/09/2010, when “enormous protests” (Vetter, n.d., p. 4) against 
Stuttgart 21 were violently dissolved, leaving people injured – in a police operation 
later recognised as unlawful (Linsenmann, 2018). A public mediation followed to 
resolve the conflict, as well as a referendum on the project in 2011 with a 58.8% vote 
for Stuttgart 21. Throughout the process, costs increased and delays occurred 
repeatedly (Südwestrundfunk, 2018).  
Beyond the city council, informants pictured the institutionalised and/or 
informal involvement of further actors in policy-making. Depending on the issue, these 
were inter alia associations and interest groups, e.g. the Chamber of Industry and 
Commerce, the Chamber of Crafts, unions, companies; other governance levels, their 
political actors and administrative institutions; the major welfare associations, 
citizens’ initiatives, religious representatives, especially the city deacons of the 
Catholic and the Protestant churches and partly of Muslim communities. However, 
formal partnerships are not the norm and responsibility for policies often largely rests 
on the city administration or on set arrangements, such as on welfare associations for 
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social services. Policy objectives are partly conceived as directions to work towards 
with no clearly defined actors’ responsibilities, outcome measures nor time-frames. 
Interviewees saw certain actors missing from the policy negotiations. Herein, they 
inter alia referred to migrants, Muslims, less articulate and/or educated citizens – 
while the more articulate were partly seen as unjustly and undemocratically 
dominating urban developments. This was found to make citizen participation non-
representative; exchange was sometimes considered as too little or dialogues to exist 
in pretence.  
The New Steering Model in Stuttgart. With NPM reforms in Germany being 
introduced in relatively decentralised ways and often driven by local actors (cf. Section 
3.3.5 b)), it was up for investigation how far its ‘German version’, the ‘New Steering 
Model’ (NSM) has been embraced locally (for British NPM reforms cf. Section 3.3.5 a) 
– for local countermovements cf. Section 6.3.2). Public sector employee 1 – to whom 
all views and quotes in this section relate – shared his experience of the NSM 
introduction in Stuttgart. Being significant to the study’s conceptualisation as internal 
dimension of NPM reforms and as a meaningful within-case, I discuss it forth following. 
From 1990 to 1995, when many local authorities aimed at introducing NSM, 
“Stuttgart this time did not sleep, like many others”, but had a mayor who wanted to 
take it up. After founding a steering group and advertising NSM to the city council as 
enabling better administrative steering and control, while the council would only set 
broad lines, it agreed to NSM reforms. At the time, a council majority consisted of CDU, 
FDP and Independent Voters (Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, n.d.-d). However, there was 
a “quite clear mistrust” of the council towards the administration, fearing that the 
latter may steer processes and that the political side might then not be able to act or 
control. These concerns of disempowerment led to the wish for a neutral project 
accompaniment. Following an according tender, a large consultancy company 
received the attractive assignment of 3-5 million Euro starting off with “[g]reat 
euphoria. It was super”. The consultancy’s project team presented their NSM plan at 
a closed meeting where the first of two “cracks” appeared: the plan involved 
structured goal-setting through a workshop with the city administration’s 
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departments and establishing objectives with the council, led by a steering group 
consisting of administration and consultancy members. However, the council did not 
expect to formulate objectives itself and was also not inclined to do so. Instead, the 
administration should bring forward a proposal. The meeting has then been set aside. 
Following steps were integrating the ca. 10% of administrative personnel involved in 
projects apart from any steering into the steering process and adapting the financial 
system to the latter.  
The process was partly met with scepticism and resistance by the 
administration, partly chances were seen in budgeting. It was nonetheless carried out 
following the time plan and involved mapping goal dimensions and building up a 
reporting system – a “gigantic work” with objectives for employees, finances and 
citizens, involving key figures to be presented to the council. Here, the second “crack” 
occurred with a following “showdown”: councillors were critical that they could not 
intervene in processes after objectives had been set. They therefore asked for “very 
effortful” quarterly – instead of yearly – reports of performance indicators and 
detailed figures of all departments. In a following meeting where the council should 
define its objectives, councillors “refused. […] Entirely”. In essence, groups in the 
council did not want to share their objectives and achievements since political 
competitors could copy them. Although these political objectives differed from those 
in NSM, the latter did not go ahead at this point. However, with the effected 
investments, the council asked the administration to formulate objectives itself. This 
was precisely the opposite of the latter’s interest, given the effortful reporting system 
and since it would make the administration more transparent and attackable, due to 
detailed data on departments including calculable provision costs or sickness rates. On 
these bases, departments could be held accountable for set objectives which they did 
not meet. Public sector employee 1 commented: „So it [...] started [...] relatively well. 
For the council, not for the administration. The administration has been made to look 
like a fool. Yes. At this occasion”.  
Subsequently, decreasing tax income led to cost pressures. Ideas for saving 30-
40 million German mark, mainly in personnel and material costs, were then fetched 
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from the created reporting system and “rushed through” “in a bad interplay” of 
finance department, central offices and council. “The steering model was led ad 
absurdum because everyone said: ‘ok, now the whole turned into budget 
consolidation’”. This latter and daily operations were then more important than a 
steering model. In this way, the NSM introduction in Stuttgart ended after two to three 
years; the consultancy was paid off and there was never a final report nor another 
effort in the direction of NSM. Traces of the attempted reform remain with the partial 
reporting system, including performance indicators for each department, separated 
into product groups, objectives and measures as part of the city’s budget plan and a 
central project steering. Since then, each new project receives a project order, a 
framework with objectives, duration, employees’ and financial resources involved. The 
finance department thereby won information and steering opportunities, i.e. cost and 
performance accounting options for separate products. By contrast, output steering 
and contract management have not been retained. 
Public sector employee 1 concluded that NSM did not suit Stuttgart’s local 
setting, as municipal – other than federal or state level – politics steered less through 
objectives and more by close bilateral links between politicians and administrators. 
Overall, the city council did not want to lose its power nor commit to time-set 
objectives, involving responsibility for the process and contestability. Concurrently, it 
mistrusted the administration and could still seek responsibility for shortcomings with 
it in order “[t]o look good in front of the citizen”. Conversely, the administration did 
not want to give up power through high transparency and preferred to steer via 
budgets, not objectives. The informant concurred that NSM would not have changed 
much in Stuttgart, as it would have remained a rudimentary steering model, not 
attaining what KGSt51 aimed for. This was because the council would have discharged 
                                                     
51 KGSt, the Municipal Association for Administration Management, develops concepts and advises 
regarding local authority management in Germany, Austria and Switzerland. It specifically supports 
processes of administrative modernisation (Kommunale Gemeinschaftsstelle für 
Verwaltungsmanagement, 2019). 
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itself from the contract management and the administration would not have tolerated 
it thus far. 
Overall, the incomplete NSM introduction in Stuttgart increased the 
generation of data ordering political and administrative action according to an 
economic logic. This involves a codification in terms of recording processes, assigning 
costs and accountability. Meanwhile, previous budget steering was considered 
unmodern: “a bit further away from SAP et cetera. Like jumped out of the village”. This 
development may be contextualised as part of wider societal rationalisation, 
modernisation and individualisation, where control and accountability partly remove 
conventions and trust; as does focusing on smaller social entities (e.g. departments, 
individuals) instead of more collective ones (e.g. whole administration, city society). 
Paralleling the individual level, I suggest that the new reporting data provide an 
evidence base to problematise related behaviour – as has been the case in times of 
budget pressures – and can thus function as instruments of power. The exemplar 
illustrates how these data were co-produced with power structures, i.e. with the 
administration in a weaker position than the council, and how power was central to 
the developments. The NSM case of a move towards a market-oriented approach and 
its subsequent partial reversal – back to a more ‘Weberian’ one – due to 
incompatibilities with the prevailing governance logic, resonates with other local 
authorities’ experiences (cf. Section 3.3.5 b)) and with similar instances in Stuttgart, 
i.e. infrastructure privatisation and cross-border leasing transactions (cf. Section 
5.7.4).  
6.4.2 The urban relating to other governance levels  
This section moves from inner urban relations to those with other layers of 
governance. Some interviewees stressed the relevance of Stuttgart’s embedding in the 
Region of Stuttgart, consisting of six administrative districts. These regional relations 
were generally seen as cooperative. The following example of a strategy development 
shows how regional cooperation of numerous different actors was viewed as valuable 
per se: 
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   Extract 52 
„The guideline strategy process showed how important the cooperation of regional 
actors is thereby. Involved in the process were besides regional institutions like the 
Chamber of Industry and Commerce, the Chamber of Crafts or the unions, districts 
and municipalities numerous universities, research institutions, companies and 
interest groups. In doing so, new processes and projects have been initiated and 
regional collaboration has been strengthened altogether. This process therefore 
already constitutes a value in itself for regional cooperation and networking” 
(Verband Region Stuttgart, 2013, p. 19). 
Governance in Stuttgart importantly interacts with the state of Baden-
Württemberg, of which the city is the political and administrative centre. For instance, 
some policy issues spread across governance levels (e.g. air pollution) and political 
majorities at both are similar with the CDU and the Green Party dominating. 
Informants referred to this intertwining, such as business representative 7, for whom 
state and federal actors were premier dialogue partners – more so than urban ones:  
   Extract 53 
„So there are some municipal players […] via their institution, be it the Chamber of 
Industry and Commerce for example […], there are also […] mayors […] with whom 
we do things together […]. But usually our focus is rather not so much on city 
politics, but-. My manager is in a discussion group with the state premier, we are 
in a lively exchange with the economics minister Ms Hoffmeister-Kraut. It is 
therefore rather the state initiatives which [accompany] us as sparring partners 
[…]. So […] this concept […] of the city, that is […] not the primary for us. Because 
[…] questions of education policy, of skills shortage, of families, work time models 
and so on, [I] find these are actually all things which are of state and federal 
political natures.” 
Possibly interacting with the principle of subsidiarity and thus high local 
autonomy, political relations with the state and the federal government did not come 
up as problematic and were barely thematised. 
Regarding the EU, Baden-Württemberg receives funding of 507 million Euro 
during 2014-2020 via the European Regional Development Fund and the European 
Social Fund together (City Population, 2018; Thormaehlen, 2019; own calculation). 
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Support through these two funds across Germany differs regionally in relation to 
economic performance, with higher funding mostly in East German states 
(Bundesinstitut für Bau-, Stadt- und Raumforschung, n.d.). Stuttgart Region’s 
Economic Development Corporation emphasised benefits through EU funding in terms 
of knowledge exchange and collaboration: 
“Funding from European programmes allows Stuttgart Region to implement 
innovative project ideas and work together with other European regions in 
searching for solutions to challenges. In addition, such projects facilitate an 
exchange of knowledge and experience with other regions […]” 
(Wirtschaftsförderung Region Stuttgart, 2016b). 
However, the relation to the EU or its funding did not play a significant role in 
any of the interviews. 
Altogether, relations to other local, regional, state, national and European 
levels were mostly perceived as cooperative – thus in tendency allowing to combine 
(sustainability) efforts. Regional collaboration and the interconnectedness with the 
state-level were particularly relevant, making the urban partly receding into the 
background.  
6.5 Stuttgart: the public  
6.5.1 Views and conditions of the public  
Connecting the political and administrative to the public, I subsequently seek 
to understand the public’s conditions through its views and further data – partly 
enabling comparisons with Nottingham.  
Stuttgart’s biennial citizens’ survey gives insights into views of the population 
and about how the city council constructs the latter. For the 2017 survey, 9,400 
citizens have been representatively selected and 44% of them participated 
(Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, 2017b). Thereby, quality of life in Stuttgart was rated 
positively, i.e. very good by 15%, good by 65%, medium by 17%, bad by 2% and very 
bad by 0%. When asked about their satisfaction with 29 areas of life, respondents were 
  189 
most satisfied with shopping facilities (81% – converted to a scale of 0-100 with 100 
being most satisfied), job and income opportunities (79%), cultural institutions/events 
(76%), waste disposal/collection (76%) and medical care/hospitals (73%) 
(Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, 2017b, p. 1). They were most dissatisfied with the 
housing offer/market (28% – values being lowest here since the last 12 citizens’ 
surveys), parking in the inner city (32%), regulation of car traffic (37%), air quality 
(42%) and parking in the residential area (44%) (Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, 2017b, p. 
10).  
In relation to biggest problems in Stuttgart, respondents on average named 9.2 
out of 33 given issues. “[T]oo much street traffic” was chosen most frequently (by 
75%), followed by “too high rents” (73%), “too many construction sites” (67%), an 
“unsatisfactory housing offer” (65%), “bad air quality” (59%) and “too little parking 
options” (58%) (Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, 2017b). With the crucial exception of 
housing, existential socio-economic threats and social problems were seen as lesser 
priorities compared to these traffic and infrastructure issues. According items were 
“too many beggars” (stated by 38%), “insecurity on the streets (drugs, robbery, 
criminal damage)” (28%), “safety and order” (28%), “insecurity in public transport 
(harassment, robbery, criminal damage)” (27%), “poverty” (15%), “homelessness” 
(15%) and finally “unemployment“ (7%) as the least often mentioned problem 
(Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, 2017b, p. 10). This corresponds to Stuttgart being among 
the three most secure German cities in terms of crime (Holowiecki, 2018). Besides, a 
“tight financial and budget situation of the city” (10%) figured as 6th least important 
problem and “too high communal taxes/tolls/charges” were named by 27%. More 
public spending was especially desired for “residential construction” and “improving 
air quality” (Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, 2017b). 
Views about equity are captured by Stuttgart’s 2015 citizens’ survey for which 
9,167 persons were representatively selected and of whom 40% participated 
(Statistisches Amt Stuttgart, 2018, p. 3). Herein, the justice concepts of 
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egalitarianism52 and ascriptivism53 received high approval of 63% to 67% agreement 
to according statements. This was less the case for fatalism54 (40 – 54% agreement) 
and individualism55 (34 – 42% agreement). Those with lower educational attainment 
and income saw the distribution of goods and services in more fateful and resignative 
ways (Statistisches Amt Stuttgart, 2018).  
Overall, Stuttgart’s citizens’ survey as an instrument of governance 
encompasses a broad range of issues, including satisfaction with living conditions, the 
city, its administration and infrastructures; main problems, spending priorities, justice, 
participation in elections, views on politics; activities, mobility and energy use. It 
reflects main Stuttgart themes coming up in this study, i.e. emphases on the 
environment, planning, social development and integration and often structural 
approaches.  
So far, a picture emerges where Stuttgart’s public is relatively satisfied and 
mainly struggles with housing, traffic and air quality – issues also interacting with the 
city’s economic expansion. However, some population groups came up as more 
disadvantaged during the case study which I discuss to represent diversity: those 
receiving social benefits, homeless persons, sex workers/prostitutes and refugees. 
These themes shaped up differently for both cases. Besides, comparability with 
Nottingham is limited due to less available data for Stuttgart, such as for fuel poverty 
where I have not found data for the city nor Germany or regarding health where “many 
data from the healthcare sector are not accessible for communal health reporting” 
(Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, n.d.-g).  
                                                     
52 “The state is responsible for the distribution of goods, chances and benefits” (Statistisches Amt 
Stuttgart, 2018, p. 6).  
53 “The distribution is naturally given or determined on the basis of social role and social status” 
(Statistisches Amt Stuttgart, 2018, p. 6). 
54 “The distribution is being accepted as fateful and resignatively” (Statistisches Amt Stuttgart, 2018, p. 
6). 
55 “The distribution is based on competition” (Statistisches Amt Stuttgart, 2018, p. 6).  
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First, in relation to recipients of social benefits, civil society representative 8 
interpreted how deprivation and lacking participation in society are connected to a 
decline in behavioural conventions and scapegoating of specific groups: 
   Extract 54 
“If one has not participated for a very, very long time in everything happening 
outside and one is not important anymore. [...] [That] [a]lso changes the view I 
think, so it […] becomes more and more limited [...]. [...] [I] am [then] actually 
permanently busy with a lack or a grievance in my personal life and find everything 
unjust. And that hardens and I become [...] frustrated and angry. [...] Everywhere 
one […] has to set out everything for the support one gets from the state. [...] [H]ow 
that happens or how one feels at it, that does something to the people. And one 
starts, so out of an inclined position, to also judge the rest of the world. And I think 
things like xenophobia, racism, these are all also consequences which come to the 
fore due to this inclined position […] of people [...]. And one always has the feeling, 
other people take something away from myself, otherwise I would not feel so bad. 
That means, I am [...] worth nothing anymore. [...] [T]he inhibition thresholds, I 
notice it here, the readiness to push someone, to nudge in order to reach 
something, they in fact sink, [...] the more I am reduced also as a human in my 
value in society. [...] [I] think that is indeed a serious effect of permanent shortage 
or of poverty [...]. 
Lacking socio-economic security for many in Stuttgart has also been described as a 
“fight for work” under discriminating and harshening circumstances of a growing low 
wage sector and a precarisation of jobs (cf. Section 7.8.2) 
Second, estimatedly 3,700 homeless persons live in Stuttgart in 2015, i.e. more 
than in almost every other German large city (Lill, 2016). With ‘only’ 20-60 of them 
sleeping rough, this has inter alia been attributed to a very good and long-standing 
according support infrastructure. The latter was described as one of the best 
nationwide, having created a certain pull effect – as a social welfare office employee 
stated –, with many coming to Stuttgart to find work and stranding due to a lack of 
affordable housing. This inter alia concerned incoming EU citizens and refugees who 
increasingly became homeless (Lill, 2016). Mainly through a rise in the latter two 
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groups, the number of homeless persons housed in Stuttgart quintupled in the last ten 
years (Bury, 2018b).  
Third, regarding sex workers/prostitutes, Stuttgart’s police has registered 
1,686 of them in the city in 2017 through legally binding consultations, mainly coming 
from Romania, Bulgaria and the Dominican Republic (Bury, 2018a). The German 
legalisation of prostitution in 2002 led to a strong increase in numbers and went with 
conditions where prostitutes are being made dependent and businesses are partly in 
the hands of organised crime (Schmoll, 2017).  
Finally, around 7,700 refugees live in Stuttgart in the end of 2017 in 125 refugee 
residences, with many of them having fled from Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria and 
Eritrea (Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, n.d.-f). However, due to shortcomings, the United 
Nations called on Germany to ensure that asylum seekers enjoyed equal treatment 
regarding access to non-contributory social security systems, to healthcare and to the 
labour market; and to establish better living conditions, especially regarding 
overcrowding, in order to respect the country’s commitment to human rights 
conventions (Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte, 2019a, 2019b). 
In summary, large parts of Stuttgart’s public appear to enjoy relatively high 
socio-economic living standards, while environmental, housing and infrastructural 
problems are perceived as prevailing. Simultaneously, some groups of the population 
are excluded from these standards, in multiply marginalised positions and often 
deprived of basic social and economic rights, thus compromising social justice.  
6.5.2 Devising policies aiming for sustainability – and the public  
Building on the outlined, this section explores the public’s role in negotiating 
local policies pursuing sustainability. I proceed as described in Section 6.3.2. Table 7 
represents five significant tendencies for Stuttgart: civil society had a crucial impact on 
the development of the first three of them. I discuss them forth following.  
Privatisation and re-municipalisation of infrastructures. Infrastructure 
privatisations in Stuttgart have partially been reversed after civil society involvement. 
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First, cross-border leasing transactions were opposed by citizens and their group 
Water Forum, who eventually impeded another one and contributed to changing 
according majorities in the city council. Seeing private ownership of public 
infrastructure as unsustainable was one of their motives. Second, Water Forum 
similarly opposed the privatisation of Stuttgart’s infrastructures for gas, electricity and 
drinking water. The group criticised “[a] selling out like in no other city in Germany or 
in Europe […] All being property of us citizens, built up over generations” (Stuttgarter 
Wasserforum, n.d.). With its activities, Water Forum crucially contributed to partial 
reversals of the privatisations (cf. Section 5.7.4).  
Air pollution; traffic organisation. With Stuttgart being sometimes described as 
a ‘car city’ due to its significant car industry cluster, matters of air pollution and traffic 
organisation may concern these local interest structures. I first outline the issue of air 
pollution. With a number of lawsuits since 2005 against Baden-Württemberg due to 
fine dust pollution in Stuttgart breaching EU legal limits – which have all been won –, 
Manfred Niess and/or the Alliance for Climate and Environment Stuttgart have driven 
state and city in the matter. They forced the authorities to establish and update clean 
air plans (Buchmeier, 2017; Klima- und Umweltbündnis Stuttgart, n.d.; Leibbrand, 
2017). In 2016, this led to Baden-Württemberg obliging itself to limit car traffic on days 
with exceeding air pollution, followed by a backdown and a driving ban on diesel cars 
with Euro 4 emission standard and below from 2019 on to reduce nitrogen values 
(Asendorpf, 2017; Zeit Online, 2018). The activists’ legal action was accompanied by 
protests against traffic-induced air pollution and for driving bans (Götz, 2018). The 
Alliance for Climate and Environment Stuttgart aims for a policy of sustainability, 
climate protection and the necessary change in energy policy (Klima- und 
Umweltbündnis Stuttgart, n.d.). Second, an instance regarding traffic organisation is 
the ‘Cycle-decision Stuttgart’ (‘Radentscheid’). While the city government aimed to 
increase the bicycle traffic share to 20% long-term, several citizens perceived its action 
as too slow and set up the public petition ‘Radentscheid Stuttgart’ in 2018 (Ayerle, 
2018; Baur, 2018). It demands that everyone in Stuttgart should have the option to 
travel by bike safely, swiftly and without fear, requiring a cycle-friendly transport 
policy, better cycle paths and safely designed streets and junctions – altogether aiming 
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to make Stuttgart a more liveable city (Radentscheid Stuttgart, n.d.). Though the 
petition was declared inadmissible on legal grounds, the mayor wanted to further 
pursue its objectives, calling it a „warning and motivation at once” (Ayerle, 2019a, 
2019b). Subsequently declaring that Stuttgart should become “a real cycle city”, 
cycling policy objectives became more ambitious, inter alia aiming for a bicycle traffic 
share of 25% until 2030 (Ayerle, 2019).  
Stuttgart 21. As described in Section 6.4.1, protests against the traffic and 
urban development project Stuttgart 21 led to a public mediation and a referendum 
on it in 2011 (Südwestrundfunk, 2018). Besides, major shifts in political majorities have 
partly been attributed to the protests:   
Extract 55 
„There was at first the CDU-dominated city and state politics and in the course of 
the confrontations around Stuttgart 21 there was a political direction change [...]. 
The Green Party has won the elections in 2011, a green state minister for the first 
time in Germany, and in Stuttgart the CDU mayor has been replaced by a green 
one. These are results of the extraparliamentary protest on the occasion of 
Stuttgart 21. Not only, but absolutely crucially” (Dr. Werner Sauerborn, Action 
group against Stuttgart 21). 
The issue can be interpreted as an emancipatory development of citizens in relation 
to the state and it may have “supported a growing climate of ‘pro-cooperation’, assuming that 
cooperation is an appropriate way of conflict resolution and a way of strengthening political 
legitimacy […]” (Vetter, n.d., pp. 4–5). Regarding his opposition, Werner Sauerborn of the 
citizens’ initiative ‘Action group against Stuttgart 21’ saw the project as reckless towards 
future generations:  
Extract 56 
„[...] [I] find it virtually ruthless towards future generations. […] [T]he one who 
breaks down a 16-track train station in favour of an eight-track one, which can 
never be expanded, simply ruins the future of this city in relation to transport 
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options. And tied to this are of course many ecological questions“ (Dr. Werner 
Sauerborn, Action group against Stuttgart 21). 
Strong support of disadvantaged groups. I described in Section 5.6.1 how 
Stuttgart’s exceptionally encompassing social support system expands on national 
ones, often justified in terms of social justice. This is inter alia the case for 
homelessness support (cf. also Section 6.5.1), support of drug addicts or efforts for 
social mixing. 
Changing (infra-)structures. The document analysis yields a picture where 
change for the better, often towards making life in Stuttgart more sustainable, is 
relatively often aimed for by changing urban structures and infrastructures and more 
seldomly through individual level changes (cf. Section 5.2.2 c)). This is inter alia the 
case for environmental protection, the integrated and recently improved public 
transport system or social provision such as in terms of child care, youth social work, 
the Youth Council or in supporting the economy to maintain prosperity. 
Altogether, it stands out how civil society opposition as organised activities, 
protests or legal action changed the course of important policy issues aiming for 
sustainability in Stuttgart; while many other policies stemmed from city council 
activities. Citizens also often justified their acting with concerns for social and 
intergenerational justice – arguing that the respective political activities counteracted 
it. There was partially a sense of civil society ‘being ahead’ of politics.  
However, probing this tendency, civil society involvement also followed 
‘NIMBY’ motives, i.e. ‘Not in my backyard’, aiming to avoid perceived drawbacks in 
one’s direct environment. This has also been invoked by interviewees, e.g. in relation 
to disruptions through the Stuttgart 21 construction site – which would benefit future 
generations. Other NIMBY instances may be dismissals of wind turbine constructions 
by adjoining neighbourhoods (e.g., Durchdenwald, 2016; Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 
2011); or – thus far unsuccessful – petitions or referenda rejecting local refugee 
accommodations (Jürgen, 2017). I therefore conclude that citizens’ involvement in 
Stuttgart has been very impactful in several, but not all instances and partially 
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contributed to more sustainable policies – though the relation between civil society 
impact and sustainability remains ambiguous (cf. NIMBY protests). 
6.5.3 Relation of the public and policy developers  
Focusing on the relation between the public and policy developers, I approach 
both groups’ conditions subsequently and draw on views about it. Table 9 indicates a 
rather similar access to economic resources as well as realisation of economic and 
social rights of the average citizen and policy developers, moderate inequalities and 
segregation; an above average educated public and more so policy developers; and 
strong local competencies in a pluralist local political fabric.  
Table 9: Stuttgart's public and policy developers 
 Public Policy developers 
Local government Local autonomy, subsidiary principle 
Stable/expanding budget 
Proportional representation 
60 councillors (2014-2019): 11 different groups 
(Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, n.d.-k) 
Social and economic rights/ 
resources 
Disposable income per 




Many realising social and 
economic rights – 
exceptions housing and 
disadvantaged groups 
Average monthly gross 
salary in public sector: 
39,840 – 43,160 €56 
(Gehalt.de, n.d.) 
Allowance for council 
members: 18,000 € + 
possibly other income 
(Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, 
2018b, p. 1f) 
National inequalities In incomes – Germany: 0.29 
(25th most unqual of 37 mostly OECD-countries; OECD, 
2017) 
Regional inequality of disposable incomes: Germany in 
lower area in European comparison (Braml & Felbermayr, 
2018) 
                                                     
56 To give a rough orientation, an annual gross income of 41,500 € in tax bracket one amounts to a net 
income of 25.855 € (Gehaltsrechner, 2019). 
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Relatively strong social mixing; in decline with housing crisis, 
displacing those on lower incomes 
Sources: own research and as indicated. 
According to Stuttgart’s 2017 citizens’ survey, satisfaction with “work of the 
local city offices” was 69% (converted to a scale of 0-100 with 100 being most satisfied) 
and with “work of the city administration altogether” 62% (Landeshauptstadt 
Stuttgart, 2017b, p. 10). 
The sometimes critical role of the public in policy negotiations gives insights 
into its relationship with policy developers and the according power positions of both. 
Interviewees correspondingly described Stuttgart’s civil society as partly very engaged, 
confident, strong and fortified, as no “heelers”; articulate and knowledgeable, also 
regarding functionings of politics and administration. This was found to influence the 
whole society; and to be enabled by prosperity, e.g.: 
Extract 57 
“It is significantly easier to get involved or to pass something on when one has 
something. […] So people fight stronger for their convictions because they can seek 
a problem for themselves, for which they become active. Because they do not have 
to be busy with their existential problems all day” (public sector employee 4). 
Further named factors for the powerful civil society were time, the regional 
pietistic and strong civic legacies: 
   Extract 58 
„So fundamentally, it certainly has to do with the city‘s wealth, people have time 
to get involved, that is not an insignificant factor. On the other hand, there is this 
pietistic state, this obligation to also support others. […] And the other issue is that 
in Southern Germany there is also generally this long, big tradition of civil society, 
historically, I don’t know whether one can stretch the large curve to 1848, but so 
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this really great sense, okay, we are citizens. And we are self-confident citizens and 
shape our living space” (civil society representative 9).  
An informant outlined how the city’s political leadership was careful to involve 
the public early enough in processes, so as to obviate protests like around Stuttgart 21 
(cf. Section 6.4.1). Furthermore, Dr. Werner Sauerborn of Action group against 
Stuttgart 21 found that the respective citizen movement was more knowledgeable 
about the project than those dealing with it professionally: 
   Extract 59 
„The project is incredibly complex. It requires such a profound expertise, so as to 
politically assert oneself and be able to interfere, that many, by the way I also 
believe in journalism, many [...] prefer to just stay away from it. Also in the justice 
system [...]. We […] have dozens of trials still pending. […] There has not yet been 
a sustainable reappraisal concerning the whole project, also no committees of 
inquiry. And I believe that this is the fear of involved professions such as justice, 
journalism, politics, to deal with this complex matter. And at this, we as citizens‘ 
movement are a real step ahead I think. So on our end […], I believe, concerning 
the whole complex of this project, the expertise is higher than at the actors 
themselves.“ 
Politician 1 perceived that citizen participation had sometimes been used as a 
“combat instrument of obstruction” in policy processes, where groups mainly focused 
on their particular interests. Besides, developments around Stuttgart 21 had 
“weakened the backbone”, the strength and decisiveness of some decision-makers, 
with its critics “being right in all points”. The politician saw the city council as to some 
extent driven by citizens’ initiatives; and explained how he expected citizens’ 
involvement: 
   Extract 60 
„Now we are coming to my understanding of the state. Politics almost always 
reacts. It only has to weigh up in the end. So from these different initiatives that 
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are coming. So, I am always saying, folks, do drive politics. We will certainly decide 
in the end. But I [...] expect of every citizen that they get involved“ (politician 1). 
In relation to who gets involved, civil society representative 9 stated that „it is 
all educated middle-class milieu which fulfils itself again somewhere”, but however 
stressed that engagement was widely spread, though some groups lacked access to 
the public and media.  
Altogether, informants’ perceptions evidence limited asymmetries in power, 
knowledge and resources between parts of civil society and local decision-makers. I 
argue that the partly strong position of civil society is – inter alia – a function of 
comparatively favourable living conditions where relatively many can realise basic 
social and economic rights and inequalities between policy developers and the public 
are rather moderate. This corresponds to informants’ views and is substantiated by 
the finding that persons in secure income situations in Baden-Württemberg are twice 
as often volunteering, active in citizens’ initiatives, in political parties and local politics 
than persons at risk of poverty (Saleth et al., 2015, p. 587). By contrast, it appears less 
likely for disadvantaged groups to get involved in public matters, more so given 
possibly limited access to according structures. Overall, the possibility and experience 
of successfully contesting local political power speaks for limited hierarchies in 
Stuttgart’s local state-society relationship. 
6.6 Discussion – research question 2  
The following concludes on RQ 2, How does the negotiation of policies relate 
to sustainability?, as set out in the chapter’s introduction.  
In Nottingham, citizens’ partly declining living conditions are especially 
unsustainable, also as they likely weaken their negotiating position. Thereby, 
government fails what may be a convention of how the population and its problems 
are being understood and managed by the state, as expressed by Foucault: 
“[…] [P]opulation comes to appear above all else as the ultimate end of 
government. [G]overnment has as its purpose […] the welfare of the population, 
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the improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health, etc” 
(Foucault et al., 1991, p. 100). 
Besides, if “[d]evelopment consists of the removal of various types of 
unfreedoms that leave people with little choice and little opportunity of exercising 
their reasoned agency” (Sen, 1999, p. xii), then development in this capitalist 
organisation reversed for parts of the population. During rising inequalities, the city 
could be considered as part of a ‘periphery’57, constituting an – on average – devalued 
place in many respects: in terms of living standards and health, educational and 
employment opportunities, but also immaterially when inhabitants are disrespected. 
Latter experiences were perceived as highly significant and harmful in Nottingham 
(Mckenzie, 2015). Besides unfavourable existing conditions, national policies underpin 
some of the city’s devaluations with the funding regime disadvantaging it, unequal 
cuts to local authorities, austerity and the fostering of a market-liberal competition 
between regions, cities and people. As conditions of those losing out under such 
systems deteriorate, these policies are socially unjust. With this expectable outcome, 
the welfare of Nottingham’s whole population does not appear as a prime purpose of 
government. The institutional structure of segregated wealthier and poorer local 
authorities and relating interests reinforces inequalities – which European Union 
funding regimes and local politicians aim to counterbalance. Facing little local 
opposition, Nottingham’s long-standing Labour government realises extraordinary 
measures in relation to social and intergenerational justice – though within tightening 
budgetary limits. Governance in Nottingham is co-produced with partly contradicting 
values of individual responsibility, competition, ambition, the need to select 
favourable environments (places of residence, schools, etc.), the strengthening of local 
infrastructures, redistribution and supporting the disadvantaged. Associated with the 
                                                     
57 Increasing spatial rifts between ‘centres’ and ‘peripheries’ as poles of contemporary capitalism are 
being described. On the one hand, a new educational and cognitive class divide emerged, functioning 
as an up- vs. down-escalator, respectively. On the other hand, this divide coincides with spatial 
polarisations between ‘centres’ – with rising educational and economic resources, such as Stuttgart –, 
and ‘peripheries’ – underperforming in these respects, such as Nottingham. These trends interact with 
the globalisation of markets and rising complexity, requiring more cognitive skills (Collier, 2019). 
However, their occurrences vary cross-nationally. 
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First-past-the-post voting system and relatively confrontational negotiating styles, to 
an extent ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ emerge in these contexts. With the latter meeting 
considerable hardship, this plays out as structural violence. 
Contrarily, Stuttgart is in a position of structural advantage and increasingly 
valued. Socio-economic capitalist progress on average still materialises in terms of the 
population’s rising welfare. Advantage in Stuttgart accumulates as relatively well-
earning/wealthy people living in the city, favourable living conditions (e.g. an 
increasing longevity), educational and employment prospects. However, 
simultaneously growing inequalities and exclusions contradict social and 
intergenerational justice. With rising segregation, those disadvantaged and average 
earners increasingly struggle to find housing in the city. Politically, negotiations in the 
urban realm and with other levels of governance – all with partly proportional voting 
systems –, are marked by coordination and consensus-seeking. This may relate to 
lesser interregional inequalities in Germany and a more generous welfare state than 
in the British case. In comparison, these policies intermingle with more communitarian 
values and approaches, less competition, the constitutional aim of comparable living 
conditions and lesser frictions between local and national levels. A greater distribution 
of power amongst governance levels and citizens thereby seems to correspond to 
more equal outcomes.  
Reflecting on civil society and the context of Polanyian counter-movements to 
urban marketisation and austerity (Warner & Clifton, 2014), I observe all three 
patterns in Nottingham. Mainly due to cuts of the government’s Revenue Support 
Grant (cf. Section 3.4.1 b)), local services are significantly ‘hollowed out’. Besides, the 
city council ‘rides the wave’, i.e. harnesses the market successfully (cf. Section 5.4.3 
c)). It finally opposes marketisation (‘pushes back’) by circumventing government’s 
market-oriented policies. Citizens’ movements also engage in relating push backs, e.g. 
in anti-austerity or Living Wage protests – but relatively seldom changed the course of 
major urban policy instances. In Stuttgart, marketisation occurred from the 1990s 
onwards when the city rather effectively ‘rode the wave’, i.e. adopted NPM early on 
and privatised or leased out its infrastructures, partly capitalising on them. Subsequent 
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‘push backs’, often led by civil society, ultimately promoted a substantial re-
communalisation of infrastructures.  
Comparing both cases with regards to how urban policies aiming for 
sustainability are devised bares contrasting power dynamics (cf. Table 7). The 
development of crucial according policy issues in Stuttgart has sometimes changed 
essentially due to civil society engagement. Politics and administration were thus in 
significant instances driven by civil society; they were partly seen as not doing their 
jobs and partially became wary of the public, while happenings around Stuttgart 21 
became a cautionary tale. In Nottingham, main policies aiming for sustainability were 
prevailingly initiated and implemented by the city council, i.e. rather top-down and 
partly in protective, sometimes prescriptive approaches. Within their urban fabrics, 
Stuttgart’s civil society appears more impact- and powerful than Nottingham’s.  
Besides, the perspective of Polanyian ‘push backs’ to urban marketisation and 
austerity discloses according cleavages and power dynamics. In Nottingham, they lie 
mostly between the government pushing for these concerns and the local council and 
citizens opposing them. However, with strong central control, this opposition remains 
less effective than in Stuttgart, where more market-based approaches were pushed 
for by the city council and driving local actors – and also effectively rejected locally. 
However, regarding austerity, the cities’ national contexts generate disparate initial 
conditions. The dismantling British welfare state implies an extensive dis-embedding 
of the market system from society – conditions which Polanyi related to the rise of 
fascism in the 1930s (Palley, 2018; Polanyi, 1944). The profound political, institutional 
and economic crisis and polarisation around ‘Brexit’ exactly arose in the context of a 
dismantled welfare state – which Palley (2018, p. 1) calls “critical in saving capitalism 
from itself after World War II” as “a way of embedding the market system so as to 
produce socially acceptable outcomes that are politically stable”. In contrast, 
“[n]eoliberalism’s war promises a body blow against shared prosperity” (Palley, 2018, 
p. 1), or the breaking of a previous social contract. This might again threaten other 
conventions in liberal capitalism, e.g. about democracy, civility or public debate. In 
  203 
Germany, the market system’s embedding also decreased during welfare state 
retrenchments, but it has not been revoked as extensively as in the British case. 
I connect the varying political impact of both cities’ publics to their differential 
relations with policy developers. In Stuttgart, both groups are more equal than in 
Nottingham in terms of realising social and economic rights, access to economic and 
educational resources, experiential worlds, political and societal hierarchies. This 
interacts with differing views and experiences of citizenship, i.e. civil societies’ 
capacities, obligations, agency and self-efficacy – averagely appearing more effective 
and more on an equal footing with policy developers in Stuttgart than in Nottingham. 
Arguably, Stuttgart’s ‘middle class’ appears larger than Nottingham’s. As discussed, 
these varying power asymmetries manifest in the development of policies aiming for 
sustainability. Moreover, they are reproduced in the communication between policy 
developers and the public, likely reinforcing existing disjunctions. The potential of civil 
society to resist policies therefore seems to be connected to negotiating styles and its 
relation to policy developers. The public’s and the local state’s impact relate differently 
to sustainability, but a stronger civil society adds a layer of scrutiny and justification 
which sometimes contributed to more sustainable outcomes. Similarly, Scott (1999) 
identifies a civil society unable to resist well-intentioned, large-scale authoritarian 
state plans as one of four conditions to their failing. Besides, I argue in Section 8.4.2 
that the diverging political systems influence negotiating styles – where a culture 
marked more by compromise as in Stuttgart may enable a stronger civil society impact.  
Regarding governance theory, the above reinforces the critique of it largely 
disregarding power relations (Kjær, 2009). Mainly, power matters where its uneven 
distribution interacts with how policies are negotiated. Governance theory’s 
assumptions regarding citizens’ involvement then appear overly optimistic especially 
in Nottingham, with many living in deprived or precarious circumstances and having 
little access to local power. In a seeming paradox, Nottingham’s population is however 
asked to “take on more responsibility” (Nottingham Labour Party, 2015, p. 3), evincing 
growing expectations towards an on average disadvantaged group. By contrast, I have 
not encountered similar public demands on Stuttgart’s – though on average much 
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more privileged – population. I therefore argue that guaranteeing social and economic 
rights could provide a foundation for civil society participation. Correspondingly, Bua 
et al. (2018) find in their comparison of five European cities that severe austerity 
erodes the foundations for strong collaborative governance. Besides, governance 
theory’s presuppositions about trust and consensus-building are questionable, given 
the discussed disjunctions in both cases. Overall, the theory lays bare an idealistic 
understanding of more cohesive societies than we are witnessing, e.g. with crises 
around austerity, ‘Brexit’ or surges of right-wing populism – in relation to which it 
appears dated. That it barely addresses problems of concentrating power and 
hardening according conflicts reduces the theory’s explanatory force.     
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7 Political and economic interdependence 
7.1 Introduction 
Within the overall research problem of how Nottingham’s and Stuttgart’s 
governance regimes relate to the future, this chapter addresses the roles of their local 
economies. It examines RQ 3: How do political and economic interdependencies relate 
to sustainability? For this, I draw on relating interview and documentary data and 
further research. While Chapter 3 lies the conceptual and substantive foundations, this 
chapter addresses RQ 3 empirically and set up against a neoliberal understanding of 
corporations’ purpose and their relation to society which I outline subsequently.  
The Friedman Doctrine expresses an ideal-typical view of companies’ purpose,   
prevailing since around 60 years (Mayer, 2018, p. 7): 
“In […] [a free] economy, there is one and only one social responsibility of business 
– to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so 
long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and 
free competition without deception or fraud” (Friedman & Friedman, 2002, p. 133). 
This neoliberal conception can be related to the neoclassic idea that economic systems 
converge towards a homogeneous, deregulated and flexible world market (Hoffmann, 
2003, p. 124) – which has been challenged by the ‘varieties of capitalism’ literature (cf. 
Section 3.2). 
In a parallel structure for Nottingham and Stuttgart, this chapter explores how 
corporations relate to their places’ political and social context. Herein, Sections 7.2 
and 7.6 focus on communication and cooperation between public and business actors. 
I then examine according structures, power relations and conflicts (Sections 7.3 and 
7.7) and interpret ways in which ‘economy’ and ‘society’ interact (Sections 7.4 and 
7.8). The chapter finally studies views about the connection of economic growth and 
intergenerational justice (Sections 7.5 and 7.9) and interprets findings in relation to 
RQ 3 (Section 7.10).   
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7.2 Nottingham: relation to place, communication and cooperation 
For relations between companies and Nottingham, I initially explore the 
significant example of Boots, the chemist and pharmacy chain. Further themes are 
then examined across companies. Boots is meaningful in terms of encountered 
tendencies and its size, employing 8,000 people and being the company with the 
highest turnover in Nottinghamshire in 2017 (D. Robinson, 2018). My interview 
requests to Boots remained unsuccessful. Politician 2 saw this historical Nottingham 
corporation as relatively detached from its origin: 
Extract 61 
“If you’ve got shareholding, you then become vulnerable […] to takeover, […] - 
which is why Boots is gone, Boots is a classic case. […] 
Boots used to be locally owned, then obviously it floated. Shares were taken over 
[…] by a venture capitalist, an Italian, […]. They then merged with a firm in the 
States, and so it’s become more and more remotely managed Nottingham, 
Nottingham’s just an outpost now and therefore […] the local link it’s been broken. 
If you want a perfect example of a local link been broken, we hardly ever talk to 
Boots now. […] 
And their decisions are made- they're made either in Switzerland or possibly in the 
States. And that is because of the structure of our capital, our system which is 
highly dependent on shareholding […] rather than on […] ownership”. 
The informant thereby related this perceived “broken” local link to attributes of the 
economic system. Outlining some background, Boots is accused of avoiding an 
estimated £1.21 billion in tax over six years since going private in 2007, inter alia by 
relocating its headquarters from Nottinghamshire to the low-tax Swiss canton Zug 
(Medact, 2017). Campaigners state that tax avoidance and evasion “may be legal, […] 
but [are] […] clearly unethical and wrong”. “By undermining public services, tax abuse 
harms society and risks public health” (Medact, 2017). Boots’ “approach to tax risk and 
dealing with tax authorities” includes “[n]ot to enter into transactions purely for the 
avoidance of tax” (Walgreens Boots Alliance, 2018), i.e. it may be one of several 
effects. Further concerns (“How Boots went rogue”) were raised by employees in 
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relation to high pressure exercised by the company to meet certain targets 
(Chakrabortty, 2016).  
Fundamentally, Boots was considered important to Nottingham’s future and 
there were fears that it may leave: 
Extract 62 
I: […] [H]ow do you think will Nottingham develop and how will it be for the 
citizens?  
Politician 2: […] I don’t know, I think a lot will depend on what happens in Brexit. 
And a lot will depend on Boots. I’m very worried about Boots post Brexit.  
I: Yeah, why is that? 
Politician 2: It’s based here, right? A lot of its sales go to Europe so, the owner is 
European, Italian. And if it becomes problematic shifting their goods into Europe 
from here with tariffs why can’t then they[…] relocate? 
Nottingham Post enquired about Boots’ relation to Nottingham – given that it sold its 
BCM factory (formerly Boots Contract Manufacturing) to a contract manufacturer, 
thus ceasing to produce in Nottinghamshire (D. Robinson, 2017): 
“Does the loss of BCM undermine Boots’ commitment to Nottingham and that of 
its US owners? 
Mr Pessina [executive vice-chairman and CEO of Walgreens Boots Alliance] speaks 
passionately. ‘Nottingham is the home of Boots. How could we move, even if we 
wanted to, which we don’t? 
We couldn’t take all the people in Beeston, the organisation and move them 
anywhere else in the world. The commitment is to Nottingham, traditionally the 
home of Boots. It is so part of Nottingham and Nottingham is part of Boots. It 
would be impossible to separate them. To move would inflict a big wound on the 
company.’” (Tresidder, 2018). 
These concerns illustrate “a bit of a disconnect” (business representative 5) between 
political and economic actors and how far Nottingham’s welfare is seen to depend 
upon Boots. Business representative 3 more generally described companies in 
Nottingham as “very footloose” – while they provide an increasingly important part of 
the city’s tax base (cf. Figure 1). However, local impact on Boots’ and other large 
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companies’ decisions was perceived as limited. At the same time, their local ties and 
commitments were partly found to have weakened, altogether apprehended as 
insecure socio-economic perspectives for Nottingham. Some informants saw 
businesses act unsustainably in other ways, inter alia in terms of little engagement in 
qualifying local people (cf. Section 7.4.2). Otherwise and as above, companies partly 
emphasised their commitment and obligation to Nottingham, importantly due to their 
employees who could not easily be replaced and to their historical roots. Most of them 
stressed that they would not easily relocate. However, the outlined discrepancies in 
actors’ views speak for a certain erosion of trust.  
Informants of local companies and the city council expressed lack of 
communication between both. Some businesses were seen as not actively 
participating in exchanges with the public sector and according structures were partly 
perceived as missing. A business representative raised how they felt that the public 
sector did not sustain cooperations with them; others that they were consulted too 
late on draft strategies, leaving little time for changes and with the expectation to 
approve relatively finalised drafts. Furthermore, private and public sector logics were 
considered contradictory:  
Extract 63 
“So you can’t get the same motivation [in the public sector]. It seems to take a long 
time to action things I think probably it’s a lot of red tape in the public sector. […] 
“I think we do work very fast here and I think that's what you get with the private 
sector. If you don't do the work, you don’t get paid, do you? You get kicked out, 
you lose your job but with the council, they tend to take a lot of time overdoing 
stuff so you need to get on with it or you’ll never get it done” (business 
representative 5).  
Equally, politician 1 saw private companies’ understanding of the city council as 
limited, inter alia due to its diverse and democratic accountabilities: 
   Extract 64 
“[…] [T]he thing about business organisations is it is full of people who are […] 
variously good at running businesses, and work on the assumption that the council 
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is like any other business. Well, it is not true. The council is not a business. It is a 
public organisation and it is also a democratic organisation and that means that 
instead of how […] you do with the business, just working to a bottom-line say you 
only have one objective which is to make as much money as possible. Everything 
else is divisible within that. That is not the role of the council. Council has got 101 
different things to do. [I]t has got to provide services, it has got to be an enforcer, 
it has got to make decisions in loco parentis, it has got to do a range of things; 
some of which are quite hard and difficult and most of which […] other people have 
opinions about. Their opinions, because everybody pays for the services, […] are 
valid.”  
However, a number of interviewees saw the exchange and collaboration 
between public and private sectors positively. Relatedly, the city council provides 
business support and advice services, e.g. through D2N2 (cf. Footnote 43), the Creative 
Quarter Nottingham or in-house, with the aim of making Nottingham a favourable 
business location.  
Altogether, perceived factors which may counteract sustainable socio-
economic perspectives are companies’ reliance on shareholding, an increasing 
emphasis on profits, weakened local commitments and a certain disconnect between 
public and private sector actors. However, successful cooperation and communication 
between both and companies’ ongoing presence were found to contribute to 
Nottingham’s welfare. 
7.3 Nottingham: structures, power relations and conflicts 
Nottingham’s economic structures relate to its industrial decline. This applies 
to some large companies which disappeared and ensuing local power relations. Public 
sector employee 14 described the latter in terms of a low wage economy: 
   Extract 65 
“If you look at the structure of Nottingham’s economy, it’s a low wage, low skill 
economy and even the professional posts tend to be lower paid than they might 
be elsewhere. Whereas, if you look at somewhere like Derby, very high skilled, high 
paid, because they’ve got Rolls Royce, Bombardier. So, Nottingham tends to have 
service sector, leisure, retail, a lot of care work, public sector employment. So, the 
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big employers are very influential because the city doesn’t want to lose them, and 
because we have to keep them because our economy without them would just be 
devastated.” 
The informant expressed what recurred in other interviews: Nottingham’s 
socio-economic dependence on few larger companies and on public sector 
employment. The picture that formed for me during the study was one of a certain 
split of jobs in terms of working conditions, pay and care about local communities. It 
relates to the polarisation which took place in Britain through an expansion of high- 
and low-end service jobs (Oesch, 2015) (cf. Section 3.4.1 c)).  
On the one side, there are some successful companies or institutions, partly 
offering attractive, higher skilled, paid and recognised jobs. These were also named by 
informants and are inter alia Boots, the two universities, Experian (2,000 employees 
in Nottinghamshire) and Capital One (853) (D. Robinson, 2018; Rossiter, 2018). Many 
of them operate in financial and information services, research, biotechnology or 
creative industries. However, they employ markedly less people than Nottingham’s 
‘lost’ industries and their jobs often demand different and higher qualifications: “In 
biotechnology we’re doing quite well but is not creating loads of jobs. And a lot of the 
jobs are [held by] the people who live outside the city […]” (politician 2).  
On the other side, there are numerous organisations relying on low skill, low 
wage and partly precarious labour (cf. also Section 6.3.1). Examples named in 
interviews were service jobs, e.g. retail and distribution or food packaging, or the 
student economy, including night-life, taxi driving, food and drinks. One of them is the 
retailer Sports Direct in Shirebrook, located in former mining areas north of 
Nottingham. The company employs 18,280 people (D. Robinson, 2018) and appeared 
in newspapers in relation to adverse working conditions. Minimum wages were not 
respected (Pritchard, 2017) and working practices found to be “appalling” by a House 
of Commons report (2016, p. 29). Businesses operating on a low pay, low skill basis 
may in fact be attracted to places like Nottingham, where formal qualifications are 
relatively low, un- and underemployment are considerable – implying a surplus of 
potential employees.  
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Inequalities in Nottingham’s economic structure parallel its significant societal 
inequalities (cf. Section 6.3.3) and correspond to values of individual responsibility, 
performance and recognition of the successful. As least advantaged members of 
society suffer from these inequalities and values, they conflict with social justice.  
Nottingham’s two universities were seen as anchor institutions, employing ca. 
8,300 people (Rossiter, 2018, p. 20) and importantly supporting the city’s economy. 
However, besides worries about companies’ relocation and public sector job cuts 
through austerity policies since 2010 (BBC News, 2017), student numbers were 
another concern: 
Extract 66 
“I’m also worried about foreign students because we do benefit massively from 
students. They’re bringing a lot of money into the economy. So that will become 
fragile [with Brexit]” (politician 2).  
The student economy also met critique. For instance, Labour Councillor Malcolm 
Wood called the current development rate of – profitable – student flats 
unsustainable:  
“I would like to know whether these properties are convertible should the student 
market collapse […], which it inevitably will. Sooner or later we are going to face a 
major crisis" (Sandeman, 2018d).  
The high weight of student’s purchasing power is also unsustainable in that its costs 
are partly postponed into the future through loans. Finally, the student economy 
exemplifies (class) inequalities. They become obvious in – relatively often middle-class 
– students’ economic weight partially exceeding that of other – more often working-
class – Nottingham residents. The latter thereby often cannot access their 
neighbouring university, especially the Russell Group University of Nottingham. These 
inequalities for instance played out in terms of the local community being seen as 
“taken over by students” (Sandeman, 2018d). 
With the relevance of public and service sector jobs, the universities and 
importantly few larger companies, it is of interest how conflicts with the latter are 
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negotiated. While the Labour-led city council supports and cooperates with 
businesses, informants referred to instances where it imposed policies against their 
resistance. These are the establishment of the tram, the Selective Licensing Scheme 
(cf. Footnote 26) and the Workplace Parking Levy – which I illustrate forth following. 
Nottingham’s Workplace Parking Levy. Nottingham City Council has been the 
first and only UK local authority to instate a levy on workplace parking in 2012 (Clayton 
et al., 2017) – which has since been discussed in Manchester and Glasgow (BBC News, 
2018a; Sandeman, 2018e). The levy is also viewed as socially and environmentally 
pioneering (Clayton et al., 2017; WWF Scotland, 2016), inter alia demonstrating how 
a local authority can be more influential regarding modes of infrastructure funding 
(Parkes, 2016). The city council enforced the Workplace Parking Levy against some 
companies’ interests, as I describe subsequently. Companies carry ca. half of its costs 
– and pass down the rest to their employees (Clayton et al., 2017). Regarding its 
impact, “research indicates that the levy has significantly contributed to a 33% fall in 
carbon emissions, and a modal shift which has seen public transport use rise to over 
40%” (WWF Scotland, 2016).  
The Workplace Parking Levy “is a charge on employers who provide workplace 
parking” “to tackle problems associated with traffic congestion, by both providing 
funding for major transport infrastructure initiatives [extension of the tram, 
redevelopment of Nottingham Railway Station, public transport] and by acting as an 
incentive for employers to manage their workplace parking provision” (Nottingham 
City Council, n.d.-f). Besides, the levy should enhance social justice by redistributing 
from car-commuters to those depending on public transport (cf. Extract 7) and 
contribute to environmental sustainability (WWF Scotland, 2016). The levy amounts 
to £387 annually per parking space for employers offering at least 11 spaces in 2017-
18 in Nottingham.  
Businesses partly criticised the Workplace Parking Levy and threatened to 
leave Nottingham due to it, as politician 2 recounted: 
Extract 67 
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“And I was told that other firms would move. And I thought ‘no you won’t’, and the 
reason why they wouldn’t, because the marginal cost of that is disproportionate 
to the cost of moving, of losing your labour. And nobody, absolutely nobody has 
moved because of workplace parking, it was all mouth. And we stuck it out and 
we’re getting 10, 9 million quid a year out of it. And that is why […] relocating, it’s 
a very expensive business and it’s a very risky business […]. Because you need to 
guarantee that your staff will stay with you because your most valuable asset is 
not the land you’re on, it’s your staff. […] 
And the people that said they were going- I just thought you- either you’re very 
foolish, or you’re just posturing.” 
However, a counter-example is Games Warehouse having relocated to Derby over the 
levy (BBC News, 2012).  
7.4 Nottingham: economy in society 
7.4.1 Companies’ societal impact 
The following explores companies’ societal impact in Nottingham. While the 
city was heavily industrialised in the past, from around 1950 it lost its textile industry, 
other large employers such as Raleigh or John Player’s & Sons and its coal mines. 
Nottingham simultaneously lost many jobs with implications for related identities, but 
also employers who partly got involved for their workforce and local communities. For 
instance, the bike manufacturer Raleigh was understood as an industry “in which 
employees could take pride” as a symbol of British manufacturing quality (Smart, 
2018). “The company rewarded the skills of its workforce by providing for their social 
and medical needs as well as secure and well-paid jobs” (Smart, 2018). Nottingham 
Post considers similar engagement as largely lost: “Such things are rarely heard of 
today. The gap between the big employers and their workers has never been greater, 
both in pay terms and lifestyle” (Smart, 2018). An interviewee relatedly expressed that 
companies, e.g. supermarkets, had a responsibility for the local areas of which they 
profited and should in turn support these communities. Otherwise, business 
representative 2 outlined how the city and public sector would benefit from a thriving 
private sector, which should therefore be invested into:  
  214 
Extract 68 
“[…] I think there's a misconception […] actually [which] is as the private sector 
thrives, the public sector doesn't. What you find is that […] if the entrepreneurs and 
business owners […] employ people, they invest in their communities, they create 
opportunity, they create wealth […] [,] everything around benefits. […] 
They [any entrepreneur] would say: whilst we need to support the NHS and we 
need to support our public services, invest in private sector, make the private 
stronger and the other things will start to take care of themselves.” 
I encountered varied engagement of employers in Nottingham, partly 
reflecting widened inequalities and an austere state. Some companies exhibited a high 
local commitment, often wanting to contribute to communities’ current and future 
well-being. Businesses partially “help[][ed] to fill a gap” (public sector employee 6) by 
stepping into what sometimes used to be public authority tasks. Examples are Speedo, 
the Nottingham-based swimwear maker, supporting seven public leisure centres in 
partnership with Nottingham City Council (Nottingham City Council, 2015b); or the 
supermarket chain Co-op giving 1% of spending on certain goods and services “to local 
projects – from improving community spaces or helping school leavers learn life skills, 
to simply connecting people” (Co-operative Group, n.d.-a). “Any organisation can 
apply [for the local community fund] as long as it can prove it’s not run for private 
profit and has a project in mind that benefits their local community” (Co-operative 
Group, n.d.-b). Furthermore, the consumer credit reporting agency Experian 
supported young people from a deprived neighbourhood to attend the University of 
Nottingham. The company also provided financial education for school children: 
Extract 69 
“Experian have worked with Blue Bell Hill School in St. Ann‘s to build a resource 
called Values, Money and Me which is now available free to all teachers, parents 
and carers nationwide and now carries a PSHE Association Quality Mark.”  
“It was purely and simply because we recognise the importance of financial 
capability and it was clear that youngsters were not being taught how to be 
financially savvy in the classroom. So we got to work with Blue Bell Hill School, 
combined our financial and teaching expertise, and created a high quality teaching 
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resource to help teachers tackle this important life skill” (Janet Hemstock, 
Experian) [later amended by interviewee]. 
These instances illustrate characteristics of businesses’ local community 
engagement. It firstly depends on companies’ choices and values which causes or 
groups they promote and how – e.g. contrasting with public will formation. Secondly, 
businesses’ engagement supposes their presence or local interest and thus likely 
varies with the latter. Thirdly, it sometimes depends on local initiatives in terms of 
starting projects or applying for funding. Combined with a shrinking state, these 
developments make companies increasingly important societal actors in a place –  
which Crouch (2011) describes as inherent to neoliberalism. With businesses’ 
contributions relying on their preferences and local preconditions, they are probably 
unevenly spread and places with a weaker local infrastructure may fall further behind. 
Altogether, companies’ societal impact in Nottingham partly reflects a withdrawing 
state, may enhance sustainability, but could also reinforce spatial inequalities through 
its organisation. 
7.4.2 Expectations and the public 
An issue occurring during the interviews was that local employers on the one 
hand struggled to find qualified employees; and on the other, local people had 
difficulties finding paying employment. To understand why employers and potential 
employees did not seem to find together, I enquired about informants’ interpretation. 
It elicits a misfit between people’s qualifications and employers’ demands; and 
relating views about structural, educational and labour market inequalities. 
Informants expressed that employers in Nottingham partly saw little leeway to 
qualify people so that they could employ them, but equally that there was not a 
culture of doing so: 
Extract 70 
“Employers- are somewhat hypocritical in the sense that they want to have ready-
made, finished people given to them. The lack of security of income for them, you 
know, the tenuous state of many employers as I say makes it difficult for them to 
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invest in skills and behaviours, and there’s not a strong culture in the UK of 
employers getting involved in education, of employers getting involved in- schools, 
of employers using their recruitment practices, using their corporate-social 
responsibilities practices to improve the pipeline of- future candidates, the future 
workforce. [T]here isn’t a culture of doing it” (public sector employee 11). 
Politician 1 agreed and described a dysfunctional further education system: 
Extract 71 
“Provision of skills has been a mess for a very long time. Fundamentally, what it 
[is] about is that we have had a series of governments that do not believe in […] 
economic planning and […] agree in a market-led approach to training […]. […]  
[T]he providers have too much power in the system. [S]o you get [a] mismatch. 
[Y]oung people do not understand that if you are a plumber or an electrician or a 
builder, you can print money because there are shortages. They do not know that 
bioscience is the biggest growing sector in the city's economy and instead, they 
queue up to do music technology because it sounds exciting and beauty and 
hairdressing and journalism for which there is no market at all because these are 
the things that are attractive […]. Well, after care for the elderly, training is 
probably the biggest most disorganized scandal in the country […].” 
Moreover, informants said that there was neither the experience nor the expectation 
that especially younger people stayed with employers for longer – again lowering the 
willingness to qualify them. I address interpretations of related labour market 
inequalities subsequently. 
‘Raising aspirations’: making sense of inequalities. The theme ‘raising 
aspirations’, appearing across Nottingham data, provides an example for changing 
individual behaviours to improve a situation (cf. Section 5.2.2 a)), here in relation to 
work. It is central to the ‘City of Nottingham Sustainable Community Strategy 2020. 
Family, Neighbourhood, City: Raising Aspirations’ (One Nottingham, 2009):  
Extract 72 
“But we must also connect more people into the benefits of Nottingham’s 
economy. Despite [its] […] underlying strength […] and its future prospects, too 
many people in the City remain disconnected from the jobs, wealth and 
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opportunities. Poverty persists in many communities, side by side with prosperity. 
And for some, aspirations are low; too many people do not share in the city’s 
optimism. This leads to wasted talent and is holding the city and its people back” 
(One Nottingham, 2009, p. 5).  
Measures to tackle these issues stress individual responsibility and changes in 
attitudes and behaviours, according themes in the strategy being: raising people’s 
aspirations; increasing positive behaviours; rebuild a culture of work; take 
responsibility of one’s own life; limitations of government action; people not fulfilling 
their potential. While opportunities in Nottingham are emphasised, the problem is 
described as some people not seizing them:  
Extract 73 
“There are many opportunities for people in Nottingham, young and old, to 
advance themselves and many do just that. However, there are some who appear 
to lack the willingness or ability to do so – who appear to lack the aspiration or 
motivation to engage with opportunities. We believe that the inter-generational 
experience of underachievement in some families in Nottingham – often 
associated with deprivation – has led to a lack of confidence about their personal, 
educational and employment prospects. In some more extreme cases, it has led to 
almost full disengagement with the city’s wider community, economy and values” 
(One Nottingham, 2009, p. 5). 
A key for breaking this “cycle of poverty” is thus seen in higher aspirations:  
Extract 74 
“Our biggest priority for the coming decade is to break the cycle of poverty in this 
city. We want our children to grow up with higher ambitions and aspirations for 
the future. We want more of the city’s wealth creation to benefit local people” 
(One Nottingham, 2009, p. 1). 
This is connected to stressing individual responsibility:  
Extract 75 
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“Nottingham will only fulfil its potential as a city when all of its people feel able to 
take responsibility for their own lives. This strategy aims to empower people, not 
just make them reliant on public services [...]” (One Nottingham, 2009, p. iv).  
Causes for persisting poverty are thus partly individualised through lacking 
aspirations and a personal failure to take responsibility. However, structural factors 
such as low wages, high un- and underemployment are not mentioned here.  
Individualisation to explain economic inequality has been described as 
“locat[ing] conditions for overcoming disadvantaged social situations within 
individuals (and their personality)” (Sachweh, 2014, p. 341, emphasis in original). In 
this way, individualisation in Nottingham decontextualises social problems and thus 
reduces a critical consciousness towards their structural conditions. Policies and values 
are thereby co-produced and may be mutually explaining factors in that individualising 
values afford measures aiming at behavioural change and the latter again substantiate 
individualising social norms.  
Another view of inequality, potentially enabled by its high extent, was the 
unavoidability of deprivation, e.g.: “[...] because somebody has to do the low paid jobs 
don’t they?” (business representative 1) or  
Extract 76 
“[t]here will always be a certain amount [of fuel poverty]. [...] [T]here’ll always be 
a little bit because there’s always [...] the people who find themselves on hard 
times. But the scale of it is ridiculous” (public sector employee 1).  
This interpretation of inequality by necessity also “suspend[s] legitimatory pressures 
relating to social inequality” (Sachweh, 2014, p. 341).  
Other interviewees expressed that economic conditions in Nottingham were 
actually very difficult. For instance, public sector employee 11 found that  
Extract 77 
“[t]he problem is [...] the pathway by which somebody who is from a family of 
intergenerational unemployment now, because of the industrial jobs in the ‘70s 
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and ‘80s--how does somebody [...] with that environment, with limited social 
capital, achieve the social mobility they need to get into the job in a laboratory […]. 
And the reality is they can’t.”  
– “without an exceptional early intervention, and for the vast majority that 
opportunity is missed” [later amended by interviewee]. 
Public sector employee 14 strongly criticised ‘raising aspirations’ as patronising:  
Extract 78 
“I find it repulsive when people talk about raising ambitions actually. I just find it 
disgusting. Have you ever met a young person that wasn’t ambitious? It’s 
patronising. Actual bullshit. It’s not about raising ambitions, it’s opportunities. See, 
you can have all the ambition in the world. Young people are really smart [and] […] 
they will tailor their ambitions to the expectations. So, if they see no way of them 
becoming – somebody going to work at BioCity or whatever they want to be, they 
won’t have those aspirations. They’re realistic. [...] They don’t lack ambition, they 
lack opportunities. And the patronising crap that goes into some of those 
strategies about raising ambitions is done from an absolute patronising 
paternalistic, privileged position. If only you aspire to be what I am, life would be 
better. I can’t tell you how often I’ve sat in meetings and I can’t hear this. [...] [A]nd 
I hear it a lot in Nottingham, and actually I haven’t heard it anywhere else in the 
same way.” 
More generally, some interviewees expressed that sufficiently paid, secure 
work would be the first step to help people in Nottingham. This view emphasises more 
structural than individual reasons for social problems and challenges the city’s policy 
language. While both contending views exist in the data, the document analysis 
suggests that the individualising one has shaped significantly what issues are being 
tackled ‘officially’ and how (cf. Section 5.2). By contrast, restricting structural 
conditions came up more in the interviews than in the documents.58  
A rhetorical pattern connected to individualisation was the recognition of 
difficult and increasingly challenging conditions – yet an emphasis on resilience, 
                                                     
58 This may partly be due to a certain shift in the policy discourse over time with the documents mostly 
dating back some years (from 2009 to 2017) and interviews taking place in 2018. 
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ambition, boldness, of taking on challenges and a wealth of opportunities (cf. e.g. 
Extract 74). This in parallel appeared at the individual level and at the urban level, e.g.:  
“Nottingham will be the best place in the world” (public sector employee 3). 
Altogether, systemic ‘misfits’ between employers’ demands and people’s 
qualifications and relatively short-term expectations appear to counter sustainability, 
e.g. through lesser qualification and investments on both sides, un(der)employment 
and unfilled positions. Whilst the recognition of Nottingham’s difficult labour market 
conditions concurs with a social justice perspective, interpretations of inequality by 
necessity and individualisation thwart it.  
7.5 Nottingham: economic growth and intergenerational justice  
This section explores how informants interrelate economic growth and 
intergenerational justice through the interview question “What role does economic 
growth have for future generations/the future?” The way actors negotiate inherent 
tensions (cf. Section 2.2.2 a)) is insightful regarding political and economic 
interdependencies. 
7.5.1 A need for growth 
Most interviewees saw economic growth as “essential”, “critical”, “absolutely 
vital”, “fundamental”, as “the most important thing” or similar for the future or future 
generations. Some stated that growth and sustainability could be pursued together. 
Economic growth was inter alia considered very important for creating jobs, also to 
offset previous job losses. Economic growth was viewed as good for the tax base and 
important for businesses, for local investment, to develop the city and widely regarded 
necessary for good living conditions and to update the infrastructure, e.g.:  
Extract 79 
“[…] [W]e've got to get economic growth or else the city is going to die because 
[…] people need to have money coming into their pockets and therefore they need 
jobs, and therefore you need economic growth […]” (politician 8).  
Coincidingly, Nottingham’s Growth Plan emphasises sharply: 
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Extract 80 
“The programmes aim to provide the optimal conditions to encourage internal 
development and growth within the key sectors and will run in tandem with a 
strong and aggressive campaign marketing the city to external businesses, 
investors and markets” (Nottingham City Council, 2012, p. 34). 
7.5.2 Questioning economic growth 
Some informants questioned a sole ‘need’ for growth, e.g. as societally 
unbalanced: 
Extract 81 
“[…] [I]f there’s any growth, that to me sounds […] to be what the city council […] 
and private sector want. […] Just going back to my discussion […], it’s what kind of 
growth. You can […] hit all the targets about creating jobs, and it does nothing for 
inequality and social cohesion, personal income” (public sector employee 14).   
Informants also scrutinised the growth measure GDP, for instance: 
Extract 82 
“[…] Maybe it's the economists that need to […] rethink about how they do the 
numbers. […]  
I think growth should be looking at those broader links of measures that look at 
how well people are, how green things are, how socially connected people are” 
(public sector employee 6).  
Civil society representative 8 perceived the focus on growth as detrimental to other 
values: 
Extract 83 
“[…] Economic growth everywhere, oh God. […] And it’s a very sad story because 
it’s just reducing our humanity to one dimension, money and capital, and that’s 
very sad. I think this economic growth is going to fuel further and further 
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individualism, greed and deprive us of great moral, social, and spiritual values. 
Because it doesn’t leave any time, that’s what economic growth is about sadly.” 
Few interviewees saw economic growth as (mostly environmentally) unsustainable 
and reflected about what needed to change, e.g.:  
Extract 84 
“The big question is, with economic growth […] can democracy deliver a 
sustainable future for the human race? Or the next question is, […] [h]ow does 
democracy have to evolve to ensure that there is a sustainable future? Because 
you can't ignore economic growth and sustainability. They are in inextricably 
linked because we live on one planet, and at the moment […] we are like a pre-
teenager, no, we don’t think about the consequences” (civil society representative 
6). 
Besides, several interviewees mentioned “inclusive,” “equitable” or “good” 
growth. Expressed views hereby included that growth should be distributed in a fairer 
way, that everyone ought to participate in it; that the benefits of growth should go 
where they were needed most; inclusive growth should be slower and narrow the 
income gap; good growth should not be off-shore and not based on borrowing. 
Altogether, the pursuit of economic growth was central to Nottingham’s 
policies. Informants often saw future well-being depend on it and growth being a cure 
for socio-economic problems. However, some found that the latter decreasingly 
materialised and growth conflicted with a more sustainable future. They challenged 
the growth paradigm and partly wished it to change accordingly. Interpretively, I 
suggest that Nottingham’s severe socio-economic problems may reinforce a current 
necessity for and policy focus on economic growth as the system-inherent way 
forward – despite discomfort and over problems of its future sustainability with 
regards to the environment, societal values and cohesion. 
7.5.3 Environmental pioneerism 
Examining a larger related pattern, Nottingham shows – in a national 
comparison – high ambitions, efforts and successes in increasing its environmental 
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sustainability (cf. also Cauvain, 2018). For instance, the city exceeded its CO2 emission 
reduction goal for 2020 years before (Deakin, 2016) and the East Midlands were the 
first region signing the Nottingham Declaration, committing its local authorities to 
develop plans for contributing to CO2 emission reductions by 2010 “to address the 
causes and effects of climate change” (The Nottingham Declaration on Climate 
Change, n.d., p. 18; Climate East Midlands Projects, 2018); it has been named Britain’s 
smartest city for energy in the ‘UK Smart Cities Index’, e.g. with the goal to deliver 20% 
of its energy from renewable sources by 2020 (Nottingham City Council, 2017h); or it 
has been labelled the least car-dependent city in the UK due to its good public 
transport system and investments in cycling (Milmo, 2010).  
However, Nottingham’s environmental ‘pioneerism’ may partly be enabled by 
deindustrialisation, its high economic deprivation or restrictions. Accordingly, that 
14.6% of Nottingham’s households live in fuel poverty in 2016/17 (Nottingham City 
Council, 2018h, p. 5) and that the significant fall in CO2 emissions is due to a reduction 
in domestic energy use (Nolan, 2016), may contribute to reaching emission reduction 
targets. Furthermore, “Nottingham city has a much higher proportion of households 
without access to car (45%) compared to […] the England average (27%)” (Nottingham 
2001 Census data in Nottingham City Council, 2011, p. 135). With more people than in 
other UK cities ‘depending’ on public transport, low incomes may have brought forth 
the development of such a system considered exemplary in the UK. Equally, besides 
the environmental benefits of the installation of solar PVs and the insulation of council 
homes (Nottingham City Homes, n.d.), these measures might contribute to cost 
savings – and may have partly been driven by them. 
I therefore suggest that there is a partial trade-off between social justice and 
environmental sustainability in Nottingham, i.e. if less people would be deprived of 
fulfilling their basic needs or live in a way currently considered a norm, Nottingham 
would be less environmentally sustainable. While deprivation might drive 
environmental sustainability, the costs for it are importantly borne by those living in 
deprivation. It is then involuntary and co-produced with power asymmetries. Other 
case studies equally point out incompatibilities between environmental integrity and 
  224 
equity, “raising the need for trade-off decisions” (e.g. Hutton et al., 2018, p. 2). Also, 
empirical research shows that there is a trade-off between economic growth and 
environmental quality at lower incomes (Barbier & Burgess, 2015, p. 825). Such a 
trade-off seems to materialise in Nottingham and is indicative of its polarised social 
order. Methodologically, this interpretation demonstrates the merits of an integrated 
approach to sustainability and a whole regime perspective (cf. Section 2.3.3 c)) – which 
a ‘one pillar’ or single policy approach might have precluded. 
7.6 Stuttgart: relation to place, communication and cooperation 
Moving on to Stuttgart, I first focus on the local economy’s relation to it. 
In the interviews, political and economic actors often spoke with relative 
appreciation about one another’s behaviour. There appeared to be a shared rationale 
of agreeing on some matters cooperatively – reflecting German corporatism. 
Informants on both sides outlined how Stuttgart’s prosperity depended on the well-
being of the industry and how the industry in turn required good and stable conditions 
to develop. However, companies described their influence on specific political 
decisions as limited, e.g.: 
Extract 85 
„[…] [C]oncretely, we are like every other company, someone who […] since years 
[…] advertises […] for such a motorway connection. But the political procedures 
are, I don’t want to say broadly independent of this-, we give many impulses, also 
regarding economic policy, digital policy, digital literacy and so on, […]. But I would 
say: No, we don’t have a larger impact, also other companies not I think, regarding 
the decisions […] [in] [...] the Stuttgart [...] area“ (business representative 7). 
Equally and despite relatively strong associations’ lobbyism, public sector employee 3 
saw no significant impact of the big companies on urban politics – which he endorsed: 
Extract 86 
„[…] [I]n Stuttgart we of course also have a relatively high degree of advocacy work 
in associations, groups in every form […] from […] the automobile association, here 
massively represented by Daimler and Porsche, who of course have a weight. 
  225 
Whereby I don’t have the impression that the large industrial representatitves […] 
have a strong impact. So Daimler has no presence at all in urban politics. And 
neither really does Porsche. And Mahle also makes itself rather rare. The people 
don’t have-, that’s Swabian understatement, I don’t know, but they do not have 
this presence that one could actually expect from them. Which I find agreeable.”      
Businesses’ and public sector informants often described their communication 
and negotiation of local issues as consensus-oriented, very cooperative, involving 
many of the parties concerned and as relatively balanced. Business representative 6 
described this in relation to a controversial issue in Stuttgart: 
Extract 87 
„[...] [E]specially at the topic of air pollution control I have the feeling that the [city 
of Stuttgart] proceeds[] very fairly and also enters[] into dialogue with all actors. 
And then simply looks, how can one reconcile everything as well as possible, the 
interests of the economy, but also the other interests of concerned actors, be it 
local residents, be it trade or crafts […]. So I think there is a very fair togetherness, 
also a very good balance.”  
The informant characterised the relation with the city of Stuttgart as “very 
cooperative” and “very trustful” with the common objective to continue “creating jobs 
of the future”: 
Extract 88 
„So I think it is also very important for the city council that one talks with the 
economy, that one explores together how do we manage […] now especially with[] 
the topic of mobility to set the course, so that the city of Stuttgart […] remains 
automotive location and mobility location” (business representative 6). 
Otherwise, politician 1 found that the economy needed to be driven to 
orientate itself more towards the future – given Stuttgart’s dependence upon the 
automotive industry: 
Extract 89 
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I: Yes, how do you see altogether [...] the role of the economy in Stuttgart? (13 sec.) 
Politician 1: That is, considering the dependence upon the automotive industry in 
Stuttgart extremely complex. So if the automotive industry oversleeps the future 
[…], then it goes downhill in Stuttgart extremely quickly. And here everyone is 
relatively nervous at the moment. […] [T]he trust into lobbying for safeguarding 
the portfolio, has […] been very high in the automotive industry located in 
Stuttgart. That means the protectionism of politics for the existing has actually 
rather slowed down the necessary processes of change, i.e. the future orientation. 
And in the end the economy does not make itself a favour. And those are always 
such disputes in all political bodies. Do I also drive the economy so to speak, do I 
claim to also drive the economy into the future? Thereby to support it? Also if it 
hurts sometimes at the moment? This balance is practically negotiated on a daily 
basis. Whether in Bundestag, Landtag or in every municipality. [...] 
[...] [O]ne in the end has to push the industry in the common interest a bit. Because 
it also helps us long-term economically. 
Oppositely, another informant expressed that the political sector was not well 
prepared for change in terms of a future orientation.  
Regarding communication, interviewees portrayed partially close, supportive 
and “decidedly constructive” (business representative 9) formal and informal links 
between companies and politics/administration. However, some wished for more to 
be done for Stuttgart’s companies, inter alia bureaucratic requirements reduced or a 
“crusade against the car” stopped (politician 7). Some interviewees perceived political 
and economic interests as disparate, while another saw the industry being valued as 
an idea provider in Stuttgart – more than e.g. in Berlin.  
I partly inquired whether and why companies would relocate from Stuttgart – 
also given high labour and production costs. All asked business representatives 
emphasised their organisation’s commitment to Stuttgart. Resonating with others, 
public sector employee 3 stressed how political continuity, reliability despite changes 
of government, good transport links, but mainly the historical rooting of the city’s 
major companies would prevent them from “even rudimentarily wanting to leave”. 
Business representative 7 outlined why his company would not move, describing 
Stuttgart Region as a unique cluster in Europe encompassing varied companies, crafts, 
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businesses, research institutions and customer relations (about the comparative 
historical significance of these institutional structures cf. Section 8.2.2): 
Extract 90 
„So this word ‘mid-sized sector’ [‘Mittelstand’], yes, and this strong reference of 
businesses to the region who are there since years and reinvent themselves 
repeatedly and are twinned with each other and completely heterogeneous. […] 
That is a cluster, I would allege that exists in the whole of Europe actually only in 
this Stuttgart Region, like that. […] So these are clusters which one cannot, also 
within Germany, easily transplant. […]  
That is why in Stuttgart Region one feels very, very comfortable. […] Now one can 
ask what is hen and egg, yes. Was it the political side? I think it is a give and take. 
But politics let’s it go long enough so that companies are comfortable, that I really 
have to say, yes.”  
Besides, business representative 6 emphasised regional know-how and 
innovativeness:  
Extract 91 
„What hinders us to leave Stuttgart? […] 
Well, for one thing it is actually also this strong cluster which has now built up in 
the last decades. So this knowhow which simply exists here. The highly qualified 
workforce which is here on site. And simply this automotive knowledge which one 
does not find everywhere on the world like this. Where one of course has an 
enormous advantage in knowledge. That is [...] in fact the great strength here in 
the region. […] So there really also sit all the engineers and developers who now 
work on these future technologies […]. And that certainly is an enormous locational 
advantage.” 
In turn, informants described employees as often ready to live in Stuttgart as an 
attractive city. A cumulative strength of the region was emphasised and companies 
wished to sustain its competitiveness and jobs.  
Nonetheless, mentioned hindering factors for companies to stay in Stuttgart 
included congestion, a deficient digital infrastructure, a lack of commercial and living 
space, and a certain saturation of the population and little tolerance towards the 
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uncomforts of industrialisation. These three latter aspects were seen as threatening 
Stuttgart’s prosperity.  
While public sector informants were sometimes concerned that Stuttgart’s 
major companies may not be future-proof (cf. Extract 89), they did not fear their 
departure or lacking communication about such a step. Business representative 6 
explained how they related to politics in a previous case of production relocation, 
emphasising dialogue, trust and fairness:  
Extract 92 
„But there it was very important for us that one simply informs politics about the 
development. Und there we really had very, very many intense phone calls and 
discussions beforehand. And then had […] the production [of one model] […] 
replaced by the production of other models. But this I find […] simply important, 
regarding trust between economy and politics. That especially if there are negative 
messages, that one then enters into dialogue early on. […] That is certainly our 
approach, that […] one then […] deals fairly with the opposite party […].” 
Altogether, political and economic actors often aimed at maintaining future 
generations’ socio-economic leeway. This went with a shared concern for the 
threatened car industry on which the city’s prosperity was seen to largely depend, 
partly close and trustful corporatist coordination and longer-term mutual obligations 
– though not implying companies’ direct influence on political decisions.  
7.7 Stuttgart: structures, power relations and conflicts  
Contrary to other places in the Western world, Stuttgart has not largely lost its 
industrial base (cf. Section 3.4.2c)) and associated structures. Highly-paid and often 
high-skill jobs concentrate in Stuttgart with 73,026 € gross value added per employee 
(2012), Stuttgart Region’s being 67,003 € and Germany’s 57,364 € (Durchdenwald, 
2015). Employment and economic value creation particularly depend on the car 
industry cluster. It accounts for more than two thirds of investments in the region and 
almost 200,000 persons work in it, equalling ca. a sixth of socially insured employees 
in Stuttgart Region (Dispan et al., 2015, p. 75; Durchdenwald, 2015). Companies which 
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informants mentioned as important to Stuttgart were inter alia (number of employees 
in Stuttgart Region in parentheses): Daimler (80,900), Bosch (34,963), Porsche 
(17,700) and Mahle (6,696) (IHK Region Stuttgart, 2017). These all partially belong to 
the car industry cluster which business representative 6 saw as “a very tight network 
of companies and suppliers and that is the great strength in Stuttgart and the region”. 
The high proportion of often family-owned medium-sized businesses in Baden-
Württemberg forms part of it. They are frequently regionally rooted, plan long-term 
and have close links between entrepreneur, company and employees (Lochner, 2016). 
Furthermore, Stuttgart’s seven public universities (Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, n.d.-n) 
were mentioned as important to the educational and research landscape, but not 
specifically as carrying economic weight.   
An opinion in Stuttgart – more bluntly expressed by civil society 
representatives – was that of a one-sided dependency with ‘the economy’ being the 
most powerful part in the city and having a decisive impact over what happened 
politically. For instance, civil society representative 5 named as key players in 
formulating policies in Stuttgart: “Daimler, Porsche, Mahle, Bosch. Those are the 
crucial actors” [later specified by interviewee]. Conversely, civil society representative 
4 described political and economic interdependence as “a kind of symbiosis”: „[...] You 
support me with political power and I help you with your interests of generating 
money, preserving jobs […]”. Similarly, public and economic sector informants 
described Stuttgart’s power structures as an interplay of politics and economy with 
civil society influences. Extract 85 evinces limits of businesses’ impact. Business 
representative 3 found that the car industry was met with more criticism since a Green 
Party-led mayor and state government were in power, but did not consider policies as 
“industry-critical”:  
Extract 93 
„I certainly think that every politician, no matter of which political colour, if he is 
in governmental responsibility, understands that without the jobs and also the 
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business tax revenue of the large companies, he can hardly implement what he 
wants. So that there is in any case a coordination and at least an exchange […].  
I would not say that industry-critical or -destructive policies are imposed in the 
Stuttgart area.” 
Politicians equally recognised a strong agreement between political and economic 
interests, e.g.: 
Extract 94 
I: [W]hat is […] your impression, how far do political decisions […] comply with the 
interests of the local economy? […] 
Politician 8: (8 sec.) All in all there is much agreement. If one is honest. So, [...] of 
course, the trade associations would probably wish for even more investments into 
road construction. But indeed they also see that one reaches boundaries here. […] 
Although many in Stuttgart hold relatively favourable jobs, there are signs of 
increasing labour market inequalities. This is through rises in low wage employment, 
marginal employment, fixed-term contracts, more subcontracted labour and more 
bogus self-employment between 2000 and 2013 in Baden-Württemberg (Klee & 
Klempt, 2014). Almost every fourth German employee in 2015 earns below the low 
pay threshold of 10.22 € per hour (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund & Hans Böckler 
Stiftung, 2018, p. 14). These increasingly difficult conditions found repercussions in 
some interviews (cf. Section 7.8.2). Besides, average working conditions are gendered 
with higher paying jobs being overproportionately those of ‘male breadwinners’. That 
“[t]he ‘main-earner model’ continues to dominate in Germany” (OECD, 2016a, p. 19) 
corresponds to lasting conservative welfare state arrangements. Accordingly, mothers 
in Germany contribute less to household incomes than in most OECD-countries: 
women’s earnings on average account for almost a quarter of household incomes in 
couples with a female partner aged 25 to 45 and at least one child (OECD, 2016a, p. 
20).  
With the relevance of Stuttgart’s economy as a tax base, in the provision of 
jobs and socio-economic structures, its interests seemed powerful and intertwined 
with those of local politicians and administration. Maintaining these socio-economic 
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structures partially appeared as a shared task between political and economic spheres 
– modes of which however conflicted with environmental sustainability. I 
subsequently explore a crucial conflict case for this in policy-making.   
Industry over health and environment? The case of air pollution. For Stuttgart, 
the air pollution conflict constitutes a paradigmatic within-case, i.e. a “[…] case[] that 
highlight[s] more general characteristics of the societies in question” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, 
p. 232), as it is indicative of power relations between the car industry, politics and civil 
society. I examine these via relating views (state: January 2019) and refer to Section 
6.5.2 for the role of civil society within the developments. The issue is particularly 
pressing in Stuttgart as the German city with the highest air pollution59 
(Südwestrundfunk, 2017) since more than a decade (Resch & Kuhlmann, 2016) which  
exceeds EU legal limits. As effective action to comply with the latter stayed out for 
some time, the EU threatened Stuttgart with penalties amounting to millions in case 
it further exceeded the thresholds (Leibbrand, 2017). Manfred Niess, who sued Baden-
Württemberg because of this, described the situation as follows: 
Extract 95 
„That cannot be, that the state government breaches law. Here in Stuttgart is a 
legal vacuum since 2005 every day or at each particulate matter alarm. And the 
government looks away, because it has to look away, because the automotive 
industry tells it, yes, we cannot make driving bans now. The government should 
make the decision and not the automotive industry” (Götz, 2018).  
Indeed, economic actors opposed driving bans as a solution – which finally had to 
come into force in 2019 after court rulings (cf. Section 6.5.2): 
   Extract 96 
„[…] [T]he city of Stuttgart says […] we cannot avoid driving bans. And it is just 
important to us that one also considers the proportionality. And looks at solving 
this problem rather through innovations and not through driving bans. So I think 
                                                     
59 This is also attributed to much of the traffic passing through the city, the industry and mainly 
Stuttgart’s basin-shaped topography (Südwestrundfunk, 2017). 
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that is such a point which the economy certainly advocates very, very strongly“ 
(business representative 6). 
Politician 8 hereto outlined a trade-off in that Stuttgart 
   Extract 97 
„[...] will just always remain an industrial location and not a spa town”. „[...] 
[T]hose who then just want an air spa simply have to move to Baden-Baden or to 
Freudenstadt. […] But of course we are eager to improve the air quality.” 
Civil society representative 5 found that an amalgamation between economic 
and political interests as centres of power – apart from democratic processes – led to 
a unity of opinions rejecting driving bans:  
Extract 98 
„[T]he climate was never important to Daimler. […] Mr Zetsche [Daimler CEO at 
the time] obviously also meets Mr Kretschmann [state premier of Baden-
Württemberg]. And there are then the important things discussed, not in the 
Landtag. […]  
[...] [B]esides [...] Daimler, Bosch and Mahle [...], Porsche there is also the IHK 
[Chamber of Industry and Commerce]. That is another powerhouse. […] If it raises 
its voice, then normally it is listened to. […] If the IHK for instance says: ‘No driving 
bans.‘ Is this familiar to you? The same which Daimler and Porsche also say, but 
also what the municipal council and the mayor say. In this way, the centre of power 
in Stuttgart forms itself. […]” [parts later specified by interviewee]. 
Business representative 8 ascribed this perceived economic primacy to feared job 
losses:  
Extract 99 
„[I] believe in the end the economy decides with what it makes its money. […] So 
now, if one [takes] this Diesel issue- I mean there one actually could decide very 
differently. One could voice the topic, one could always have done the tests right 
and not let oneself be captivated by the lobbyists […]. So that means consequently, 
I would certainly think that politics does not have terribly much influence on the 
economy. […] So politics could have it, but doesn’t take it. [...] Because it is far too 
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scared. Because it thinks anyone only needs to say something about the workforce 
[…] and the theme is through already.”   
Concludingly, political actors in this critical instance seemed to decide in view 
of a dependence upon the car industry in terms of prosperity. Informants saw this as 
a reason for why the authorities – despite high problem pressure – have not enforced 
EU air pollution controls earlier, thereby stretching the rule of law and trading off 
population health and environmental sustainability for the industry’s well and related 
benefits for Stuttgart. Policies aiming for health and environmental protection then 
originated from civil society’s legal action, not from formal political actors. 
7.8 Stuttgart: economy in society 
7.8.1 Companies’ societal impact 
Stuttgart’s businesses get involved societally in various ways. A representative 
survey of 541 Baden-Württemberg companies in 2005 about their entrepreneurial 
civic involvement gives related insights (Zentrum für zivilgesellschaftliche Entwicklung, 
2007). It states changing relations between state, economy and society which 
challenge entrepreneurs to understand themselves as parts of civil society and whose 
contributions to solving societal questions become increasingly important – and would 
complement state social security and civic engagement (Zentrum für 
zivilgesellschaftliche Entwicklung, 2007, p. 8). Almost every second participating 
company found that “civic involvement belonged to entrepreneurial tasks” (Zentrum 
für zivilgesellschaftliche Entwicklung, 2007, p. 10). The three most important reasons 
why businesses got involved were personal concerns (for 81%), the relation to the 
business location (70%) and that the engagement suited the company (68%) (Zentrum 
für zivilgesellschaftliche Entwicklung, 2007, p. 18). Companies perceived most need 
for regional action in relation to overcoming unemployment (75%), to education and 
training (68%), regarding the values of diligence and commitment (56%) and “carrying 
responsibility for each other” (53%). Thereby, the study’s authors see businesses 
emphasising the idea of a ‘social market economy’ (Zentrum für zivilgesellschaftliche 
Entwicklung, 2007, p. 9). Finally, it was most likely for businesses to engage if they 
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knew involved companies in their environment, if they were larger and if their 
economic activities were more regional (Zentrum für zivilgesellschaftliche 
Entwicklung, 2007, p. 28).  
Stuttgart Region’s economic strategy similarly diagnoses a return to social 
market economy traditions and a shift to more sustainable orientations:  
Extract 100 
„In society, a change in values is furthermore observable. Sustainability in the 
sense of an economic, ecological and social responsibility towards future 
generations has gained a new significance. The companies often return to the 
traditions of the social market economy: to a rather long-term orientation of 
business activity, to a cooperative partnership between employees and employers 
and to a commitment to social security“ (Verband Region Stuttgart, 2013, p. 3). 
Exploring informants’ views, public sector employee 4 characterised the involvement 
of Stuttgart’s companies as exceptional and compensating for social injustices: 
Extract 101 
„Stuttgart simply is a city which has a lot to give. That means we have many funds 
for example. Here in the area of civic involvement, Daimler has donated a pot of 
money. That means they have supported civic involvement during the last years 
with a large annual donation of 80,000 to 100,000 Euro [later specified by 
interviewee]. […] Other cities can only dream thereof. From that, a lot in social 
grievances can be offset as it were. And such pots also exist in other areas.” 
Indeed, Stuttgart hosts the fifth most private foundations across German large cities 
with 72 of them per 100,000 inhabitants (Bundesverband Deutscher Stiftungen, 2018). 
Companies understood their societal commitment for instance “[…] at first via 
the business tax […], thereby the city benefits […]” (business representative 6). 
Business representative 7’s view included tariff-bound pay, strong unions, societal 
integration, recognition and spatial loyalty beyond shareholder value: 
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Extract 102 
„[...] [T]he economy is society. So I have never understood this contradiction 
between society and economy […]. So […] at our location are working 3,500 people, 
yes. […] These are families, these are tariff workplaces. I mean the IG Metall [union] 
has just now got out 4.3 percent [pay rise] for pay-scale employees. That is 
incredibly much. The integration, also how migration functions, if they have 
successful experiences, if they have a structure, an everyday life. So I can actually 
not think of a greater power for societal responsibility than companies in a place. 
Who don’t pay dumping salaries, but top salaries, because there is an IG Metall, 
strong unions and so on. So that is already the basis, in general. And then beyond 
that, companies take on very, very much in the region. That is why the cultural 
sector and the educational sector are flourishing. […] Those are companies who 
build museums, who acquire image collections, very clearly they support the youth, 
support sport events, support-, so in one sentence: Stuttgart Region is also doing 
so well, not only economically, but also culturally, because there are engaged 
companies. Who do not only consider shareholder value, but actually also say: ‘We 
are here. We are here since eternities, we want to stay here.’ This high loyalty to 
location. [...] [T]hat is something different than a banking location, right […], than 
[…] from a hedge fund or so to the City of London […]. […] And that’s a high 
entrepreneurial responsibility here. Really.“ 
However, politician 5 found that companies’ societal engagement had changed and 
local ties partly weakened with globalisation: 
Extract 103 
„I certainly think that due to decision-makers in many companies [...] being en 
route globally and also changing the work location frequently, there naturally is a 
lesser connection to the city itself. And that was surely […] different in the past, 
right? […]  
So I certainly think that this is a concomitant also of globalisation. Which indeed 
brings us many, many advantages. Therefore, one also cannot only lament it.“ 
Another politician wished for more societal engagement of companies. As an example, 
civil society representative 8 saw Daimler’s responsibility dwindling: 
Extract 104 
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„[...] Daimler, who is sitting there with its several thousand jobs, just doesn’t create 
one more job. Wherever it can, it indeed rather outsources to elsewhere. I mean-. 
Workplaces anywhere into a country where production is cheaper. So here it did 
not take on a real responsibility, this huge employer. […] It is like such an own […] 
state in the city.” 
This latter idea can be related to businesses providing (additional) welfare only to their 
own workforce, thereby becoming relatively exclusive. This may encompass job-
related benefits, such as public transport tickets at reduced costs (‘Jobticket’), an 
employer’s name improving chances on Stuttgart’s tense housing market; or 
companies providing privately for their district’s safety after drug and crime issues, as 
described in an interview. These company-related privileges become increasingly 
important during rising inequalities and tend to reinforce them – as the least 
advantaged can less likely access these privileges. Besides, the characteristics of 
Nottingham businesses’ local community support discussed in Section 7.4.1 largely 
apply to Stuttgart. Thereby, a multifaceted picture emerges with companies 
exceptionally and significantly complementing public provision and sustainability in 
the sense of a ‘social market’. Its configurations however remain selective and possibly 
strengthen inequalities. 
7.8.2 Expectations and the public 
Between companies and potential employees, a certain misfit of the former’s 
demands and the latter’s skills came up in the data. I explore this tension 
subsequently. 
Business representative 5 laid it out as follows: 
Extract 105 
„So the [workshops] also complain, because they don’t find professionals. […] But 
they simply also complain because they don’t find apprentices. […] 
[...] [T]hat is [...] a complaint which we hear since quite a while now. That the young 
who come out of school, are not really mature to qualify. They may have a diploma, 
but [...] they then also partly lack basic knowledge, like calculating and so on. But 
they also often lack social skills. That they are punctual, right? That they have a 
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certain appearance. Crafts has a lot to do with clients, right? […] And we also have 
many businesses who […] if so to speak the academic performance is not the best, 
[…] then at the same time commit themselves privately and give them tutoring and 
so on. But if it simply lacks at the very fundamental things, how do I act in business 
life. If there is nothing given to them by the parental home, then sometimes a 
business cannot save the situation either. And then training relationships also […] 
dissolve.“ 
The interviewee stated that employers still saw apprenticeships as worthwhile, even 
if apprentices left after their three to four years long dual training (split between 
vocational school and work in a company). While this business representative saw 
deficits on the side of apprentices partly being compensated for by companies, 
politician 1 depicted how companies’ willingness to take on “the weakest people” 
varied with the economic climate: 
Extract 106 
„[...] [I]t now comes to pass, the need of many companies for qualified or 
unqualified employees. That means they open up stronger for our responsibility of 
people who without support don’t find the way into the labour market or don’t 
stay in it. So today actually, everyone who can walk and withstands a certain 
mental and physical exposure, […] finds work. And if he cannot do this alone yet, 
then he gets according support. And here the employers are more open for such 
models today than before. But which relates to the economic situation, I need 
people. […] 
At the moment where economic activity drops, it [the economy] will discharge from 
this openness again and logically hand the weakest over to the public sector again” 
(politician 1). 
However, business representative 5 also saw demands in crafts rising: 
Extract 107 
„So I would say earlier, 30, 40 years ago, crafts was maybe still such a catch basin 
for those who didn’t make it elsewhere. […] That also becomes less and less in 
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crafts. And the professions become increasingly specific. And [...] really also 
increasingly demanding.“ 
Beyond that, civil society representative 8 – working with long-term unemployed 
people – described a decreasing engagement of companies for employees, including 
job cuts and outsourcing (cf. also Extract 104). The informant observed a “fight for 
work, for training positions”, leaving behind “weaker people”:  
Extract 108 
„Also the conditions on the first labour market are made so that someone weaker 
doesn’t get in anymore. […] 
That has something to do with large companies simply outsourcing very many 
things, […] that already aggravates the pressure. […] And age-, I think by now […] 
from end 40, 49, 50, has a lot of difficulties to enter anywhere again. Thus many 
applications eliminate themselves due to age. Hence because prognosis: could be 
ill more often, not as […] productive anymore and so on. Experience does not 
matter anymore […]. 
So the togetherness I think, becomes more difficult in the future. […] With the way, 
how the sorting out, the fight for work, for training positions. [...] How this is all 
organised for the youth [...]” (civil society representative 8). 
In conclusion, while the perceived longer-term commitments of employers and 
employees and the willingness to qualify the latter may contribute to social and 
intergenerational justice, growing demands, competition and discrimination likely 
exclude more disadvantaged groups. The cyclicality of companies’ engagement for the 
latter evinces how social justice efforts are economically bounded.  
7.9 Stuttgart: economic growth and intergenerational justice 
7.9.1 The growth imperative 
When asked “What role does economic growth have for future 
generations/the future?”, many interviewees stressed its relevance within the current 
market economy. They invoked that economic growth was a “macrosocially desirable 
model”, played a “great role”, was “very significant” “indispensable”, we “depended” 
on it or that it was “always the motor” and the basis of Stuttgart’s prosperity. It was 
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considered essential for jobs – these again being important for societal cohesion – and 
tax incomes. A politician outlined that the city’s budget and capacities depended on 
future growth. Growth was also described as favouring peace, education, integration 
and enabling citizens by freedom from existential fears to stand up for things. An 
example for this ‘growth imperative’ perspective is:  
   Extract 109 
„[...] [E]conomic growth is actually always needed due to the completely ordinary 
economy. If there is a standstill, that means immediately with jobs loss and so on, 
that means we will always need to grow“ (civil society representative 3).  
Some informants expressed that Stuttgart’s economic growth essentially depended on 
the automotive industry – with the fear of it being left behind in global markets (cf. 
Section 7.9.2).  
Absent growth was seen as problematic for future generations. One informant 
questioned whether democracy would work without economic growth and a few 
found that imagination was lacking about how society would be without growth.  
Moreover, informants qualified which kind of economic growth was desirable. 
One stressed that “real growth” was important, meaning that companies’ profits 
should be invested in the region, that the number of jobs was paramount and not stock 
market values. Another informant emphasised that long-term economic growth 
should take into account ecological and social considerations. However, documents 
and interviewees often rather referred to “economic development” or the “economic 
location” than to “economic growth”.  
7.9.2 Limits of growth? 
Informants also discussed limits of growth. This was inter alia in terms of 
resource use, species extinction, spatial limits and our wealth being based on 
exploiting countries rich in raw materials. While some found that growth and 
sustainability could be reconciled, others saw both in an unsolvable dilemma. 
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Alternatives to a sole growth-orientation such as an economy for the common good 
were suggested. 
Spatial limits to growth were e.g. described by politician 8: 
Extract 110 
„Thus we simply come up against our [spatial] boundaries. But we certainly have 
to do everything, so that companies just also stay here and don’t move away. […] 
And then there actually was such a consideration to say, no, ok, the city is now 
simply at, I don’t know, 600,000 or 550,000 [inhabitants]. Is simply saturated. [...] 
Thus, I believe, say 700,000 or so, that’s completely unrealistic in Stuttgart. My 
perception“.   
Contrary to limiting spatial growth, business representative 6 favoured “intelligent 
solutions” to enable it further: 
Extract 111 
„[...] [I]f one wants to grow, one accordingly […] needs space. And there, one also 
has to see here in Stuttgart that one […] provides this as well. That one can also 
grow further economically. By intelligent solutions. There is actually no need to 
always further build on the surface, but it can also happen upward and downward. 
But one has to think about this as early as possible.” 
Specifically, a number of interviewees expressed that Stuttgart’s future 
depended upon the future of its automotive industry. For instance, civil society 
representative 5 stated: „All the wealth here in Stuttgart is automotive industry”. 
Walter Rogg of Stuttgart Region Economic Development outlines how the region faces 
historical challenges and could either grow further or decline – like the US ‘car city’ 
Detroit (Dalcolmo, 2017): 
„[...] [T]he industries of which we live, [...] [face] the biggest existing challenges 
altogether in history. We have the topic of digitalisation, as industrial revolution, 
we have the topic that the automotive industry has to totally reinvent itself. In the 
area of banks, trade, insurances, many jobs will face a big change or loss through 
digitalisation. We have too little space for the companies, space which is needed 
urgently. We have infrastructure problems with internet connection, we have few 
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professionals, we have far too expensive housing. We are really at a crossroads as 
a growth region and successful economic region. […] It no longer suffices for us, 
particularly not for the children and the future generations. […] And either we deal 
with it today, where we have the possibilities, where we still have enough money, 
have social peace, or do we really first have to wait until the big crises come, the 
large firms leave, big numbers of unemployed emerge. […] 
We have not led the discussion about the limits of growth consequently I think. If 
one had led it consequently, one could already have intervened earlier […]. Today, 
we still have the possibility to reroute, to take into account what the firms need. 
So that our jobs, training positions, tax revenues are good further on. […]” 
(Dalcolmo, 2017). 
Rogg emphasised that companies’ needs should be reacted to – to provide for future 
generations socio-economically, who would otherwise suffer from “great crises”. 
However, also with the low availability of commercial spaces, more companies already 
left Stuttgart than entered it between 2013 and 2016 (Reimers & Fleischer, 2018, p. 
17; Wirtschaftsförderung Region Stuttgart et al., 2017, p. 5). Relatedly, Rogg 
concluded that “[w]e are a victim of the success” (Dalcolmo, 2017) – with this market 
economy’s modes of operation undermining its required conditions (e.g. enough 
resources, commercial and housing space). 
Some interviewees were ambivalent towards continued economic growth. 
One questioned whether ‘green growth’ (cf. Section 2.2.2 a)) was possible; another 
opted for growth via products that did not consume resources and one did not see 
growth ensuring that everyone was better off. Beyond ambivalence, few informants 
wholly dismissed economic growth, seeing the current situation as frustrating, power- 
and helpless and leading to ecological breakdown, e.g.:  
  242 
Extract 112 
„So, I think the system which we have at the moment, of the neoliberalism which 
only depends on growth, growth, growth, doesn’t work, will not work. And that is 
absolutely certain. The only question is: when will the crash come? […] 
So we not only have Peak Oil, but we have Peak Everything. […] 
So the economists who think the ecology was a subsystem of the economy. That is 
a huge deception. The economy is a little subsystem of the nature” (civil society 
representative 5). 
Altogether, economic growth was often considered imperative for present and 
future well-being which was reflected in Stuttgart’s development. Other informants 
rejected economic growth, saw it contradicting sustainability or discussed how far its 
urban limits were reached. Similar to Nottingham, its shorter-term socio-economic 
advantages appear to largely dominate over the seemingly more distant dilemmas it 
implies. 
7.10 Discussion – research question 3 
The following interprets and compares findings with respect to RQ 3, How do 
political and economic interdependencies relate to sustainability?, and the business 
ideal type defined in the chapter’s introduction.  
(Neo-)liberal economic theory understands profit maximisation as companies’ 
sole purpose (cf. Section 7.1). Despite increasing contestation such as through 
heterodox economics, liberal economic theory still dominates the field and has also 
moulded policy-making and discourses. Contrasting with the widespread separation 
into economic, political and social issues (cf. Section 2.2.1), this study empirically-
founded concurs with an economic sociology perspective, viewing ‘state’ and ‘market’ 
as mutually embedded. 
A main conclusion is that Nottingham’s local economy appears more 
disintegrated from local society and politics than Stuttgart’s. This corresponds to my 
overall observation that it assumes lesser according obligations – making 
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Nottingham’s regime socio-economically less sustainable and exhibiting a more 
neoliberal understanding of economic life. I explain this in the section’s remainder.  
Structurally, these differences likely correlate with the withdrawal of some 
large employers from Nottingham and thereby a diminished role which the local 
economy could assume. By contrast, this has barely happened in Stuttgart where 
economic interests seem more decisive for local developments. Relatedly, 
Nottingham’s labour market appears relatively polarised with a limited number of 
well-paid jobs requiring higher qualifications and large sections of low productivity and 
low wage work. There are a strong reliance on public sector jobs, few larger companies 
or the student economy. Conversely, Stuttgart is still strongly industrialised with a 
comparatively large proportion of highly paid, high value jobs in the private sector.  As 
factors keeping them in their places, companies in Stuttgart emphasised the cluster of 
businesses and institutions in automotive or engineering, including in education and 
research, expertise and qualified employees as well as firm’s local traditions. In 
Nottingham, the value of employees, strong local and historical ties were stressed, 
while clusters were of lesser relevance.   
Perceptions in Stuttgart reflect corporatism and major companies holding 
considerable informal power in the city – with politics across parties largely 
accommodating it in main developments. Economic interests were thereby described 
as often informally promoted and partly internalised by politicians – rather than 
colliding in conflicts – who recognised how Stuttgart’s prosperity depended upon the 
local economy. The paradigmatic within-case of air pollution regulation exemplifies 
this, particularly through a constrained rule of law (i.e. not respecting legal pollution 
thresholds). Communication between companies and politics/administration was 
reported to be often close and confident. In contrast, economic actors’ impact on 
Nottingham policies was described as markedly weaker, also as they were in some 
significant cases enforced against businesses’ interests. Relations and cooperation 
between city council and businesses were partly viewed as conducive; and partly as 
clouded, removed and marked by eroded communication and trust, as in the case of 
Boots. Some saw both sectors’ logics and ways of working as disparate.  
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While businesses in Nottingham and Stuttgart undoubtedly seek profits, they 
also do other things which do not appear nor were described as most effective ways 
to maximise profits. These partly relate to societal conventions and 
interdependencies, such as the qualification of apprentices and employees, benefits 
for them, their dependents or wider society, the foundation of charities or the pursuit 
of local projects. Companies thereby also act and understand themselves as societal 
entities which contradicts Friedman’s Doctrine of a ‘free’ economy, where businesses’ 
only social responsibility is to increase its profits (Mayer, 2018, p. 7). Informants’ views 
and empirical instances reflect that Stuttgart’s local economy takes on a more 
comprehensive societal role than Nottingham’s, which thereby appears more 
neoliberalised – though I have not found comparative quantifying urban data. This 
manifests in an often lower – systemic – commitment to qualify and hold (local) 
people, in a seemingly higher financial volume of firms’ societal investments or the 
stronger belief of local actors in companies’ spatial loyalty in Stuttgart than in 
Nottingham. These differences partly comply with a more shared provision of public 
goods, higher levels of trust and mutuality between public sector and economy in 
Germany’s coordinated than in the UK’s liberal market economy (Hall & Soskice, 2001). 
In capitalist systems where majorities (indirectly) depend on paid labour, conventions 
of a more coordinated market economy appear socio-economically more sustainable 
than those of the more competitive liberal form. While both regimes converge slightly 
in that companies’ local ties partly weakened with globalisation, local conditions and 
conventions still differ markedly. 
Oppositely, environmental and pollution protection was in a number of 
instances more ambitious and effective in Nottingham than in Stuttgart. However, 
deindustrialisation and widespread deprivation might confine materially more 
expansive practices in Nottingham. Such an outcome appears less likely in Stuttgart’s 
wealthier and more equal society. Despite some discomfort, problems of sustainability 
and lacking space in Stuttgart, economic growth remained without alternative to 
provide for future generations in both places.  
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I conclude that considering local economies as differently embedded in local 
societies is more empirically accurate than assuming a sole liberal profit orientation 
across capitalist configurations. Besides pursuing profits, such an understanding 
includes companies’ varying roles in providing livelihoods, public goods and as places 
of social interaction and recognition. Coincidingly, Mayer (2018, p. 8) states that  
“[p]resuming that corporate purpose is simply profits potentially creates too great 
a divide between private interests of shareholders and those of society at large. 
Equating it with social purpose unduly restricts the corporate purpose to those 
determined by social interests. Determining where they should correspond and can 
deviate is a fundamental consideration that has received inadequate attention to 
date […].”  
This comparative study illustrates instances where a stronger societal embeddedness 
of ‘the economy’ appears socio-economically more sustainable. It suggests that for an 
according recalibration, values of mutuality, fairness and trust would be central. In 
more detail and to help “address many of the major environmental, political and social 
issues of the 21st century”, Mayer (2018, p. 5), argues for an approach 
“[…] that emphasizes the role of corporate purpose, commitments, trustworthiness 
and culture in which companies specify their purposes, clarify their associated 
commitments and demonstrate how their ownership, governance, performance 
measurement and management enable them to fulfil their obligations” (Mayer, 
2018, p. 5). 
Besides and corresponding with this research, Collier (2019) suggests to address the 
“derailments of capitalism” – inter alia increasing spatial inequalities – with the 
creation of knowledge clusters in towns and taxing successful centres.  
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8 Comparison and conclusion: the co-production of 
policies and social order in two governance regimes 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter compares governance in Nottingham and Stuttgart in relation to 
sustainability and explains divergence. Besides, it considers limitations of this study 
and its research and practical implications. Arguments are normative from the 
viewpoints of social and intergenerational justice (as defined in Section 2.2.3). The 
interpretive co-production lens directs attention to how social order with its power 
structures, values and moralities is simultaneously co-constructed with policies, their 
making and related reason and how both influence each other.  
I address some questions emerging through the comparison, e.g.: Why do 
policy approaches focus more on individual behaviours in Nottingham and more on 
(infra-)structures in Stuttgart? Why are policy objectives in Nottingham more often 
measurable and monitored, while they are more developmental in Stuttgart? Why are 
policies and practices in Nottingham partly more environmentally progressive than in 
Stuttgart? Why did moves towards market-principles yield different developments in 
both places? 
Building on the comparative case study’s findings, Section 8.2 interprets how 
the governance regimes approximate and deviate from the initially assumed ideal 
types and how they constitute two specific variations of democratic capitalism. 
Sections 8.3, 8.4 and 8.5 explain selected diverging aspects of how policies and social 
order interact in both regimes (RQ 4). They are thematically organised along the three 
preceding empirical chapters and concluded on in Section 8.6. The chapter’s 
remainder focuses on limitations (Section 8.7), research implications (Section 8.8), 
practical and policy ramifications (Section 8.9).  
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8.2 Interpreting governance regimes 
This section interprets Nottingham’s and Stuttgart’s governance regimes 
altogether. It emanates from the assumed ideal types of NPM for Nottingham, 
embedded in a liberal welfare state and market economy; and of a Weberian 
bureaucracy for Stuttgart, embedded in a conservative-corporatist welfare state and 
a coordinated market economy (cf. Chapter 3). I explore how the empirical cases 
converge – or not – with the ideal types or typologies and draw on further governance 
concepts which help understanding the cases.  
Section 8.2.1 addresses urban governance, while I discuss welfare state and 
market economy contexts in Section 8.2.2. However, as this is an in-depth-study of 
two cases, its focus is not to develop a governance typology capturing a great number 
of cases (such as DiGaetano & Strom, 2003; Pierre, 1999) – which is more purposefully 
generated on a larger-n basis –, but to gain insights about broader phenomena by 
understanding how policies and social order are co-produced in the two cases.  
8.2.1 Urban governance regimes 
a) Nottingham 
Governance in Nottingham resonates in numerous instances with the business- 
and market-oriented NPM as its initial ideal type (described in Sections 3.3.4 b) and 
3.3.5 a)). Nottingham approaches a minimal state vision in being increasingly confined 
to its statutory duties through governmental policies. Also, competition, market and 
business principles are applied to the local state. In relation to NPM’s external 
dimension, tasks between the state and the market have been redistributed in terms 
of favouring market-mechanisms which the state enables. This was mostly 
government-led since the 1980s and includes privatisations (water, gas and electricity 
supply), ‘quasi-markets’ (public transport), commercialisation and bidding for funding, 
i.e. competition, among local authorities. Nottingham City Council adopts this in 
successfully bidding and commercialising some of its services. At the same time, 
privatisation and marketisation are also widely resented and partly circumvent in 
Nottingham with public assets, infrastructures and services deliberately being kept 
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public as far as possible (bus system), instated publicly (Robin Hood Energy – collapsed 
in 2020) or regulated above national standards (private renting: Selective Licensing 
Scheme). Reasons of the city council for these measures are their empirical inefficiency 
and social injustice. These market mechanisms were not perceived to empower 
citizens, as NPM assumes. While the local state largely attempts to provide an enabling 
environment for the market – as assumed in NPM – its efforts are only partly 
successful. They are restricted by structural devaluations in terms of averagely difficult 
living conditions, low educational attainment and skills and thereby partly low margins 
for businesses.  
Regarding NPM’s internal dimension, many private sector management 
principles have been transferred to Nottingham’s public sector. Such managerial 
attributes partly stem from government requirements, including controlling, 
performance measure- and management (with budgeting by departments) and 
partnership approaches. Enabling network governance also conforms to governance 
theory. Entrepreneurial forms of governance are present in a number of strategies and 
plans, inter alia as measurable objectives with defined time-frames and 
responsibilities for implementation. Though some of the according regulations have 
later been repealed, informants explained that the approaches were partly useful and 
therefore further pursued in Nottingham. Government also promoted administrative 
decentralisation through agencies, quangos, etc., thereby significantly weakening 
steering capacities of local authorities (cf. Section 3.3.5 a)). Value for money and 
service orientation towards its ‘clients’ are primary concerns of the council and e.g. 
polled in the citizens’ survey (cf. Section 6.3.1) – possibly relating to government’s 
austerity measures. However, the NPM assumption of a separation of politics and 
management in governing does not hold true in Nottingham. Finally, its urban 
‘bureaucrats’ often appear as competitive employees (NPM) and as mediators and 
networkers (governance theory). Overall and in line with national developments, the 
NPM ideal type suits the Nottingham case in many ways, while local counteraction to 
marketisation deviates from it. The case also resonates with assumptions of 
governance theory, but barely those of an ‘old public administration’ (cf. Table 2). 
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However, some NPM assumptions hardly materialise in Nottingham and 
appear overly optimistic or not applicable to an accordingly ‘peripheral’ and devalued 
place. This is the case for the workings of competition, the local state as market-
enabler, democracy and power (cf. Table 2). Limitations to the two former are 
described above. Third, NPM theorises democracy as an aggregation of individual 
preferences defined by politicians. The First-past-the-post voting system significantly 
diminishes the plurality of such an aggregation. Also, the recent (2019) electoral 
turnout in local elections of less than a third, partial political apathy and the high 
power gap between an average member of the public and policy developers speak for 
an accordingly limited effectiveness of Nottingham’s local democracy. Fourthly, 
contrary to the NPM assumption that power is dispersed through the market and 
therefore unproblematic, questions of power are in fact crucial to governance in 
Nottingham. It was the lack of power through centralisation which impeded the city 
council to shape local government policies differently; and lacking power of many 
Nottingham citizens to seek more favourable living conditions in contrast to wealthier 
people and places. The impact of government policies in Nottingham may be captured 
through a thesis Wacquant (2012, p. 66) puts forth to understand the neoliberal state 
transformation, drawing on Bourdieu’s concept of bureaucratic fields. He argues that 
neoliberalism entails a tilting of the space of bureaucratic agencies defining and 
distributing public goods in favour of “a Centaur‐state that practises liberalism at the 
top of the class structure and punitive paternalism at the bottom”. Correspondingly, 
public provision has been hollowed out increasingly and paternalistic views towards 
the more disadvantaged e.g. materialise in interpretations of inequality (cf. Section 
7.8.2) or stigmatisation, e.g. regarding begging (BBC News, 2016) – thus reinforcing an 
increasingly unequal social order. In these respects, a neoliberal policy regime and a 
neoliberal social order mutually stabilise and condition one another. 
While NPM does not cover Nottingham’s tendency to counteract privatisation, 
the welfare model of urban governance (Pierre, 1999) helps to further differentiate 
Nottingham’s regime. It resembles the welfare model in terms of being an old 
industrial city with severe problems of economic restructuring and limited 
regeneration. “This made [...] [these cities] dependent on governmental spending to 
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maintain individual and collective existence at a subsistence level” (Gurr & King, 1987, 
p. 200; as cited in Pierre, 1999, p. 386). With its predominance of and dependence on 
public sector institutions and employers (cf. Section 3.4.1c)), this applies to 
Nottingham. However, a subsistence level seems to be reached less and less with a 
declining life expectancy. Also, the formation of leftist and progressive policies in the 
welfare model resonates with Nottingham. Nonetheless, in contrast to the welfare 
model, the city clearly aims at economic growth and business support; and a primary 
use of intergovernmental contacts does not appear fruitful, given significant 
discrepancies with central government (Pierre, 1999, pp. 385–387).  
Furthermore, Peterson (1981) suggests that cities would pursue 
developmental and not redistributive goals because they would ‘die’ if they could not 
retain mobile businesses and residents. While many Nottingham citizens are barely in 
the position to choose their place of residence over its attractiveness, they however 
enjoy a better public infrastructure than they would in many British cities. In this, 
Mossberger’s (2009, p. 41) explanation that more generous social policies would 
attract poor people and repel businesses and affluent residents to avoid high taxes 
partially applies to Nottingham, also with one of the highest Council Tax rates in the 
UK and views expressed in interviews that businesses would partly prefer to locate at 
places with higher educational attainment and skill bases. Though consequences of 
such tendencies in terms of a lower tax base and higher spending needs were 
sometimes problematised, this logic of displacement has not been applied by 
Nottingham City Council in favour of more socially just policies.  
Altogether, Nottingham’s governance regime exhibits many NPM 
characteristics, but NPM’s core assumptions barely materialise. From this cases’ 
perspective, NPM’s normative presumptions therefore appear flawed. The regime is 
further qualified by the welfare model of urban governance, governance theory and 
trade-offs between developmental and redistributive goals. 
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b) Stuttgart 
Stuttgart’s governance regime partly overlaps with its initially assumed ideal 
type, the Weberian bureaucracy (cf. Sections 3.3.4 a) and 3.3.5 b)). Though formal 
power over many decisions and processes is with the city council – thus resting on 
legal authority as central to the Weberian bureaucracy –, evidence speaks for also 
locating it in coordination, a certain economic primacy and citizens’ impact. First, 
coordination across sectors, political parties and between politics and administration 
was often described as important in Stuttgart to decide on priorities and to build 
consensus. This specifically materialises in terms of a relatively ‘coordinated’ market 
economy (cf. next Section), where informants appreciate fundamental dependencies 
between public and economic sectors. While the local state steers, controls and 
provides many public goods and services, it also offers an enabling environment for 
the market. On these grounds, the local state’s role appears as a hybrid of a Weberian 
bureaucracy and NPM. Second, a certain economic primacy manifests in Stuttgart 
where economic interests dominated over environmental and health protection as in 
the cases of air pollution, continuing growth and land use (cf. also Section 8.5.1). 
Finally, in some crucial instances citizens contested the city council’s legal authority, 
e.g. in the cases of Stuttgart 21 or air pollution. Altogether, power in Stuttgart’s 
governance is only to an extent “identifiable, visible and located in the centre of 
government” (Kjær, 2009, p. 139), as the Weberian bureaucracy implies. Conversely, 
power is also constructed and reconstructed in formal and informal exchanges of 
actors from different sectors; and thus partly not easily identifiable. This also to an 
extent takes power out of democratic control, thereby again deviating from the 
Weberian bureaucracy.  
Further discrepancies to the ideal type exist in relation to its view of the urban 
bureaucrat as a neutral implementer of decisions taken by the city council, working in 
steep hierarchies with marginal scope of action. The empirical partly exhibits 
negotiating scope of administrative employees and transformations of hierarchies 
taking place, as was the case with the NSM introduction (German NPM version). With 
input-oriented budgeting and resource management as well as the according 
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reporting being characteristic to the Weberian bureaucracy, NSM established some 
elements of an output orientation in Stuttgart. These are a partial reporting system, 
including performance indicators separated into departments, product groups, 
objectives and measures. While this enables more financial control, direct output 
steering and contract management have been abandoned (cf. Section 6.4.1). 
Overall, the Weberian bureaucracy ideal type suits the Stuttgart case in some 
ways and helps understanding its provenance. This is in terms of input-oriented 
budgeting, management by resources, a developmental policy orientation and NSM 
reforms building on these. However, the Weberian bureaucracy does not adequately 
characterise its locus of power, cooperative and participative traits (no clear 
separation between politics and administration; public and private spheres), nor its 
moves, reversals and remnants of NPM-inspired reform. As in Germany, a paradigm 
shift to a managerial NSM stayed out in Stuttgart nonetheless. Besides, the Stuttgart 
case resonates with governance theory (cf. Table 2) in terms of coordination and 
participation of various actors, partly making the urban state less of a ‘steerer’ than a 
mediator. Power is then to an extent shared in consensus-building networks. 
Notwithstanding, Stuttgart differs from a more ‘networked’ governance by mostly 
retaining its capacities as an initiator and implementer. Democracy in Stuttgart 
appears to be substantially secured through the municipal council, constituted via the 
competitive local elections with a participation rate of over 55% in 2019; but amended 
by participation of multiple actors, especially with a civic culture of – partly effective – 
contestation. Relatedly, some actors perceived local democracy as undermined by 
economic primacy. The case thereby combines assumptions about democracy of the 
Weberian bureaucracy and governance theory. In sum, the Stuttgart case cannot be 
assigned essentially to the Weberian bureaucracy; neither to NPM nor to governance 
theory, as it shows characteristics of all three. I therefore do not examine it against 
one model’s assumptions (cf. Table 2), as with NPM for Nottingham (cf. Section 8.2.1 
a)).   
The ‘Neo-Weberian State’ describes hybrid governance forms emerging 
through Weberian local administrations adopting NPM elements and their partial 
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reversal (Kuhlmann & Bogumil, 2019; originally: Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017). The 
concept, described in Section 3.3.5 b), helps to contextualise and further interpret the 
Stuttgart case. Overall, Kuhlmann & Bogumil (2019, pp. 10–11) conclude that a new 
‘Neo-Weberian’ administrative model has not yet developed in Germany and that the 
emerging ambivalent picture requires empirical exploration – to which this study 
contributes. However, they describe shared traits of a Neo-Weberian State. Stuttgart 
exhibits all its ‘Weberian’ elements: the state’s central role in solving new complex 
problems, continued relevance of representative democracy to legitimise government 
action, the importance of administrative law in grounding state action, legal certainty 
and the preservation of a civil service with a specific status and conditions (Kuhlmann 
& Bogumil, 2019, p. 2). Also, the concepts’ main ‘neo’ elements occur in Stuttgart: an 
increased external, results- and citizen-orientation instead of an internal rule-
orientation only through a new service culture; expanding citizen participation; and 
city council employees/civil servants becoming more citizens-oriented besides their 
legal and administrative expertise (Kuhlmann & Bogumil, 2019, pp. 2–3). The Neo-
Weberian State can thereby also serve as a normative reform model, combining 
legality with productivity, results- and customer-orientation. However, Stuttgart’s 
trajectory is certainly not teleological towards a Neo-Weberian State, as the external 
governance dimension illustrates. This appears as following a discursive hegemony of 
modernisation through NPM approaches – and/or budget pressures –, subsequent 
learning, some backpedalling, correction of certain elements and retention of others 
(‘NPM-return’; Kuhlmann & Bogumil, 2019, p. 5). The latter could be adopted 
successfully and linked to the prevailing legalist practice (e.g. citizen participation), 
while others did not suit it well. Also, some elements did not fit Stuttgart’s fabric of 
marked political competition (e.g. measurable objectives and relating accountability, 
cf. Section 6.4.1). These incoherences partly explain observable malfunctions. Returns 
from NPM elements were also initiated to re-gain steering capacity (Kuhlmann & 
Bogumil, 2019, p. 5) – being pronounced in the Weberian tradition – and after public 
pressure (e.g. re-communalisation, repurchase and insourcing of local public services 
and assets; cf. Section 5.7.4). Herein, Stuttgart is a significant exemplar, moving from 
a relatively enthusiastic ‘NSM-pioneer’ and most comprehensive urban privatiser in 
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Germany with increasing experience towards re-valuing traditionally more 
‘continental European’ administrative practices. I agree with Kuhlmann & Bogumil 
(2019, p. 6), who interpret these ‘NPM reversals’ as learning curves and administrative 
resilience. They (2019, p. 5) argue that these context-sensitive adaptations after NSM 
reforms in German local authorities proved to be more stable and sustainable than the 
radical policy changes in British public administration. My comparative observations 
support this for Nottingham and Stuttgart. Besides, I argue that NPM expresses lower 
levels of trust towards politics and administration than previous governance modes, 
since its principles embody attempts to establish control, e.g. through measurement 
and monitoring. 
Overall, the Neo-Weberian State captures Stuttgart’s governance regime 
better than the Weberian bureaucracy, as a ‘middle-way’ between the latter and NPM 
– but barely represents its overlaps with governance theory.  
8.2.2 Capitalist welfare state and market economy types 
Proceeding to the level of welfare states and market economies, I subsequently 
relate the cases to Esping-Andersen’s (1990) and Hall & Soskice’s (2001) respective 
conceptions (cf. Section 3.2).  
The UK case of a liberal welfare state seems to have pushed its principles far, 
to a point of regressing human development in terms of average population welfare. 
This relates to decreasing de-commodification and containing the scope of social rights 
during a decade of austerity. Nottingham illustrates this well, being an extreme case 
on the end of poverty in the UK. It shows how eroded state-organised solidarities and 
a nationally increased market-rule counter socio-economic aspects of social and 
intergenerational justice. Co-produced with the welfare state’s dismantling are 
increasing societal power asymmetries and diverging experiential worlds, which again 
relate to growing stigmatisation, authoritarianism towards and dehumanisation of 
disadvantaged groups (Tyler, 2020). With Stuttgart (still?) representing the prosperous 
end of a German conservative-corporatist welfare state, the stronger emphasis on de-
commodification and communitarian values promotes – in line with the initial 
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expectation – more socio-economically sustainable policies on a national level. 
Countering the typology’s expectation, the German welfare state however appears 
less class- and status-preserving with its higher provision than the contemporary 
British liberal one, despite the latter’s progressive and egalitarian residencies (Castles 
& Mitchell, 1992, p. 20). These retrenchments happen in a welfare state partly built 
upon appropriations as part of Empire (Holmwood, 2000). Their dissolving also links to 
the industrial and socio-economic decline which particularly concerns places like 
Nottingham.  
Conversely, how far may the German welfare state follow an ‘Anglo-American’ 
liberalising path, as the ‘stages’ of capitalism approach suggests? German pension, 
labour market and social security policies have moved towards the liberal welfare 
state model (Knuth, 2014, p. 5; Seeleib‐Kaiser, 2016, p. 235) and inequalities widened. 
I observed a certain cultural appreciation of a more Anglo-American ‘soft capitalism’ 
(Thrift, 2005, p. 20), e.g. in terms of entrepreneurship, fast innovation or individualistic 
values. However, there was distancing from neoliberal business practices in both 
Nottingham and Stuttgart in interviews and documents (e.g. in favour of more 
“sustainable” ones, cf. Extract 100). Also, both cases evince returns to state-solutions 
in public provision (being nationally restricted in Nottingham). In the German debate, 
there is some apprehension regarding surging inequalities in more liberal capitalism 
and in relation to ‘Brexit’.60 This might indicate a certain re-orientation to the German 
welfare state’s more preserving, coordinated institutional arrangements and related 
values. However, similar criticism exists in the UK, suggesting that the split in relating 
views goes through both countries – but appears more polarised in the UK. Reversals 
of more neoliberal policies often emanated from learning through own experiences or 
observing others’ examples. Diverging policy reversions and insistences occurred 
despite similar tendencies in contemporary capitalism, e.g. in terms of pressures of 
globalisation or rising inequalities. While the existence of broadly similar struggles 
                                                     
60 Relatedly, I hold that rapid, politically-driven deindustrialisation moves with no or little compensation 
as in the cases of mining in the Midlands or through ‘Brexit’ are unlikely in Germany’s more corporatist 
structures with a stronger economic primacy. 
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supports a ‘phases’ view of capitalism, their differential course speaks more for 
capitalist ‘varieties’, in which actors prefer to preserve existing structures for their 
known equilibria and expectations (Fioretos, 2001, p. 220). Concludingly, elements of 
both approaches help interpreting the cases (cf. also Section 8.3.4).  
The ‘liberal’ (UK) and ‘coordinated’ (Germany) market economy types resonate 
with many of the cases’ findings (cf. Section 7.10). For instance, this concerns higher 
inequalities of the British labour market, along with shorter-term profit expectations 
and economic action. Companies tended to ‘dissociate’ themselves more from 
Nottingham’s society than in Stuttgart, e.g. in terms of providing quasi ‘public goods’. 
The German coordinated market economy appears more socio-economically 
sustainable through its longer-term financing, lesser labour market inequalities, 
stronger unions and often an investment in quasi ‘public goods’. Stuttgart’s regime 
thereby co-exists with more collectivist values and a certain structural conservativism, 
whereas individual performance, responsibility and rapid change are more prevalent 
in Nottingham’s. Overall, economic and societal responsibility seem more shared in 
Stuttgart with a closer coordination of political and economic actors than in 
Nottingham. Also, the Stuttgart case does not support a contradiction between 
creating an enabling environment for the market and distributive policies, which the 
Anglo-American governance literature partly establishes (e.g. Swanstrom, Todd, 
1985). I argue that this is due to the diverging logics of a liberal and a coordinated 
market economy. Actors in the latter, also of civil society, are aware that in their 
governance set-up, economic development often enables – and not only competes 
with – distributive measures. The dichotomy materialises stronger in Nottingham’s 
more neoliberalised context and partially parallels party-political cleavages. 
Consequentially, I suggest that local economic interests are in fact more internalised 
by many actors in the corporatist Stuttgart/German case than in the liberal 
Nottingham/UK one – although governance in the British case appears more market-
oriented. However, this neoliberal sense of ‘market’ is less concerned with the city’s 
broader development – which distinguishes it from Stuttgart’s more embedded view 
of a ‘social market economy’. Neoliberalism and NPM therefore fit the German 
understanding of urban governance less than the British and reflect geographical foci 
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of governance research. Where Wittrock & Wagner (1996, p. 107) observe “deep-
seated intellectual differences” between Anglo-American and European welfare states 
in the co-emergence of social knowledge and social policy (cf. Section 2.3.2 b)), I have 
shown that such differences similarly exist in the co-production of governance 
research and practices of the urban state and market. 
Supporting the ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach historically, Piore and Sabel 
(1986) explain the varying institutional structures of the US and Germany in terms of 
labour relations, corporate structure, state regulation and international trade as 
responses to the requirements of mass-production (US) or the retention of craft 
production elements (Germany). They argue that in Germany, this has led to a stronger 
emphasis on collaboration and paternalism, community, local and regional 
development and small-scale institutions – whilst mass production in the US inter alia 
promoted managerial control (Taylorism) and the creation of internal labour markets 
(Brody, 1985). This also has explanatory power for the British and the German cases, 
where these differences similarly materialise – along with a higher significance of 
crafts and apprenticeships in Stuttgart.  
8.3 Policy approaches – research question 4 
While Section 5.8 summarised Chapter 5’s findings in relation to RQ 1, How do 
policy approaches relate to sustainability?, this section deepens the comparison of 
selected according aspects and addresses RQ 4: How far can a co-production of policies 
and social order explain divergence? This correspondingly applies to Sections 8.4 and 
8.5. 
8.3.1 Individualism/collectivism and state-society relations 
Comparing the documents analysed in Sections 5.2 and 5.5, policy areas and 
issues to which they are assigned diverge strikingly between Nottingham and 
Stuttgart. Where in Nottingham issues of health, health-associated behaviours and 
social problems are accordingly salient, in Stuttgart the natural and built environment 
are most important. Consistent with NPM principles, public efforts thereby focus more 
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on individual level issues in Nottingham than in Stuttgart, where (infra-)structural 
approaches prevail. Correspondingly, more responsibility for change to the better is 
located at individuals in Nottingham, whereas it appears more as a collective task in 
Stuttgart; where individual behaviour change is rarely demanded. For example, the 
aim to change individual behaviours occurs in Nottingham documents on teenage 
pregnancies, breastfeeding, weight, alcohol, smoking and mental health. This also 
relates to its partial ‘nanny state’ approach. By contrast, none of the Stuttgart 
documents nor significant sections within them are dedicated to these named issues. 
Also, disadvantaged groups are barely being targeted nor markedly higher 
expectations raised towards them, as is the case in Nottingham (cf. Section 5.2.2 a)).  
What issues urban strategies deal with – or not – expresses power as agenda 
setting (Lukes, 1974) (cf. Section 3.3.1). At first, both cities’ politicians and 
administrations are in principle free to define policy problems more individually or 
more collectively. One could then assume that the cities’ diverging problem definitions 
relate to varying problem pressures. Indeed, this seems to be case for teenage 
pregnancies which are probably much more seldom in Stuttgart than in Nottingham.61 
However, this ‘reason-based’ explanation does not hold for some issues. For instance, 
local and national figures suggest a similar or lower alcohol consumption in 
Nottingham/UK than in Stuttgart/Germany62 – yet only Nottingham pursues an alcohol 
strategy. This illustrates how ‘objective’ problem pressures have diverging policy 
implications in both regimes which gives insights into their social orders. Accordingly, 
it appears less common for policy developers in Stuttgart to advise citizens on how to 
                                                     
61 Comparative urban frequencies of teenage pregnancies may be approximated as follows. In 
Nottingham, there are 152 conceptions in the 15- to 17-year-old age group in 2015 (Cann-Livingstone, 
2017, p. 3), that is ca. 48.4 per 100,000 inhabitants (UK Population 2016, 2018; own calculation). 
Contrarily in Baden-Württemberg, there are 337 live births of women under 18 years old in 2015 
(Brachat-Schwarz, 2017, p. 8), that is ca. 3.1 per 100,000 inhabitants (Statista, 2019; own calculation). 
62 Alcohol consumption in the UK is averagely 11.4 litres per capita in 2016 and over 12 litres in Germany 
(Drinkaware, 2019). To approximate, self-reported (citizens’ survey) data for Nottingham of 2012-2014 
suggest that around 10% of the population drink at levels which have a greater risk for their health, 
resonating with estimates by Public Health England in 2014 of 7% of Nottingham’s population being 
higher-risk drinkers (Keenan et al., 2015, p. 11). Based on Stuttgart’s 2011 citizens’ survey, 28% of men 
and 21% of women have a risky alcohol consumption (Erb et al., 2012, p. 412). 
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conduct oneself than in Nottingham. This again resonates with greater power gaps and 
inequalities between both groups in Nottingham than in Stuttgart (cf. Sections 6.3.3 
and 6.5.3). Interacting with governance in Stuttgart are then a less polarised state-
society relationship, a stronger collectivism, possibly a view that health-related 
behaviours are more private and a lesser questioning of conventional practices such 
as smoking or drinking alcohol than in Nottingham. 
Correspondingly, Ulrich Beck characterises individualisation as a long-term 
tendency in modernised societies where people increasingly engage with the intimate 
and more public aspects of their lives – which were previously governed by taken-for-
granted norms (Beck, 1997; Elliott, 2008, p. 290). The above identified differences 
between the cities can be related to a further progressed individualisation in 
Nottingham than in Stuttgart. Individualisation in Nottingham involves a power 
asymmetry where such an increasing engagement is suggested by more powerful to 
less powerful members of society. The ensuing behavioural approaches partly neglect 
wider structural conditions and thereby to an extent make the latter responsible for 
the ‘social problems’ they experience. This exemplifies Straßheim & Korinek’s (2016) 
finding that behavioural governance became most influential in the UK with an 
imagined future – by government – turning “societies into highly individualized states 
of mind” where citizens should make better decisions in a much smaller and smarter 
state (Straßheim & Korinek, 2016, pp. 121–122), cf. Footnote 23. Contrary to this 
expectation, the Nottingham case demonstrates how such a progressed 
individualisation obstructs social and intergenerational justice. This is as excessive 
demands on groups who often lack adequate resources to meet them and as a 
rationalisation of socio-economic decline through assumed individual responsibility 
and stigmatisation. These phenomena did not occur comparably in Stuttgart. I 
therefore suggest that a lesser belief in individual responsibility and lesser inequalities 
in Stuttgart than in Nottingham are co-produced with and partly explain Stuttgart’s 
more collectivist policy approaches – which in this capacity are more socially and 
intergenerationally just than Nottingham’s more individualising ones. More collectivist 
or individualistic policy approaches in turn underpin prevailing values in a place.  
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8.3.2 Civic epistemologies: co-producing knowledge, policies and social order 
‘Civic epistemologies’ capture “the social and institutional practices by which 
polities construct, evaluate and utilize politically relevant knowledge” (Hilgartner et 
al., 2015, p. 7), cf. also Section 2.3.1 b). This culturally specific knowledge (Miller, 2008, 
p. 1900) “shapes and is shaped by the social and political context in which it is made – 
used by democratic societies in turn to defend, legitimize and critique the exercise of 
power in democratic societies (Ezrahi, 1990)“ (Miller, 2015b, p. 202). In their 
comparison, I suggest that Nottingham exhibits an ‘individualising’ and Stuttgart a 
‘collectivist’ civic epistemology. Carving these out contributes to knowing both 
governance regimes; and shows how both cities’ governance and welfare state 
regimes express these civic epistemologies. Subsequently, I discuss this in relation to 
how policies and employed data interact, using smoking as an example; reflect on 
according anthropological assumptions; and outline the two civic epistemologies. 
In tendency, individualisation in Nottingham is intertwined with a recourse to 
geographically fine-grained behavioural data, such as about breastfeeding (cf. Section 
5.2.2 b)). By contrast in Germany, these data partly do not exist at a city nor a sub-city 
level. For instance, there are no consistent local breastfeeding data (Bundesinstitut für 
Risikobewertung, 2018) nor general performance rankings of schools. Besides, city 
level data partially cannot be used or are not being used for monitoring nor to base 
policies on (e.g. teenage pragnancies: Brachat-Schwarz, 2017). Finally, I notice a rarer 
recourse to data for comparing Stuttgart’s standing nationally or internationally than 
in Nottingham. Therefore, data regulation, production and use are also indicative of 
what constitutes politically relevant knowledge. This is e.g. in terms of what should be 
monitored; or how far behaviours should be attributable to those exhibiting them. If 
policies are then based on certain knowledges, these are functioned as instruments of 
power. This interpretation partially resembles Foucault’s idea of ‘governmentality’, 
allowing the exercise of a specific form of power “which has as its target population, 
as its principal form of knowledge, political economy, and as its essential technical 
means, apparatuses of security” (Foucault et al., 1991, pp. 102–103). 
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Smoking provides an example for the distinct institutional practices of co-
producing policies and social order. With no dedicated plan nor measurable objective 
on smoking in Stuttgart, efforts appear less targeted and encompassing than in 
Nottingham. However, measures to reduce the harmful impact of smoking are 
pursued: regulation on protecting non-smokers and tobacco control measures have 
been significantly intensified in the last years and there are awareness-raising 
measures in schools and help in smoking cessation (Gesundheitsamt Stuttgart, 2008; 
Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, n.d.-l). Conversely, the Nottingham Plan 2010-2020 set 
the aim to “[r]educe the proportion of adults who smoke to 20% by 2020” and a key 
principle of the Tobacco Control Strategy 2015-2020 is to promote non-smoking as the 
social norm, thereby “[i]nspiring Nottingham’s smokefree generation” (Nottingham 
City Council, n.d.-b, pp. 22; 1). Similar patterns exist in other policy areas: an ambitious, 
prescriptive and more behavioural-individual approach in Nottingham and a less 
interfering, partly more conservative approach in Stuttgart, where smoking barely 
appears as a primary urban problem. Both approaches illustrate diverging views of 
citizens in society: one emphasising that individuals make choices which should be 
improved in Nottingham and one rather depicting smoking as a practice occurring in 
society which should be reduced, but not necessarily ended through municipal efforts 
in Stuttgart.  
In aiming for individual behaviour change, policy approaches in Nottingham are 
more paternalistic towards citizens than in Stuttgart. I suggest that this is again 
associated with more unequal state-society relations, more control of and lower trust 
towards citizens. It is expressed in the practice of setting behavioural targets with 
time-frames, measuring and working towards them. By contrast, less polarised state-
society relations underlie Stuttgart’s behaviourally more conservative, incremental, 
often less ambitious and less targeted policy approaches.  
In summary, Nottingham’s ‘individualising’ civic epistemology is marked by 
behavioural and individual-level foci in how policy-relevant knowledge is generated, 
interpreted and used. Public policy in turn should be ‘evidence-based’. The civic 
epistemology is further characterised by a measurement- and audit-culture (e.g. 
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Power, 1999), comparisons and competition, often due to governmental practices – 
thereby being closer to a “modernist paradigm of scientific rationalization and control” 
(Jasanoff, 2005, p. 41) than Stuttgart’s regime; a need for individual action, sometimes 
linked to stigmatising disadvantaged groups; the setting of measurable objectives tied 
to generated data; foci on transparency and data accessibility. This importantly 
describes a tendency of political and institutional practices in Nottingham – and not of 
its entire society. 
Stuttgart’s ‘collectivist’ civic epistemology exhibits a (legally) more restricted 
use of behavioural data. Policies are less often ‘evidence-based’ and instead stem 
more from conventional practices, values and ideas – though monitoring increases. 
Urban data are only partly publicly available and sometimes sold by the city’s statistical 
office. In comparison to Nottingham, health-related issues remain more in the private 
sphere of the citizen and disadvantaged groups are barely being stigmatised. This 
knowledge is co-produced with more collectivist debates, often developmental 
objectives, and consensus-seeking across governance levels, political parties and 
sectors.  
Concludingly, I propose that Nottingham’s ‘individualising’ civic epistemology 
furthers more individualising policy approaches – which in turn stabilise the authority 
of individualising knowledges. Conversely, Stuttgart’s ‘collectivist’ civic epistemology 
promotes more developmental and collectivist policies – which in turn underpin more 
collectivist knowledges. However, comparatively relating both civic epistemologies to 
sustainability yields ambiguous interpretations. While approaches in Nottingham aim 
for social and intergenerational justice by improving population health (e.g. smoking, 
alcohol, weight, breastfeeding, carbon emissions), they are partly patronising, 
sometimes treat symptoms rather than causes and are socially injust in their higher 
expectations towards disadvantaged groups. In Stuttgart, some practices harmful to 
health appear politically more accepted than in Nottingham (e.g. smoking, air 
pollution). While disadvantaged groups are not confronted with higher expectations, 
they often disproportionately suffer from these practices’ adverse health impacts. 
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Others have comparatively examined civic epistemologies, such as Jasanoff 
(2005) in relation to public policies for the life sciences over three decades. For 
Germany (“Consensus-seeking”), the UK (“Communitarian”) and the US 
(“Contentious”), she similarly finds significant divergence in styles of public 
knowledge-making, public accountability (basis for trust), demonstration practices, 
objectivity registers, expertise foundations and the validity of expert bodies (Jasanoff, 
2005, p. 259). Such findings could be drawn together for further research on civic 
epistemologies – which still constitute a research gap. 
8.3.3 Policies, justice and expectations 
Interviewees in Nottingham saw local policies more often accounting for social 
and intergenerational justice than in Stuttgart. While this might reflect the higher 
proportion of public sector informants in Nottingham – and a potential interest in 
representing local policies positively – I suggest that it also relates to varying 
expectations in both cities.  
Informants were aware of Stuttgart’s comparatively high socio-economic living 
conditions and support of disadvantaged groups – as they were of Nottingham’s 
entrenched socio-economic problems and lack of local means to alleviate them 
further. Responses reflected these diverging initial conditions as higher expectations 
in Stuttgart to account for social and intergenerational justice than in Nottingham. For 
instance, citizens fulfilling basic needs was thematised more often in Nottingham, 
whereas demands in Stuttgart were more often higher up in a ‘hierarchy of needs’. 
However, citizens’ surveys evidence a relative satisfaction with the city (Nottingham) 
or its quality of life (Stuttgart; cf. Sections 6.3.1 and 6.5.1). I argue that informants 
adjusted their expectations to local perceptions and that this illustrates the context-
dependency of the case study. British welfare state retrenchments may thereby have 
facilitated a habituation to higher deprivation and inequalities in Nottingham, which 
did not happen likewise in Stuttgart. The created social order might in turn influence 
policy-making via lowered expectations towards public provision in Nottingham. 
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8.3.4 Two cities as counterfactuals 
Taking the comparative findings of these sections further, I suggest that 
Nottingham and Stuttgart can be interpreted as each other’s counterfactual.  
For one thing, if Nottingham’s structural conditions were better (as in 
Stuttgart), e.g. more jobs with higher salaries available or if the welfare state would 
adequately secure livelihoods, social problems may be less pressing and citizens may 
be asked less to change their behaviours as a remedy. Since these structural conditions 
are more favourable in Stuttgart, it can herein serve as Nottingham’s counterfactual. 
As shown, individualisation barely occurs on a policy level in Stuttgart. For example, 
low formal qualifications are less problematised and can go with high salaries in 
Stuttgart’s manufacturing industries, whereas Nottingham’s lower qualified citizens 
are on a policy level asked to further qualify and aspire more (cf. Section 7.4.2) – 
thereby individualising the societal problem.  
Then again, Nottingham may be Stuttgart’s counterfactual in relation to 
industrial decline. While both cities were cradles of the industrialisation – Stuttgart 
later than Nottingham –, an encompassing deindustrialisation with severe socio-
economic implications so far only occurred in Nottingham. How far might Stuttgart 
follow Nottingham’s trajectory, should Stuttgart’s car industry cluster which is vital for 
the city’s prosperity, decline as feared? This would imply a ‘stages’ view of capitalism 
in which its British (neo-)liberal variety is at the front of developments with more 
coordinated and corporatist varieties such as the German following. In relation to the 
two countries, this pattern indeed exists with tertiarisation, tides of privatisation, 
some welfare state retrenchments, a growing low wage sector and partly hardened 
attitudes towards disadvantaged groups. Notwithstanding, these tendencies mostly 
occur to lesser extents in Germany than in the UK and British ‘forerunning 
neoliberalism’ partly serves as an inspiration, but partly also as a deterrent model 
promoting alternative orientations (cf. also Section 8.2.2). This contradicts a simple 
‘stages’ model. Not attempting to forecast a future convergence of both cases, 
Nottingham gives insights into how industrial decline might play out with other factors 
of social order; and which problems might arise in that case. Therefore, if Stuttgart 
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had Nottingham’s deindustrialisation and deprivation, a more polarised social order 
with more marked social problems and their individualisation seem likely – though 
being alleviated by more collectivist orientations and a stronger welfare state in 
Germany (the Ruhr area may be an example).  
Altogether, the comparative case study demonstrates how vitally structural 
conditions in a polity interact – are co-produced – with its policies, and may alter 
citizens’ opportunities, the recognition and demands they encounter.   
8.4 Policy negotiations – research question 4  
8.4.1 Justifying ‘choices’? Inequality and moralities of living conditions  
These sections move on to explaining factors in relation to policy negotiations. 
As a first comparative aspect, moralities in relation to aspects of urban life differ in 
terms of stronger valuations and devaluations in Nottingham than in Stuttgart. I relate 
this to higher levels of inequality in Nottingham (cf. Sections 3.4.1 d) and 3.4.2 d)). 
Discussed examples are places of residence, modes of transport and foodbank use. 
First, Nottingham interviewees sometimes referred to the neighbourhoods 
they inhabited in terms of justifying their choice, attaching ideas or values to them. 
For instance, one informant did not opt for a neighbourhood as it was “too posh” for 
him. Another denoted himself as “eccentric” for living in a partly deprived 
neighbourhood. In tendency, interviewees rather lived outside Nottingham’s 
boundaries, often in wealthier suburbs. By contrast, Stuttgart informants rarely 
referred to their places of residence. According justifications did not come up and the 
issue appeared less loaded. I suggest that higher deprivation and inequalities – as in 
Nottingham – incentivise and pressure citizens to select more favourable 
environments; and interact with valuations and devaluations which interviewees 
expressed. The consequential residential segregation is detrimental to social and 
intergenerational justice as it promotes a solidification of socio-economic 
disadvantage along with many experiencing disrespect. Such a ‘morality of distinction’ 
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and segregation seems weaker in Stuttgart. Relatedly, literatures about urban 
segregation and regeneration established that 
“deprived neighbourhoods are not just receptacles of the victims of a divided and 
polarized society, but that living in such neighbourhoods contributes to the 
reproduction of inequalities and is a further source of social exclusion” (Atkinson & 
Kintrea, 2002, p. 162). 
Besides, spatial valuation patterns are opposed in Nottingham and Stuttgart. Whereas 
inner-city living becomes increasingly valued, gentrified and exclusive in Stuttgart with 
displacement effects, more desired places to live in the Nottingham area are often 
outside the city’s boundaries. In this context, commuting to work into the city appears 
as a more ‘white middle-class’ way of life, while others more often inhabit deprived 
inner-city neighbourhoods. Social order thereby interacts with municipal boundaries 
and particularly confines Nottingham’s options to act upon residential segregation as 
wealthier districts are outside the local authority’s reach (cf. also Section 5.3.3).  
Second, there is a differential ‘morality of transport’ in both cities. In 
Nottingham, modes of transport appear relatively tied to socio-economic status. While 
the better-off were described as often commuting by car (cf. above) and partly by 
tram, public buses were sometimes portrayed as being ‘for the poor’, or cycling as a 
marginal practice. I did not come across similar devaluations of the latter in Stuttgart 
– only their capacities were seen as insufficient. However, there was a certain cleavage 
in both cities between individual car use and promoting more public transport, cycling 
and walking – reinforced in Stuttgart with its coinage as a ‘car city’. A more polarised 
‘morality of transport’ as in Nottingham seems detrimental to more environmentally 
friendly transport options (e.g. regarding congestion, air pollution or material use), as 
it devalues them.  
Third, permanently depending on a food bank was an accepted and possible 
condition in Stuttgart with an identifying badge, whereas a Nottingham informant 
expressed that people should not become dependent on food banks and access to 
them generally required a referral. The difference illustrates the stronger emphasis on 
self-reliance in Nottingham – which is however harder to achieve than in Stuttgart. 
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Overall, I argue through these three comparative instances that higher 
inequalities in Nottingham than in Stuttgart partly explain stronger valuations and 
devaluations in Nottingham. These often contradict social justice. 
8.4.2 Political representation and political culture 
Interacting with political representation principles, local political power in 
Nottingham is concentrated in terms of the Labour Party’s enduring city council 
majority and a lacking effective opposition. Conversely, it is relatively dispersed in 
Stuttgart with its 11 groups in the city council, requiring and promoting more 
negotiation; as well as with its principles of interest mediation and stakeholder 
representation. These disparate political power distributions partly explain diverging 
policy-making processes. Accordingly, Nottingham’s Labour Party pursues consistent 
long-term approaches, often aiming for social and intergenerational justice, which 
partially counteract more market-based government policies. In Stuttgart, policies 
emerge in less determined, seemingly less consistent and often slower ways with 
shifting majorities. This manifests in ongoing discussions and power struggles, 
concrete instances of which are policy reversals (of infrastructure privatisations and 
NSM) or successful citizens’ contestations (e.g. regarding air pollution, cycling 
infrastructure development or Stuttgart 21). Though policy development in Stuttgart 
appears to incorporate a greater array of interests which may reduce polarisation, 
Nottingham’s persistent concentration of political power may enable its pioneering 
role in environmental policies and public infrastructure provision. Nottingham’s leaner 
local state could also be argued to act more effectively, while Stuttgart’s was partly 
seen as not fulfilling its duties in a timely manner and subordinating to economic 
interests. I conclude that principles of political representation in the UK and Germany 
are co-produced with social orders in that they foster and partly explain diverging local 
political cultures: more confrontative, capable of acting and dominating in Nottingham 
under the First-past-the-post system and more cooperative, incremental and 
contesting in Stuttgart with its proportional representation. 
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8.4.3 Central-local relations and role of the local state 
Furthermore, local political power in Nottingham and Stuttgart does not 
translate into similar spheres of influence. There is strong divergence in local 
autonomy, local budgets, regional inequalities and political cleavages.  
High power inequalities mark the relation between central and local 
governments and between some regions in the UK – with Nottingham economically 
often being situated at a relatively ‘losing end’. This amplified with government’s 
austerity measures which the city had to implement in a highly centralised system, 
increasingly restraining it to its statutory duties and reinforcing interregional 
inequalities through its funding regime (cf. Section 6.2.2 a). These tendencies 
contradict social and intergenerational justice. They also relate to party-political and 
ideological cleavages between the Conservatives-led central government and Labour-
dominated Nottingham, partly working against each other. Behind this backdrop, 
Nottingham’s local state, but also government and partly companies (cf. Section 7.4) 
decreasingly assume responsibility for citizens’ basic needs. The local authority’s role 
is thereby diminished, developing into a – partly commercialising – body managing a 
number of local services – but which is underfunded for a general public provision.  
Conversely, the relationship between federal and local government was not an 
issue of contention in Stuttgart. Local policies rather complement national ones, also 
in relation to concerns for social and intergenerational justice. Relatedly, the German 
constitution grants the federal state the right to legislate in order to establish equal 
living conditions (GG Art 72). Besides, in a system of high local autonomy, Stuttgart is 
structurally advantaged with its strong local economy, partly of high added value, and 
related stable municipal budgets.  
 Nottingham City Council has therefore a considerably smaller sphere of 
influence in many policy areas than Stuttgart’s. I conclude that less local autonomy, 
stronger cleavages and higher inequalities between regions and between central and 
local governments facilitate friction losses and more structural disadvantage – which 
counter socio-economic sustainability. On the contrary, more local autonomy, more 
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concerted political action and lesser such inequalities appear conducive to 
complementary policies and more interregional balancing.  
8.4.4 Consolidation regimes? 
Altogether, policy negotiations and social order shape each other differently in 
Nottingham and Stuttgart. Despite Nottingham City Council’s remarkable and 
pioneering counteraction (cf. Section 6.3.2), continued austerity in the UK is linked to 
an increasing shift of public provision into the private sphere. This also implies 
postponing costs into the future, e.g. in the form of underfunded public 
infrastructures, debts or loans. Nottingham thereby approximates a ‘consolidation 
regime’ (Streeck, 2016, pp. 113–142). This excludes a growing share of citizens from 
living standards which are then only enjoyed by the wealthier – thus restricting social 
justice. My findings illustrate how the consolidation regime reinforces inequalities, 
undermines social and economic rights and therefore (local) democracy through 
lacking basic security. This increasing polarisation and disenfranchisement of large 
parts of the population may be characteristic for the current trajectory of liberal 
welfare states.  
Curiously, while in the British case – more than in the German – partnership 
approaches are promoted, building on voluntarism, reciprocity and trust as assumed 
in governance theory (Kjær, 2009, p. 144), basic security as a precondition for such 
engagement exists less in Nottingham than in Stuttgart. Stuttgart still deviates from a 
consolidation regime, though similar tendencies occur: raising levels of private debt 
(Baur, 2017), increasing inequalities and polarisation, particularly through rising 
housing costs, and an expanded low wage sector. However, in comparison, the 
national welfare state and the local state provide at higher levels in Germany than in 
the UK.  
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8.5 Political and economic interdependencies – research question 4 
8.5.1 Economic primacy? 
As summarised in Section 7.10, Nottingham’s and Stuttgart’s economies 
assume differential roles in their urban fabrics. In Stuttgart, a view prevailed where 
politicians across parties followed the local economy’s interests in major conflictual 
instances to sustain the city’s prosperity. This perceived dependence partly explains 
why economic interests prevailed over environmental and health protection as in 
relation to air pollution, continuing growth and land use. This interpretation 
underwrites findings of the community power debate (cf. Section 3.3.2) in explaining 
diverging urban outcomes to tackling air pollution as follows. That the US-city Gary 
took 13 extra years to enact anti-pollution legislation compared with equally-polluted 
neighbouring cities has been linked to the dominance of the industrial complex in 
Gary, i.e. U.S. Steel being identified with the town’s prosperity (Crenson, 1971, p. 169; 
as cited in N. Robinson, 2006, p. 7). However, contemporary Stuttgart differs from 
former Gary in that its prosperity is not mainly linked to a sole company, but to the 
automotive cluster – and to some other industries. This may have played a role in air 
pollution not being displaced from the agenda in Stuttgart. Also, Stuttgart’s ‘economic 
boundedness’ involves high degrees of – partly successful – public contestation in the 
city council and by civil society. This has not characterised cases of stronger economic 
primacy in the literature such as Atlanta, where local representative democracy 
provided a smokescreen for dominant economic interests and issues only moved with 
the approval of a business-dominated elite (Hunter, 1953; Harding, 2009). Stuttgart’s 
dominance of economic interests is therefore less pervasive and obvious than in some 
historic US cases. 
Conversely, Nottingham’s economy does not approach the weight of 
Stuttgart’s. In comparison, it appears diminished and more disembedded from society. 
Behind this backdrop, politicians sometimes enforced policies more confrontationally 
against economic interests, which also forms part of Nottingham’s ‘forerunner role’ 
regarding environmentally progressive and redistributive policies. Examples are the 
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objective of becoming carbon neutral as the first UK city by 2028 (Nottingham City 
Council, 2019e), the Workplace Parking Levy (cf. Section 7.3) or the Selective Licensing 
Scheme (cf. Footnote 26). Comparing these to Stuttgart, its vision to become climate 
neutral by 2050 (Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart, 2016b) is significantly less ambitious 
time-wise.63 More generally, Nottingham takes a pioneering role in environmental 
sustainability (cf. Section 7.5.3). By contrast, Stuttgart’s environmental regulation was 
relatively reluctant in instances concerning its industries or traffic infrastructure, e.g. 
in tackling air pollution and carbon emissions reduction – despite partly more pressing 
problems than in Nottingham. Furthermore, I have not found an urban policy charging 
employers for workplace parking to redistribute towards public transport as the 
Workplace Parking Levy; nor was there a local measure to counter poor housing 
conditions like the Selective Licensing Scheme. However, both cities’ national contexts 
differ markedly, e.g. in terms of high housing standards in Germany in an EU 
comparison (Noll & Weick, 2014) and partly stronger antagonisms in the British case.  
The cases’ divergence is not explained by neo-pluralist arguments (Lindblom, 
1977), cf. Section 3.3.2. While ‘structural power’ – i.e. the critical importance of 
business decisions for providing public welfare (Harding, 2009, pp. 33–34) – is high in 
both cities, it is more dispersed across companies in Stuttgart. Nottingham’s few large 
businesses may therefore hold a relatively higher structural power, as the Boots case 
exemplifies (cf. Section 7.2). However, empirically this does not seem to translate into 
‘instrumental power’ – i.e. businesses’ ability to mobilise their case effectively and 
receive attentive hearing (Harding, 2009, pp. 33–34). Businesses’ instrumental power 
generally appears higher in Stuttgart which is counterintuitive from the neo-pluralist 
standpoint, where a company’s higher structural power would imply more 
instrumental power. Contrastingly and in light of this study, I argue that urban policy-
                                                     
63 “[…] [T]he term climate neutral is similar to carbon neutral, but has one crucial difference: it covers 
all greenhouse gases (GHGs) as defined by the Kyoto Protocol” (T. Butler et al., 2015, p. 2). As a rough 
orientation, 82% of US greenhouse gas emissions in 2017 were carbon dioxide (US Environmental 
Protection Agency, 2017). “The inclusion of non-CO2 GHGs in the term climate neutral provides 
additional options for climate mitigation” – in comparison to carbon neutrality (T. Butler et al., 2015, p. 
3). 
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making is much more interwoven with a governance regime’s social order, 
conventions and values. As discussed throughout Chapter 7, these diverge significantly 
between Nottingham and Stuttgart. Variation in the cases’ economic primacy – 
stronger in Stuttgart than in Nottingham – can therefore partly be explained by 
differing senses of businesses’ obligation, coordination, interest mediation, mutuality 
and trust between the economy, politics and society (as partly captured by the ‘liberal’ 
and ‘coordinated’ market economy types, cf. Section 8.2.2). Stuttgart’s stronger 
economic primacy, its close, corporatist links with the automotive cluster and 
relatively preservationist values may then also have precluded more progressive 
environmental policies at an earlier stage – while the relative absence of such an 
industrial counterweight in Nottingham and a stronger embrace of change may have 
enabled them.  
8.5.2 Labour markets and individualisation 
Differences in both cities’ labour markets are striking. This is in terms of 
structures, opportunities, relating debates and expectations (cf. Sections 7.4.2 and 
7.8.2). Nottingham data evince an antagonism between employers looking for skills 
which they barely find locally, while being partly unwilling to qualify local people to 
their expectations. The discrepancy relates to relatively short-term commitments 
between employers and employees and neither was the further education system 
seen to bridge this gap. The antagonism is also present in Stuttgart, though to lesser 
extents. As mitigating factors appear a significantly higher proportion of better paid 
private sector jobs, the stronger provision of quasi ‘public goods’ through businesses, 
including the dual vocational training system, higher qualifications, longer-term 
commitments and a stronger welfare state. 
However, responsibility for the discrepancy was sought more at individuals 
struggling with the labour market in Nottingham than in Stuttgart; or a collective 
obligation for them of state, educational institutions and companies appeared higher 
in Stuttgart (cf. also Section 5.2.2 c)). Correspondingly, the neoliberal economic view 
which rejects businesses’ pursuits not directly linked to profit maximisation (Crouch, 
2012, p. 363) materialises more in Nottingham. This might be qualified in terms of a 
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more short-term profit orientation in Nottingham and one which is more long-term in 
Stuttgart. Nottingham accordingly exemplifies a neoliberal labour market regime. I 
argue that the latter is less sustainable since it partly relies on drawing in qualified 
labour externally – thus presupposing educational provision elsewhere – and produces 
many who lose out. They are often excluded from sufficient material provision, 
societal recognition and participation. This labour market polarisation and dualisation 
counters social justice. ‘The market’ therefore co-produces a relative rule of the 
powerful and strong, competition, inequality and decreasing solidarity. Effects of this 
occur more in Nottingham than in Stuttgart in terms of social disintegration, 
weakening societal cohesion, up to dehumanising those in need – enabled by 
explaining their suffering through a lack of individual responsibility (cf. Sections 6.3.1 
and 7.4.2). 
I conclude that diverging degrees of labour market polarisation in both cities 
relate to a more extensive market rule in Nottingham than in Stuttgart. Higher 
expectations towards the disadvantaged and formally lower qualified are then partly 
explained and reinforced by their stronger marginalisation – i.e. initially weaker 
position in the social order – in Nottingham than in Stuttgart.  
8.5.3 Economic growth and intergenerational justice 
While both variations of capitalist governance regimes function in 
intergenerationally unjust ways, i.e. transfer socio-economic and environmental costs 
into the future, they hold on to growth paradigms. In Nottingham, a politically shaped 
polarised social order left many impoverished. The normalisation of this condition 
again underpins national policies perpetuating a system which locally does not work 
for many. Economic growth is being adhered to, even with little notable signs of 
improving living conditions – although growth is increasingly aimed at being inclusive. 
While Stuttgart’s population averagely suffers less from deprivation than 
Nottingham’s, the city approaches its physical limits under continued growth. Herein, 
economic development partly appears to be prioritised over environmental and 
human health protection.  
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Problems relating to their current economic models are however differently 
debated. Notwithstanding its present economic strength, there is a sense of falling 
behind in Stuttgart in terms of the automotive industry and innovation. In Nottingham, 
there is a clear consciousness of the city’s severe socio-economic problems. In both 
places, urban strategies frame economic growth as a precondition for future 
generations’ prosperity. Foci therein are the preservation of Stuttgart’s industrial base 
and the creation of jobs in Nottingham – reflecting their respective problem pressures. 
However, Nottingham’s rhetoric is more focused in relation to economic growth than 
Stuttgart’s, e.g. aiming for “a strong and aggressive campaign marketing the city to 
external businesses, investors and markets” (Nottingham City Council, 2012, p. 34). 
Stuttgart’s growth rhetoric is more concerned with economic development and 
emphasises the preservation of economic structures and companies. These two 
versions of pursuing economic growth interact with their economic models as 
discussed throughout this chapter, more ‘coordinated’ and persistent in Stuttgart and 
more ‘liberal’ and prone to rapid change in Nottingham (e.g. in carbon emission 
reduction, environmental policies, industrial change, digitalisation, socially 
progressive/partly identity-based policies or behavioural approaches to health 
policies). Both varieties of expansionist modernity imply the described – diverging – 
problems for future generations. 
8.6 Discussion – research question 4 
This last empirical chapter hitherto focused on comparing both cases and 
explaining their divergence. Building on the thesis’ empirical findings, I examined the 
ideal-typical expectations from which this study departed. Governance in Nottingham 
appears as a composite of many NPM traits – but contradicts some of its optimistic 
assumptions –, the welfare model of urban governance and governance theory. The 
Stuttgart case is better captured by the Neo-Weberian State than by the Weberian 
bureaucracy. Beyond that, the cases can be interpreted from many other angles. While 
there are limits to this within the thesis, I attempted to detail the cases’ complexity, 
contradictions and messiness to do justice to them and to allow for further analyses. 
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Where RQ 4 asks: How far can a co-production of policies and social order 
explain divergence?, it indeed explains significant findings of this study. The following 
summarises main explanations along four comparative aspects.  
First, more individualising policies in Nottingham compared to more collectivist 
ones in Stuttgart are enabled by stronger beliefs in individual responsibility, higher 
inequalities and greater social distancing in Nottingham than in Stuttgart. They also 
interact with varying civic epistemologies: a more ‘individualising’ in Nottingham and 
a more ‘collectivist’ in Stuttgart. These policies again give rise to the described 
diverging values and beliefs. However, individualisation counters socio-economic 
sustainability.  
Second, local government regulation sets out power relations between central 
and local government. Whereas the British system confines local autonomy, budgetary 
leeway and subjects Nottingham to (additional) structural disadvantage, the German 
system assures local autonomy and with its high business tax income, Stuttgart is 
structurally advantaged. This relates to policies countering each other and party-
political cleavages between Nottingham and central government, which are not an 
issue in Stuttgart. Therefore, higher spatial inequalities, political power concentrations 
and ideological cleavages interact with less consensus-building and policy approaches 
opposing one another – facilitating less sustainable friction losses and more politically 
caused disadvantage.  
Third, where politicians in Stuttgart were forced by citizen activists and courts 
to act upon air pollution, Nottingham’s environmental policies driven by the city 
council were among the most progressive in the UK. This can partly be explained by 
Stuttgart’s powerful automotive cluster, shifting city council majorities requiring 
political brokering and an impactful civil society. Conversely, a similar seeming 
‘industrial opponent’ is absent in Nottingham, the stable Labour Party majority in the 
city council enables long-term action and there is a larger power asymmetry between 
policy developers and the public. While policies are often more environmentally 
sustainable in Nottingham, this may be partly facilitated by high deprivation. 
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Fourth, some Nottingham policies were enacted against local businesses’ 
resistance – which did not occur as a theme in Stuttgart. A partial explanation lies in 
varying urban fabrics where economy and society are more embedded in Stuttgart 
with closer, more corporatist and trustful links between politics and economy than in 
Nottingham. These urban policies again co-produced – e.g. clouded or boosted – 
relations between businesses and politics. More shared concerns for the city across 
sectors appear socio-economically more sustainable. 
Altogether, the initial ideal types capture governance in Nottingham and 
Stuttgart only to varying degrees. Notwithstanding, the theoretical expectation that 
the regime which is more impacted by neoliberalism (Nottingham) is less sustainable 
than the more traditional one (Stuttgart) holds for various aspects of socio-economic 
sustainability. By contrast, Nottingham’s more neoliberalised regime in tendency 
produced more environmentally sustainable policies than Stuttgart’s. I have thereby 
concluded on the research aim of this study: To compare and explain how governance 
in Nottingham and Stuttgart relates to sustainability.  
The remainder of the chapter illuminates limitations of this study and then 
moves beyond the two cases by considering its implications for research and practice.    
8.7 Limitations 
As every research, the one at hand has its limitations. I discuss four of them 
subsequently: consequences of my predominant cultural rooting, concerns regarding 
the case selection, partial knowledge underlying the study and the depth of its 
interpretations. 
First, having grown up and spent most of my life in Germany, my cultural 
orientations and views about society and economy are moulded by the experience. In 
comparison, I perceived very marked differences to the British context, values and 
attitudes during my more than three years in Nottingham. This particularly concerns 
questions of political culture, individualism/collectivism, inequalities and intensified 
with the ‘Brexit’ crisis. My research surely reflects this. Although I have attempted to 
  277 
understand and do justice to both cases and their comparison, achieving this may have 
been limited by my perspective, being more an ‘outsider’ to Nottingham and more an 
‘insider’ to Stuttgart. This might promote blind spots in relation to the latter and 
limited understanding in relation to the former.  
Second, one might object whether the cases Nottingham and Stuttgart are at 
all ‘comparable’, as they are so different. Contrarily, high variation within one country 
could hold institutional and cultural variation more constant. For instance, Nottingham 
could be compared to wealthier Brighton or more neoliberally governed 
Northamptonshire (cf. Footnote 29); Stuttgart could be compared to structurally 
weaker Duisburg. This could ease singling out particularly local factors. However, areas 
of homogeneity are defined in relation to the research interest (cf. Section 4.3.2). The 
strength of this study’s case selection is to include marked varieties of capitalism, 
wealth and inequalities, political systems, cultures and civic epistemologies. These 
divergences allow drawing conclusions about relating factors and consequences – 
which a within-country comparison would to far lesser extents (cf. Sections 2.3.3 c) 
and 4.2.1). 
Third, as all research this study draws on partial knowledge. Different 
interviewees and a different researcher might alter interpretations. Also, purposive 
sampling likely rather attracts informants with relating interests and could be done in 
many ways. However, I attempted to build a diverse and broad data base and be 
attentive to instances countering my narrative (cf. Section 4.4), so as to arrive at a 
measured, justified and thorough representation which is as valid as possible. 
Throughout this thesis, I aim to integerly display how I constructed interpretations, 
striving for transparency and trustworthiness (cf. Section 4.2.2 c)). 
Fourth, interpretations can be further driven forward. With the set time-frame 
requiring to conclude at some point and my view of how I could deepen 
interpretations evolving in the course of this research, additional theoretical 
development can follow. However, this study is a substantive start and contribution in 
itself. 
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8.8 Implications for future research 
Numerous implications for future research can be derived from this thesis. I 
discuss some predominant ones subsequently. 
Primarily, cognitions of the comparative case study could be transposed into 
co-production regime (ideal) types which characterise interactions between policies, 
their knowledge claims and social order. They could particularly expand on the civic 
epistemologies described in Section 8.3.2.   
Considering how governance in Nottingham and Stuttgart relates to 
sustainability through the lens of policies and social order being co-produced brought 
diverse insights to the fore. Throughout the empirical chapters, I have related them to 
the advance of neoliberalism and inequalities. The thesis therefore speaks to 
significant sociological puzzles around both themes which I have opened up in the 
Introduction (Chapter 1): 
Why is neoliberalisation still advancing, despite its many unsustainable 
tendencies? 
Why is there not more resistance against widening inequalities, particularly in 
places where they are more pronounced, despite their negative consequences for 
many? 
Partial answers to both questions lie in differential power relations in 
Nottingham and Stuttgart, as discussed in Chapter 8: Those who suffer the most from 
both tendencies are hardly in the place to decide about instances of their advance (e.g. 
poorer citizens). And those sympathising with the latter hold limited power in relation 
to these broad trends (e.g. Nottingham Labour Party with respect to austerity; local 
politicians with respect to cities’ rising housing costs). With power being central to 
better understand the two puzzles, it should be central to future research. The 
following outlines according routes in relation to four themes: researching 
inequalities; roles of government, economy and civil society; studying economy and 
society; and separating issues into dimensions and disciplines. 
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First, researching poverty while leaving aside inequality and wealth as its 
structural conditions bears the risk of individualisation and decontextualisation. 
Instead, carving out and theorising their interrelations would be crucial to apprehend 
power through economic resources. Moreover, researchers should consider the 
‘power bias’ particularly in the existence of quantitative data, so as to not 
unconsciously reproduce the higher scrutiny of disadvantaged vs. powerful citizens. 
This involves closing the research gaps about wealth, high incomes – as reflected in 
the case descriptions for Nottingham and Stuttgart (cf. Sections 3.4.1 d) and 3.4.2 d)) 
– and relating attitudes and morals. 
Second, research should reconsider how the nature, scope and purpose of 
government, nationally and locally, is co-produced with neoliberalisation and rising 
inequalities. This implies substantial power shifts in the local fabric, as exemplified in 
Nottingham, e.g. in terms of a weakened civil society whose subsistence level is not 
granted or businesses’ rising ‘structural power’ (cf. Section 8.5.3). The latter aspect is 
for instance addressed by Crouch (2011); or Birch (2019) theorises the rising 
significance of rentiership in capitalism. Contrarily, more or less established 
conceptualisations appear decreasingly transtemporal in the face of recent 
developments. For example, Foucault’s view of a government’s purpose and steering 
capacity seems overly optimistic (cf. Section 6.6). The same applies to governance 
theory’s idealistic expectations of an actively participating civil society, helping to 
provide in networked governance what the public sector partly withdrew from – as it 
leaves aside underlying power relations (cf. Sections 6.1 and 6.6). Finally, Habermasian 
(1996) ideas of a deliberative democracy partly oversee implications of widened 
inequalities and power asymmetries as in the British case. They thereby overestimate 
citizens’ capacities to engage in public debate, but also the meaning of such debate 
for a national political level. The role of civil society and its relation with those in power 
should come to the fore, as also strikingly demonstrated by misapprehensions in 
relation to the ‘Brexit’ vote. 
Third, I argue that relations between ‘economy’ and ‘society’ should be 
empirically studied in their meanings and consequences, rather than being pre-
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conceived in terms of beliefs such as following from liberal theory (e.g. Friedman & 
Friedman, 2002). The latter implies a social order where the economy is disembedded 
from society, in tendency (unsustainably) privatising profits and collectivising societal 
and environmental concerns (cf. Sections 7.1 and 7.10). Conversely, this study 
evidences economic actors feeling (differently) co-responsible for their localities’ 
social state. It thereby contributes to the growing economic sociology literature which 
realises an empirical and more accurate perspective on interrelations of economy and 
society. This promotes considering factors of social order which are co-produced with 
economic policies and behaviours, such as mutual commitment and trust in different 
capitalist regimes. These prove to be significant in the comparison and should thus 
receive more attention in future research – as also suggested by Collier (2019) and 
Mayer (2018), cf. Section 7.10.  
Fourth, this study generally makes an empirical case for not isolating sectors 
(e.g. economic, political, societal) nor sustainability dimensions (e.g. environmental, 
social, economic) by research design (cf. Sections 2.2.1 c) and 2.3.3 c)). This would have 
precluded understanding their interdependencies and relating power dynamics, such 
as between state/society and economy or between environmental sustainability and 
social justice (cf. Section 7.5.3) – which are of high sociological relevance. 
Alternatively, relegating social problems to sociology and ‘social’ dimensions only 
would free ‘economic’, ‘technological’ and ‘environmental’ disciplines and dimensions 
from them – although they are concerned with the structural conditions in which those 
social problems arise. In terms of power relations, this resembles individualisation at 
a discipline or thematic level. 
Besides specific themes, further integrating governance regime research with 
the constructionist co-production lens holds promising perspectives. As shown, it 
allows recognising blind spots in relation to power – where normative, realist or 
rationalistic orientations partly prevailed. The interpretive approach renders visible 
normativity and ideas about what is valued or devalued in different governance 
regimes. This study substantially contributes to the sparse intersection of both 
research strands – beyond single issues or instruments (cf. Section 2.3.3 c)). Future 
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research could expand on this by examining further urban and welfare state regime 
types. Since the comparative approach prove useful, the weight of factors and their 
combinations could be systematically explored using Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(Rihoux & Ragin, 2009).64 The research at hand could serve as a starting point in 
relation to according cases and factors to study, in order to better understand 
conditions of a more sustainable governance.  
8.9 Practical implications 
Numerous practical implications can be derived from this research in relation 
to social and intergenerational justice. After first reflecting on the study’s practical 
significance, I argue for three – interacting – major practical implications: reducing 
inequalities, reviving the welfare state and altering expansive practices. 
With this study, I aim to contribute to a public sociology (Burawoy, 2005). 
Relatedly, Flyvbjerg (2011, p. 166) recommends for a “[s]ocial science that matters” to 
take up “problems that matter to the local, national, and global communities in which 
we live” and to do it in ways that matter, i.e. “focus on issues of values and power”; 
and finally to “effectively communicate the results to our fellow citizens”. I support 
and attempt to realise all these aspects – the latter through subsequent, also non-
academic, writing and talks. 
In the initial Chapters 1, 2 and 3, I have laid out unsustainable tendencies in 
‘Western’ democratic capitalism since the last decades. However, capitalist varieties 
exist within this and contribute to explaining diverging policy outcomes – as this study 
does. The overall unsustainable tendencies include environmental degradation and 
climate change, a relatively low consideration of future generations’ interests in 
democratic processes, rising economic inequality, a declining rate of economic growth 
and rising debt, public and private. Many of them accelerated with neoliberalisation. 
Partly harshening living conditions interact with a differential sense of societal 
                                                     
64 Its subtype fuzzy set ideal type analysis (Kvist, 2007) also enables assessing ideal types more formally. 
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polarisation, hardening and decline; which possibly relate to the erosion of shared 
facts and values, populism and the rise of movements which devalue certain 
population groups, such as the far right. 
Regarding this outset, I hold that change for the more sustainable requires as 
a first step to appreciate and acknowledge the rational grief of those disadvantaged 
through the mentioned developments. Contrarily, narratives of resilience, coping and 
defensive reactions which I sometimes encountered may devalue their perceptions 
(‘public gaslighting’) and individualise the problems to which collective approaches are 
more socially just and appear more effective. Throughout this thesis, I show how there 
is nothing ‘natural’ or inevitable about the social orders which the case study depicts 
– but how they are co-produced with certain power structures, the recourse to certain 
knowledges, certain values and ideas about the nature of society. Recognising this 
shows how things could be different.  
At this, the value of the comparative approach lays in illustrating different 
routes, their implications, struggles and turnarounds in relation to neoliberalisation 
and rising inequalities in two broadly similar systems – but with disparate 
configurations. Though transferrals across political communities may not easily be 
possible in a network of interdependencies (cf. Section 2.3.3 c)), understanding how 
different combinations of factors may play out in relation to social and 
intergenerational justice can inspire policy lessons. This is evidenced by constitutions 
being used as orientations; or by policy models which states broadly took over from 
others, such as in the cases of parental benefits (‘Swedish model’) or prostitution 
regulation (‘Nordic model’). A practical experience and its narrative appear crucial to 
these adoptions – which this comparative case study provides.  
Based on this thesis, I argue that reducing inequalities, reviving the welfare 
state and reconsidering our expansive practices would enhance social and 
intergenerational justice.  
First, the cases’ comparison illustrates how higher inequalities regularly 
counter social and intergenerational justice. Higher inequalities in income and wealth, 
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knowledge, education and health often co-emerged with stronger political and 
societal power asymmetries and with larger ideological polarisations. Stronger system 
logics of competition and confrontation (e.g. through a majoritarian voting system; 
between state and ‘market’; on the labour market; between central and local 
government; between citizens and places) often went with less communication, 
negotiation and cooperation; but also with less stable conditions for people, places 
and businesses. Stronger inequalities and polarisations also co-developed with more 
social distancing, declining mutual understanding and empathy – up to a point where 
government ministers seemed to have lost touch with living conditions in their country 
(cf. Section 1.1.1). These tendencies again seemed connected to less mutual 
recognition, respect and trust. I conclude that reducing inequalities, polarisations and 
competition within and between political communities would promote cooperation, 
societal cohesion and socio-economic sustainability. While promoting these factors 
appears ambiguous in relation to countering the climate and environmental crises in 
capitalism, relating responsibilities and contributions were likely more shared.  
Second, I argue for maintaining or reviving the welfare state to reduce some of 
the mentioned inequalities. Securing social and economic rights prove effective to 
ameliorate living conditions and enable broader educational and societal participation 
for many Europeans after the Second World War. However, this requires an adequate 
tax base and thus solidarities on the side of the state, the public and the economy; and 
must exclude (neo-)colonial exploitation as practiced. Relating material and mental 
changes should thus be conceived together. More cooperation and coordination 
between the public sector and the ‘market’ likely support businesses and the welfare 
state. Accordingly, ‘varieties of capitalism’ contributions and this study “suggest that 
many kinds of social policies actually improve the operation of markets and enhance 
the capacities of firms to pursue distinctive strategies” (Porter, 2003, p. vi). Besides, 
Prasad (2012, p. xiv) identifies “a trade-off across the industrial countries between 
reliance on the welfare state and reliance on credit-based consumption”. The UK 
significantly relies on the latter – less so Germany (Giles, 2019) with its stronger 
welfare state. Regarding the US – herein resembling the UK –, Prasad concludes  
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“that developing the public welfare state would benefit economic growth […] by 
loosening the grip of mortgage Keynesianism, thereby lowering the demand for 
finance and reorienting political efforts and resources away from the financial 
sector and towards more stable sources of growth” (Prasad, 2012, p. xiv). 
The severe crisis around the virus Covid-19 currently challenges the capacities of 
welfare states. Thus far, the dismantled British welfare state, its political management 
and particularly the NHS appear less robust in the face of the outbreak than the 
German system where – despite an economisation of health care and further calls to 
reduce hospital beds – the political handling of the crisis seems more effective. The 
more cooperative and coordinated system thereby appears more resilient in the face 
of this pandemic than the liberal, which also demonstrates the tragic consequences of 
a continuously underfunded public provision. 
Finally, the capitalist growth logic of constant material expansion65 – and an 
established understanding of welfare in both regimes – contradicts environmental 
sustainability and builds on exploitative practices towards the Global South. With no 
indications that similar growth-oriented economic practices would become 
environmentally sustainable nor more socially just in the future, their collective 
change remains as the more sustainable development path. As we know many factors 
contributing to less expansionist practices, but partly fail to realise them (voluntarily), 
further recognising the co-production of our material and mental infrastructures 
(Welzer, 2013, p. 64) – as this thesis has shown – may be a way forward. Reconsidering 
how we want to live together, materially (which systems and policies? How ‘much’?) 
and mentally (which values, morals, knowledge, power structures?), and relatingly re-
shaping our polities is more hopeful than understanding us as objects of destructive 
systems with pervasive power structures beyond our impact. However, if 
environmental sustainability should be improved in socially just ways, it is necessary 
to address the partial trade-off between social justice and environmental sustainability 
and the questions of social order it raises (cf. Section 7.5.3). The absence of existential 
                                                     
65 Material improvement altogether mostly also implies material expansion.  
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struggles, e.g. via an intact welfare state, is often a necessary condition for the named 
reconsiderations. As this study illustrates, single factors and actions can change 
courses and contribute to a more sustainable development.  
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Appendix 
A) Thematic maps of the two current city strategies 
Nottingham (own research based on One Nottingham, 2009): 
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B) Analysed policy documents 
Nottingham 
Documents selected: 38 Target interval 
Key strategies and plans 
Ambition 2025. 10-year strategic plan 2015 - 2025 
Building a better Nottingham. Neighbourhood Regeneration Strategy  
Nottingham Growth Plan 
next 5 - 10 
years, i.e. ca. 
2013-2023 
Nottingham Growth Plan. Summary 
next 5 - 10 
years, i.e. ca. 
2013-2023 
Children and young people's plan 2016 - 2020 2016 - 2020 
Council Plan 2015 - 2019 2015 - 2019 
Energy strategy 2010 - 2020 2010 - 2020 
Happier Healthier Lives. Nottingham City Joint Health and Wellbeing 
Strategy 2016 – 2020 
2016 - 2020 
The Housing Nottingham Plan. The three year plan of the Nottingham 
Housing Strategic Partnership 2013-2015 
2013 - 2015 
Greater Nottingham. Broxtowe Borough, Gedling Borough, Nottingham 
City. Aligned Core Strategies. Part 1 Local Plan 
Adopted 2014 
Nottingham Local Transport Plan: Strategy 2011 – 2026 2011 - 2026 
Nottingham Crime & Drugs Partnership. Partnership Plan 2015 to 2020 2015 - 2020 
Family, Neighbourhood, City. One Nottingham. The Nottingham Plan to 
2020 
2010 - 2020 
Sustainability and Transformation Plan 2016 - 2021. Summary Guide 2016 - 2021 
Sustainability and Transformation Plan 2016 - 2021. A healthier future 
for Nottingham and Nottinghamshire. Summary Guide. Executive 
Summary 
2016 - 2021 
A Waste-Less Nottingham. Waste Strategy 2010-2030 2010 - 2030 
Instruments of citizen consultation and engagement 
Customer Charter - Nottingham City Council  
Nottingham Citizens' Survey 2016  
"Your City, Your Say" Nottingham Citizens' Panel (Website, downloaded 
09/08/2017) 
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Nottingham Crime and Drugs Partnership. Respect for Nottingham 
Survey 2016 
 
BUDGET CONSULTATION 2017/18  
Further strategies and plans 
Breastfeeding: A Framework for Action Nottinghamshire County and 
Nottingham City 2015 - 2020 
2015-2020 
Nottingham Cold Weather Provision Plan 2016-2017 2016-2017 
Nottingham City Inter-agency Homelessness Prevention Strategy 2013 - 
2018 
 
Healthy Weight Strategy for Nottingham City 2011-2020 2011-2020 
Tackling Deprivation in Nottingham: Towards a ‘2020’ Roadmap. 
Discussion Paper: Challenges and priorities. SQW Consulting 
2020 
N2 ECONOMIC GROWTH STRATEGY  
Safe.Responsible.Healthy: Nottingham's approach to alcohol 2012-2015 
Nottingham Children’s Partnership. Family Support Strategy 2010-2014. 
earlier support, stronger families 
2010-2014 
Autism Strategy for Adults who live and work in Nottingham City 2014 - 
2017 
2014-2017 
Autism Strategy for Adults who live and work in Nottingham City 2014 - 
2017 - Summary 
2014-2017 
Nottingham City Suicide Prevention Strategy 2015-18 2015-2018 
Wellness in Mind Nottingham City Mental Health and Wellbeing 
Strategy 2014-2017 
2014-2017 
Nottingham City Tobacco Control Strategy 2015-2020. Inspiring 
Nottingham's smokefree generation 
2015-2020 
The Nottingham Community Climate Change Strategy 2012-2020 2012-2020 
The Nottingham Community Climate Change Strategy 2012-2020 - 
Executive Summary 
2012-2020 
Nottingham Bus Strategy 2014-2019 2014-2019 
Nottingham City Teenage Pregnancy Plan 2014-16 2014-2016 
 
Stuttgart 
Documents selected: 45 Target interval 
Key strategies 
Stadtentwicklungskonzept Entwurf 2004 
 
Stadtentwicklungskonzept Dialog 2005 
 
  338 
Stadtentwicklungskonzept Strategie 2006 
 
Stuttgart 2030: Ideensammlung/Mitschrift aus der Debatte mit den 
acht vorläufigen Themenfeldern und den jeweiligen Leitsätzen, die der 
Gemeinderat auf seiner Klausur am 19. und 20. Mai 2017 erarbeitet hat 
 
Further strategies, plans and outlines 
Das Bodenschutzkonzept Stuttgart (BOKS) (Kurzfassung) published 
2007 
Flächennutzungsplan Stuttgart published 
2012 
Wissenswertes zur Flächennutzungsplanung 
 
Richtlinie zur Foerderung von urbanen Gaerten in Stuttgart published 
2014 




Hof-, Dach- und Fassadenbegrünung. Richtlinie für das kommunale 
Grünprogramm der Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart zur Förderung der Hof-, 
Dach- und Fassadenbegrünung 
published 
2017 
10-Punkte-Programm des Oberbuergermeisters (Stadtklima) (Website, 
downloaded 22/07/2017) 
 
Für unsere Umwelt. Klima schützen, Ressourcen schonen, Energie 
sparen 
 
Luftreinhalteplan für den Regierungsbezirk Stuttgart Teilplan 
Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart 3. Fortschreibung des Luftreinhalteplanes 
zur Minderung der PM10- und NO2-Belastungen 
2020, max. 
2021 
Nachhaltiges Bauflächenmanagement - NBS (Website, downloaded 
22/07/2017) 
 
Aktionsplan Nachhaltig mobil in Stuttgart 
 
Ablauf der Lärmaktionsplanung in Stuttgart mit 
Öffentlichkeitsbeteiligung 
 
Leitbild der Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart zur Umsetzung der Ziele der 
UN-Behindertenrechtskonvention (Website, downloaded 24/07/2017) 
 
Energiekonzept "Urbanisierung der Energiewende in Stuttgart" 
(Website, downloaded 22/07/2017) 
2020; 2050 
Energiekonzept Urbanisierung der  Energiewende in Stuttgart 2020; 2050 
Übersicht der Ergebnisse der Abstimmungsgespräche zum 
Energiekonzept der Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart 
2020; 2050 
VEK 2030. Das Verkehrsentwicklungskonzept der Landeshauptstadt 
Stuttgart 
 
Nahverkehrsplan Stuttgart. 2. Fortschreibung 2016 - 2021 
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Zeitstufenliste Wohnen 2014 - Fortschreibung Potenziale für den 
Wohnungsbau in Stuttgart 
published 
2015 
SIM Stuttgarter Innenentwicklungsmodell. Perspektiven und 
baulandpolitische Grundsätze für eine sozial ausgewogene und  
qualitätsorientierte Stadtentwicklung 
 
SIM Stuttgarter Innenentwicklungsmodell Baulandpolitische Grundsätze published 
2017 
Ziele und Aufgaben der Arbeitsförderung (Website, downloaded 
22/07/2017) 
 
Stuttgarter Partnerschaft Eine Welt (Website, downloaded 24/07/2017) 
 
Zehn Ziele der Partnerschaft ("Eine Welt") (Website, downloaded 
24/07/2017) 
 
Gründung der Partnerschaft ("Eine Welt") (Website, downloaded 
24/07/2017) 
 
Bündnis für Integration (Website, downloaded 24/07/2017) 
 
Integration - der Stuttgarter Weg (Website, downloaded 24/07/2017) 
 
Integrationspolitik (Website, downloaded 24/07/2017) 
 
Lärmaktionsplan der Landeshauptstadt Stuttgart. Fortschreibung 2015 
mit Ergebnissen der Lärmkartierung 2012  
published 
2015 
Vision Lärmschutz Stuttgart 2030 
 
Klimaanpassungskonzept Stuttgart KLIMAKS  published 
2012 








Konzeption Kinderfreundliches Stuttgart 2015 bis 2020 2015-2020 
Soziale Entwicklungsperspektiven für die Stadtgesellschaft - 
Infrastruktur im Wandel (Website, downloaded 25/07/2017) 
 
Strategische Gesundheitsförderung und Kommunale 
Gesundheitskonferenz in Stuttgart (Website, downloaded 28/07/2017) 
 
Gesundheitsberichterstattung (Website, downloaded 28/07/2017) 
 
Instruments of consultation and engagement 




Haushalt und Bürgerhaushalt 2017 
 




Salz & Suppe. Stuttgart im Dialog. Projektinfo Salz & Suppe 
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C) Consent form 
School of Sociology and Social Policy 
University of Nottingham 
Participant Consent Form 
Project: A tale of two cities – justice and sustainability in Nottingham and Stuttgart 
(working title) 
Researcher’s name: Hannah Keding 
Supervisors’ names: Reiner Grundmann, Jenni Cauvain, Paul Nathanail 
In signing this consent form I confirm that: 
 I have read the Participant Information Sheet and the nature and purpose 
of the research project has been explained to me. 
 I have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 I understand the purpose of the research project and my involvement in 
it. 
 I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I may decide not 
to continue at any stage, without providing reason and this would not 
disadvantage me in any way. I understand that participation is unlikely to 
be of direct benefit to me. 
 Interviewees will not be named. Where participants could be readily 
identified, identifying information will not be disclosed to preserve their 
anonymity. Anonymous and not anonymous quotes – the latter only if 
agreed to below – will be used in reports/publications. Interviewees will 
have the opportunity to approve any anonymous and not anonymous 
quotes prior to publication. 
 I understand that the interview will be recorded using electronic voice 
recorder. 
 I understand that data will be securely stored.  
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 I understand that the information provided can be used in other research 
projects which have according ethics approval. In these cases, where 
participants could be readily identified, identifying information will not be 
disclosed to preserve their anonymity. Equally, quotes will be handled as 
specified above.  
 I understand that I may contact the researcher if I require further 
information about the research, and that I may contact the Research 
Ethics Officer of the School of Sociology and Social Policy, University of 
Nottingham, if I wish to make a complaint relating to my involvement in 
the research. 
 I agree to take part in the above research project.   
 I agree that extracts from the interview may be anonymously quoted in 
any report or publication arising from the research. 
Please tick boxes if applicable:  
☐ I would like to approve any anonymous quotes in draft copies of publications 
with respect to whether these might reveal my identity. 
☐ I agree that extracts from the interview may be not anonymously quoted 
(referring to my full name) in any report or publication arising from the research. 
☐ I would like to approve any not anonymous quotes in according draft copies of 
publications. 
☐ I would like to be sent a copy of my interview transcript in order to review in 
terms of accuracy, correcting errors, and providing clarifications. 
____________________     ____________________     ____________________ 
     Participant’s name            Participant’s signature                     Date 
____________________     ____________________     ____________________ 
     Researcher’s name           Researcher’s signature                      Date 
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D) Interview guideline 
Policy process 
 (How) are you involved in the formulation of policy objectives in Nottingham (unitary 
authority)? 
 Which actors or groups are involved in formulating the city’s policy objectives? 
o Which should maybe be involved but are not currently? 
 How are these actors or groups involved in formulating the city’s policy objectives? 
o How are economic actors involved in the process? 
 What are main influences on the city’s policy objectives? 
Policy objectives 
 In your view, how do policy objectives in Nottingham account for social justice? 
o Is economic inequality a justice issue? 
 In your opinion, how do policy objectives in Nottingham account for future generations?  
Policy approaches 
 What would be your priorities to be tackled in Nottingham? 
 What role does evidence play in the formulation of city policies? 
Future generations 
 Looking into the future, how do you think will the city develop and what will this mean 
for its citizens? 
 What role does economic growth have for the future? 
Political and economic spheres 
 How far do political decision making processes comply with the interests of the local 
economy? 
 How far does the local economy rely on continuously favourable location conditions?  
Governance 
 What leeway do the city and its citizens have in shaping the city’s future? 
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 What is the significance of municipal strategies and plans?  
Ending questions 
 Is there anything else you would like to say? 
 Is there anyone you think I should talk to about these issues? 
